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ABSTRACT
Using a geographic framework, this dissertation explores how Algerian
immigrants and their descendants perform identity and negotiate belonging in French
society. Bringing together critical theorizations of race, identity, space, and place, this
work investigates what it means to be a racialized minority in a postcolonial context and
to learn and experience the boundaries of ‘Frenchness.’ It is based on the narratives of
Algerian immigrants who have migrated to Paris, France, and their French-born children.
The empirical evidence of the case studies highlights the myriad ways in which Algerian
immigrants and their descendants encounter and structure their interactions with French
society, and the many geographic contexts that influence where these interactions unfold.
By highlighting the postcolonial influence, this dissertation situates integration in a
broader historical and geographical context, examining how ‘belonging’ becomes a
matter of contention in receiving contexts marked by post-colonial anxiety. The
objective of this research is to understand integration not as an organic process of
adaptation, but as a form of politics that plays out in the spaces of everyday life. This
research moves beyond traditional preoccupations with immigrant clustering to consider
the less visible ways that migrants move in and out of spaces, accommodating or
subverting dominant norms and finding or creating spaces of belonging for themselves.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“I do not label myself in the same way in all situations. For example, I would
insist on my Algerian roots if I am in a French context for three reasons. First,
because I know that racism and contempt are very important in France and I want
people to associate my academic and professional success with my [Algerian]
roots. Second, because I know that the French nation that I admire (the 1960s
France, where culture and republicanism were very important) is mythical and
does not exist anymore—therefore I consider myself French in the sense that I
want to belong to the community of philosophers and writers, but not in the sense
that I have a common interest with all of my compatriots. Let’s say that I feel
“Frenchness” as an esthetic demand, never reachable, and as a consequence, I
prefer to modestly highlight my Algerian origins. Third, because since my
father’s death, I feel like I am required not to forget him and his [Algerian]
origins.”
- Abdel, 25-year-old son of Algerian immigrants

Abdel’s narrative about identity and belonging illustrates the complicated reality
of identity and the tangled relationships that migrants and their children have with places.
Abdel’s sense of self is bound up with multiple places and with the difficult histories that
bind them together. Migrants are often described as living between two different worlds,
but in this case, the ‘worlds’ in question are not entirely separate. France and Algeria are
not simply connected; rather, they have come to define each other over the course of
nearly two centuries. In articulating who he is and where he is, Abdel refers to the
‘mythical aspect’ of French republicanism, the persistence of racism in French society,
and a familial loyalty to Algeria. We can see in his statement some of the ways that
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people of Algerian origin engage with identity categories and find a sense of belonging in
a sometimes-hostile context. In this example, Abdel mentions membership in different
communities and polities, recognizing the terms and conditions associated with each. He
outlines the boundaries of identities and communities, but then moves between them and
muddles them.
This dissertation focuses on Algerian-origin communities in France, examining
how integration occurs in receiving contexts marked by anxiety and hostility toward
immigrants. Integration is a key concept in the social sciences, and it frequently appears
as a ‘problem’ to be solved by policy interventions. Since the early 20th century, the
concept of integration has referred to a process of adaptation, adjustment, and
acculturation, whereby immigrants become part of ‘mainstream,’ national society
(Castles, et. al, 2014). The concept of integration (more commonly referred to as
‘assimilation’ in U.S. literature) suggests that immigrants are absorbed into a host-society
over successive generations in ways that render their behavioral patterns and identities
indistinguishable from the majority group (Alba and Nee, 2003). The fundamental
concern of scholarly and political discourse on integration has been the extent to which
immigrants are ‘succeeding’ in disappearing as distinct socio-cultural entities—as ethnic
colonies or clusters. This ‘success’ has typically been assessed and measured vis-à-vis
indicators such as educational attainment, language acquisition, employment,
intermarriage, naturalization, civic participation, and residential location (Crenshaw et al.,
1996; Nagel, 2009).
Scholars have often misrepresented integration scholarship as supposing an
inevitable march toward societal homogeneity. In fact, canonical accounts of integration
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have often described the process of integration as multidimensional and incomplete,
whereby a group can be incorporated into the mainstream in certain respects and to
certain degrees, but not others (Gordon, 1964). But even the most subtle analyses take as
given that there is an endpoint of integration, however difficult it is to achieve. This
endpoint is absorption into a national host society, the boundaries of which are clearly
defined and relatively static. This acceptance of a national host society as a natural unit of
analysis has been heavily critiqued, and critics have often accused integration scholarship
of playing into nationalist-assimilationist ideologies. In response, scholars in recent
decades have sought to separate integration research from a political agenda of enforcing
conformity among immigrants to a national norm (Alba and Nee, 2003). Yet the effort to
measure migrants against a benchmark of ‘mainstream’ society is inevitably freighted
with ideological meanings and assumptions.
In France, discussions of integration have revolved around the notion of ‘failure’
of immigrants from North Africa (and their descendants) to assimilate into French society
(Silverman, 1992). This interpretation of failed assimilation effectively places Algerianorigin individuals—even those who are French citizens and born in France—as ‘internal
outsiders’ (Costelloe, 2015; Driggers, 2018). In discussing ‘failed’ integration, most
commentators and politicians put the blame on people of Algerian descent—failed
integration, in other words, is a matter of the unwillingness of Algerian-origin people to
shed their ‘homeland’ identities, particularly religious (i.e., Muslim) identities. In this
sense, France’s assimilation discourse revolves less around the “spread of French
customs” than on “the rejection of the cultural values and practices of migrants”
(Sánchez, 2019, p. 1).
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My work builds on the foundation laid by French critical scholarship on
postcolonialism and migration. This includes Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and
Sandrine Lemaire’s (2005) analysis of the contemporary extensions of colonial
representation and the mechanisms that structure the relationship between colonized and
colonizer. Their work describes the socio-spatial exclusion of postcolonial immigrants in
France in terms of “a historical amalgamation of conscious and unconscious
administrative and social practices that have been at work since the process of colonial
independence got underway…and that are to be found in migration and urban policies in
[modern] France” (2005, p. 2). French scholar Silyane Larcher’s (2015) work furthers
this understanding of the ‘conscious and unconscious’ aspects of French society by
directly addressing the power relations and social outcomes involved in systemic racism
in France, tying the “racial issue” to French colonial history (p. 213). Abdellali Hajjat’s
(2012) work identifies Islam to “constitute so many borders to the so-called ‘national
identity’” (p. 1). These perspectives from French scholarship highlight the myriad
connections between immigration, ‘race,’ postcoloniality, and integration within modern
thought.
This dissertation elaborates on existing critiques of integration scholarship, but it
also attempts to salvage the concept and to offer a critical reading of integration that
focuses equally on dominant and subordinate groups and their mutual, if somewhat
antagonistic, production of ‘integration.’ I am concerned, first, with how dominant
groups understand their own cultural values and the cultural values of racialized others.
Focusing on the case of France, this dissertation scrutinizes the subjective judgments
hidden beneath universalistic republican language and examines the structural
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impediments and unrealistic expectations imposed upon immigrant groups. ‘French
society,’ I will demonstrate, is a product of constant gatekeeping on the part of dominant
groups—gatekeeping that politically and socially marginalizes and excludes immigrant
groups. Second, the critical approach developed in this dissertation sheds light on
immigrants themselves and their experiences of exclusion or partial inclusion. It asks
how they and their descendants engage with the social constructs created by dominant
groups—how they might conform to them or subvert them. This perspective overall
views integration not as mere adaptation, but as a political relationship that works
through discourses of difference and practices of social subordination. The focus of
attention becomes the constant reconfiguration and negotiation of group identities across
historical and present-day contexts and spaces. The politics of integration involves the
policing, production, and re-working of socio-spatial boundaries to include certain types
of people, but not others, within the national community.
This research thus asks: How do Algerian immigrants and their children enact
identity and belonging in French society? How do they navigate systems of racialized
exclusion within the context of a postcolonial history and society? What are the
particular fields of political discourse and practice that become meaningful to
integration politics in republican France? How do different groups of people imprint
their identities on urban space and experience belonging and exclusion through urban
space?
How, in short, do we situate integration in the realm of the political?
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Contexts of Belonging in Contemporary France
A key argument of this dissertation is that the politics of integration in France and
in other former metropole societies must be situated in a historical context of European
imperialism. Though France officially ended its imperial rule over Algeria in 1962, the
notion of ‘empire’ remains indelibly imprinted on relationships between France and its
Algerian-origin communities. These (post)colonial relationships are not static but are
constantly evolving. In Algeria, for instance, postcolonial political instability encouraged
the rise of an Islamist political movement which, in turn, led to French intervention and a
deepening of hostilities toward France. France, in turn, experienced its own ‘imperial
hangover’ with the migration of hundreds of thousands of former colonial subjects to the
former metropole (along with hundreds of thousands of European colonists, known as
pied noirs) in the two decades after Algerian independence. In 2018, France was home to
over 6.5 million immigrants, equal to 9.7 percent of the population, and many politicians
(including those aligned with the far right) perceive immigration to be an intractable
problem (INSEE, 2020; Benaissa, 2021).
In France, immigration has been perennially politicized through highly publicized
events like the ‘headscarf affair’ of the late 1980s, the ‘Sans-Papiers’ case in 1996, the
2005 uprisings by immigrant youth against the police that struck major French cities, the
renewal of the headscarf debates in the early 2000s, the Charlie Hebdo and Paris attacks
in 2015, the Nice Bastille Day attack in 2016, the Strasbourg Christmas market attack in
2018, the Lyon bombing in May 2019, and, most recently, the 2020 beheading of a
teacher who showed cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in a suburb north of Paris
(Gatehouse, 2018; Williamson, 2020; Onishi and Méheut, 2020).
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The problem of terrorism in France is real. Since the beginning of 2015, there
have been 36 incidents of terrorism on French soil, totaling 252 killed and 943 wounded
(Gatehouse, 2018; Breeden, 2019; Onishi and Méheut, 2020; Erlanger, 2020). But these
recent dramatic events have allowed the French state to continue its framing of
immigration as a cultural problem; terrorism, along with the appearance of the headscarf
(treated as an epiphenomenon of Islamic radicalism), have come to signify the failure of
immigrants to embrace French values. Postcolonial immigrants thus have come to
symbolize the ultimate figure of strangeness and alterity—the Other who does not belong
and who is a threat to national cohesion. Tellingly, the French-born children of Maghrebi
immigrants are “still routinely (and unrealistically) imagined as ‘first’ generation”
(Rosello, 2001, p. 89). To be sure, plenty of attention is given to the material conditions
of Maghrebian immigrants and their families and the poor living conditions found in the
immigrant-dominated banlieues1; yet this attention serves to reinforce the main narrative
of immigrant deviance, rather than to compel a deeper reckoning with high
unemployment, economic insecurity, social exclusion, and persistent discrimination in
the labor market.
The French government and society continuously draw “a line between ‘them’
and ‘us’: that is, between those they deem unworthy of, or unable to access, ‘Frenchness,’
and those who are seen as properly ‘French’ and ‘Republican’” (Tchumkam, 2015, p. 1).
These practices of social bordering are inflected with republican concepts and
sensibilities. French republicanism is against separation of people based on their social,

The term ‘banlieue’ can be directly translated to ‘suburb’ in English. However, the term
in French holds very heavy connotations of poverty, crime, immigration, and violence. A
more appropriate interpretation of the term is ‘immigrant ghetto.’
1
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political, and intellectual views. Further, republican ideology posits that “living together
in a society requires agreement on basic values” such that “citizens must all subscribe to
the same values in the public sphere” (Bowen, 2007, pp. 11, 157). Public space,
therefore, is shared space, where general interests and common ideals are valued over and
above individual interests and diversity—an interpretation that places clear constraints on
acceptable conduct and expression within that space (Bowen, 2007).
The French concept of secularism, laïcité, has been especially important in
constructing Frenchness and in creating a public sphere (and public spaces) that exclude
people of Algerian origin. Laïcité is “a curious term with no satisfactory English
translation…a relative neologism in the French language” that has emerged from
centuries of contestation between the French state and organized religions (Lizotte, 2020,
p. 1). This form of secularism is commonly explained as a principle of the republican
social pact, and it continues to be a consistent object of political struggle (Bowen, 2007;
Roy, 2007; Thomas, 2006; Lizotte, 2020; Selby, 2011; Benaissa, 2021).
Understood broadly, laïcité refers to the state’s respect for the liberty of
conscience and the non-interference of the state in religious matters. While it speaks to
neutrality, it also insists on the creation and separation between public and private
spheres. In recent decades, the concept has been used as a tool to discipline and punish
people of immigrant origin who are visibly pious. This was seen most notably with the
2004 ban on the hijab in public schools. More recently, in the wake of a terror attack,
laïcité was again invoked to signal France’s “renewed fight against radicalism and
challenges to the nation’s secular ideals” (Onishi and Méheut, 2020, p. 1). The French
state, then, places Muslims and Islam at the center of its national self-ideation via laïcité.

8

It becomes crucial in this context to place religion alongside race, class, and gender in
exploring the experiences of Algerian-origin people in France, regardless of individuals’
actual level of religiosity (Lalonde, 2018).
While this context of colonialism, postcolonial immigration, and secularist
republican ideology is crucial to understanding the politics of integration in France, there
is also a need to look beyond the colonial and postcolonial drama to consider how
immigrants themselves, in their day-to-day lives, negotiate membership in France, as well
as in Algeria. The narratives of my research participants that I present in this dissertation
provide insights into the socio-spatial practices whereby immigrants and their children
conform with, challenge, re-work, or undermine French identities and attempt to shape
and reshape the meaning of ‘Algerian’ in France. This dissertation examines how people
of immigrant origin participate in the politics of integration—how they interpret culture
and place and how they assert belonging and membership through their place-based
behaviors and interactions. This dissertation goes well beyond traditional preoccupations
with immigrant residential ‘clustering’ to explore the meanings that people find within
certain places and how their movements through these places becomes part of their
performance of membership and belonging.
About the Study
To investigate the research questions for this dissertation, I conducted intensive
interviews with members of the Algerian-origin community in Paris. For the purposes of
this research, Algerian-origin communities include first-generation immigrants from
Algeria and their children born either in Algeria or in France (second-generation). At
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times, I refer in general terms to the ‘Algerian community,’ but it is important to
emphasize the generational, ethno-linguistic, and class differences within this group.
The French state does not officially collect census data according to ‘race’ or
religion owing to the republican commitment to universalism and its aversion to
‘communalism’—an aversion that stems partly from the Vichy regime’s registration of
Jews during World War II (Hargreaves, 1995). But the state does collect information by
place of birth. According to the Institut national d'études démographiques (The National
Institute for Demographic Studies, INED), there were 845,000 Algerian immigrants in
France in 2018 (INED, 2020). Algerians represent the largest immigrant population in
France, totaling 13 percent of all immigrants in France (the second largest group of
immigrants is from Morocco with 11.9 percent) (INED, 2020). In 2011, there were an
estimated 4.6 million people of Maghrebi origin (with at least one Maghrebi grandparent
from Algeria, Morocco, or Tunisia) living in France (up from an estimated 3 million in
1999) (Tribalat, 2015, pp. 1-2). Between 2006 and 2008, an estimated 16 percent of
newborns in France had at least one Maghrebi grandparent (Breuil-Genier, Borrel, and
Lhommeau, 2011, p. 33). This population is not evenly distributed across the country. As
in many immigrant-receiving societies, Maghrebi immigrants and their children are
highly concentrated in certain districts within certain cities. In 2005, Maghrebi-origin
young people under the age of 18 constituted about 7 percent of the population of
Metropolitan France, 12 percent in Île-de-France, 22 percent in the department of SeineSaint-Denis, and 37 percent in 18th arrondissement of Paris (Tribalat, 2009, p. 436).
While the site of Paris and the surrounding area provided ample access to a population of
Algerian immigrants and their descendants, I chose the site of Paris because I had
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established connections with respected members of the Algerian community during a
previous stay in Paris (unrelated to this research).
I conducted formal, semi-structured interviews in the summers of 2016 and 2017
with members of the Algerian-origin community from a variety of class backgrounds,
ethnicities (i.e., Arab and Berber), generations, and cohort groups. As detailed in Chapter
Three, I used snowball recruitment to build a pool of 73 research participants. I had
informal conversations with many others, as interviews were conducted in homes, cafes,
restaurants, and other social spaces where friends and family members of my
interviewees were often present. I used a series of semi-structured questions to uncover
how immigrants and their children articulate their identities, how they describe their
family history, how they position themselves in social categories, how they interpret and
interact with different ‘communities,’ and how they go about their daily business in the
spaces of Paris. My goal was to reveal the linkages between identity and everyday sociospatial activities and behaviors, and to explore how people draw upon both historical and
present-day experiences to articulate their sense of membership and belonging.
In some respects, this use of qualitative methods represents a return to the earliest
years of ‘assimilation’ scholarship, when Chicago School scholars, many of them
immigrants or the children of immigrants themselves, conducted in-depth, ethnographic
studies of immigrant families and communities. This dissertation has sought to capture
the richness of those early studies while interpreting empirical findings in a critical
framework that interrogates the constant production of meanings around race, nationality,
religion, and other modes of social belonging and exclusion. This dissertation has also
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sought to engage more explicitly with place and space and to consider how immigrants
and their children engage with different kinds of spaces in the course of everyday life.
The Arguments
While the overarching categories of ‘immigrant’ and ‘Algerian’ are very
meaningful to my study respondents, my respondents are not a homogeneous group either
in terms of their backgrounds or in terms of the ways they articulate their identities and
relate to specific socio-spatial contexts. In their varying engagements with discourses and
forms of belonging and exclusion, they both reinforce and blur the central FrenchAlgerian binary. Their social geographies—the places they frequent and avoid, their
perceptions of and attitudes toward different places and the people in them—reflect their
different understandings of belonging and exclusion, self and other.
While my aim is to capture a range of behaviors, identities, and experiences, I do
identify some patterns and similarities in the responses, and I do attempt to draw some
linkages between generation, legal and class/educational status, and identities, attitudes,
and actions. These are always tentative, and I make no deterministic claims about cause
and effect. The analysis of my empirical findings points to the following
conceptual/theoretical points:
(1) My respondents learn what it means to be ‘French’ and ‘Algerian’ through
everyday actions and encounters; ‘integration’ for them involves negotiating a
social position vis-à-vis Frenchness and Algerianness. This negotiation involves a
creative interplay of identity whereby respondents qualify, reformulate, subvert,
discard, and/or rework identities and the meanings attached to them. Practices of
being French and/or Algerian both reinforce and destabilize these categories.
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Respondents draw upon stereotypes and essentialized notions of ‘community,’ but
they can also view themselves in more hybrid terms or position themselves in the
interstices of these broad categories. This finding, in the first instance, indicates
the need to interrogate and take apart the two key social units—immigrant group
and host society—that are at the core of most research on immigrant integration.
(2) The politics of integration are rooted in historical dynamics, but the meaning and
relevance of ‘history’ changes. This dissertation shows how colonial memory and
postcolonial dynamics permeate the everyday lives and encounters of Algerianorigin people in France and inform the ways they conceive of, and experience,
social membership and belonging. Entering the national community of France
requires mastery of the attributes, habits, dispositions, and mores of French
society and culture, as defined by the French political elite. Some of my
respondents are able, willing, and even desirous to do this; for some, being
‘French’ comes somewhat ‘naturally.’ But for others, French ‘culture’ is a
constant affront, one that they might resist (for instance, by creating alternative
spaces of community), even as they conform to its strictures in certain contexts.
This analysis highlights the political, rather than simply adaptational, nature of
integration. Integration does not have any clear trajectory or end point; instead, it
continuously unfolds, altering the significance of historical relationships.
(3) Religion and citizenship are two key social fields in which my respondents
negotiate belonging. Religion is not a black-and-white condition: people practice
faith in various ways, and they may also reject spiritual belief while treating
religion as a cultural identity. Likewise, citizenship is not a simple matter of being
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‘legal’ or ‘illegal’: citizenship involves a whole range of claims about rights,
obligation, loyalty, and membership vis-à-vis one, two, or more polities. This
dissertation explores how Algerian-origin people engage with these social fields
and how they imagine and practice integration in relation to them. The findings
show how French secularist ideology (laïcité) is meant to privatize religion, yet,
in fact, it politicizes religion by making it the object of public discussion and
deliberation. The findings also highlight how people conceive of citizenship as
encompassing different dimensions, and how this dimensionality allows people to
conceive of themselves as at least partial members of two (or more) polities.
(4) Traditional discussions of integration have usually fixated on residential patterns
(in both academic and political arenas). In contrast, I argue for a more fluid
approach to identity and place. While there are certainly immigrant ‘clusters’ in
Paris and the surrounding area, not all immigrants live in these clusters, and the
existence of these clusters must be viewed in a broader metropolitan context of
social/class/racial difference and inequality. Immigrant neighborhoods in the
Parisian suburbs are an important touchpoint for discussions of identity and social
membership, but my respondents have relationships with many different kinds of
places, and they move in and out of places over the course of the day or week.
Rather than emphasizing the singular importance of the banlieues as an
‘immigrant’ space and/or a space of non-integration, this dissertation explores the
multiple meanings attached to the banlieues and the very different ways that study
respondents relate to the city overall. The point here is that the politics of
integration unfold across city spaces and involve sometimes subtle adjustments in
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comportment to establish sameness (or to avoid being seen as different).
Integration involves intentional responses to places and the meanings embedded,
whether through avoidance or through the practice of appropriate behaviors.
This research overall suggests that integration is less a pathway of adaptation than a
politics of negotiating identities, membership, and belonging in place. It advocates a
more critical approach that understands integration “not only as a pattern of sameness but
as a relational process of making sameness” (Nagel, 2009, p. 401). For people of
Algerian origin in France, this politics is shaped by present-day experiences and by the
colonial past; it relies upon stark binaries of identity and difference, but it also disrupts
these binaries, creating new openings and new closures that can be seen and felt within
neighborhoods and across Paris. Algerian-origin individuals have little choice but to
define who they are in relation to the unmarked French polity; in this sense, they are
subordinate participants in a contentious co-production of difference and sameness—a
process through which the boundaries of self and other are defined and redefined. Still,
we cannot dismiss the agency they exercise in positioning themselves within social
categories and the ‘communities’ they represent.
This study is geographical at different levels: it considers the complex
geographies of colonialism and the ways these geographies are still taking shape today; it
highlights the importance of spatial isolation and exclusion in the formation of identities
and experiences, but it also emphasizes people’s movements through space and their
negotiations of place-based identities. This work also touches on the significance of
people’s transnational connections with Algeria, emphasizing that such relationships can
be just as ambiguous as people’s relationships with France.
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Organization of this Dissertation
I begin this dissertation by creating a conceptual framework for integration that
moves away from traditional, ecological conceptions of adaptation. My framework,
presented in Chapter Two, critically engages with mainstream literature on integration
and builds an alternative understanding of integration by drawing upon postcolonial and
critical race theory, theories of identity and belonging, and critical-geographical
theorizations of space and place. This review of the literature shapes the theoretical
framework that guides the analysis of this empirical research.
An overview of the methodology of this research is presented in Chapter Three.
This chapter outlines the qualitative methods used to gather and analyze the data
collected during fieldwork including the methods used to identify and recruit study
participants and conduct interviews. This chapter also deals with researcher reflexivity
and power dynamics involved in interview data collection, and how these relationships
can influence qualitative data collection and analysis.
Chapter Four focuses on the historical relationship between France and Algeria
and the ways this relationship continues to shape the lives of Algerian-origin people in
France. This chapter explains how French imperialism, despite its sense of engaging in a
so-called ‘civilizing mission,’ conceived of the indigenous Algerian population as
fundamentally incapable of being French. This chapter traces the experience and
development of immigration of Algerians to France and their social, political, and spatial
marginalization in French society.
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven draw on interviews to investigate the ways that
Algerians in France articulate their identities, conceptualize belonging, and interact with
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the spaces and places of Paris, France. Chapter Five begins by analyzing immigrant
identities, as they function along prescriptions of ‘Frenchness’ and ‘Algerianness.’ Here,
I pay special attention to the postcolonial aspect of Algerian identity via iterations of
oppression, revolution, and victory. Chapter Six examines how the French state, and my
respondents articulate belonging through religion and citizenship, and how my
respondents’ identities and actions both support and subvert secularism and republican
models of citizenship. This chapter explores the connection between present day
discourses of membership and the colonial past, while also showing how my
respondents’ identities and social practices are formed in relation to present-day
experiences. Finally, Chapter Seven expands the analysis by observing a wide range of
social behaviors and interactions in spaces and places, and how they tie into the
integration experiences of Algerians in France. This chapter shows the connectedness of
urban space to performances of identity and citizenship practices. I highlight how some
of my participants view the banlieues as spaces of comfort and cultural authenticity,
while others view them as undesirable spaces or even spaces of foreignness; I also
highlight how my respondents variably seek out, avoid, or modify their behavior in
French-coded public spaces.
A concluding chapter summarizes these arguments and draws out main lessons
from this study for our understandings of identities, integration, and the geographies of
immigrant incorporation into host-society contexts. Together, these chapters argue that
immigrant integration is constituted through everyday practices and is connected to
contentious histories of nation- and empire-building. For Algerian-origin individuals in
France, the immigrant experience cannot be disentangled from France’s colonization of
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Algeria. But the significance of the colonial experience varies across the Algerian-origin
community. The postcolonial legacy, in other words, is not monolithic or static.
Intersectional analysis provides a helpful framework for considering differences that exist
within Algerian-origin communities, though my analysis indicates that relationships
between class, generation, religiosity, and other axes of difference are not entirely
straightforward. Integration, as I explain it, is heterogeneous and contingent upon the
varied situations and standpoints—it is not a measurable or coherent set of actions.
Individuals of Algerian descent are practicing ‘integration’ in France through their dayto-day actions and in their encounters and interactions with different people and places.
The concluding chapter of this dissertation draws out the main lessons from this research
for our understandings of identities, belonging, integration, and it looks forward to the
ways that geographers can continue to change the terms of debate about the ‘problem’ of
immigrant integration.

18

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This research analyzes integration politics in France and notions of identity,
belonging, and place among Algerian-origin people in France. While traditional
approaches to immigrant incorporation—that is, how newcomers become more like a preexisting ‘host-society’—address some of the parameters of immigrant integration, they
do not adequately consider the constant production (and re-production) of the hostsociety and of immigrant ‘minorities.’ I argue that the categories of host-society and
immigrant group cannot be taken as givens. Rather, they are constantly in the process of
being created. This work advances this dynamic approach to the formation of social
categories in geographically complex contexts that include (but are not limited to) the
receiving society and the sending society. I approach assimilation and integration as
processes of negotiation between dominant and subordinate groups that involve the reworking of socio-spatial boundaries to include certain types of people, but not others,
within the national community. Thus, the parameters of immigrant incorporation are
defined by acts of differentiation that marginalize and exclude certain individuals while
including others.
Algerian immigrants and their descendants living in France occupy multiple
socio-political positions that are rooted in multiple historical and geographic contexts.
Discourses and hierarchies relating to immigration, (post)colonial relationships, and race
circulate through and structure individuals’ everyday experiences in France. Questions of
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integration, identity, and belonging intersect constantly with postcolonial and racial
discourses. Rather than following a single trajectory of integration, Algerian immigrants
and their descendants negotiate diverse and shifting conceptions of social membership
and belonging in France. This dissertation presents a discussion of the varying discourses
of national belonging that circulate in French society, the spatial and institutional settings
in which people encounter these discourses, and the ways in which diverse, intersectional
experiences shape people’s understandings and expressions of identity and belonging.
The discussion aims to expand ideas of what happens when ‘foreigners’ join a ‘national
society’ by focusing on the formulation and reformulation of societal membership.
Academic studies of immigrant incorporation implicitly focus on the moment of
encounter between host-society and arriving newcomer and follow the trajectory of
immigrant incorporation from the point of arrival. But the postcolonial relationship
between France and Algeria requires that any treatment of immigrant incorporation must
begin long before the moment of encounter and must consider the fraught colonial
relationship between the two countries. The French colonization of Algeria (discussed in
detail in Chapter Four) means that Algerian immigrants and their descendants speak the
French language and recognize French cultural habits and norms. But many Algerianorigin people also are marked for exclusion by their association with Islam, their use of
Arabic and Berber languages, and their visible, racialized difference. Algerian
immigrants and their children thus experience belonging and exclusion in complex ways;
there is no single trajectory or path by which they ‘become French.’ Concepts of
adaptation and acculturation are not to be entirely dismissed, but they must be viewed in

20

light of conflict and acts of accommodation between politically dominant and subordinate
groups.
This literature review begins with an overview of mainstream assimilation and
integration scholarship before turning to the more critical perspectives on intergroup
dynamics offered by critical race theory and postcolonial studies. This literature review
then turns to theories of identity and belonging, and of the ways ‘community’ is
constituted within particular sites of encounter and experience. The key arguments that I
wish to develop are: (1) that the dynamics of belonging unfold across a long temporal
scale, not just in the immediate context of immigration or over a set number of
generations; (2) that belonging is a political construct and not the endpoint of an
ecological process of adaptation; and (3) that belonging is a fundamentally spatial process
that operates translocally, connecting streets, neighborhoods, towns, cities, regions, and
nation-states in an uneven landscape of personal and collective experiences.
Integration, Assimilation, and Transnational Theory
Studies of immigrant experiences often begin with conceptions of ‘integration’ or
‘assimilation’, and scholars across the social sciences routinely use these terms to
describe and make sense of immigrants’ lives and experiences. While there has been
much formal theorization of these terms, scholarly works can also make reference to
assimilation and integration (or ‘incorporation’) in an off-handed or ‘commonsense’ way.
Therefore, it is important to consider explicitly how the framework of
assimilation/integration has shaped the way we think and talk about immigrants.
The concept of integration, or assimilation, as devised by American sociologists
and geographers starting in the early 20th century, has been conceived as a “process of
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interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories,
sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups” with the outcome being their
incorporation into a “common cultural life” (Park and Burgess, 1921, p. 735). Integration
theories were originally developed through observations of European immigrant
settlement in the United States, though they borrowed from theories of urbanization and
modernization developed by Georg Simmel and other, mainly German, scholars. In these
studies, integration2 involves the process by which immigrants become part of the
‘mainstream’ of modern, urbanized American culture. This body of theory was pioneered
by members of the Chicago School of Sociology, namely Robert Park and Ernest
Burgess, who argued that there was a universally identifiable cycle of ‘race relations’ that
immigrants passed through on their way to incorporation into an implicitly national
‘mainstream.’ While initial contact through immigration or conquest might lead to
violence and domination, dominant and subordinate groups would learn to coexist over
time, with the smaller or weaker group adopting the language and customs of the larger
group.
The work of the Chicago School also outlined specific obstacles to assimilation,
notably, racial prejudice and discrimination—and described assimilation as a process
laden with conflict, especially between generations of immigrants. But despite
recognizing such conflict, classic assimilation theory posited that immigrants and
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The terms integration and assimilation have been used and criticized in academic and
public discourses. Integration is often viewed as a less-aggressive form of assimilation
where an immigrant is incorporated into the host society without forced cultural
homogenization, whereas assimilation demands immigrant sameness with the host
society by abandoning cultural traits from the home-country. In this dissertation, I treat
the concepts similarly as they are concerned with the extent to which immigrants come to
resemble society at large.
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majority groups would eventually converge and become more similar over time in mores,
norms, characteristics, and behaviors (Brown and Bean, 2006). In short, immigrants
residing in the host society for longer periods of time as well as members of later
generations would, as a matter of course, exhibit more similarities with the majority
group than newer arrivals (Brown and Bean, 2006).
Assimilation “refers, above all, to long-term processes that have whittled away at
the social foundations for ethnic distinctions” (Alba, 1995, p. 4). But this is not to say that
scholars have not recognized a more heterogeneous set of outcomes. In the early 1960s,
sociologist Milton Gordon advanced assimilation theory by postulating several stages that
follow the acquisition of culture and language (Alba and Nee, 2003). Cultural
assimilation (also called acculturation), or the immigrant’s adoption of the language and
cultural patterns of the core group, is the first assimilation process to occur (Gordon,
1964). Acculturation, Gordon argued, was virtually inevitable; ideally it would be
followed by ‘structural assimilation,’ by which he meant acceptance into the host
society’s social sphere, including clubs and institutions. Structural assimilation would
involve close social relations with the host society, which would lead to large-scale
intermarriage, ethnic identification with the host society and finally the ending of
discrimination, prejudice, and value conflict (Gordon, 1964). But writing in the 1960s,
Gordon did not see structural assimilation on the horizon. In his work, he outlined that
the U.S. was a collection of three major subgroups—Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish.
Each of the three groups held similar ways of life, but they did so within their own social
milieu (Gordon, 1964). He also saw other subgroups—Black Americans, Puerto Ricans,
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and others—who had acculturated to Anglo-Protestant norms, but who formed distinctive
subcultures that were unlikely to fade over time.
Sociologist Herbert Gans (1992) further complicated the straight-line assimilation
model (i.e., ‘classic’ assimilation theory) with the ‘bumpy-line theory of ethnicity,’ which
posited that assimilation is dynamic, that each subsequent generation of immigrants faces
different and distinctive sets of difficulties relating to larger society, and that the
resolution to these difficulties creates a distinctive pattern of acculturation (Gans, 1992;
Alba and Nee, 1997). Gans (1992) also suggested a pattern of ‘second generation decline’
that challenged the ‘straight-line’ assimilation immigrant success story, whereby “a
significant number of the children of poor immigrants, especially dark-skinned ones,
might not obtain jobs in the mainstream economy” (p. 173). These children of
immigrants do not share their parents’ willingness to take low-wage, long hours, ‘ethnic
niche jobs,’ owing to a perceived change in their work and status expectations (as they
compare/equate themselves with the majority culture) (Gans, 1992). This is an example
of what Zhou (1997) later referred to as the ‘second generation revolt’ that involves the
oppositional culture of the children of immigrants who feel excluded from mainstream
society owing to institutional discrimination and segregation that leads to social isolation
and deprivation.
Sociologists Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou (1993) elaborated on Gans’ work,
describing assimilation as a segmented process shaped by ethnicity, race, and income.
Their segmented assimilation model explored differences among immigrants and status
hierarchies within the ‘host society.’ Portes and Zhou theorized segmented assimilation
as involving one of three outcomes: (1) increasing acculturation and parallel integration

24

into the white middle-class; (2) assimilation into the marginalized, non-white underclass;
or (3) rapid economic advancement explicitly tied to the preservation of the immigrant
community’s values and solidarity (1993, p. 82). Portes and Zhou connected these
different outcomes to varying levels of social capital (interpersonal relationships of
reciprocity and obligation within social groups that act as a resource for the group’s
members) and human capital (individuals’ skills and credentials) that played heavily into
the ‘assimilation outcome’ of migrants (1993). Segmented assimilation theorists have
been keen to identify factors that might hinder upward mobility of the second generation
(Portes and Zhou, 1993), and they have extended their analysis to understanding cultural
dynamics within families that can ease or prevent assimilation. This research overall
suggests that assimilation is not a unilinear path, rather, multiple adaptations are possible.
Mainstream integration approaches have been critiqued from many angles, but at
this point, I want to emphasize the near total focus of these approaches on the ‘hostsociety’ and its ability to absorb ‘foreigners.’ Even as recent iterations of assimilation
theory have offered a somewhat more complicated conception of the receiving context
(for instance, by recognizing racial and class hierarchies within it), assimilation theorists
have been overwhelmingly concerned with the ‘host society,’ treating it as a relatively
static, if expandable, entity (in contrast to immigrants, who undergo change3). One
important challenge to this host-society-centric view has come from the scholarship on
transnationalism, which emerged in the 1990s to bring attention to the transnational ties
that migrants maintain with their homelands. Whereas assimilation/integration
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Postcolonial studies critique this assumption—that colonists and settlers changed
colonized peoples but themselves remained unchanged by their interactions with
colonized people.
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scholarship has been predicated on the notion of long-term settlement and the severing of
ties between immigrants and their homelands, transnational theory suggests that
immigrants are no longer severing their ties with their places of origin and are instead
participating in dense ‘social fields’ that cross-cut boundaries. Guarnizo (1997) thus
describes ‘transmigrants’ as forming a “continuous transterritorial social
formation…evident in the incessant back and forth traveling and multidirectional
exchanges of material and intangible resources and symbols between” home and host
country (p. 281). This perspective shifts the focus of analysis from the host-society
(country) to the enmeshment of migrant networks within broader processes of economic
and cultural globalization (described sometimes as globalization ‘from above and below’)
(Smith and Guarnizo, 1998).
Scholars of transnationalism suggest that migrants may identify as members of
multiple societies (home/host-society) leading to multifaceted cultural outcomes (Basch
et al., 1994; Vertovec, 2001). Further, these scholars emphasize that those living in
transnational social fields experience and negotiate multiple forms of power located in
sending and host-society contexts (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004). For some,
transnationalism is a positive adaptation and form of resistance to oppressive economic
and political environments (Glick Schiller, et al., 1992). Because immigrant populations
often face new forms of poverty and racial oppression in host-societies, transnational
scholars explain that the maintenance of a bond to their homeland through frequent
communication, visits, and participation in hometown associations is a form of resistance
to those oppressions and a means of exercising agency rather than passively adapting to
conditions forced upon them.
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While transnationalism avoids the tendency of assimilation theory to fixate on the
absorption (or lack thereof) of immigrants into a monolithic national host society,
transnational ideas have also tended to reproduce some of the same problems as
assimilation theory, such as taking national identity (now including both the sending
society and the host society) as paramount in the lives of immigrants. Thus,
transnationalism perpetuates the assumption that immigrants are a priori members of
national groups (e.g., sending countries, homelands), and it takes national boundaries and
national identities for granted rather than making those the very categories as the object
of inquiry. So, rather than challenging the binary host-society/immigrant dichotomy that
has characterized mainstream approaches to assimilation and integration,
transnationalism offers an image of migrants as permanently having one foot in two
countries. Transnationalism thus does not depart entirely from the ‘old’ assimilation
narrative. (As I describe below, geographers have worked to overcome some of the
limitations of transnationalism by employing the concept of translocality, which decenters the nation-state and which highlights socio-spatial interconnectedness and
simultaneity (Greiner and Sakdapolrak, 2013; Brickell and Datta, 2011; Castree, 2004;
Verne, 2012)).
This dissertation recognizes the importance of nationalism and nation-states as
social-territorial entities in the lives of migrants and the places that receive migrants. But
‘national society’ (like all socio-spatial categories) is neither static nor fixed but contested
and always in the process of becoming. The idea of host societies and ethnic/minority
groups as cohesive cultural units must be interrogated rather than taken as a given. This
dissertation thus advocates a more critical approach that understands integration “not
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only as a pattern of sameness but as a relational process of making sameness” (Nagel,
2009, p. 401). Rather than a natural, taken-for-granted, and inevitable process of
immigrant adaptation that can be measured through a standardized set of indicators,
assimilation can be construed as an “uneven and contentious process by which
immigrants and host societies negotiate the boundaries of social membership” (Nagel,
2002, p. 982). To reiterate, the idea of ‘making sameness’ does not negate the importance
of national imaginaries, but it takes the on-going construction of these imaginaries in
particular contexts as the object of study (Leitner, 2012; Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2006).
This perspective shifts attention to the everyday, power-laden interactions through
which individuals and groups debate, contest, challenge, and accommodate what counts
as difference and sameness, especially as these become framed in terms of ‘race.’ While
traditional integration studies have recognized the existence and persistence of
discrimination and the continuation of racial identity and consciousness, they have
generally not focused on the racialized structure of societies or on the ways in which
dominant groups mark minority groups and their characteristics as racially proximate or
distant vis-à-vis ‘the nation.’ Rather than simply a ‘complicating factor,’ race, from a
critical perspective, is central to integration politics. Critical race theory, intersectionality,
and postcolonial approaches have brought into focus the ongoing and indeterminate
production of social hierarchies and disparities within historical and geographical
contexts of Western colonialism and imperialism. These perspectives allow us to re-think
integration as a political, not ecological, process that unfolds in the exchanges between
dominate and subordinate groups.
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Critical Race Theory and Intersectionality
Critical Race Theory (CRT) has its roots in the fields of sociology, history,
anthropology, philosophy, and politics and emerged as a formal body of scholarship in
the mid-1970s (Mitchell and Stewart, 2013). The theory gained broad acceptance in the
legal profession in the 1990s—specifically, Critical Legal Studies—with the goal of
providing a critical analysis of race and racism from a distinctively legal point of view
(Crenshaw et al., 1996). One of the key assumptions of CRT is that racism is more than
just unconnected isolated acts by individuals, rather, racism is endemic to American
society, entrenched within the legal, cultural, and psychological spheres (Mitchell and
Stewart, 2013). The application of CRT has extended into many social science
disciplines, including geography (Price, 2010; Domash, 2015; Esson and Last, 2019).
Here, I engage CRT to understand power relations, media and discourse influences,
citizenship practices, and intersectional identities as they pertain to the French context.
CRT works to interrogate the ways of seeing, understanding, and thinking about the
world that are based on racialized and colonial assumptions that are unremarked upon,
normalized, and perpetuated (Domash, 2015).
Critical race theory focuses on the reformulation of race and the embeddedness of
racial formations within institutions and legal structures, drawing on ideas of ‘racial
formation’ outlined by Omi and Winant (2015), among others. Omi and Winant
understand race as “a way of ‘making up people’” and “race-making” as a process of
defining groups of people as “Other” (2015, p. 105). Racial formation is “the
sociohistorical process by which racial identities are created, lived out, transformed, and
destroyed,” and race itself “is a concept that signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and
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interests by referring to different types of human bodies” (Omi and Winant, 2015, p. 109110). In the case of the U.S., Omi and Winant (2015) assert that race is a master category,
“a fundamental concept that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, the history,
polity, economic structure, and culture of the United States” (p. 106). In short, inequality
and difference in the U.S. have been built upon concepts of race (Omi and Winant, 2015).
CRT scholars study the relationship between race, racism, and power in a way
that departs from mainstream/traditional approaches to immigrant integration, which tend
to treat race as a variable (or a characteristic that applies to particular migrants) rather
than as an active process that operates across society (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). As
outlined by Bell (1992), racism is ordinary, not aberrational, and dominant groups
racialize different groups at different times, often in response to the shifting needs of the
labor market. Critical race theory questions existing power structures that function to
shore up white privilege and to perpetuate the marginalization of people of color through
systemic, institutionalized racial inequalities (Crenshaw et al., 1996). White supremacy,
or white cultural and political hegemony, is “authorized in different ways by
governments, [and] has been a source of cultural integrity, political leverage, and
economic gain for those imperial and white settler groups armed with the power of
definition” (Anderson, 2000, p. 5). Dominant groups thus tend to disregard the tacit
forms of racism embedded in the thoughts, discourses, and structures that they create
(Delgado and Stefancic, 2012).
Critical race theory often focuses on the binary opposition of white versus black
racial categories, especially in the U.S., but it can be applied across contexts to
marginalized groups in order to understand the situations of structural racism,
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subordination, and domination. Mathias Möschel (2011), for instance, offers that CRT
can “problematize Europe’s widespread reluctance to frame issues in terms of race,”
especially in France, where discussions of inequality flow from a color-blind ideology
based on the premise that “races do not exist and that the legal language should not
perpetuate the idea of their existence” (Möschel, 2011, p. 1651). In France race has been
rendered invisible by state practices that forbid the recognition of race as a structural
reality, even though Algerian immigrants and their descendants have experienced levels
of segregation and discrimination similar to those experienced by African Americans in
the US South (Begag, 2007). Such practices stem from republican ideologies that view
any recognition of ethnic-cultural differences as undermining national, civic cohesion.
Discussions of race in France presuppose a conflict between universalist French
Republicanism and communitarianism (Möschel, 2011). According to Begag (2007), this
willful invisibility of race is, in turn, linked to powerful discourses of liberalism
predicated on ideas of
individualism, which accords primacy to the individual over the group of which
he or she is a member; meritocracy, which valorizes individual merit and talent in
the competition for social goods; and universalism, according to which all
individuals competing for such goods receive equal treatment (p. 96, emphasis in
the original).
Critical race theorists give particular attention to the construction of racialized identities
and the reproduction of racial inequalities through public and media discourse (Mason,
2017). The media, from this perspective, “serve as a hegemonic device for the purposes
of securing, for the ruling class (and other dominant groups in society), a continued
position of power and leadership” (Jay, 2003, p. 6). Racialized groups are commonly
portrayed as “motivated in their conduct by naked impulse rather than rational
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deliberation” and as “savage peoples…deemed either beyond, or potentially improved by,
the cultivation of self-government” (Anderson, 2000, p. 3). In France, dehumanizing
media portrayals of immigrants include the depiction of immigrant Others as “savages,”
“wolves,” and “beasts,” reinforcing pervasive fears about minority groups (BBC, 2015;
Crenshaw, 1995). Those groups with a vested interest in the perpetuation of racist
attitudes present a fundamental impasse to immigrant inclusion (Jay, 2003).
Immigration and citizenship laws are also crucial to understanding racial
formation and oppression. As Kevin Johnson (2004) notes,
It is society, with the assistance of the law, that defines who is an ‘alien,’ an
institutionalized ‘other,’ and who is not. It is a society, through [government], that
determines which rights to afford ‘aliens.’ Like the social construction of race,
which helps to legitimize racial subordination, the construction of the ‘alien’ has
helped justify the limitation on non-citizen rights imposed by [the] legal
system…alien terminology helps rationalize harsh, perhaps inhumane, treatment
of persons from other countries (pp. 154; 268).
The social construction of immigrant status “is not complete without policing and
surveillance” (Romero, 2008, p. 28). The process of racial profiling is indicative that
“citizenship status is inscribed on the body” (Romero, 2008, p. 28). So called “stop and
frisk” police procedures in France require little more than “reasonable suspicion,” often
merely a person’s physical appearance as “Algerian” or “Arab,” to request proof of
citizenship4 (Welch and McGongale, 2013). Police aggression exemplifies the way
racism is reproduced and reinforced during common, daily, normalized interactions
between a racialized (minority) person and a person from the dominant group (Essed,
1991). As Essed (1991) remarks, “When racist notions and actions infiltrate everyday life
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I offer an in-depth overview of policing and surveilling Algerians in France in Chapter
Four.
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and become part of the reproduction of the system, the system reproduces everyday
racism” (p. 50). Critical race theory thus provides a framework for identifying and
interpreting the structural conditions that produce ‘race’ and racial inequalities. Later in
this literature review, I will discuss how geographers have applied these insights to
conceptualizations of space and place.
Ideas of racial formation in recent decades have been complicated by an
intersectional analysis that views individuals as positioned within multiple identity
categories and as embodying privileges and oppressions associated with each of these
categories. Intersectionality, then, rejects the concept of a unified, individual subject and
instead acknowledges the layered positionalities and multi-dimensional relations involved
in identity formation (Hopkins and Noble, 2009). This approach looks beyond racist
oppression to consider how immigrants negotiate membership, and it interrogates how
the process of “becoming” involves a negotiation of multiple signifiers of difference.
This approach works to understand how immigrants negotiate belonging and position
themselves in complex (racialized, but also gendered, sexualized, nationalized, and classbased) hierarchies and systems of structural oppression. In doing so, it draws on Said's
(1978) ideas of the Other—an individual or group with conflicting beliefs, values, and
aspirations (I discuss Said’s work further in the following section). The attributes of
otherness are fundamental to representations of identity. Identity, then, is a relational
concept that involves the definition of Self in relation to an Other—an Us in relation to a
Them. Groups uphold this type of differentiation through borders and bordering practices
that are at once spatial, social, temporal, and discursive (Newman and Paasi, 1998). Such
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borders are instruments of power that make the inclusion of 'insiders' and the exclusion of
outsiders visible and real (Paasi, 2001).
Intersectional analysis, along with critical race perspectives, allows us to move
away from the more traditional focus in immigration literature on ethnicity (typically
treated synonymously with nationality). The term ethnicity is often applied to “minority”
groups and those viewed as distinctive vis-à-vis an unmarked national society. Ethnicity,
however, must be understood as a product of both Other-definition and of Self-definition.
It does not merely consist of maintaining one's distinct traditions or customs; nor is it
fixed in identifying some kind of “roots” from which the immigrants come from (sending
or home-society) (Castles and Miller, 1993). Rather, ethnicity can be seen as the active
production and reproduction of collective identity (Cohen and Bain, 1988). This process
is relational, whereby, on the one hand, dominant groups play a key role in the
determination of who is (or is not) “ethnic,” and on the other hand, those identified as
ethnic also produce a bounded sense of identity and belonging.
Ong (1996) refers to this dual process as “self-making and being made” (p. 738).
The classification of an ethnic minority created by dominant groups, also involves the
subsequent self-creation (self-identification) of ethnicity by the minority group. In this
way, the dominant group has a key role in defining ethnicity as something separate from
‘mainstream,’ national culture. Hutchinson (2000) connects ethnic identity to memory,
noting that “central to ethnicity is the question of origins, the recovery of memory, and of
a ‘usable past’ by which to negotiate the problems of the present” (p. 653). Thus, ethnic
identities are fluid, situational, they are constantly being negotiated and re-constructed,
and change over time (Neils Conzen et al., 1992). As I describe in greater detail below,
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this relational identity construction takes shape through the everyday spaces and practices
of immigrants and reflects the intersectionality of each immigrant experience.
I have alluded here to the importance of agency within intersectional analysis. A
key concept relating to agency is subjectivity, which refers to an individual’s sense of
selfhood and membership; subjectivity refers to an “active agent that shapes and is
shaped by prevailing social, cultural and political spaces” (Blackman et al., 2008, p. 16).
In the case of Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France, a critical subjectivity
that plays into identity creation is the historical colonial relationship between France and
Algeria. Identities forged under (post)colonial conditions are multi-faceted identities that
“cannot be accounted for by binary oppositions” rooted in one nation-state or another
(Grewal and Kaplan, 1994, p. 10). Rada Hegde (1998) addresses the powerful role of
colonialism in the formation of identities, describing colonialism as having “seeped into
the lives of people globally” (p. 276). For Algerian-origin individuals in France, a
postcolonial identity is forged from “the crosshatched trajectories of colonialism and
globalization as they come to demarcate quotidian understandings of postcolonial
identity, which is to say, within the recurrent practices of everyday life” (Ganguly, 2001,
p. 2). It is in everyday social situations that individuals “use culture to express and give
meaning to our identity, which in turn is used to construct affiliations with and
boundaries between other individuals and groups” (Joshi, 2006, p. 11).
The importance given to historical context requires that we consider critical race
and identity theories in relation to postcolonial theory, which connects contemporary
power relationships and inequalities to the legacies of European imperialism.
Postcolonial theory, as I explain below, offers a more specific way of thinking about
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racialization, the experiences of racialized minorities, and the identity practices in a
postcolonial context, such as that of France and Algeria.
Postcolonial Scholarship
Postcolonial approaches explore the economic, political, and cultural legacies of
European imperialism and colonialism and ongoing processes of racialization and
subordination between former colonizers and colonized people—including former
metropole contexts (like France). The idea here is that postcolonial states and metropoles
remain inherently and complexly entangled in their colonial pasts long after formal
decolonization (Yeoh, 2000). Postcolonialism engages with the production of knowledge
in colonial and postcolonial environments and addresses questions of identity among the
colonized and colonizers. It is especially interested in the ways colonial powers used the
“optic of race” to “represent, reflect, refract and make visible native cultures in inferior
ways” (James, 2018, p. 1). At the same time, postcolonialism designates a politics of
transformational resistance to the unequal power relations (including the production of
knowledge) formed by colonial practices (Ashcroft et al., 2000).
Postcolonial scholar Gayatri Spivak (2005) defines colonialism as “when an alien
nation-state establishes itself as ruler, impressing its own laws and systems of education
and rearranging the mode of production for its own economic benefit” (p. 828). Colonial
processes of domination by force through civilizing and military missions produce and
reproduce ideological discourses that subjugate colonized populations. The colonies
became the Other against which the industrial modernity of the West defined itself, and
colonies then became entrenched in an inferior position that, in many cases, continues to
this day (Gilbert and Tompkins, 1996). Colonialism, in this respect, involves much more
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than the domination of markets and political institutions. It has far-reaching effects that
shape language, education, religion, art, and social interactions (Gilbert and Tompkins,
1996). Postcolonialism thus involves an engagement with (and contestation of)
colonialism’s discourses, power structures, and social hierarchies (Gilbert and Tompkins,
1996).
Scholars widely regard Franz Fanon as bringing the concept of the postcolonial
into being (Golden, 2015). Fanon was a freedom fighter in Algeria during the 1950s and
1960s. A psychiatrist by profession, Fanon was born in French Martinique and moved to
France, and then to Algeria during his professional career. Through his patients, Fanon
encountered the clinical effects of colonial domination on the psyche of the colonized
people—what he called the colonization of the mind (Fanon et al., 2005). He focused on
the identity of colonized peoples and followed the trajectory of identity development,
whereby colonialists proclaimed European culture superior to native culture and used
violence to impose European culture and to suppress native culture and identity and
create a subjectivity rooted in all-encompassing inferiority (Fanon et al., 2005). Fanon
claimed that the “colonized acquire a peculiar visceral intelligence dedicated to the
survival of body and spirit” (Fanon et al., 2005, p. ix). Fanon’s work called for the use of
violence by the colonized in order to expel their colonizers (as was the case in Algeria).
Yet for Fanon, decolonization was not a simple solution to colonialism, as colonialism
left the colonies bereft of social structure while leaving intact the effects of the colonial
language, the colonial state bureaucracy and colonial attitudes and ways of thinking
(Fanon et al., 2005).
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French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre worked with Fanon to uncover the structural
provenance of racial relationships, referring to the “constitutive gaze through which the
Self and the Other are made” (Kobayashi, 2014, p. 1102). Sartre sought to understand the
totality of the French conquest of Algeria, including the complex political, social, and
economic structures put in place during colonialism and then abandoned upon
decolonization. Sartre laid bare the truth of the French conquest of Algeria by, “showing
the congruence between economic spoliation, cultural imperialism, and political
domination of the native Muslims by the French invaders and colonizers” (Sartre, 1956;
Smith, 1973, p. 428). Sartre furthered the understanding of colonialism as a process of
dehumanization working through forced labor and intimidation. For Sartre, colonization
triggered a moral problem of the rights involved in the French interpretation of liberty,
equality, and fraternity. He argued, “By rejecting metropolitan universalism, [French]
soldiers overseas apply the numerus clauses to the human species: since none can rob,
enslave, or kill his fellow man without committing a crime, they lay down the principle
that the colonized subject is not a fellow man” (Sartre, 1963, p. i). Sartre also elaborated
the concept of racialization, arguing, “one of the functions of racism is to compensate the
latent universalism of bourgeois liberalism: since all human beings have the same rights,
the Algerian will be made subhuman” (Sartre, 2001, p. 45).
Along with Fanon and Sartre, scholar Edward Said is considered to be the
“originator and inspiring patron-saint of postcolonial theory and discourse” owing to his
contribution of “Orientalism” (San Juan, 1998, p. 1). Drawing on the work of Michel
Foucault, Said exposed the Eurocentric universalism that assumes the superiority of the
West. He described Orientalism as a particular mode of knowledge, power, and cultural
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representation—a way of identifying the East as the Other and inferior to the West (Said,
1978). In articulating Orientalism, Said, moved culture, which he defined as “all those
practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation that have
relative autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in
aesthetic forms,” to the forefront of critical theory (Said, 1994, pp. xii–xiii). Culture,
from this perspective, is not a bounded or static social entity. Rather, culture refers to
social imaginaries, norms, and ideals that define who “we” are vis-à-vis an ‘Other.’ Said
understood that in situations of unequal power relations, like colonialism, the dominant
group has the power to produce knowledge about itself and the Other. Certain ways of
seeing, knowing, and describing Self and Other thus become naturalized and taken-asgiven in colonial societies.
Importantly though, dominant ways of knowing can also be contested and
subverted. By shedding light on dominant forms of knowledge production, one can
destabilize them and create alternatives to them. Homi Bhabha’s (1983) discussions of
mimicry, hybridity, and ambivalence speak to this possibility. Colonialism was a fragile
project, one that functioned on a desire for the “subjugated others…to look or at least act
the same as the occupiers” yet held the balance of this fearful outcome “because it would
dilute their own sense of difference and superiority” (James, 2018, p. 2). Thus, mimicry
was the way that subjugated members of a colonized society imitated and took on the
culture of the colonizers—a metonym of presence (Bhabha, 1984). Bhabha (1990) argued
further that the interdependence of colonizer and colonized renders all identities hybrid
and thus resistant to the imposition of fixed and singular identity classification
(hybridity). Bhabha explained his concept of ambivalence to describe the difficult
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situation of the subaltern subject “torn between the material benefits colonization
sometimes brings (e.g., jobs in colonial administration) and the crushing weight of the
loss of national sovereignty” (James, 2018, p. 2). For Bhabha, there is always a state of
ambivalence, contradiction, and self-alienation built into human agency, so that agency is
more an effect of rhetorical and discursive social processes than a product of individual
self-consciousness (Bhabha, 1994). In this way, the subject becomes individuated, or
enabled, only after being situated into the symbolic order (colonized versus colonizer).
Postcolonial studies have influenced some discussions of migration and
transnationalism, with colonialism and imperialism understood to be key components of
the global contexts in which contemporary migrants are enmeshed. Stuart Hall (1996)
described colonialism “as part of an essentially transnational and transcultural global
process [which] produces a decentered, diasporic or ‘global’ rewriting of earlier, nationcentered imperial grand narratives” (p. 247). Tying transnationalism to postcolonial
theory offers a way to think about immigrants’ homeland affiliations and the mutual,
power-laden processes that underly immigrants’ relationships to different places. When
viewed through a postcolonial lens, the division between homeland and host-society
becomes less salient when colonized territories are subsumed within the colonizer’s
territory, as was the case of Algeria and France—where colony and metropole were
mutually constituted and remained tied together. Following Hall’s work on race and
culture, Paul Gilroy (2004) notes the tension between postcolonial ‘multiculturalism’ and
the persistent language of race in Britain and other postcolonial societies. Like Hall,
Gilroy is concerned with how postcolonial affiliations continue to shape modern political
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structures and how the social formations of colonialism persist and are incorporated into
postcolonial societies.
The enduring legacies of colonial relationships manifest themselves in deepseated structural processes of racialization and subordination in metropolitan contexts,
which have become sites of settlement for many postcolonial subjects. Working within
the idea of ‘postcolonial predicaments,’ Basch et al. (1994) further Hall and Gilroy’s
observations, stating that the “layered intertwining of color, class, and culture that mark
the historical processes within [colonized] societies” create a “filter through which
immigrants…interpret and respond to the structures of [the imperial] society” (pp. 104–
105). The impossibility of erasing centuries of cultural subordination is crucial to
understanding the dynamics of identity in postcolonial immigrant contexts, in which the
formerly colonized Other is now living among the former colonizer.
It is important to note here, however, that dominant groups are not always
inclined to recognize the on-going relevance of colonialism to contemporary politics,
especially in relation to immigration. As Forsdick (2005) argues,
The ‘postcolonial,’ often perceived in France as an Anglo-Saxon invention
emerging from an obsession with the ‘politiquement correct,’ is held at bay,
however, despite—or even as a result of—the potential illumination it offers to
the culture and institutions of contemporary France. Ideological attempts to
exclude the Other range from the radical centralization of Republicanism to the
desire for ethnic homogenization on the Far Right, but Frenchness has never
successfully been constructed as a core, seamless identity. However, the
postcolonial problematic rarely emerges from the French discourses of politics or
culture (p. 35-36).
Discussions of postcolonialism in the French context inevitably revert to the
contributions of the republican tradition to former colonies, namely the policy of
assimilation. The centrality of these republican values is one possible reason for the lack
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of interest shown by French scholars in postcolonial theoretical contributions. As recently
as 2018, a (in)famous manifesto signed by 80 French academics claimed postcolonialism
to be “a hegemonic strategy” that attacks the ideals of republican universalism, using
“methods of intellectual terrorism reminiscent and far [exceeding] what Stalinism once
did to European intellectuals” (Guesmi, 2020, p. 1).
Postcolonial scholarship allows us to push past the limitations of integration/
assimilation scholarship by problematizing identity categories and ideas of culture that
inform everyday attitudes toward, and ways of seeing, immigrant Others in receivingsociety contexts. Postcolonial theory rejects the idea of a uniform “host-society culture”
as a historical given, demanding attention to the historical and relational processes that
have given rise to “national societies” and the criteria used to define them. Postcolonial
theory also draws attention to the complicated ways immigrants understand their place in
the receiving/postcolonial society and their relationship with dominant groups, who are
their former colonizers.
This approach asks how relationships of power and domination persist and how
politics interfere in the efforts by immigrants to seek entrance to national society. In the
case of Algerians, dominant constructions of French society can be subverted by
referencing Algeria’s rebellion against and defeat of French colonialism 5. This shared
sense of solidarity among a ‘victorious’ Algerian population is sometimes shared with
immigrants from other former colonies. Yet, despite memories of French defeat,
immigrants find themselves in a subordinate position to their former colonizer, which
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I offer a detailed account of the Algerian victory in the war of decolonization in Chapter
Four. I discuss the internalized identity of revolution among Algerian immigrants and
their descendants in France in Chapter Five.
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frames its particularisms as the universal traits of citizenship. This can motivate some
racialized immigrants and minorities to adopt assimilatory behaviors (i.e., conformity)
rather than experience marginalization and exclusion from the spheres and spaces of
mainstream French society. Others, of course, might bristle against dominant
constructions of host-society identity. In either case, postcolonial scholarship urges us to
recognize the political acts involved in the everyday life of immigrants.
With its focus on domination, subordination, and the production of knowledge
about “Self” and “Other,” postcolonial scholarship overlaps with CRT and intersectional
analysis. Both postcolonial and critical race theories focus on the racialization and
subordination of particular groups and the incompleteness of legal equality between
dominant and subordinate groups (Thomas, 2000). Moreover, both sets of theory work to
“expose the insufficient integration of historically subordinate populations into the
dominant legal system” (Thomas, 2000, p. 1198). Together, these theories push forward
the notion that race and racism, along with nationalism, gender, and other hierarchical
social constructs, are intrinsic parts of social history and larger social orders, and they
allow us to re-think integration as a political, not ecological, process that unfolds in the
exchanges between dominate and subordinate groups (Crenshaw et al., 1996).
Still, there is further need to look beyond the historical drama of colonialism and
structural racism and to consider in more detail the ways that immigrants themselves
negotiate membership in contexts of settlement and origin. To understand the experiences
of Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France, it is necessary to contextualize
their experience within a historical-structural framework that includes postcolonialism.
The grand narrative of colonial and postcolonial analysis can erase the individual agency
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of immigrants and the fluid co-production of contemporary national societies. To avoid
the decontextualized analysis that assimilation studies are often faulted for, this research
seeks to engage not only with the global level of postcolonialism, but also with the more
intimate scale of individual existence and experience—to consider what race, identity,
and the postcolonial mean in the innumerable encounters between immigrants and nonimmigrants that occur in everyday places and spaces. This research aims to understand
integration by bridging the scalar gap between global postcolonialism and personal
everyday politics, and by exploring social interactions that take place simultaneously
across urban landscapes and nation-state borders. In order to engage more fully with the
ways in which immigrants operate within systems of oppression and negotiate belonging
and position in racialized hierarchies, I now turn my attention to concepts of belonging
and ‘the everyday’ that emphasize the agency of subordinate groups and the daily politics
of negotiating membership in a thoroughly racialized, yet contestable, ‘host-society.’
The Everyday Practices and Spaces of Belonging
Classic assimilation scholarship from the early 20th century made heavy use of
ethnography to describe the immigrants’ difficult adjustment to American society and to
explore immigrants’ (and their children’s) changing social and cultural practices (e.g.,
Burgess, 1926; Young, 1928; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1927). By the 1950s and 1960s,
however, the field of immigrant research had moved to more quantitative approaches, and
fewer studies involved detailed understandings of the nuances of everyday immigrant
life—the ways newcomers learn social cues from their environment; the ways they
struggle for acceptance and inclusion; the ways they confront discrimination. This
dissertation returns to the model built by earlier researchers and uses the idea of the
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‘everyday’ as an entry point into understanding the dynamics of membership in
postcolonial, immigrant-receiving contexts. Following Lefebvre (1991), Bourdieu (1977),
and de Certeau (1984), the ‘everyday’ is understood here to connect experiences and
practices, including the ways people conduct themselves in their daily routines, how they
think about the social world around them, how they interact with dominant members of
the national society, and how they comport themselves in certain spaces. In engaging
with the everyday, this dissertation highlights immigrants’ encounters with, and
responses to, institutionalized racism and subordination. This work explores how and
where people encounter and engage with dominant cultural practices, and how they
respond to daily cues that they belong or do not belong. The links and interactions
between immigrant experiences and identity formation are central to understanding how
immigrants negotiate and rework the socio-spatial boundaries of inclusion and exclusion
in contexts of settlement (Ranek, 2017).
Scholars explain belonging as an emotional attachment (Yuval-Davis, 2006), as
feelings of being at home (Hage, 1997), at ease (May, 2011) and as rooted in an
individual’s, or group’s, desire to feel and create an attachment to a place (den Besten,
2010). But as Yuval-Davis et al. (2005) note, belonging does not flow naturally or
unproblematically from ‘ethnicity’ or nationality. Instead, belonging is a dynamic
process, one that “like other hegemonic constructions...tends to become ‘naturalized’ and
thus invisible in hegemonic formations...” (Yuval-Davis et al., 2005, p. 528). Thus,
belonging is “formed through the interplay of the subjective self, individual agency and
structural position,” and it is negotiated and claimed at different scales, from the
intimately personal (the everyday), to the level of a nation-state (Hamaz and Vasta, 2009,
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p. 7). It involves a process and dialogue in which individuals and communities, insiders
and outsiders, newcomers and natives work to negotiate and renegotiate competing
claims and attachments to the places and spaces they inhabit. Belonging, in short, is
political (Antonsich 2010).
In the context of immigration, one of the more relevant fields of belonging is
citizenship6—a legal designation that also signals membership in a national community
(or polity) bound together both by core political values and common origins and
destinies. Citizenship, along with other forms of membership, community, and identity,
are continuously produced and reproduced through daily practices (Ranek, 2017).
Integration policies are also key modes of producing belonging in immigrant-receiving
contexts. In many Western states, such policies rest upon particular conceptions of
belonging that tend to frame “white, middle-class culture as the implicit norm” that
immigrants must strive to emulate (Nelson and Hiemstra, 2008, p. 321). Immigrants must
negotiate these established narratives about what, and who, is perceived as the ‘norm’ by
the dominant group and they must learn the ‘local habitus’—referring to the dispositions
tacitly performed and accepted by the dominant group (Bourdieu, 1977). At the same
time, immigrants might create a sense of belonging that stands apart from this dominant
habitus and that draws upon so-called “ethnic resources”—social ties based on places of
origin, common language, common religion, or other forms of community that stand out
as ‘foreign’ or distinctive in the place of settlement. The spatiality of these communities
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I discuss the complexities of citizenship for Algerian immigrants and their descendants
in France in Chapter Six.
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and the feelings of belonging they engender can be complex and create their own
exclusions.
Connecting immigrant experiences and social interactions to the spaces and places
in which they occur is key to understanding how immigrants navigate the boundaries of
inclusion and exclusion (Staeheli, 2003). This research works to uncover the multiple
meanings, complex constructions, and contested associations of everyday spaces to
understand the societal dynamics we associate with integration. For the purposes of this
research, space refers abstractly to the material, inhabited realms produced by social
actors, while place is defined as a specific materialization of identities and social relations
in a given location. This study begins with the assumption that people’s experiences of
exclusion and/or belonging are spatialized, and that places materially convey membership
or exclusion. Certain places are “produced and stabilized by the dominant groups who
occupy them” in order “to mark out those who are in or out of place” (Valentine, 2007, p.
18). People, depending on their positionalities in multiple social hierarchies, can
accommodate, resist, subvert, or conform to the social cues that dominate certain places.
Geographical scholarship on immigrant integration has often focused on the
distribution of immigrant populations across urban space, most notably through studies of
residential clustering and segregation (e.g., Massey, 1985; Wright et al., 2005; Allen and
Turner, 1996; Logan et al., 2002). Following the logic of traditional assimilation theory,
spatial assimilation studies assume “that ethnoracial segregation in the city is a temporary
step in the socio-spatial dynamics that eventually lead to the mainstream and minority
groups to share urban space” (McAvay and Safi, 2018, p. 46; though see Peach, 1997 for
an opposing argument). Thus, residential mobility is considered to be a sign of
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“successful” social assimilation (Massey, 1985). As with assimilation research overall,
however, the past few decades have seen various efforts to complicate the standard
spatial assimilation narrative. For some, this is largely an empirical exercise, with
scholars questioning whether, for instance, certain racialized immigrants are ghettoized or
whether patterns of outward dispersion of immigrants over time still holds (for instance,
Peach, 2009; Brettell and Nibbs, 2010). Others have given more specific attention to the
ways racist policies, especially in the real-estate, mortgage-lending, and housing sector,
have created unequal, stratified urban landscapes and that “consistently hinder
desegregative dynamics for the most disadvantaged groups” (McAvay and Safi, 2018, p.
46; Alba and Logan, 1993; Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour
l'Egalité, 2006; Housel, 2007). In France, for instance, racialized minorities have been
“segregated into public housing complexes in the suburban communities,” or the
banlieues (Ware, 2015, p. 186). A key point here is that patterns of segregation reflect not
so much “non-assimilation” on the part of racialized minorities, but the choices made by
the upper class to self-segregate (Grzegorczyk, 2013, p. 22; Préteceille, 2006).
Still other geographical literature has tried to look beyond broad patterns of
segregation to understand how “socially created difference is actually organized and
reconstituted in space,” and how space organizes people’s lives along the lines of social
difference (Anderson, 1987, p. 129). Anderson’s approach requires that we look over
time at the discourses and social dynamics that produce spatial patterns and that, in turn,
convey meanings about Self and Other. An example of this approach is Phillips’s (2006)
examination of housing in northern British cities. Responding to claims in the early 2000s
that British Muslims were self-segregating in British cities and leading “parallel lives,”
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Phillips and her colleagues found that institutional racism within public and private
housing markets “together with popular racist sentiments, expressed through racist
harassment, continued to reinforce existing patterns of minority ethnic segregation”
(Phillips, 2006, p. 27). Yet they also explore the choices of minorities to form cultural
communities where they feel a sense of security and belonging as the white majority acts
to exclude them and to disinvest in inner-city neighborhoods (Phillips et al., 2007). At the
same time, Phillips’ research reveals increasingly complex motivations and patterns, as
many British Asians and other non-white groups attempt to gain a foothold in
predominantly white suburban neighborhoods. For these individuals, residential mobility
is an outcome of socio-economic gains, but it also reflects a process whereby individuals
must constantly consider whether they can, in fact, belong in white suburban space.
As Phillips’s research indicates, scholars, while noting the effects of racism in the
urban landscapes and the negative structural forces that constrain residential choices for
minorities, have also worked to bring to light the geographical agency of minorities and
immigrant groups and the choices they make (given various constraints) to build
communities in place. So, for instance, while the formation of ethnic enclaves reflects
social and economic disadvantages, it also reflects systems of social and economic
support, as well as the workings of vibrant transnational cultures. Immigrant enclaves are
geographically defined spaces that contain concentrations of residents who share an
identity and have specialized stores and institutions that provide local support for
residents (Abrahamson, 1996). Ethnic enclaves offer benefits, mainly in terms of
employment, but also in terms of fostering a sense of belonging for immigrants who see
these ethnic places as representations of home with strong social, cultural, or emotional
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associations. This type of spatial engagement with ethnicity can be seen in Paris’s 10th
arrondissement, where there is a small area (about three square blocks) with a high
concentration of Algerian tea houses, halal restaurants, and Algerian-owned cafés—
effectively demonstrating how Algerians have created a transnational “home” for
themselves in Paris by enacting the neighborhood as “Algerian” and placing their
identities both in the public and private spaces of the neighborhood (Ehrkamp, 2002).
Conversely, in emphasizing the transnational relationships that work through
urban space, some scholars note the existence of “heterolocal” communities—
communities that function and maintain a degree of cohesion across space and borders
without any clustering at all (Zelinsky and Lee, 1998). This is especially relevant to
higher-income immigrants, like the aspiring, middle-class Asian families identified by
Phillips, et al. (2007), who have moved in recent decades into white-dominated suburban
neighborhoods. But this kind of dispersal is not limited to the middle classes. According
to Silverstein (2004), while many lower-income immigrants reside in the banlieues,
significant segments of the Algerian immigrant community in Paris are diffused
throughout the city per the ‘mixité sociale’ (social mix) policies implemented by the
French government with the aim of reducing social exclusion7. Thus, Algerian-origin
individuals in Paris participate in aspects of heterolocalism on an everyday basis, going
occasionally to areas of immigrant concentration to share a meal with friends and family
or perhaps to attend worship services or cultural events. These areas of Algerian
businesses inhabit a different sense of locality through the visual landscape (Wise, 2011).
Following Wise’s understanding of ethnic areas like this, the “presence in the urban
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domain of familiar shops and signage…means it is a much more homely place for
[immigrants] than other parts of the city, and this sense of home…incorporates a
translocal sense of belonging” (2011, p. 152).
The variety of social dynamics associated with different spatial patterns in
immigrant settlement contexts indicate that it is difficult to read a single meaning from
spatial patterns and illustrate the complicated relationship between community and place.
Whereas immigrant clustering can reflect discrimination and racism, it can also signal
immigrant agency, community, and mutual aid. Shifting residential patterns, combined
with renegotiations of societal membership, offer new insight into the spatial politics of
belonging in immigrant-receiving societies (Mavroudi and Nagel, 2016). These
approaches suggest, first, that scholars must consider the contested meanings and
motivations behind spatial patterns, as well as the ways such patterns are represented by
dominant groups within discourses of social membership (Anderson, 1987). Second,
scholars must look beyond residential patterns to examine mobility across urban space
and people’s engagements with heterogeneous urban environments. Integration is not just
a matter of where people live but how they relate to and negotiate a broader urban
environment that embodies and materializes multiple class and racial identities.
Consequently, the discussion must be taken further to attend to the contested identities
inscribed in place(s) and the mobilities across space for different groups of individuals.
Who decides whether the banlieues are vibrant immigrant communities or so-called
“badlands”? How is a place determined to be a ghetto or a community? Who (and how)
are the terms of entry to particular places decided? Why (and how) are some individuals
“stuck” in place, lacking mobility while others (as the concepts of heterolocalism and
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translocalism suggest) move across space, changing behaviors and comportments through
the course of the day?
Trudeau’s (2006) exploration of political conflicts surrounding a halal
slaughterhouse in a rural Minnesota town highlights these complex questions, showing
how negotiations of place and belonging for immigrant Others emerge when a behavior
or action is identified as a transgression of the unspoken rules attached to places. Trudeau
(2006) notes that “transgressions provide a context in which the orthodoxy of dominant
groups (re)creates landscape in order to revitalize a sense of community and belonging”
(p. 437). Dominant groups that codify landscapes and define the terms of belonging
within the spatialized boundaries of urban landscapes; but newcomers can contest that
exclusion both by claiming the right to be different and by insisting that their difference
falls without the boundaries of membership in a given place/community. Likewise,
Nelson and Hiemstra (2008) examine the regional political and economic dynamics
surrounding farmworker housing in Colorado and Oregon in two non-metropolitan
communities that have experienced a significant increase in Latino immigration. Nelson
and Hiemstra’s (2008) work illustrates the complexities of community and belonging in
the ways that assimilationist discourse privileges whiteness, obscures hierarchies of class,
race, and legal status, and in some ways, prevents a sense of belonging among
immigrants. In these ways, the dominant groups set the terms of belonging and determine
the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.
Geographers focus on the ways powerful actors produce space as a means of
control, domination, and power over subordinate groups (Lefebvre, 1991). But as these
examples demonstrate, space is not solely produced by dominant groups; subordinate
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groups, as well, can attach their own meanings and identities to places, and create spaces
of alterity to resist or challenge dominant meanings and identities. Subordinate groups
can also demand access to dominant spaces, both by accommodating or re-working the
dominant meanings of spaces (Bolt et al., 2010). Illustrating these complex relationships
between belonging and place is Elizabeth Chacko’s (2013) examination of the ways that
immigrants affirm their sense of belonging to the nation through annual (immigrant)
celebrations. Representations of ethnic immigrant history and culture in public spaces,
she shows, “can serve as important markers of an immigrant community’s sense of self”
(Chacko, 2013, p. 443).
In sum, the marginalization of cultural Others is deeply woven into spaces and
places. In the case of France, the marginalization of North African and other immigrants
can be seen as a historical remnant of France’s colonial relationships. To account for the
complexities of this case, we must understand that places are caught up in larger histories,
struggles, and connections. Following the approach of Doreen Massey (1991), “there is
the specificity of place which derives from the fact that each place is the focus of a
distinct mixture of wider and more local social relations…[T]his very mixture together in
one place may produce effects which would not have happened otherwise” (p. 29,
emphasis in original). Massey (1991) focused on how “all these relations interact with
and take a further element of specificity from the accumulated history of a place, with
that history itself imagined as the product of layer upon layer of different sets of linkages,
both local and to the wider world” (p. 29). Massey’s approach allows us to see that the
places and spaces of immigrant life in France are sites of multiple interactions and
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contests over belonging, and that they are uniquely defined by the accumulated struggles
of Franco-Algerian history (Massey, 1991; Cresswell, 2004).
Nowhere is this more evident than in France’s ostensibly neutral ‘public spaces,’
which have become fiercely contested in the context of heightened anxieties around
immigration and Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ and terrorism. Public (i.e., state-controlled)
spaces in France are governed by French republican ideology (i.e., shared political values
and a commitment to democratic principles)—and the concept of laïcité, which requires
the separation of religion and politics (Welch and Perivolaris, 2016; Bowen, 2007). There
are two aspects of public space that are important to consider in the context of this
research: The first is the idea of ‘the public,’ which includes notions of the boundaries of
public space and ‘common life’ (notably ideas and policies about religion and space)
(Bowen, 2017). The second idea is related to the idea of an indivisible French people
whereby “a common life in public space facilitates the recognition by each of the other
persons as a member of a shared French peoplehood” (Bowen, 2017, p. 1). This
normative idea of the universality of French subjects makes it difficult to recognize
categories of religion, ethnicity, or race (Bowen, 2017). As I will discuss in Chapters Six
and Seven, these ideas, and the dramas they generate, become central to negotiations of
belonging in France. As Algerians move in and out of these public spaces, how do they
accommodate (at least temporarily) dominant French meanings and directives? How do
those marginalized in this environment resist particular readings of public space and try
to rework ideas about the public/national community?
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Conclusions
In this chapter I have attempted to create a conceptual framework for
(re)interpreting the social dynamics that take place when migrants enter a nationally
defined host society—dynamics that have traditionally been interpreted through the lens
of integration and assimilation. This account of migrant experience and interactions takes
into account the legacies of France’s colonization of Algeria, formal systems of inclusion
and exclusion (as seen, for instance, in naturalization and citizenship laws and in public
housing policies), and patterns of institutional racism (evident, for instance, in policing
and the banishment of headscarves from ‘public’ space). It accounts for spatial patterns of
exclusion and marginalization, while also exploring the ways that migrants, in variety of
ways—including accommodation, resistance, avoidance, and politicized engagement—
contend with racism and dominant discourses and practices of social membership. If
space is “a simultaneity of stories-so-far” then the spaces of everyday engagement for
Algerians in France are inclusive of the tumultuous stories of colonization and
decolonization (Massey, 2005, p. 24). It is important, however, not to interpret these
colonial linkages in a static way. Rather, the importance of these linkages is continuously
transformed in contexts of economic change and insecurity, growing anxieties about
terrorism, and right-wing sentiment and contestation of the European Union. The colonial
legacy still exists, but the significance of colonialism has changed and been obscured by
reconfigured controversies over Islam, fundamentalism, and terrorism.
The historical Franco-Algerian relationship has created a situation in present-day
France characterized by institutionalized racism and marginalization. Immigrants and
their descendants must find a place for themselves in this context and must create a sense
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of belonging through their personal relationships and their everyday encounters in
urban space. Both critical race theory (CRT) and postcolonial theory provide an
interpretive framework that highlights the workings of racial ideologies and
processes of Othering in postcolonial contexts, including the ongoing racialization
of particular groups. These theories emphasize the creation of ideologies,
representations, and discourses, and the ways these produce and take shape within
laws, institutions and policies. Theories of identity, belonging, space, and place
meanwhile, highlight individual and collective negotiations of representations,
discourses, and institutional policies and practices. These theories move the
analysis beyond the structural perspective and bring agency into consideration.
This interaction between structure and agency in producing and subverting
particular social formations is central to a critical approach to integration. While
traditional approaches to immigrant incorporation emphasize a gradual and
somewhat inevitable process of sameness, this critical approach emphasizes the
constant re-working of the boundaries of difference as migrants and non-migrants
negotiate the boundaries of membership in ‘the community’ (usually, but not
exclusively defined in terms of ethnicity and/or nationhood).
I have argued that the categories of host-society and immigrant groups cannot be
taken as givens, rather, they are constantly in the process of being created and are
influenced within specific geographical contexts. This research approaches assimilation
and integration as processes of negotiation between dominant and subordinate groups that
involves the re-working of socio-spatial boundaries to include (and exclude) certain types
of people. Postcolonial dynamics and ideologies of race permeate the everyday lives and
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encounters of Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France, requiring them to
develop diverse approaches to social membership and belonging in France—whether
some strive to accommodate and conform to dominant French social norms while others
resist, or whether some may alter their behaviors in certain places to conform while
creating alternative spaces of community. These foundations allow for a complete
understanding of the entirety of the immigrant experience for individuals of Algerian
descent in France. In the following chapter, I describe the methods used in this research
project to collect and analyze data to explore the localized contexts and experiences of
belonging and membership for Algerian immigrants (and their descendants) and
racialized others within the context of a French national society.

57

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
For this dissertation, Paris’s Algerian-origin population serves as an empirical
case study to explore theoretical issues involving identity, belonging, and integration in a
postcolonial society. This dissertation examines immigrant integration from a place-based
perspective, focusing on the ways in which Algerian immigrants and their descendants
participate in the building of community and societal membership within mainstream
social categories. This research draws on qualitative data gathered from in-depth and
semi-structured interviews and is centered on a qualitative case study of Algerian
immigrants and their descendants living in Paris, France.
Traditional studies of integration have often employed quantitative data and have
been valuable in measuring the degree to which members of immigrant groups are
participating in key spheres—e.g., labor markets and housing markets—within societies
of settlement. These studies assess levels of integration by collecting quantitative data on
residential location, intermarriage, social contact, political participation, and language
use, among other indicators (Van Tubergen, 2006; Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003; Phalet
and Swyngedouw, 2003). While useful for understanding the link between integration
policies and societal outcomes (e.g., monitoring the beneficiaries of policies and
conducting impact evaluations) (Huddleston, Niessen, and Tjaden, 2013), it is
problematic for understanding the lived experience of integration for immigrants.
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Quantitative studies of this kind tend to oversimplify the immigrant experience by
isolating identity or cultural traits that do not account for the variability of identity and
belonging or the contestability of ‘integration’ itself. Another problematic feature of
quantitative studies of immigrant integration, as identified by Schinkel (2013), is the
tendency to presuppose an essentialized notion of bounded cultures, to treat social
inequalities (e.g., lower levels of education) as cultural problems, and to position
integration as an individual (not group or relational) process. Quantitative studies cannot
measure or analyze the non-quantifiable experiences and actions involved in the
formation of immigrants’ understandings of identity, belonging, and integration through
everyday encounters.
In contrast, qualitative research interrogates immigrant experiences and seeks to
capture the complexities of social membership and integration. Qualitative research
methods are useful when research questions focus on research subjects’ frames of
reference and try to explain the ambiguities that arise from complex social interactions
(Taylor et al., 2015). The important contributions of qualitative studies in immigrant
research are that they allow for both significant understandings of highly contextual
phenomena and essential engagement with theory. Qualitative methods provide insights
into the ways people perceive their own experiences and actions, and the experiences and
actions of others, and they excel at collecting evidence about “values, opinions,
behaviors, and social contexts of specific populations” (Yamey, 2017). While qualitative
research has been criticized for lacking scientific rigor with small and unrepresentative
samples of the broader population with results that cannot be generalized, findings from
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qualitative research can contribute to the refinement of theoretical concepts and provide a
basis for theoretical abstraction (Yin, 1992).
A growing body of literature uses qualitative data to understand the meanings
embedded in immigrant behavior and experiences. Silverstein (2004), for instance, uses
semi-structured, in-depth interviews with Algerian immigrants and their descendants in
Paris to examine the formation of identity and the influence of life experiences, family
history, and sociocultural factors in the formulation of Algerian transnational politics and
identity. Ehrkamp and Nagel (2012) likewise use qualitative methods to investigate
questions relating to the politics of citizenship in immigrant-receiving contexts and to
illustrate social practices of faith communities both in destabilizing and reinforcing the
social boundaries of race and legal status. More recently, Beaman (2017) similarly uses
semi-structured, in-depth interviews with North African immigrants and their
descendants in Paris and surrounding banlieues to understand how French republicanism
(citizens are free from ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’) in fact imposes, rather than erases, ethnic
boundaries in the construction of a French national identity.
Following the above approaches, this research starts from the premise that social
categories like ‘race,’ ‘nation,’ and ‘ethnicity’ are constructs. That is, people actively
produce the boundaries of these groups through a variety of social and discursive
practices. The techniques I have chosen are particularly suited to uncover the social
processes that underlie the formation and transformation of social categories and the
meanings that people project onto everyday life. This chapter outlines my data collection
and analysis techniques and explains the research context and research sites. I also reflect
on my positionality as a researcher in the data collection process.
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Research Questions
This project’s data collection and analysis took place around three major research
questions:
(1) How do Algerian immigrants and their descendants understand and practice the
idea of ‘integration’ in France? That is, how do people of Algerian origin
interpret and evaluate various identity categories (i.e., French, Algerian, Arab,
Berber, Muslim, immigrant, etc.); how do they learn what it means to be members
of various identity categories through everyday experiences and social
encounters; and how, through their observable socio-spatial behaviors, do they
position themselves within or outside of different identity categories?
(2) How does the postcoloniality of Algerian immigrants and their descendants shape
their interactions with dominant institutions, groups, and discourses in France?
That is, how do memories and interpretations of colonialism inform the identities
of people of Algerian origin? What are the contexts in which memories of
colonialism are fostered, circulated, and expressed? And to what extent do
postcolonial imaginaries and community bonds facilitate, or provide alternatives
to, participation in ‘mainstream’ French social, political, and economic
institutions?
(3) What is the spatiality of integration among Algerian-origin communities in
France? That is, how do people of Algerian origin ‘read’ or interpret space as
belonging to particular social groups? What are the tangible, visible, and audible
ways in which they participate (or attempt to participate) in ‘mainstream’ social
spheres and spaces? How might they challenge or accommodate dominant
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identities inscribed in spaces? How and to what extent do ideas of gender, race,
class, legality, and postcolonial status influence their movement within and across
space? And to what extent do Algerian immigrants and their descendants create
subaltern spaces as an alternative to engagement with dominant spaces and
realms?
To answer these research questions, I use qualitative methods within a narrative case
study structure. A case study approach is a detailed analysis of a person or a group as a
model of a social phenomenon that can be used to illustrate and shed light on theoretical
concepts like gender, race, or integration (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011). The case study
is best to use when analyzing an individual situation to identify structures, forms, and the
order of interactions between the research population in a specific situation (Starman,
2013). Narratives are event-centered stories depicting human action and activity, they “do
not merely describe what someone does in the world, but what the world does to that
someone” (Mattingly, 1998, p. 8). Narrative case-study research requires the researcher
to distinguish narratives from discourse—the former being a “retrospective meaningmaking—the shaping of ordering of past experience” that may not follow a set
chronological timeline, but instead follow the memories of the participant as the story or
narrative is told (Chase, 2005, p. 656). The information collected in this process must be
interpreted as socially situated interactions that are produced within the interviewing
process and analyzed accordingly (Chase, 2005).
Study Population and Research Context
This research is intended to uncover the everyday politics of immigrant
integration in France, the role of a postcolonial history in these politics, and the space(s)
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within which these engagements occur. Owing to their significant role in the history of
French colonization and immigration8, Algerian immigrants and their descendants are
highly visible in the politics of immigration, race, and identity, and they have been
studied at length. Recent literature in France has focused on many aspects of the FrancoAlgerian relationship, including, most recently, the alarming exclusion and
disenfranchisement of banlieue residents (Aissaoui, 2009; Begag, 2007). French
scholarship has also focused on immigration management and control vis-à-vis Algeria
(Cohen and Lacroix, 2016). But French scholars are now calling to “refine the analysis
beyond a strict binary opposition” between France and Algeria to understand “other
logics of social structuring” that are not based on legal or racial relationships (Cohen and
Lacroix, 2016, p. 1). This dissertation aims to address this need to understand Algerians
in France, not as a homogeneous group but as a varied group of people who are working
to articulate their identities and belongings in highly specific socio-spatial contexts.
People of Algerian origin in France do not constitute a singular cultural or political entity;
rather they engage with multiple discourses and forms of belonging that cross-cut French
and Algerian spaces and that operate over time in concert with each, and at other times in
conflict or tension.
Because the Parisian area has “welcomed a disproportionate share” of immigrants
from former colonies, especially Algeria, the city (and surrounding banlieues) has been
shaped and reshaped by their presence (Kaplan, 2015, p. 23). Whereas immigrants and
the second-generation make up 20 percent of the population of metropolitan France, in

8

Colonial Algeria held two unique characteristics—being a settler colony and a
constitutional part of the national territory. No other territory outside France held this
status.
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Paris they comprise 43 percent of the population, in some neighborhoods of Paris, that
number is even higher, such as the département of Seine Saint Denis, where the
immigrant population is as high as 30 percent of the population, a majority of which are
of Maghrebi descent (18 percent of the population) (Beauchemin et al., 2010; Simon,
2012, p. 14; INED, 2020b). Further, approximately 40 percent of Algerian immigrants in
France live in the Paris metropolitan area, and 33 percent of second-generation Algerians
live in the Paris metropolitan area (Beauchemin et al., 2010, p. 17). The presence of such
a large Algerian immigrant group in Paris, coupled with the city’s place in Algerian
history (see Chapter Four) where a massacre of Algerian immigrants occurred in 1961,
Paris makes for a complicated environment in which to study immigrant identity. I argue
that it is this complexity that gives this research significance and relevance in broader
theoretical discussions of citizenship and integration in the contemporary world.
Study Population
I chose to focus my research on the city of Paris, France, due to its large
immigrant population. Of the 12 million people living in the metropolitan area of Paris,
over four million people are either immigrants (17 percent) or identify as having at least
one immigrant parent (18 percent) (IAU, 2011). The Algerian immigrant community in
Paris is diffused throughout the city. There are noticeable spatial patterns to immigrant
settlement in greater Paris, as shown in Figure 3.1. In this figure, the 20 arrondissements
of the city of Paris are shown in orange, the outlying districts, ‘departements’ are shown
in red (92, 93, and 94). The immigrant population of each geographical unit is shown as a
percentage of the population.

64

65
Figure 3.1 Migrant Population Rates in the Greater Paris Region. (Krause, 2021; OECD, 2018)

For example, the northeastern sections of the city are home to more immigrants
from former French colonies in the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) than other
areas; immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa have also settled in these areas, primarily in
the 18th, 19th, and 20th arrondissements; there is a small Turkish population in the 2nd and
10th arrondissements, and a Chinese population in the 13th arrondissement—though all of
these neighborhoods (including “Arab neighborhoods”) tend to be multicultural in
character and are not contiguous across the Parisian urban landscape (Kaplan, 2015, p.
28; Silverstein, 2004, p. 91). Where certain neighborhoods of the city, such as Barbes (in
the 18th arrondissement) or St. Denis (in the 93rd département), do have a particular
Algerian character, they also show the influence of the other immigrant groups from Asia
and Africa. This diffusion of immigrant groups was part of a concerted effort by France
to “break down structures based on mechanical solidarity and to foster social integration”
(Silverstein, 1998, p. 3).
This research began with two designated sites: the 13th arrondissement in Paris
and the Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue (in the 94th département). These sites were
chosen during the pilot study in June 2015. The sites were selected for their different
situation relative to central Paris—one an arrondissement within the city limits of Paris,
and the other, a banlieue, outside the city limits of Paris9. Both sites were neighborhoods
with significant immigrant populations but were quite distinctive in terms of access to
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There is a great deal of economic and ethnic unevenness within the Paris metropolitan
area—one main source of disparity is the difference between the city of Paris itself and
the banlieues (Kaplan, 2015). While not all banlieues are poor (there are several wealthy
suburban neighborhoods outside Paris), there are “large swatches of neighborhoods
marked by a great deal of social housing, a larger mix of industrial land uses, and a
heightened immigrant presence” (Kaplan, 2015, p. 27).
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social, cultural, and educational resources. Economic growth has been concentrated
inside the périphérique of Paris; banlieues have been effectively isolated from this
growth due to a lack of public transportation (Driggers, 2018). Some banlieues have
unemployment rates as high as 40 percent (Driggers, 2018). Furthermore, educational
expectations and opportunities are vastly different between the two sites. Access to
higher education, employment opportunities, and other life chances are tremendously
lacking in the banlieue (Selby, 2011).

Figure 3.2 Map of Initial Study Sites. (Google, n.d.)
As the research continued in 2016 and 2017, I visited prominent centers of immigrant
religious and cultural life (e.g., the Algerian Cultural Center, the Berber Cultural
Association, the Paris mosque, etc.) and attended communal events (e.g., a book reading,
a storytelling event, a Berber festival, etc.) that my participants informed me about that
were associated with the Algerian or broader immigrant community that were located
outside of my initial two study areas. At these places and events, I encountered people of
Algerian backgrounds from different areas of Paris who desired to participate in the
research. Following the approach of snowball sampling (outlined below), I was able to
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make further connections with other Algerian-origin individuals in Paris who both
participated in culturally identified organizations and also those who did not but
identified in various ways as Algerian. As I gained access to research participants that
lived all over the city of Paris (and its suburbs), I eventually abandoned my initial
attempts to limit participation to people of Algerian descent who physically lived only in
the 13th arrondissement and the Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue. By including
participants from varying places in the Parisian area, I was able to understand broader
patterns of movements—for example, many Algerian-origin individuals have a small
‘everyday mobility’—that is, the places they live, work, and socialize—by including
participants from other areas, I was able to contextualize their spatial movements in a
broader context, rather than in isolation (in only 2 locations). However, I did work to
ensure that as the geographic distribution of the research participants grew, the type of
neighborhood stayed true to the initial intention to collect participants from either an
immigrant neighborhood within the city limits of Paris (similar to the 13th
arrondissement) and from a disadvantaged immigrant neighborhood on the outskirts of
town (similar to the Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue).
My interest also homed in on the connections between these neighborhoods and
broader relationships and mobilities across urban space toward the goal of capturing a
broader set of spatialities by not assuming that people are contained in their
neighborhoods. While the direct statistical comparisons were not purely equal, the sociospatial aspects of the neighborhoods were, in fact, quite comparable in terms of
immigrant population, access to (or lack of access to) various socioeconomic entities like
transportation, education, housing, employment, etc.
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For this portion of my analysis, I categorized each interview participant’s
locations (i.e., home, interview, etc.) into one of my two locational parameters—
immigrant arrondissement or immigrant banlieue. This approach is not without
shortcomings, in that the findings from my research cannot be generalized as indicative
of any specific arrondissement or banlieue. Yet, I found this to be an opportunity to
greatly enhance my understandings of life for Algerian immigrants and their descendants
in Paris by expanding the geographies that I included in my analysis. In so doing, I was
able to find patterns in experiences that occurred within and across different spaces.
During data collection, I lived with an Algerian-origin family in the 20th
arrondissement of Paris. The population of the 20th arrondissement in 2016 was around
200,000 people; of that total, over 43,000 residents were immigrants (OECD, 2018).

Figure 3.3 Map of Residence Location in the 20th Arrondissement. (Google, n.d.)
The household in the 20th arrondissement in which I lived during my fieldwork was
headed by Kahina10, a woman that I met through a mutual acquaintance, Said (whom I
discuss below). The family is atypical of most Algerian-origin families, comprised of
only a mother and a daughter (born in 2001). Kahina, whose life-story I discuss in greater
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All names used to describe participants in this research are pseudonyms.
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detail in later chapters, immigrated to Paris (in the mid-1990s) following her marriage in
Algeria to a French citizen born in Algeria. Kahina’s immigration path—involving a
move to France after marriage to a naturalized French citizen —is extremely common
among Algerian families in France. Kahina herself was born in Algeria just after the
Algerian War in the mountainous Kabyle region. Her mother did not register the birth, a
common practice in Algeria. Today on her French identity card, Kahina’s birthday is
listed as July 5, a day that she chose for its significance as Algerian Independence Day.
Kahina’s remaining sibling stayed in Algeria; she has one cousin, Malik, who lives in the
Paris metropolitan area, with whom she keeps regular contact. Kahina and her husband
divorced in the mid-2000s, and he now lives in the Alsace region of France with his new
wife, though he and Kahina stay in contact and remain friends. The absence of a male
family member means that Kahina’s male cousin, Malik, visits regularly and stays over
on many occasions as a father figure for Kahina’s daughter, Aida (though Aida dislikes
Malik intensely). Both Kahina and Aida had their own bedrooms, and I slept in the third
bedroom. The apartment was on the third floor of a set of buildings within a gated social
housing complex. This section of the neighborhood was characterized by older buildings,
and a relatively high concentration of immigrants for the 20th arrondissement.
As mentioned above, I met Kahina through a mutual acquaintance, Said, who,
along with this wife, Fadila, served as my primary gatekeepers. Said and Fadila were
familiar with me as I had spent many hours in their café during the preliminary research
stage of this work. Said’s café in the 13th arrondissement is a meeting hub for Algerians
and other North African immigrants in the area. Said enjoyed his role in my research and
took pleasure in introducing me to possible participants. He provided space for me to
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meet, interview, and interact with the local Algerian population. The special relationship
that I shared with Said, Fadila, and their children greatly assisted me when meeting
possible interview participants and gave me credibility and a level of trust that would
have been difficult to achieve without their assistance.
I also invited assistance from academic colleagues at universities in Paris, namely
a graduate student (also an interview participant) Sarah, who assisted me in meeting other
Algerians in banlieue areas outside of Paris11. I enlisted the help of my host-mother,
Kahina, asking her to inquire with her friends and family to find people interested in
talking with me—either formally for an interview, or informally to offer their opinions on
my research. The informal conversations with Kahina started as brief and polite
conversations about the nature of my research and interests; over time, these
conversations became great debates (mostly friendly but sometimes contentious) that
grew to include Kahina’s friends and family.
My insertion into the intimate everyday life of an Algerian immigrant family
living in Paris, and my relationship with Kahina and her daughter, in particular, was
indispensable to this research project. Kahina’s frustrations of life in social housing, with
a fixed income, and as a single woman became clearer to me over time. The constant
interaction with Kahina’s family and friends, and with Said and his café customers, also
allowed for more casual and natural conversations, rather than simply interview-style
questions and answers, as well as greater acceptance by and familiarity with the people
whose lives I was studying.
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Sarah, as I will describe in the coming chapters, was conducting research in an
Algerian neighborhood north of Paris. Additionally, she was from the Champigny-surMarne banlieue and took me to visit and interview members of her family.
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When my data collection concluded and I left France to return to the U.S., I was
invited to join Kahina, Fadila, and their children on a trip to Algeria the following
December (in 2017). When I arrived in Algeria, I met people that were connected to
many of my research participants, and I travelled with or visited six of my actual
participants themselves. My long engagement in the field, over the course of many years,
and my extensive knowledge of Franco-Algerian relations was found to be incredibly
endearing to my hosts and others that I interacted with. Algerians seemed to appreciate
my interest in their life and culture in a heartfelt way. This personal trip to Algeria
offered insights into the transnational components of Algerians’ everyday lives and
experiences. The trip provided an understanding of the many cultural nuances of Algerian
life and culture that I only understood as being ‘out of context’ in the French
environment—things like hospitality, reciprocity, kinship, and the vivid memory of
French Algeria that lives on today, even in rural Algeria. This additional aspect of my
education of Algerian culture and experience provided tremendous contextual
understanding of my work and research.
While I ended my months of fieldwork in Paris in August of 2017, I remained
(and remain) closely connected to my interviewees’ lives and struggles. I have been able
to stay in contact with many of my research participants via email, Facebook, and
WhatsApp over the years. These forms of long-distance fieldwork do not replace the
direct observation of and participation in the everyday lives of Algerian immigrants and
their descendants in Paris, they do, however, show that geographic fieldwork is a
“multiply mediated endeavor” that spans geographic space and time (Silverstein, 2004, p.
x). This manner of research also functions along the same conduits of communication
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that the Algerian immigrants that their families use to stay in touch—effectively adding
me, the researcher, into the social network of activity between France, Algeria, and now,
America.
Sample Description
Through the sampling techniques described previously, I was able to build a pool
of 73 research participants. I wanted to capture the intergenerational transmission of
cultural practices and values of the Algerian community to their children,
intergenerational tensions, and differences in viewpoints by class and education level,
gender, and legal status. Of the interview respondents, 45 were men (62 percent), and 28
were women (38 percent). Forty-six participants were born in Algeria (63 percent), and
27 were born in France (37 percent). Forty-six participants were first-generation
immigrants (58 percent), 25 were second-generation (34 percent). Two additional
interviewees were unique cases—one was the descendent of a pied noir12 and the other a
French woman who culturally identified as Algerian. Two participants were under the
age of 20 (3 percent), 28 participants were in their 20s (38 percent), 20 were in their 30s
(27 percent), 10 were in their 40s (14 percent), six in their 50s (8 percent), five in their
60s (7 percent), and two in their 70s (3 percent). The levels of educational attainment of
the respondents included seven (10 percent) elementary, 21 (29 percent) high school, 28
(38 percent) university degree, 13 (18 percent) master’s degree, and four participants (5
percent) held PhDs. The class status13 of the respondents included 35 working class (48
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Pied Noir is a term that describes the European colonists that lived in Algeria during
French occupation. I discuss this group further in Chapter Four.
13
Following the “Subjective Social Status” measures outlined by the American
Psychological Association, I determined class status from the recommended
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percent), 18 middle class (25 percent), and 20 upper class participants (27 percent). Of
the respondents, 22 held only Algerian citizenship (30 percent), three had only French
citizenship (4 percent), and 48 had dual citizenship in France and Algeria (66 percent).
All 22 respondents with Algerian citizenship (only) expressed a desire for French
citizenship. Thirteen of the 22 respondents with Algerian citizenship (only) were illegally
residing in France; two of these were women in their 30s who were born in Algeria
during a family holiday and were not able to complete the necessary requirements for
French citizenship14. These two cases represent what I call ‘split families’ in which
members have different legal statuses. All but four of those living illegally in France
were actively working to regularize their status, and all identified as ‘Algerian’ (and not
Berber or French). The 48 respondents who hold dual citizenship in France and Algeria
include all but one of the second-generation participants and the majority of the firstgeneration respondents.
Thirty-six participants identified as ‘Algerian’ (50 percent), 20 participants
identified as ‘French’ (27 percent), and 17 identified as ‘French-Algerian’ (23 percent).
When asked to identify their heritage, 48 respondents claimed Algerian heritage (66
percent), 23 claimed Berber descent (31 percent), and two respondents (mentioned
above) had special circumstances (3 percent). The primary language preferences of the
interview respondents were 50 (69 percent) French, 17 (23 percent) Arabic, and six (8
percent) Berber. The religious affiliations of the research participants included one Jew,
52 (72 percent) practicing Muslims, and 20 (27 percent) non-practicing Muslims. Of the

measurements of education, income, occupation, and family size and relationships
(American Psychological Association, 2015).
14
I discuss both of these cases in the empirical chapters.
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20 non-practicing Muslims, 9 described themselves as ‘culturally Muslim,’ that is,
Muslims who are non-practicing but retain an attachment to elements of Islamic culture15.
In addition to my Algerian-origin interviewees, I also interviewed a French social
worker, a French veteran of the Algerian war, four Moroccan immigrants, and a Tunisian
immigrant—these interviews occurred from a misunderstanding of my research invite
(e.g., if I was looking for ‘Maghrebi’ immigrants or just Algerian immigrants), another
that overheard me interviewing someone in Said’s café (war veteran), and another that I
encountered while in an Algerian neighborhood (French social worker). I did not include
these in my formal analysis, but I did draw on these interviews to create a broader sense
of context and to better understand some of the experiences and attitudes of my
interviewees.

15

I further discuss the idea of a ‘cultural Muslim’ in Chapter Six.
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Table 3.1 Description of Sample Participants and Key Social Factors
Social Factor

Number of Participants

Percentage of Total

Male

45

62%

Female

28

38%

First Generation

42

58%

Second Generation

25

34%

Low Education

7

10%

High School Education

21

29%

University Education

28

38%

Graduate Education

17

23%

Working Class

35

48%

Middle Class

18

25%

Higher Class

20

27%

The study population recruited for this research may not be representative of Algerian
immigrants and their descendants in a way that would allow for inferences across the
entire population of Algerians in France, or even in Paris. Because data relating to
ethnicity and religion is not collected by the French government, there is an overall lack
of data available for comparison or analysis of the level of representation of this
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population sample (Simon, 2012). France has, however, collected data on incoming
immigration—so called “foreign entries”—since the 1990s (Thierry, 2004). Additionally,
a landmark study titled the “Trajectories and Origins survey” was undertaken in 2008 by
the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) and the National Institute of
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) on a sample of 21,000 people including
immigrants, individuals born in French overseas départements, their descendants, and
persons born in metropolitan France without immigrant parents (Beauchemin, et al.,
2010, p. 5).
The Trajectories and Origins (TeO) survey found that education levels varied
widely according to origin, time of arrival, and reason for admission (Beauchemin, et al.,
2010). Among descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb, “the proportion of men
with low or no [educational] qualifications is almost twice as high as for the mainstream
population” (Beauchemin, et al., 2010, p. 37). Accordingly, 43 percent of Algerian
immigrants aged 18-50 have no qualifications or only primary or lower secondary school
education levels (Beauchemin, et al., 2010, p. 38). Among Algerian immigrants and their
descendants, the study found an unemployment rate of 16 percent (Beauchemin, et al.,
2010, p. 54). Accordingly, the TeO study found that “42% of immigrants will become
French…among descendants of immigrants born in France, 97% have French
nationality…just over 20% of immigrants and one third of their descendants have dual
nationality” (Beauchemin, et al., 2010, p. 115). The survey reported that 33 percent of
Algerian second-generation participants held dual citizenship (although they found that
Algerians, more than any other immigrant group, held dual citizenship) (Beauchemin, et
al., 2010; Simon, 2012). From this information, it can be determined that the interview
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participants for this research do reflect important demographic traits of the broader
immigrant population in France and in Paris. Therefore, while the findings of this
research may not be statistically representative, per se, the experiences described by the
participants of this research are likely not atypical.
Research Context
Prior to my arrival in the field, Paris experienced a series of terrorist attacks that
greatly influenced the research. In January of 2015, terrorists attacked the Charlie Hebdo
satirical newspaper’s headquarters and killed 11 people. Two days later, the Charlie
Hebdo terrorists took a hostage at a printing office while another terrorist killed four
people and wounded four others in a kosher supermarket16 in the 20th arrondissement
(Chatignoux et al, 2018). The Charlie Hebdo attacks occurred 6 months before my first
fieldwork experience, another terrorist attack occurred 6 months afterwards; yet another
incident occurred around the same time in Nice (in the south of France).
The attacks framed my work, affected my interviewees’ participation and
responses, and provided a sense of urgency to the work I was undertaking. The attacks
were all perpetrated by men of North African descent, either Algerian or Moroccan, and
all were tied to Islamic extremism. These events fueled the distrust in France toward
North African immigrants and their descendants, and toward Islam (which French
political discourse often views as a monolithic set of beliefs and practices). The attacks
featured prominently in the presidential election in the spring of 2017, as candidates
positioned themselves as ‘tough’ on Islam and immigrants in French society. Such

16

The kosher supermarket was one block away from my residence for the preliminary
research and one metro stop away from my residence during the official data collection
stages.
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political posturing compounded the general unease among Parisians with regard to North
African immigrants and Islam and created a sense of embattlement among many North
African immigrants. This is reflected in my research interviews.
The city of Paris also changed over the course of my research in ways that
reflected a suspicion of terrorism. These changes included things like increased security
all over the city (and an increase in weapons used by police and security forces) and took
the physical form of fencing around specific locations like the Eiffel tower—fencing to
control and manipulate crowds in a way that allowed for increased security. These
changes affected me in practical terms (e.g., longer transportation times because of
increased security) and emotionally (e.g., sadness at the loss of a beautiful scenic
landscape around the Eiffel tower, a heightened sense of general anxiety). A particular
incident stands out in my memory when, after a French loss to Portugal in the World Cup
soccer tournament, I was in a crowded public area in Tours, France. A large wooden
pallet somehow fell onto the concrete, making a loud crashing sound, akin to gunfire. The
crowd reacted sharply; some people screamed, and everyone ran for cover in kitchens, or
locked themselves in public bathrooms with other people. This sense of being constantly
‘on-guard’ and of assuming every loud sound was an attack of some kind permeated the
everyday lives of people in France for a long time.
These experiences and the situational effects of socialized fear likely influenced
my research outcomes. The relative frequency with which acts of terror were occurring
during the research timeframe was a topic of discussion in nearly every interview and
conversation. Following the first few interviews, I added questions to the survey
questionnaire about the attacks. Interview participants seemed generally comfortable
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speaking about this topic, albeit with furtive glances to our surroundings before they
spoke of the terrorism occurring across France. The 2017 presidential election was also a
fruitful discussion topic, and I used it to probe my respondents’ ideas about belonging
and integration in French society. The feelings of urgency surrounding terrorism, the
election, and the place of (Algerian) immigrants in French society during this time, I
think, offered richer data from my study population than might otherwise have been
possible owing to the significance of the experience of immediate marginalization (as
opposed to historic), coupled with a presidential election centered on racism and
immigration.
Reflexivity: Power Relations in Interviews and Participant Observation
Scholars of qualitative research methods have addressed the relationships of
power that exist between interviewer and interviewees during the collection and analysis
of qualitative data. The unequal relationship between interviewer and respondent along
the lines of gender, race, and class can influence responses to interview questions by
participants (Kobayashi, 1994). As a white American woman with a secure legal and
racial position in U.S. society, I had to be attentive to the difference in societal security
between myself and the research participants who, in general, occupied subordinate
positions in French society. This situation placed me as an ‘outsider’ but one, arguably
with more political/cultural capital at my disposal. At the same time, I was entirely
dependent upon them to connect with people, to open themselves and their homes to me,
and to share their life experiences with me. Therefore, power flowed between me, the
researcher, and the research participants in different ways.
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I often found that my Americanness was associated with a notion of a celebrity of
sorts for many people of Algerian backgrounds. Repeatedly, I was greeted with confusion
as to why a Christian American female with no connection to Algerians in a familial
sense would ever be interested in conducting the sort of research that I was conducting.
Many of the respondents found my interest in their struggles and experiences endearing.
As a female outsider, my access to male-dominated spaces was limited in some ways, but
my gender gave me to access the very feminine domestic spaces, which gave me
particular and valuable insights into women’s lives. I had to be cognizant of the cultural
codes of conduct—whether that included my dressing in a very conservative manner (in
Algeria), wearing a headscarf (to visit a mosque), or meeting single men in public areas
only (Valentine, 2005).
One of the greatest challenges of conducting qualitative research is getting close
enough to research participants to develop interpersonal connections strong enough to
earn trust and be able to gather “deep, meaningful data” without getting too close with
respondents (Maier and Monahan, 2010). Problems can arise if researchers become so
intimately involved with respondents that the ability for “dispassionate inquiry or
analysis is compromised” (Maier and Monahan, 2010, p. 2). For example, I was often
caught between my host-mother and her daughter—in one instance, I was asked by
Kahina to read her daughter’s journal, which was written in English to keep her Mother
from reading it. I had to scramble in order to keep the daughter’s confidence and
protecting her privacy while doing my best to assuage Kahina’s fears of the content of the
journal. Another problematic aspect of this research in particular is that many of my
interview participants were living in France with tenuous immigration status (illegal
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residence), and overcoming their initial suspicion took time. In multiple cases,
participants would not admit their illegality until later in the interview—illegality is a
way of life for many Algerians in France and while it was a sensitive subject, I did not
feel that I was endangering them or taking undue advantage of them for this research at
any time.
Qualitative research necessarily involves the researcher entering a social world,
where in my case, I witnessed the hardships faced by people of Algerian origin in Paris in
a way that made me sympathetic to their struggle. In the months following my immersion
in the field, I worked to detach myself emotionally from the situation so that I could
approach the information I had collected more analytically. I achieved this by crosschecking my ideas with others and by looking at my ideas from the opposite perspective
(Adler and Adler, 1993). But I also recognize that detaching myself completely was
impossible. Following feminist research ethics, I have tried to remain cognizant of my
role in the research and the ways my personal relationships with the study participants
may have impacted the results (Ackerly and True, 2008, p. 699). These impacts are real,
and they pervade my analysis; still, I do not believe they make the findings less valid,
trustworthy, or meaningful.
Primary Data Collection
Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the primary data collection technique
for conversations with research participants. Semi-structured interviews consist of several
key questions that outline the subject areas of the research but allow for the participant to
diverge from the main topic to elaborate an idea or respond in more detail (Gill et al,
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2008). The advantage of using semi-structured interviews for this work involves the
flexibility to adapt to each individual interview—while the questions were ‘structured’
(predetermined), the nature of open-ended questions allows for the participant to take the
discussion into areas not initially determined by the survey. Data collected during the
interviews included demographic information and also narrative information that often
came in the form of storytelling. Stories are “social artifacts, telling us as much about
society and culture as they do about a person or group” (Reissman, 2008, p. 105). As
described above, the interviewing process began with the selection of key informants and
proceeded through snowballing (Longhurst, 2010). As I have noted, I was able to create a
varied study population, while not statistically representative, captured a range of class,
generational, and legal status in the Algerian-origin community.
The interview included questions of origin, arrival experiences in France (where
pertinent), and perceptions of and engagements with various institutions and social spaces
in France. Toward the goal of exploring the range of possible identities, I began by
asking how participants identified themselves in their everyday lives, which typically led
them to describe their (often intersecting) identities and religious affiliations.
Interviewees were then presented with a series of questions about space and place.
Respondents were asked to discuss their sense of ‘home,’ feelings about their
neighborhoods, their sense of belonging in Paris, and whether (or not) they avoid certain
spaces. Additionally, the interview included questions about social groups and affiliations
with group members. I also asked respondents to describe their understandings of
integration—that is, what do they feel they are integrating into, and what is it that is
required of them to integrate. The final set of questions dealt with contemporary issues of
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belonging in modern-day France. These questions evolved over the development of this
research to follow the current events and political situations that directly involved
members of the Algerian community, as outlined previously. However, the general order
and layout of the survey questionnaire stayed largely consistent over time. The survey
questionnaire is attached as Appendix A.
Prior to the start of every interview, I discussed the anonymity and confidentiality
of the interview in this research and obtained their permission17 to record the interview. I
recorded the interview on a digital recorder and took handwritten notes during the
discussion. I asked follow-up questions for clarification of particular points of their
narratives and worked to verify my impressions and understandings of the interview
conversation (member-checking) (Glesne, 2011). Promptly after the interview, I
documented general observations ranging from the tone of the conversation, my personal
feelings about the discussion, and anything that surprised or interested me during the
course of the interview. I typically told interviewees beforehand that the interview would
take about an hour, and some interviews did take an hour (or less), but more often than
not, I spent multiple hours with participants. Many participants initiated subsequent
meetings or conversations, in cases where I did interact with a participant again, I did not
use my digital recorder but took handwritten notes. In some instances, as noted
previously, some of these ‘follow-up conversations’ are still ongoing, via email,
Facebook, or WhatsApp. Frequently the follow-up conversations and meetings were
intended to be social rather than for research purposes; and in other cases, what I

17

Not all participants gave permission to record their interviews, in those cases, I took
handwritten notes only.
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interpreted to be a social gathering was in fact for my research purposes—like being
invited for an iftar celebration, or when I was invited for a coffee and a participant had
(unbeknownst to me) invited her sister over for an interview.
I attempted to conduct the interviews in the language that the participants chose
(French or English). However, my French skills were not to a level of fluency that I could
communicate the vast detail of my research in French alone without an interpreter, an
aspect that I discuss in more detail below. Interviewees also chose the location for the
interview, if they did not have a location in mind, I invited them to my key informant,
Said’s, café in the 13th arrondissement. The location of the interview was a very
interesting aspect of the research as I often found that participants chose locations far
from their homes. This seemed to be a matter of what made them feel comfortable, or
what they thought would make me feel comfortable as an American (e.g., a popular
tourist place in the heart of Paris, in a neighborhood with a very low immigrant
population, or in a Starbucks café rather than a local place). Sometimes, though,
interviews or follow-up conversations took place in people’s homes, where I was often
invited for a coffee or a meal. In one case, I was entertained by the female members of a
family for an iftar celebration while the only male family member (the son, Karim) ate
separately from us. I was allowed to interview Karim after over a year of association with
the family, but only in the presence of his mother and sisters. Elwood and Martin (2000)
have found that such “choices made by participants about interview locations revealed
information about the social geographies of the neighborhood,” and “were central to
understanding the community’s struggles” (p. 654).
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Some of the interviews were conducted entirely in English or French (a few of
them also involved Arabic and Berber languages when translators were readily
available); a majority of the interviews were conducted in a hybrid communication style
of French and English. Many of the interviewees spoke excellent English, thus decreasing
the possibility for miscommunication and linguistic barriers. Conversely, the interviews
conducted in French were often shorter, less detailed, and held a high possibility for
miscommunication owing to my lower ability to communicate in the French language.
For many of these interviews, I had an interpreter present. I worked with two young
women (both second-generation Algerians) specifically as interpreters. Both were
relatives of interview participants that helped with an initial interview and offered to help
with additional interviews. While I offered to pay each of them for their time, both
refused (I suspect that they were influenced by their families) and instead allowed me to
purchase a hot beverage (tea or coffee) for them during the interviews. Having an
interpreter present certainly affected the flow of the interview with frequent interruptions
to interpret the conversation, though I did not notice a change in the comfort level of the
participant. Interviews with interpreters continuously changed between languages—
English, then French, Arabic or Berber, then back to French.
Interviews with an interpreter were longer and often covered less material, owing
to the additional time that translation took. However, with the help of translators, I was
able to interview individuals that I otherwise would not have been able to communicate
with (e.g., those that spoke only Arabic). Still, I acknowledge that communication
problems detract somewhat from the robustness of my findings, insofar as I was not able
to fully capture the views and stories of a significant segment of the Algerian immigrant
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population that is not multilingual. The snowball sampling of my participants, I assume,
involved a sort of ‘cherry-picking’ of participant’s friends and family that were known to
speak English—that is, it is likely that my snowball method was directed at multilingual
(English-speaking) participants. In some areas (as I discuss in later chapters) Englishspeakers were rare (as the case of the banlieues), this may have affected my findings in
that, I interviewed more highly educated Algerians than are representative of the general
population.
Data Analysis
Evaluative Criteria and Coding
Following the fieldwork phase of the research, the recordings of the interviews
were transcribed and prepared for analysis. The analysis of the data was organized around
the topics that relate to the primary research questions outlined above and covered the
following criteria:
(1) Algerian Identities: Interviews and observations were evaluated according to the
participants’ (a) self-identification (e.g., Algerian, French, Arab, Berber, and/or
combinations of these); (b) explanation of the identity categories and relationships
between identity categories (i.e., whether different identities are compatible or
incompatible, whether they are ‘activated’ in certain situations or circumstances;
whether they are ‘public’ or ‘private’; whether they are chosen or ascribed by
others); (c) description of the terms of belonging or exclusion from certain groups
(i.e., whether their friend groups included others with similar self-identification or
if they possessed cross-cultural friend groups; whether they were welcome to (and
did or did not) participate in what they identified as ‘mainstream French’ cultural
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activities and groups); (d) understanding of how historical memories influence
their notions of belonging and identity (i.e., does the postcolonial status of
Algerians in France influence their perception of belonging to French or Algerian
social groupings; does this status elevate them (or not) in mainstream or in
immigrant groups); and (e) report of the everyday lived experience of being an
Algerian immigrant (or from an immigrant background) in France (i.e., to what
degree do transnational connections factor (or not) into people’s identities, sense
of community and membership, and perceptions of belonging (or not) to different
social groups).
(2) Postcoloniality: Interviews and observations were analyzed according to (a)
participants engagement with postcolonial ways of thinking, acting, and
perceiving (i.e., in what ways do (or not) historical postcolonial mindsets come
into play for Algerians in France; did participants exhibit or experience
(post)colonial actions (e.g., acts of resistance, mimicry, hybridity), and
perceptions (e.g., colonizer versus colonized); did participants recognize or ignore
Franco-Algerian history; (b) the negotiation of group identities and the spaces
associated with different postcolonial identity categories (i.e., to what extent were
memories of French colonialism and the Algerian War meaningful to participants
in the ways in which they understood their position in French society; to what
extent did (or not) they articulate identities as they related to French colonialism
and the Algerian War (e.g., acts of resistance or feelings of shame); and (c) does
the postcolonial status of Algerians in France affect integration (i.e., does it
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preclude their acceptance into French society, does it channel their place in
French society into a ‘purgatory’ of integration).
(3) Spatiality of Integration: Interviews and observations were further analyzed along
the lines of (a) Algerians in Paris ‘reading’ or interpreting spatiality vis-à-vis
social groups (i.e., how do Algerians understand where they belong (are ‘allowed’
or ‘welcome’); how do they understand where they do not belong (are excluded or
‘unwelcome’); what spaces are seen as ‘theirs’); (b) participation in ‘mainstream’
socio-spatial spheres (i.e., do they avoid certain spaces and why; do they frequent
certain spaces and why; do they alter their behaviors in certain places; do they
struggle to gain entry into certain spaces; what are the ‘rules’ associated with
certain spaces; are they willing or able to conform to these ‘rules’); (c) the
creation of subaltern spaces of belonging (i.e., do they create (or imagine) spaces
of belonging that exclude those from different social groups (i.e., French social
groups); do their friend groups exhibit participation in exclusionary practices that
create secure (i.e., coethnic) social groups; and (d) movement between different
spaces (i.e., what factors allow for the movement between spaces; what factors
influence spatial movements).
From the above criteria, I began the evaluation of thematic qualities of the interview and
observation data via data coding. Charmaz (2006) describes coding as a crucial bond
between data collection and the explanation of the meaning of the data collected. A code
works to capture the essence of a sentence, paragraph, expression, or larger section of
text that was captured during data collection. Codes can be applied to interview
transcripts, field notes, documents, journals, interviews, drawings, email correspondence,
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etc. (Charmaz, 2006). The coded material for this research included the interview
transcripts, the interview summary write-ups, personal reflections, and correspondence
with interview participants.
After I read and transcribed each interview, I made notes that related to the
research questions and theoretical direction of the work. I then read each narrative
interview a second time and analyzed for emergent themes using an open coding system
that involved a line-by-line examination of the material from which I generated codes
(Urquhart, 2000). When a theme emerged from the material, I created a coding category.
I repeated this process for each interview participant, then revisited the interviews as I
created new codes and coding categories until all of the data was comprehensively coded.
Through this coding process, I identified patterns which revealed the most relevant issues
and themes throughout the collected data. As the coding process continued, I categorized
data into smaller topic areas, recoded, and then organized it into categorical ‘bins’ (Miles
and Huberman, 1994). An example of this process is as follows: from the demographic
information and family story of migration, participants were funneled into the ‘bins’ of
first- or second-generation, as residing legally or illegally in France, as ‘banlieue
resident’ or ‘non-banlieue resident’—from here, the information collected could be
further categorized under umbrella topics like ‘acts of resistance,’ ‘dedication to family,’
‘rejection of the old world,’ ‘cultural identification,’ and so on.
I used the software analysis program QDA Miner Lite to code the data for
analysis. The software increased the study’s validity with respect to coding consistency
(rather than relying on manual coding choices) (Lewis, 2009). QDA Miner is a
qualitative data analysis software package for coding, annotating, and analyzing
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qualitative data. The demographic information (such as age, gender, marriage status,
place of birth, etc.) for each participant was entered as ‘variables’ into QDA. I then used
my initial set of codes to begin coding the data, these codes included things like ‘Algerian
citizenship,’ ‘French culture,’ ‘dedication to family’ and so on. From these initial codes, I
began to find other themes or recurring topics of the interviews such as ‘absent father,’
‘role of the mother,’ ‘split families,’ etc. and expanded my coding in this way. The
coding guide assigned colors to responses to questions, including how interviewees
identify themselves, and the types of participation and spaces of social interaction they
are involved with. The coding also delineated the demographic traits of the research
participants including age, gender, marital status, generation, citizenship, employment,
language(s) used at work or at home, location of home, and so on. The coding tree
(inclusive of all codes used in this research) is attached as Appendix B. The text was
coded as shown below in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4 Example of Coding Text from Interview Notes
The coded and categorized data was then entered into an excel spreadsheet for analysis as
shown in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5 Example of Excel Spreadsheet
To establish patterns in narratives and identity discourses, I entered participant
demographics and identity claims into multiple spreadsheets as the baseline comparative
tool. Following this, I evaluated the interviewees’ responses to specific topics via the
corresponding demographic and identity claims. For example, traits such as gender,
generation, language, class, education, and citizenship were listed on each spreadsheet;
then, the responses of participants according to the main topic were aligned with the
identity trait. This sorting of data produced patterns within the data of the study
population from which the themes18 of data analysis were founded. The data sorting
established what, if any, connection existed between the demographic variables and the
responses to thematic questions. Secondly, I conducted a reverse sorting of the abovementioned data where I first sorted the data via responses to the questions, then aligned it
with demographic traits. This second action allowed for comparison between groups.
For example, it became clear that many second-generation Algerians expressed a
strong connection with their relatives that participated in the liberation of Algeria from

18

The themes found during data analysis are not suggestive of empirical generalizations
across the Algerian-origin population in France. This research aimed to identify patterns
that suggested certain relationships between people’s experiences, positionality, and their
viewpoints, identities, and attitudes. These claims are suggestive only.
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France (what I have identified as an attribute of postcoloniality) and that this connection
influenced their self-identification as Algerian or Berber. But not all of the secondgeneration respondents expressed this interpretation of their family history or identity;
not all of the interview participants had a connection to the Algerian War at all; and
therefore, this finding cannot be applied across the research population. However, by
focusing on the participant’s historical memories (or familial memories) of the Algerian
War or of colonization, I was able to investigate different ways that family history
influences identity and that generational distance from historical events is important in
notions of belonging for Algerians in France. This forward analysis toward general
themes of the research and then again in reverse from themes to demographics, allowed
for understanding of particular social relationships (and historical memories that
influence them) that then influence Algerian identity and feelings of belonging. Analysis
according to these specific traits and experiences allowed for an assessment of certain
social relationships that might influence immigrant identities and actions.
Additionally, comparing and contrasting within and between groups based on
their responses to different aspects of the interview offered insight into assumptions about
linkages between different types of activities and perceptions of interviewees. This backand-forth approach to data analysis drew attention to the similar claims of identity and
belonging that emerged among different types of people, and on the other hand, to the
very different identity and belonging claims that occurred among similar types of people.
From this analysis, I grouped the data to determine if certain clusters of interviewees
appeared consistently with different types of questions. The intent of this work was to
identify patterns among subgroups to assess how certain factors (e.g., gender, citizenship,
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generation, etc.) might play into identities, senses of belonging, and engagement with
social spaces. Again, the patterns that emerged from this analysis may not be applicable
to the entire Algerian population in Paris. But the patterns illustrate possible connections
between traits of interviewees, self-identification, experiences of integration, uses of
space and so on.
Conclusions
This dissertation applied qualitative research methods in the framework of a
narrative case study and attempted to accomplish findings that are valid and reliable
through meaningful ordering, organizing, and analyzing the data collected. The highly
contextual and subjective explanations of the immigrant experience and the processes of
identity creation and belonging presented by Algerian-origin indivuals in Paris required
the use of qualitative techniques to produce substantive and thorough arguments about
such abstract and unquantifiable subjects. This dissertation focuses on using conclusions
to engage with and contribute to existing theories about immigrant integration, identity,
and belonging in a postcolonial context, and I do not claim these findings to be
generalizable to the entire Algerian-origin community in France.
What is clear from the existing scholarship on immigrant integration, identity, and
belonging is that these ideas are not static processes or experiences, rather, they are
constantly being formed and reformed in and through various spaces, places, and scales.
In analyzing my collected data and investigating the potential trends that the data
suggests, this dissertation intends to illuminate the ways in which Algerian immigrants
and their descendants actively negotiate, mediate, and contend with multiple discourses
and experiences of integration, identity, and belonging—including the rights and access
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to the spaces in which these practices occur. These issues are the focus of Chapters Five,
Six, and Seven, which use interviews to engage with contemporary understandings of
immigrant incorporation. However, before the Algerian immigrant experience in France
can be understood or analyzed, it is essential to first understand the historical context
within which Algerian immigrants and their descendants are situated in France today.
Thus, the following chapter offers a historical background of the relationship between
France and Algeria.
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CHAPTER 4
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The postcolonial perspective on contemporary immigration and integration
politics is crucial to understanding how present-day Algerians in France comprehend
their position in French society—and the possibility of being ‘French.’ The tensions of
postcoloniality19 are nowhere more acute than among Algerians who have now settled in
France (Hargreaves, 1995). In France, Algerians are seen as “culturally distinct…still
marked by exclusionary memories of the colonial period” (Hargreaves and McKinney,
1997, p. 4). While they are long-term residents and often citizens of France, for many in
the majority population, Algerians appear “to belong elsewhere” (Hargreaves and
McKinney, 1997, p. 4) or are treated as outsiders, “denied ‘cultural citizenship’ because
of their background” (Beaman, 2017, p. 1). Postcolonial cultures are “defined, even if
only antithetically, with references to current or former relations between (ex)imperial
nations and their overseas dominions” (Hargreaves and McKinney, 1997, p. 5). Any
understandings about the place of Algerian immigrants and their descendants in
contemporary French society thus needs to trace the historical roots of the conflictual
relationship between France and Algeria from the moment of colonial encounter through
present-day.

19

In this context, postcoloniality refers to the process through which members of the
Algerian-origin community incorporate into their lives and are conditioned by the
sociopolitical and historical forces of their postcolonial existence in France.
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When French forces invaded the Ottoman regency of Algiers in 1830, they
initiated a colonial relationship that has dominated France’s modern history and has
shaped contemporary French society in fundamental, though sometimes hidden or
forgotten, ways. A full understanding of the intimate relationship between colonial
Algeria and postcolonial France requires an examination of the historical production and
consumption of immigrant subjectivities (e.g., ethnicity, class, religion, generation) that
inform the current discourses of identity and belonging. Therefore, this chapter focuses
on two intersecting genealogies—the first relating to France’s 132 years of colonization
in Algeria, the second tracing the history of immigration between France and Algeria.
Algeria occupies a singular position in the history of French colonialism as it was
declared a French département—an integral part of metropolitan France, not merely a
colony (like Morocco and Tunisia). Algeria functioned as a unique experiment of
France’s assimilation policies wherein the land was entirely appropriated within the
‘indivisible’ Republic and given over to a European20 population, while millions of
indigenous inhabitants were excluded from political participation. This chapter attempts
to illuminate the deep imprint that has been left on the collective and personal identities
of those involved in the “long and often tortuous relationship between France and
Algeria” (Hargreaves and Heffernan, 1993, p. i).
As a colonial power, France committed itself to making the idea of a universal
French nation come to fruition; yet colonial subjects were denied the rights of citizenship
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The European population that populated colonial Algeria is referred to by different
terminology from different time periods. At the time of colonization, the Europeans were
called colons. After colonization, they became known as pied noirs which translates
literally to ‘black feet’ but means European colonialists.
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(Reding, 2017). Not only was the colonial experience in Algeria lacking in republican
universality, but it was marked by violence that was explicitly racist and dehumanizing to
Algerian Muslims (Aissaoui, 2009). This tendency of the French to disempower
Algerians while insisting upon a Republican ideology of universality and inclusion
continues to affect Algerians in contemporary France. It is from these roots of
marginalization and colonial violence that the mental universe of Franco-Algerian
relations was built and sustained over time. One objective of this dissertation is to
understand the legacies of colonialism and to trace the institutional racism in France
today to the brutality of the Algerian occupation, the war of decolonization, and France’s
failure to deal with its colonial legacy. This dissertation means to show how ultimately,
French colonial policies of assimilation for Algerian Muslims acted as a proxy for a much
deeper existential debate about the ultimate compatibility of French and Islamic
civilizations.
This chapter begins with a discussion of colonial Algeria, followed by a
description of the migration of Algerians to France and an overview of the Algerian War
of decolonization. The final section is devoted to understanding contemporary French
immigration and integration politics. This chapter explores how the lived experience of
colonial policies affected Algerian political identity, how efforts to construct and defend
French identity altered the position of (and undermined) the rights of Algerians in France,
and how France’s colonial rule of Algeria shaped (and continues to shape) postcolonial
relations in France.
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Colonial Algeria

Figure 4.1 Map of Algeria and France. (Google, n.d.)
Prior to the arrival of the French in 1830, Algeria consisted of three Ottoman
provinces, each governed by a dey that answered to the Sublime Porte in Istanbul
(Silverstein, 2004, p. 40). The urban centers of Oran, Algiers, and Constantine oversaw
an economy that historically relied on grain production and export but had “increasingly
turned to the piracy of European vessels in the Mediterranean by the infamous ‘Barbary
corsairs’ in the ultimate employ of the dey of Algiers” (Silverstein, 2004, p. 40). Algeria
included a majority population of Muslims, and minority populations of Christians and
Jews. Algeria’s cultural, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity was a testament to the
long history of migrations and invasions of the area that included Phoenician, Roman,
Vandal, Arab, Bedouin, and Andalusian conquerors and settlers to the region, “each
having left their imprint on the social, linguistic, and physical landscape” (Silverstein,
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2004, p. 41). Thus, early-nineteenth century Algeria was a place of striking ethnic
diversity and “was comprised of multiple language, religious, and ethnic groups,
including several distinct Berber tribes, Arabs, indigenous Jews, ‘Andalous’ (Muslims
from Spain), Turks, Kouloughlis, freed African slaves, and Mozabites” (Smith, 1996, p.
33).
French colonialism in Algeria began in 1830 with an attack on Algiers by French
King Charles X’s naval fleet in retaliation for a perceived insult made by the Ottoman
dey of Algiers to the French consul during an 1827 state visit (Stora, 2001). Relations
between France and Algeria had been strained over a disagreement in the payment of
wheat shipments and the high occurrence of pirate attacks along the Barbary coast of
North Africa (Stora, 2001). Charles X’s successor, his cousin Louis-Philippe d’Orléans,
sustained the military occupation of Algiers and oversaw its expansion into a colony with
large-scale civilian settlement. By the time that Louis-Philippe was overthrown, the
French military presence in Algeria had grown to nearly 100,000 troops, and the oncetemporary occupation had become a permanent settlement of over 100,000 civilian
colonists (Ageron, 1991, p. 5). In 1848, Algeria became a French département, an
integral part of France (Stora, 2001).
Over the next century, Algeria became the jewel of the French empire and its only
colony with large-scale European settlement21 (Sessions, 2016). Over the course of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, French colons established modern Western
settlements in Algeria that attracted Europeans from other Mediterranean nations (Sloan,

21

By 1962, there were 1.5 million Europeans, colons or pied noirs, living in Algeria
(Choi, 2016, p. 1). For reference, there were just 500,000 Europeans living in colonial
Morocco (de Azevedo, 1994, p. 25).
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2012). While the early imperialists intended on policies of assimilation of the indigènes
(indigenous (native) populations), these were eventually abandoned in favor of racial
segregation and imperial domination. This segregation was carried out both
geographically and socio-economically as the colons established the boundaries between
the European and native populations in Algeria (Sloan, 2012).
In creating Algeria as a settler colony, France established ownership of the
conquered lands during the mid-nineteenth century. The colonial government formalized
the procedures of land transactions through official transfers and exchanges of titles “in
recognition of France’s victory and right to the spoils of land” (Choi, 2016, p. 18). The
expropriation of land was carried out in the manner of other settler colonies where native
inhabitants were forcibly removed from their land via treaties and extra-legal transactions
in order to make physical room for the colonists (Choi, 2016).
Colonial powers in Algeria created laws that eliminated the influence of Muslim
Algerian leaders, expanded the territory under French administration, and imposed an
‘Arab tax’ on Muslim non-citizens (Silverstein, 1998). Under colonial legislation, most
colons had the rights of French citizens (regardless of origin), while the Arab and Berber
majority was governed according to a separate legal code (Barclay et al., 2018). Limited
interaction between settlers and the indigènes “contributed to a deeply ingrained settler
racism that was particularly hostile to any sign of Arabo-Berber social and political
advancement” (Barclay et al., 2018, p. 118). The legitimating premise of this political
system—which assured settler domination of Algeria—was that, at some future date,
Algerians would be assimilable and therefore qualified for civic equality in the republic
(MacMaster, 1997).
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Concerning citizenship in colonial Algeria, in 1865, a mechanism in the form of a
statute for the individual naturalization of Algeria’s indigenous Muslims and Jews was
created by the French colonial authorities which required individuals to renounce their
religion as well as their social and cultural identity (Smith, 1996). This statute created a
secondary ‘subject’ category for Algerian Jews and Muslims that allowed them some
civilian and military rights but excluded them from political rights (e.g., military duty)
(Ageron, 1991, p. 39). In October of 1870, the 1865 statute was revised with the
Crémieux Decree (named for the Jewish Minister of Justice, Isaac Crémieux) which
granted full citizenship to Algerian Jews (Stora, 2001). The Crémieux Decree allowed for
an awkward compromise that partially satisfied the French republican desire to extend
French civilization to new groups, but also recognized that to do so for the entire
Algerian population would negate the very economic and social basis for France’s
colonial possession (Godley, 2006). In this case, Jews were perceived as more suitable
and willing candidates for assimilation. Jews were “assimilated as a kind of vanguard—a
variation on characterizations of them as an ‘intermediary race’ during the conquest
period” that allowed French colonial authorities to claim advancement in assimilation
while continuing to postpone (indefinitely) the “far thornier issue” of assimilation for the
majority of Algerians22 (Godley, 2006, p. 25).
Politician and colonial proponent, Alexis de Tocqueville discussed the progress of
the French assimilation model in 1872 as passing through an initial stage of legal

In addition to ‘assimilated Jews’ in Algeria, were ‘Gallicized Algerian Muslims,’
known as évolués—western educated Africans, literally the ‘evolved ones’” (Cooper,
2002, p. 40). In Algeria, évolués were Arabs by tradition and Frenchmen by education
This group of Algerians rejected the idea of an Algerian nation, rather identifying in
terms of its economic and cultural relations with France.
22
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pluralism and religious toleration where Algerians were governed by laws they could
respect (e.g., laws tailored to their own social, economic, and developmental
circumstances) the government would then gain the moral authority necessary for
successful rule (Tocqueville, 1872). However, the system that was created within the
social structure of French colonial society in Algeria was built upon the concerns of
demographic trends, foreigner assimilation, and the stability of French rule in Algeria
(Smith, 1996). Owing to the vast array of indigenous and European ethnicities and
identities that were present in Algeria at the time of the French colonizing mission,
problems arose in the clear establishment of the categories of ‘colonized’ and
‘colonizer’—and the French state had to manage this extraordinary ethnic diversity
(Smith, 1996). Thus, Tocqueville’s simple path of assimilation23 became unfeasible as
French legislation in Algeria developed in a way that “would thoroughly interfere with
Algeria’s ethnic complexity as the state busied itself with the engineering of the entire
social field; new identities were developed, offered, and then finally imposed, while
others were permanently erased” (Smith, 1996, p. 34). The French government set about
the task of naturalizing the European settlers in Algeria—a way to “francify Algeria”
(Smith, 1996, p. 36).
In 1881, a Code de l’Indigénat (Native Code) was established to regularize the
repressive measures of the French colonial government by legalizing an inferior legal
status for natives of the Algerian colony (Stora, 2001). The Code de l’Indigénat made
punishable by law (for natives only) such ‘crimes’ as “speaking disrespectfully to or

23

Alexis de Tocqueville also had doubts about the feasibility of assimilation policies in
Algeria and proposed racial segregation in Algeria with two separate legislations—one to
govern the colons and one to govern Arab Algerians (Pitts, 2005; Tocqueville, 1872).
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about a French official, traveling without a permit, begging outside of one’s commune of
residence, avoiding compulsory labor, and not reporting a family birth or death” (Nickels,
2007, p. 33). The administration of legal identities for Muslim subjects, combined with
the continued confiscation of land, were indicative of the dual purposes of Algeria’s
settler colonialism—the assimilation of the land and legal subjugation of Algerians (Choi,
2016).
Each subsequent law further solidified the separate treatment of Europeans and
Algerians by extending French citizenship to the colons and to Algerian Jews and setting
up a system where Muslim Algerians were governed by Muslim law and restricted to
second-class citizenship. Early colonial European immigration and territorial expansion
in North Africa was accompanied by the disproportionate entrenchment of settler power
in parliament and the systematic disenfranchisement of Algerian Muslims on the basis of
their religion (Mann, 2017). Consequently, while the 600,000 colons living in Algeria
were granted universal suffrage and offered abundant and cheap land, the 3.4 million
Muslims who had lived on that land were now subjected to repressive legislation and
heavy taxes (Ruedy, 1992). The combination of disenfranchisement of Algerian Muslims,
the citizenship (and attendant benefits) granted to the Algerian Jewish population, and the
privileged position of the colons created a “triangular political conflict” between the
settler lobby, the metropole, and Muslim elites in Algeria as they each “struggled for
control over the direction, methods and objectives of French policy in Algeria” (Mann,
2017, p. 5).
France declared that its system of government, alone among the European
powers, had a special mission to civilize the indigenous peoples under colonial control—
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the mission civilisatrice24 (Conklin, 1997, p. 1). France’s civilizing mission was founded
on Enlightenment philosophy with its beliefs in progress, rational advancement, and
European (Western) superiority (Allen, 2010). The mission civilisatrice was a secular
notion that rested upon certain fundamental assumptions about the superiority of French
culture and the “perfectability of humankind,” and it implied that the French were
particularly suited to carry out this task by temperament and by virtue of their
revolutionary past and their industrial strength (Conklin, 1997, p. 1). The French believed
that the people of Algeria were “hungry for liberty” and were “weary under the yoke of
tyranny at the hands of barbaric and despotic” governments—the people of Algeria were
“ready for the political and social advantages of free society, the rule of law, and respect
for personal property” (Allen, 2010, p. 11). The mission civilisatrice assumed that France
had a “duty and a right to remake ‘primitive’ cultures along lines inspired by the cultural,
political, and economic development of France” (Conklin, 1997, p. 2).
Functioning under the settler colonial ideology of la mission civilisatrice, the
boundaries between citizen and native, created by late nineteenth century legislation,
worked to rationalize, and justify the gross inequalities that the distinctions represented.
French citizenship implied modern, rational individuals whereas natives were “deemed
not yet modern, not quite rational, and not fully individuated—akin to an undifferentiated
mass of children or primitives molded in a society echoing the ancient past of Europe’s
present” (Nickels, 2007, p. 34). Further, the perceived difference in levels of
development of culture and civilization were tied to religiosity and religious traditions25

24

The timeframe of the mission civilisatrice is generally 1870-1930 (Conklin, 1991).
France officially became secular in 1905, well after these initial struggles between
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam in colonial Algeria.
25
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and the religion of Islam became increasingly viewed as ‘backward’ (Said, 1978). The
boundary between citizen and native became racialized between ‘white’ Europeans and
‘dark’ or ‘Arab’ natives.
Over the course of sixty years, between 1870 and 1930, there were two significant
changes in European political thought that were particularly important for this shift in
thinking about colonial rule: first, there were transformations in the way that the French
understood progress and societal development; second, there were new and urgent
concerns about how to establish viable liberal governments in a democratic age (Pitts,
2005, p. 240). To begin, French theories of “progress became more triumphalist, less
nuanced, and less tolerant of cultural difference, as a sense of civilizational—and more
specifically national—self-confidence came to pervade political discourse” in France
(Pitts, 2005, p. 240). The liberal “turn to empire” in this time period (the end of the 19th
and early 20th centuries) was accompanied by an “eclipse of nuanced and pluralist
theories of progress as they gave way to more contemptuous notions of “backwardness”
and a cruder dichotomy between barbarity and civilization” (Pitts, 2005, p. 2). Changing
perceptions of race and new forms of racism (e.g., biological, or ‘scientific’ racism)
contributed to the dramatic shift in France’s perception of Algeria, additionally, the
religion of Islam was seen as “backward and imperfect” (Pitts, 2005, p. 216). Thus, while
liberalism presupposed equality, the endorsement of radically different political standards
for different people (as implied by imperialism) required theoretical justifications that
formed “an often unexpected and indeed uncomfortable element in liberal thought in the
nineteenth century” (Pitts, 2005, pp. 4-5). It is only through this lens of seemingly
contradictory political thought that the French treatment of Algerians can be understood.
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According to French imperial assimilationist thought (in the late nineteenth
century), French institutions would offer Algerians access to a legal system, training, and
education premised in universal principles and rationality, thus ending the irrationality
and religious fanaticism (e.g., Islam) that prevented Algerians from becoming citizens
(Shepard, 2006). However, in reality, most French politicians believed that Algerians
could never become French citizens because they were too different (Shephard, 2006).
Colonial authorities considered the exclusion of the majority of Algerians from the polis
as temporary, and the characteristics that set Algerians apart from other French nationals
“regrettable and surmountable, not complementary, natural, or necessary” (Shepard,
2006, p. 21). Following ideas of assimilationism, “the state and its local agents would
break down what they described as local traditions and structures that promoted
superstition and ignorance,” which they believed were conditions that prevented men
from acting as individuals (Shepard, 2006, p. 22).
In managing the diversity and disunity of the varied population of Algeria, the
French also relied on evolving ‘ethnic’ and ‘socio-geographic’ dichotomies that
privileged the Kabyles26 over the Arabs, and they embraced religious categories that
could be more broadly applied across ethnic lines (Lorcin, 1995, p. 2). A map showing
the size and location of the Kabyle region in Algeria is shown in Figure 4.2 below.

26

Kabyles are the residents of the region of Kabyle in Northeastern Algeria. Alternative
terms are “Berber,” “Amazigh,” and “Kabylie.”
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Figure 4.2 Map of the Kabyle Region of Algeria. (Google, n.d.)
French colonial authorities depended on the ‘Kabyle Myth,’ (or ‘Berber Myth’)
which perpetuated the idea that ethnic Berbers from the Kabyle region of Algeria were
“superior and sedentary over backward and rural nomadic Arabs” (Lorcin, 1995, p. 2).
The Kabyle myth involved the idea of the Berbers’ alleged Christian European ancestry
and the perceived ease of assimilating Berbers as Frenchmen (Camiscioli, 2009). The
myth engendered a viewpoint where Berber people from Kabyle were seen as the least
physically and culturally alien of North Africans (Lorcin, 1995). Mirroring the scientific
racism of the late 19th century, French colonial scholars argued that Berbers “exhibited
somatic features identified with a variety of geographic regions, from the dark skin of
Africa to the high cheekbones of Asia to the green eyes of Northern Europe” and, that
“each successive invasion of the North Africa region had laid a sediment of cultural
heritage absorbed and preserved in the social memory and everyday practices” of Berber
peoples (Silverstein, 2004, p. 56; Rinn, 1889, p. 189). In this respect, the Berbers were
identified “in their cultural, linguistic, and physiognomic hybridity, as exemplars and
vessels of a particular North African history and identity, one in which Europeans and
Arabs had played only a marginal role” (Silverstein, 2004, pp. 56-57). The Kabyle
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Myth27 presented Berbers as hardworking individuals, pitting them against Arab
Muslims, who were presented as lazy, dishonest, sensual, stupid, and lecherous
(MacMaster, 1997). The colonial agenda to divide the Kabyles (Berbers) and the Arabs
(favoring the former over the latter) aimed to separate the population of Algeria into
groups, making it easier to rule the colony (a common strategy in colonial governance)
(MacMaster, 1997).
During the mission civilisatrice (1870-1930), the French were sowing divisions
between the Arabs and Berbers, and between the colons and Algerians, creating deep
distinctions between and disempowering native Algerians through these processes. At the
same time, they were also actively working to find ways of controlling the population of
Algerians in ways to make them more ‘French.’ The colonial civilizing mission worked
to abolish slavery, to advance humanity through education, to reform unsavory cultural
practices, to curb superstition, and to establish political and economic institutions and
laws in colonial societies (Daughton, 2002). Toward assimilating the indigenous peoples
of Algeria, French officials sought to suppress undesirable Algerian mores and to replace
them with desirable French mores. For example, indigenous languages, law, and religion
(i.e., Islam) were to be replaced with French values of freedom, social equality, and
liberal justice (Conklin, 1997). French colonial authorities forced new definitions of
ethnic identity on the Algerian population built on assumptions about the capacity of
different groups of people to embrace the future and become masters of their own history
(Cole, 2012).

27

The Kabyle Myth, first created in the late 1800s, continues today in modern France.
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Toward achieving the incorporation of Algeria into France, colonial authorities
established markets, caravanserails (road-side inns), and roads in the countryside of
Algeria; they also imposed a common currency, the metric system, and civil law to foster
the process of assimilation (Hill, 2006). The French colonial authorities attempted to
assimilate indigenous Algerians, and to foster cultural transformation, by re-shaping the
routines of everyday life. For the state agents, workers, settlers, and local tribespeople,
assimilation entailed “the dialectics of everyday life,” or “the reciprocal determinations”
of the colonial engagement (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, p. 29). In this way, colons
and indigenous Algerians alike remade themselves by “deflecting and appropriating
various aspects of political and economic assimilation, thus creating new forms of
hybridity, mimesis, and difference” (Hill, 2006, p. 23). These forms of assimilation were
intended to make nomads stationary in the new socio-cultural order of liberal
proprietorship and labor (Hill, 2006). The task of making a nomadic population into a
stationary population was at the forefront of the colonizing mission for France.
Another vehicle for assimilatory activities in colonial Algeria was education.
Colonial education is an example of the opportunities (or lack thereof) for civic equality
in colonial Algeria. Schools were viewed as the most important instrument in the process
of integrating colonial space into a centralized national structure (Silverstein, 1998).
Military leaders identified as teachers rather than soldiers and the French called for “an
army of soldier-instructors” (Le Glay, 1921, p. 13). Parochial schools and secular state
schools were established across Algeria, and maps were printed to show Algeria as part
of France (Lorcin, 1995, p. 190). Secular textbooks were brought to Algeria from France
and stated that the students’ history began with “our ancestors, the Gauls” (Citron, 1994).
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For the most part, though, these schools were attended by children from European settler
families, and only a small number of Muslim children (mostly from elite indigenous
families) were allowed to attend (Gosnell, 2002). The Kabyle region was the only part of
Algeria that “experienced deep Western acculturation through French-targeted schooling”
where “Western-style education led to the formation of a Kabyle elite intended by the
French colonial rulers to be used instrumentally to increase friction at a local level” (Fois,
2016, p. 207). Outside of Kabyle, the majority of Muslims who were educated during
French colonial rule instead attended ‘indigenous’ schools that were run either publicly
by French teachers under the authority of colonial administrators or privately by
indigenous educational or religious associations (Gosnell, 2002). An estimated five
percent of Muslim children were in school in 1870—and few Muslims went beyond
primary school during the entirety of French colonization (State, 2018).
Between 1870 and 1930 a wide range of politicians, theorists, colonial
administrators, and Muslim Algerians engaged in protracted and heated debates over
what was variously called la question indigène (the indigenous question), la question
musulmane (the Muslim question), la question algérienne (the Algerian question), or la
question d’assimilation (the assimilation question) (Mann, 2017). These ‘questions’
pertained to whether Algerian Muslims should be subject to French laws, whether they
should receive French or Arabic education, whether they could be conscripted, how and
to what extent they could be incorporated into French political bodies, and whether they
should be allowed to become French citizens while maintaining their ‘personal status’ as
Muslims (Mann, 2017). Ideas of assimilation shifted to ideas of association near the end
of the nineteenth century, in part due to colon and indigenous opposition to social and
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political integration (which, as I have indicated, were deeply problematic and never
intended to create equality). Eventually, the French colonial administration “rejected the
notion that part of its civilizing mission was to make Africans into Frenchmen” (Conklin,
1997, p. 47).
Despite legal and political marginalization, Algerians actively participated in
negotiations over the cultural boundaries of French colonial rule throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Mann, 2017). In the early 1900s, the place of
Islam in French colonial society demanded a reassessment of “the meaning and content
of assimilation itself” (Mann, 2017, p. 76). Thus, theories of association rather than
assimilation became the norm. Association policies engendered new class, racial, and
gender relations and categories with differential obligations and rights (Hill, 2006).
Though contradictory in many ways, the assimilation and association paradigms were
“two sides of the same strategy to establish French sovereignty” in a way that addressed
the refusal of the colons to integrate socially or politically with the indigenous Algerians
(Hill, 2006, p. 20). Policies of association emphasized the acceptance of differences
between colonial subjects and the French, the policies stressed the teaching of ‘authentic’
or ‘traditional’ cultures in colonial schools and channeled civic rights through local
traditional structures (Genova, 2004). Through association, then, colonial subjects would
still benefit from French culture and progress, but they would no longer aspire to have the
same status as the French and therefore no longer challenge the hierarchy of the empire
by attempting to apply French republican values of equality and universalism (Genova,
2004). In the case of French Algeria ‘assimilation’ was an ambiguous program both in
theory and in implementation as the policies carried out under the name of assimilation
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were often actually associationist, “while France continued to insist until the end of its
empire that the ultimate goal of associationist policies remained assimilation
(reconceived in the postcolonial era as integration)” (Mann, 2017, p. 11).
In sum, the creation of French Algeria was predicated on an ongoing political will
in France to carry on with (or at least not to abandon) a financially, physically, and
psychologically costly military occupation that made space available for European
immigrants (Sessions, 2005). This political will was sustained by the conviction that
national honor and the basic identity of the nation hinged on the Algerian colonial
project. Algeria’s two unique characteristics—being a settler colony and a constitutional
part of the national territory—came out of this colonial ideology. While defining French
Algeria, these characteristics also placed the “colony into a liminal, not-quitemetropolitan, not-quite-colonial space” (Sessions, 2005, p. 18). In this way, Algeria both
was and was not a part of France, and the “Algerian question” would preoccupy French
thinkers and French political discourse for decades.
Migration and Revolution
Colonialism not only destroyed indigenous forms of governance and behavioral
codes, but also undermined local economies. The introduction of the Native Code in 1881
(the segregationist and punitive code applied to Muslims) in addition to the imposition of
the European tax system and of individual ownership, “devitalized and dislocated the precolonial economy” (Aissaoui, 2009, p. 42). The dispossession of the most fertile lands by
the French colonial authorities led to large-scale rural exodus (Bourdieu and Sayad,
1964). Migration of Algerians to France began in early colonial times in the late
nineteenth century, owing to increased “pauperization and debt, along with population
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growth, caused more farmers to emigrate to France to become day laborers on French
farms or to work in the factories in French towns and cities,” and emigration “offered
some reprieve from the forces of dispossession” (Aissaoui, 2009, p. 42). Migration was
also, in many ways, a political act against the oppressive colonial regime, insofar as it
laid bare the social, political, and economic marginalization of indigenous Algerians in
colonial Algeria (Aissaoui, 2009).
In the early 1900s, the migration of Algerians to France increased markedly when
the demand for labor increased in France and the French state granted Algerians freedom
of movement to France (MacMaster, 1997). Loosened restrictions on movement mainly
benefited men from the Kabyle region (Camiscioli, 2009). Returning to the Kabyle Myth
(aka Berber Myth), the Berbers were highly encouraged to migrate to France because of
their perceived Caucasian features, which French colonizers believed would render them
more readily assimilable in France (MacMaster, 1997). Also, Berbers from Kabyle had a
history of participating in seasonal labor migrations prior to French colonization. These
historic Berber migrations involved “ancient and extensive patterns of internal migration,
of pilgrims and scholars, nomadic tribes, trans-Saharan traders, and seasonal laborers and
peddlers” (MacMaster, 1995, p. 190). Kabyles made up the “single largest flow of
seasonal migration…during the 1860s and 1870s teams of Kabyle harvesters descended
into the plains…onto the farms of the Algiers region” (MacMaster, 1995, p. 192).
Therefore, the transition from their historic temporary (seasonal) migrations within
Algeria to temporary migrations to France was uncomplicated owing to the relatively free
movement between France and Algeria and the higher wages in France.
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World War I (WWI) brought new and larger waves of Algerian immigrants to
France, as Algerians were mobilized as soldiers and as industrial workers (Sloan, 2012).
In 1912, France instituted obligatory military service (though most conscripts were
voluntary) and nearly 300,000 Algerians were sent to France as workers and as soldiers
in the French Army, and the entire Algerian economy was mobilized for the war effort
(Mann, 2017). By the end of the war, more than one third of Muslim Algerian men
between the ages of 20 and 40 were in the metropole (Ageron, 1991, p. 262). The
experience of large-scale migration to France exposed the paradox embodied in the ideas
of a republican colonial regime in Algeria (Mann, 2017). Through their conscription into
the war effort in France and greater Europe, Algerian colonial subjects learned a new
language of citizenship and rights in the factories, cafés, trenches, and prisons of Europe.
This radically transformed Algerian society and led to the swift emergence of modern
Algerian nationalism (Bouchareb, 2006).
The military service of Muslim Algerians during WWI both obliged the French
government to scramble for new ideological justifications for the persistence of
inequality—which inadvertently provided colonial subjects the conceptual tools with
which to contest this inequality (Mann, 2017). The resolute refusal of the colonial
administration to extend equal political and legal rights to Algerians after the end of
WWI “fatally undermined the validity of the French assimilationist discourse,
fundamentally changing the nature of power relations between Metropole and colony and
fueling the emergence of more radical forms of contentious politics in interwar Algeria”
(Mann, 2017, pp. 10-11). Following the war, a group of Algerian veterans sought to hold
France accountable to the republican ideals of universalism and directly lobbied the
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highest levels of French colonial authority to equalize their status with French settlers and
enable a path to citizenship without abandoning their adherence to Muslim law—
ultimately, the movement was unsuccessful but the “debates and subsequent mass
conscription of Muslims during the Great War opened up a new page in French-Algerian
contentious politics” (Maddy-Weitzman, 2018, p. 126). Forcing colonial troops to fight
(and die) for liberties that they themselves did not possess gave rise to the nationalist and
anti-colonial movements in the mid-twentieth century.
After the Armistice, economic lobbies in Algeria feared losing their colonial
workforce to mainland France and began hostile press campaigns in France “that
denounced the supposed criminality and sexual aggressiveness of Algerian men” (these
stereotypes formed an indelible image of Algerians in France that continue today)
(House, 2006, p. 2). Regardless of the hostile press campaigns and the high level of
surveillance in France, Algerians continued to arrive in France, reaching 100,000
Algerian immigrants in France by 1924 (House, 2006, p. 3). During this time, the
government commissioned studies of the aptitudes of different races under the auspices
of matching suitable employment with different groups of foreigners (Camiscioli, 2009).
Stereotypes of Algerian Muslims as backwards, impulsive, and predisposed to criminality
then justified the extension of the racist colonial system of administrative control to the
metropole and formed the basis for new forms of institutionalized racism against
Algerians (Sloan, 2012). France imposed travel restrictions on Algerians in 1924 by
requiring special papers, including a work contract from the Ministry of Labor and a
clean tuberculosis test in order to apply for a travel permit (certificate d’embarquement)
(Amiri, 2004). However, this measure did not have the intended effect of decreasing the
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number of Algerians travelling to France; rather, it triggered an increase in clandestine
immigration.
In reaction to this increase of Algerians in France, the immigration service was
reorganized at the Prefecture of Police, which then created a new surveillance network
solely for North Africans (Rosenberg, 2006). After the first World War, French
authorities “began to transform an anti-Arab prejudice that was broadly similar to the
prejudices most other migrants encountered into something fundamentally worse”
(Rosenberg, 2006, p. 12). From the years 1925-1945, the special police force tasked with
surveilling North Africans—the North African Brigade—followed Algerians in France
by patrolling immigrant neighborhoods, checking residency papers, conducting
background checks, questioning those who looked out of place, and routinely
confiscating work and residency papers (Amiri, 2004). By 1935, North Africans were
being arrested at four times the rate of the general population (Rosenberg, 2006, p. 162).
Despite their French nationality (if not citizenship), Algerians were excluded from
protections such as legal status and work permits that were extended to other immigrants
(France remained an important destination for labor migrants and political exiles from
around Europe during the interwar period) (Rosenberg, 2006). It was under these
circumstances that Algerians (in France and in Algeria) became politically mobilized and
that the movement of Algerian independence was born. The Etoile nord-africaine (ENA),
the first prominent North African political organization was formed in June of 1926
(Aissaoui, 2009). Led by Sorbonne-educated, Messali Hadj, it partnered with the Parti du
people algérien (PPA) in the interwar period (Aissaoui, 2009). Importantly, though, not
all activists supported full independence. During the interwar period, for instance, the
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Jeune Algérien (Young Algerian) movement, led by Ferhat Abbas, demanded equal
rights within the framework of French sovereignty and championed rights for Muslim
Algerians to be equal to those of the European settlers in Algeria (Stora, 2001).
According to Stora (2001, p. 17), Ferhat Abbas,
expressed a longing for the true France, which exemplified the principles of 1789.
France, the country that had invented democratic culture via the Great Revolution,
could impose on the Europeans of Algeria, respect for the indigenous person
deprived of rights. He therefore [championed equal rights], but remained attached
to Algeria’s religious personality: for him, a person could be simultaneously and
fully French and Muslim.
The onset of World War II once again involved the conscription28 of Algerians for
the war machine as soldiers and factory workers. During the war, with the creation of the
carte d’identité militaire (military identity card), Algerians and other colonial
populations—though not technically French citizens—became eligible for conscription
into the French military. Of the 400,000 men who served in the Armée Française in the
Provence offensive, two-thirds were from French colonies (Amiri, 2004, p. 29). The
Vichy government, in collaboration with Nazi Germany, took control of colonial
holdings in Africa and Asia. In 1942, the Allies (led by U.S. General Dwight D.
Eisenhower) landed in Algiers, Casablanca, and Oran and occupied North Africa
(Canzano and Cohn, 2009). The occupation forces acted as “agents of emancipation” by
promising a new world for formerly subjected peoples, and French General Charles de
Gaulle declared that France was under an obligation to the Muslims of North Africa
because of the loyalty they had shown during the war (Canzano and Cohn, 2009). Yet,
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Conscription of Algerian soldiers during WWII was not a uniform process (owing to
the Nazi occupation of France) and military leadership was not consistent. Further, much
of the Algerian force of soldiers was voluntary (there was an assumption of civil reward
for service, a so-called ‘blood tax’).
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following the Allied victory in Europe in 1945, it became clear that the French
government—though sapped of its imperial authority—did not intend to uphold their
promises of freedom and equality for Algerians (Sloan, 2012).
In the aftermath of the Allied liberation of France, “just as Algerians were hoping
for significant reform—if not outright independence—the post-war Republican consensus
in Paris moved in the other direction in order to revitalize France’s severely dented
colonial grandeur” (House, 2006, p. 3). In December of 1942, Ferhat Abbas drafted the
Algerian Manifesto seeking recognition of political autonomy for Algeria. In response to
Abbas’ manifesto, France began instituting important changes to the legal status of
Muslim Algerians, these changes corresponded with the shift in European thinking about
race in the aftermath of the Nazi defeat. The Statute of Algeria in 1947 instituted
unregulated passage between Algeria and France, and France extended citizenship status
and equal rights to all Algerian men living in France with local civil status in
metropolitan France (House, 2006; Sloan, 2012). Tens of thousands of Algerians took the
opportunity to emigrate—to escape the colonial oppression (and famine) in Algeria in the
hopes that metropolitan France “would provide new economic opportunities and a
different, better form of social relations” (House, 2006, p. 3). The flow of immigrants
changed in three significant ways: first, for the first time in the Algeria-France
immigration history, Arab Algerians began to migrate at the same rates of KabyleBerbers (who had long dominated Algerian immigration); second, entire (nuclear)
families started to emigrate; and third, immigrants began to be less focused on
communities back home in Algeria and thus stayed longer in France, attempting to
integrate into the French working class (House, 2006).
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The expansion of equal civil status did not extend to Algeria itself, and ArabBerber Algerians in France and Algeria were now officially called ‘French-Algerian
Muslims,’ an ethnically inspired sub-category of citizens that Algerians resented (House,
2006). These post-1944 reforms were attempts, by France, to “reconcile republican
values and imperial conquest” but they did little to appease the Arab-Berber Algerian
population (Shepard, 2006, p. 45). Ironically, it was French-educated Algerians—
especially those from Kabyle, who had been favored by the French colonial state and
who had initially migrated to France in greater numbers than their Arab counterparts—
who led the nationalist movement in Algeria (Fois, 2016). During the war era, this group
of educated Algerians had led the revival of the ‘national culture,’ the birth of a
nationalist press, the formation of political groups among the Algerians, and violent
resistance to compulsory military service under the French flag (Saadallah, 1965). After
the war, Algerian nationalism gained momentum as Algerian parties reached maturity
and were capable of clarifying their objectives and operational strategies (Fois, 2016).
A defining moment for these nationalists was the 1945 Sétif massacre in Kabyle,
in which a post-war victory celebration with Algerian nationalist overtones turned into a
violent confrontation with police that left 103 Europeans dead (Stora, 2001, p. 22). In
reprisal for those deaths, the French army conducted shootings and summary executions
among the native population that continued for several days. The French reported 15,000
deaths among the Muslim population, while Algerian nationalists claim a figure of
45,000 deaths (Stora, 2001, p. 22). Edward Behr (1961, p. 52-55) described the Sétif
massacre as,
an event which, in one form or another, has marked every single Algerian Muslim
alive at the time...and the after-effects of the Sétif uprising cannot be
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underestimated. Every one of the “new wave” of Algerian nationalists prominent
in the National Liberation Front today traces his revolutionary determination back
to May 1945. The moderate, French-educated Algerians who had hoped for
progressive evolution towards self-government had their hopes dashed by French
violence. Among the current leaders of the FLN…there is general agreement:
each of them felt after May 1945 that some form of armed uprising would sooner
or later become necessary.
After Sétif, Algerian nationalists became increasingly radical and the paramilitary
group, the Organization Spéciale (Special Organization, OS) was formed in 1947 but
most of the underground militants were arrested in 1950 and many of its leaders were
imprisoned (Stora, 2001). In 1954, a group of former OS members formed the Comité
Révolutionnaire pour l’Unité et l’Action (Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action,
CRUA) (Stora, 2001). The CRUA later became the Front de Libération Nationale (The
National Liberation Front, FLN), established in October of 1954 (Stora, 2001). The FLN
launched the insurrection of November 1, 1954, “which inaugurated the war of Algerian
independence and marked the end of colonial Algeria” (Stora, 2001, p. 27). The FLN
successfully brought the cause of revolution to Algerians with the primary aim of a single
democratic and socialist Algerian Republic (Barei, 2003).
The Algerian War began with the November 1, 1954 coordinated attacks of the
FLN of 30 individual targets against police and military targets (Stora, 2001). The attacks
were meticulously planned, orchestrated, and carried out by Algerian revolutionary
fighters (this attention and focus were hallmarks of the Algerian revolutionaries).
Following the attacks, the FLN issued a proclamation to all Algerians “to rise and fight
for their freedom” (Entelis, 1986, p. 50). After the start of the war, Algerian Muslims
were arrested and regularly tortured by the police and were subjected to increased
measures of racialized subjugation. The question of torture during the Algerian war for
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independence, and the “Algerian Question” more generally, soon attracted international
attention and was raised at the United Nations Security Council in January of 1955
(Entelis, 1986). The United Nations ordered France to implement Algeria’s right to
independence immediately (Horne, 1977). Instead of honoring this demand, France
increased its military presence in Algeria from 80,000 troops in 1954 to 400,000 in 1956
(Aldrich, 1996, p. 294).
Paradoxically, immigration to France did not stop during the Algerian War.
Migration continued to be driven by a labor shortage in France and an employment
shortage in Algeria (Stora, 2001). By 1954, one in seven Algerian men of working age
and ability was living and working in France—212, 000 people, equal to 1/20th of the
entire Algerian population (Sayad and Gillette, 1976, p. 40). Algerians worked in
numerous fields, with high concentrations the industrial sectors of mining and metallurgy
and other heavy industry such as automobile manufacturing during the 1940s-1950s
(Stora, 2001; Samers, 1997). In the 1950s, a construction boom overtook the other sectors
and by 1954, nearly thirty-two percent of Algerians in France worked in construction,
and twenty percent in mechanical and electrical industries (Lyons, 2013, p. 69). Algerian
families fled the violence and instability of the war by migrating to France. By 1956,
there were 300,000 Algerians in France (House, 2006, p. 3).
The Algerian diaspora in France played a leading role in the Algerian War, with
the FLN turning the structural economic inequalities between the colony and the
metropole to their advantage by “funding the majority of their military campaigns against
the French state through regular taxes forcibly raised on Algerians in France” (House,
2006, p. 3). The presence of the FLN on French soil led to a steep increase in police
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surveillance and identity-check operations in France. The police “rounded up literally
thousands of people on the street whom officers judged to be of ‘Algerian’ appearance”
(House, 2006, p. 3). The combination of repressive policing tactics in France, news of
atrocities in Algeria, structural discrimination of Algerians in the French workplace, and
a sustained attempt to forcibly assimilate Algerians all worked to reinforce Algerian’s
resistance to colonial rule and fostered support for the FLN (House, 2006).
In 1956, the war took on a new aspect of warfare in Algeria—urban terrorism
(Barei, 2003). Famously known as the ‘Battle of Algiers,’ bombings occurred in public
civilian areas in Algiers where most Europeans resided. These attacks were especially
notorious because of the part played by three Algerian women, Zohra Drift, Djamila
Bouhired, and Samia Lakhdari, who placed bombs in places frequented by Europeans
(Barei, 2003). In response to these bombings, French General, Jacques Massu directed his
men to find and destroy the terrorist network “through any means at their disposal”
(Barei, 2003, p. 69). This action gave the French military the authority to arrest Muslims
at random. It was at this time that “institutionalized torture became the regular French
police and army intelligence policy of interrogation” (Barei, 2003, p. 69). The United
Nations continued to pressure France for a peaceful and democratic end to the conflict
(Stora, 2001).
The social and political turmoil of the Algerian War led to the fall of France’s
Fourth Republic in 1958, at this time, General Charles de Gaulle came to power (Stora,
2001). During the summer of 1958, General de Gaulle visited Algeria five times to set
out his political agenda for French colonies and to establish personal contact with
Algerians (Barei, 2003). De Gaulle announced that all Muslims were now Frenchmen,
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and he presented a five-year plan that guaranteed the redistribution of land, the
construction of housing and infrastructure, and the creation of jobs for hundreds of
thousands of Muslims (Betts, 1991). He also sought to reduce the political power of the
army in Algeria. In 1959, when the FLN rejected de Gaulle’s offer of a truce, his policy
approach shifted to achieving military victory (Tyre, 2004). On September 16, 1959, de
Gaulle publicly outlined three options for the situation in Algeria to come to a peaceful
end: complete independence, integration, or self-determination in close association with
France (Evans, 2012). This was the turning point in the war, signaling de Gaulle’s
willingness to loosen France’s ties with Algeria. Algeria chose self-determination, and
both sides accepted a ceasefire (Evans, 2012).
In Algeria, the colons were devastated and promptly denounced de Gaulle’s
speech and declared his actions as betrayal. In 1960, the Europeans in Algeria built
barricades around the city of Algiers in protest to the growing realization that Algeria was
headed toward independence. Protests began to take on a violent nature and the
Europeans in Algeria began their bid to save French Algeria. They viewed de Gaulle’s
policies and attempts at reconciliation as “France’s abandonment of her military and
political obligations to the European population in Algeria” (Barei, 2003, 129). A state of
siege began throughout Algeria. At the heart of this new addition to the French-Algerian
battle was the newly created French right-wing body, the Organisation Armée Secrète
(Secret Army Organization, OAS) (Stora, 2001). The OAS began a campaign to destroy
not only the Algerian rebellion but also to gain power from the French army in Algeria
(which had been brought under control by de Gaulle and was working toward an
independent Algeria). The OAS embarked on a terrorist campaign that “formed the
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background against which the final negotiations for Algerian independence were
conducted” (Barei, 2003, p. 130).
In October of 1961, the war in Algeria was brought to mainland France in the
form of what has become known as the ‘Battle of Paris.’ This event provides insight into
the position of Algerian immigrants within French society towards the end of the war,
revealing their “degree of isolation and the depth of racism” within France (MacMaster,
1997, p. 199). On October 6th, 1961, all Algerian cafés in Paris were ordered closed by
the chief of police, Maurice Papon (a former Nazi collaborator), and a curfew was
established that banned Algerians from the streets of Paris between 8:30pm and 5:30am
(Halla, 2014). The police enforced the curfew by arresting anyone who appeared to be
Algerian—including Tunisian, Moroccan, Spanish, and Italian immigrants (Welch and
McGongale, 2013). In protest of the curfew, the FLN organized a peaceful protest for the
night of October 17, 1961 when roughly 40,000 Algerians (of ‘French Muslim of
Algeria’ status) descended upon the famous boulevards of central Paris after curfew
(MacMaster, 1997, p. 200). Algerian immigrants relegated to the margins of society were
making their presence felt and, according to MacMaster (1997, p. 200),
Parisian bystanders were astonished by the ‘invasion’, hundreds upon hundreds of
Algerians marching through the dark and rain of the Grand Boulevards shouting
slogans, ‘Algeria for the Algerians’, ‘Power to the FLN’, or in the case of the
women, uttering the shrill ‘You You’ of North Africa.
With news of the protest, the French government gave Papon the authority to arrest
and/or assault every Arab-looking individual in the streets (Guerdijou, 1998). The
protesters met with 7,000 riot police armed with heavy batons and guns. Unarmed
Algerians were beaten, shot, strangled, and drowned all across the city of Paris (Napoli,
1997). Thousands of Algerians were arrested and transported to holding centers in the
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city where the beatings continued, and many Algerians died in transit or in the detention
centers (Napoli, 1997). Bodies of drowned Algerians, with their hands tied behind their
backs, washed up on the banks of the Seine river for weeks following the incident (Welch
and McGongale, 2013). In all, over 200 Algerians were murdered by the police and
another 11,500 were arrested and held in sports complexes (functioning as holding
centers) (MacMaster, 1997). This event, a massacre, reveals French reactions to Algerian
immigrants in the final phases of the Algerian War, particularly the “hideous beast of
racism” (MacMaster, 1997, p. 200). This event and other violent, racially motivated
events that took place in Paris on and around the 17th of October 1961 are now among the
most notorious and controversial incidents in modern French history (Welch and
McGongale, 2013).
After the Battle of Paris, the momentum for Algerian independence was
irreversible and unstoppable, and de Gaulle accepted the FLN as representing the wishes
of the majority of the Algerian people (Barei, 2003). The violence in Paris not only
changed national discourses on Algerians in France, but also served to create indelible
memories of insecurity and the end of colonialism within the collective consciousness of
the Franco-Algerian relationship (Woodhouse-Ledermann, 2018). In November of 1961,
de Gaulle began talks with the FLN in Switzerland to end the brutal conflict. The Evian
accords were signed on March 18, 1962 that outlined an immediate cease-fire, amnesty,
and the release of all military and political prisoners within twenty days (Barei, 2003).
The Algerian War constituted a significant transformation of the organizational
structure of both France and Algeria. During the course of the war, four-fifths of France’s
territory was torn away and over 500,000 people were killed from both the French and
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Algerian sides of the conflict (Silverstein, 1998; Stora, 2001, p. 111). The war was “not
just about the national liberation of Algeria, but it was truly played out and understood as
a civil war within France” and created a crisis of French nationalism (Silverstein, 1998, p.
102). General de Gaulle encouraged France to see the end of the Algerian War as an
opportunity for France to set a new path. However, France was at the time suffering from
demographic uncertainty, industrial anxieties, and doubt about the nation’s founding
values (Stora, 2001). The war had weakened the French Army, divided the Church, and
divided the country. Only a decade had passed since the end of World War II and the
“kinship and participation in that unique history called “the Resistance” and “the
Liberation” had been shattered” (Stora, 2001, p. 111). The Algerian War caused a
genuine crisis in French nationalism and identity.
Postcolonial Franco-Algerian Relations
Todd Shepard (2006) has argued that French politicians ‘invented’ the concept of
decolonization in 1961 and 1962 to explain Algerian independence as a logical apex in an
emancipatory rendering of French imperial history, to conceal the embarrassment of
losing Algeria to militant rebels, and to reposition France with a focus on Europe rather
than its empire. From this perspective, Algerian independence was evidence that the
French civilizing mission was a success and had run its course by the mid-twentieth
century (Wadowiec, 2014). In addition to the guarantee of Algeria’s independence, a
significant legacy of the Evian Accords was the continued configuration of citizenship
and national belonging through categories of racial-religious difference (Shepard, 2006).
This was equally embraced by Algerians, as shown by comments made by the Ministry
of the Interior in 1962, describing that among metropolitan Muslims, “a sense of racial
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pride has swelled in their hearts and similarly has illuminated in the faces of even the less
nationalistic. This is because, for the [Algerian] worker, [the Evian Accords] signals an
official, French-recognized victory for Islam; it is the end of a complex” of inferiority
(CARAN, 1962). Thus, the racial, national, and religious delineations of geographic
belonging were (re)configured by the Algerian War—essentially rewritten by French
officials.
Further, decolonization clearly had many implications for Algerian migration.
Under the terms of the Evian Accords, two clauses guaranteed that all Algerians with an
identity card were “free to circulate between Algeria and France and while resident in
France they were guaranteed, the same rights as French nationals with the exception of
political rights” (MacMaster, 1997, p. 203). Unprecedented numbers of Algerian
immigrants arrived in France during the 1960s seeking immediate work and stability as
Algeria limped toward recovery after the war. Following the Evian accords, “70,000
Algerians were arriving each week in France, and average net Algerian immigration
increased by about 40,000 per year in the first three years of independence” (Samers,
1997, p. 56). Between 1968 and 1975, the Algerian population in France swelled from
471,020 to 710,690; by 1988, there were 820,900 Algerian immigrants in France (Stora,
2001, p. 158). This number surpassed the 812,000 Portuguese immigrants, 573,000
Italian immigrants, and 571,000 Spanish immigrants in France in the late 1980s
(Silverman, 1992, p. 47). The Algerian population was more than three times larger than
the Moroccan community, the second largest ex-colonial population in France
(Silverman, 1992, p. 47).
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Algerian-born sociologist, Abdelmalek Sayad (1977) identified a periodization of
Algerian migration to France over half a century, from the end of World War I to the
mid-1970s. In his work, he identified three periods of migration, each characterized by
dominant forms of circulation and by different types of migrant actors—the first stage
occurred from 1945-1950, the second stage from 1950-1962, and the third stage from
1962-1977 (Sayad, 1977). Sayad’s work distinguishes between the ‘origin variables’
(e.g., geographic, social, economic, and local migration culture) and ‘destination
variables’ (e.g., working conditions, accommodation, and family situation) as they
pertain to the migration trajectory of Algerian immigrants in France. Here, it is the
interwoven nature of ‘origin’ and ‘destination’ variables that are in constant interplay in
postcolonial Franco-Algerian relations. We have seen the ways that the first two stages
played out during French colonization, but now, I move on to the third stage that
occurred after the Algerian War.
While the end of the Algerian War did not immediately restrict the movement of
Algerians to France, it did alter the context in which migrations occurred. Prior to
Algerian independence from France in 1962, Algerian immigrants were not leaving one
country to enter another. The end of the war meant that Algerians in France lost their
automatic claim to citizenship status but, according to French law, they could apply to
retain their French citizenship. However, as a result of the Evian Accords, Algerians in
France were forced to choose between French and Algerian citizenship (Byrnes, 2013).
This process was complicated by Algerians’ “sense of attachment to their new, hard-won,
national independence, as well as by difficulties posed by bureaucratic paperwork to a
population with generally low levels of education and literacy” (Byrnes, 2008, p. 9). This
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hesitation to take on French citizenship weighed heavily on Algerians, because “adopting
French nationality was considered treason against one’s roots, origins, homeland, etc.
Algeria did not like its citizens to show up at the border with a French passport. This
added insult to injury” (Ben Jelloun, 1999, p. 27). Still, Algerians did hold privileged
access to residency, the labor market, and French nationality in the years following the
end of the Algerian War (Byrnes, 2008).
On April 10, 1964, France and Algeria signed the Nekkache-Grandval accords
which outlined that labor migrations of Algerians to France would be “a function of both
Algeria’s requirements and the requirements of the French state” (Samers, 1997, p. 56).
Algeria had a great need for exporting surplus labor, thus reducing unemployment and
the attendant social ills this often triggered. France, however, had a great interest in
stemming the tide of Algerian labor migrants, and this legislation imposed “humiliating
terms which radically undermined the Evian agreement,” which enabled “France to set
unilaterally a quota restriction (soon after set at 12,000 immigrants per year)”
(MacMaster, 1997, p. 204). This policy tightened documentation requirements and
introduced a quota system for Algerian immigrants 29.
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In 1962, also France had to deal with two new groups of immigrants to France: harkis
and pied noirs. A harki was an Algerian sympathetic to the French cause in Algeria—
Algerians who fought for the French in the war. In 1962, up to 100,000 harkis who had
served in the French security forces, arrived in France fleeing massacre in Algeria by
nationalist sympathizers (House, 2006). Pied noir is the term applied to the European
colons at the end of the war—850,000 pied noirs fled Algeria after the war and were
‘repatriated’ to France (Choi, 2016, p. 2). French authorities struggled to attend to the
needs of this influx of political refugees of sorts—the French colons and harkis became
highly specific and very differently treated groups of immigrants in France. While the
harkis had French nationality, they and their descendants were mostly left to exist in
isolated camps in rural areas and have been exposed to similar forms of racist
discrimination as other Algerian immigrants (House, 2006). The pied noir community
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Though French and Algerian delegations were at odds on labor migrations, both
sides agreed on the importance of limiting family resettlement (Franklin, 2017). French
authorities were concerned with housing and providing social services for Algerian
families, who were predominately residing in overcrowded and unsanitary bidonvilles
(shantytowns), which posed public health problems. The possible permanence of
Algerian family migration troubled Algerian officials because they feared that family
migration would cripple Algeria’s economic and demographic recovery from the war
(Franklin, 2017). Algerians in France received disproportionate public and governmental
attention and the presence of Algerians (and their families) in France had “already led the
French to create a template for managing migration, integration, and public fears”
(Franklin, 2017, p. 122). However, the number of families arriving in France quickly
overwhelmed the capabilities of the French social assistance system. This led to rising
rents in low-income housing as well as “racialized application procedures” that
compounded the difficulties for Algerian families to find suitable housing, resulting in
the growth of the bidonvilles (Franklin, 2017, p. 129).
The situation in the bidonvilles, in turn, reinforced the hostile French public’s
negative view of Algerian families and promoted the notion that Algerians were
incapable of assimilation into French society (Byrnes, 2013). In the late 1960s, social
workers in France identified the multi-layered effects of living in the bidonvilles for
Algerians, finding that “it is certain that reactions of hostility, contempt, and distrust, are

has also been subjected to forms of discrimination as their role in the Algerian situation
was interpreted by mainland France—most pied noirs ended up in the South of France
(Choi, 2016).
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more frequent and more contagious now that the concentration of Algerians is greater”
(Gall, 1966, p. 127). For these social workers, the problems of Algerian family migration
were not caused by its permanence, but by the systematic marginalization of Algerian
families by the French administration. Their solution was to implement specialized
programs to foster integration and to avoid delinquency, public health crises, and
discrimination (Gall, 1966). By the 1970s, most bidonvilles were demolished and
replaced by social housing high-rise apartment buildings that have become today’s cités
(large concrete housing projects) in the banlieues30 of France (Togman, 2002).
In the 1970s, France entered an economic downturn that put the industrial jobs
typically held by Algerian immigrants at risk and led immigration officials to further
restrict the number of immigrants admitted to France. The priorities of immigration
policy were not only to prevent the entrance of foreign workers but also to attempt to
reduce the number of existing foreign workers in France (Viprey, 2010). The
combination of an economic downturn, a lack of housing, and an increase in racially
motivated attacks on Algerians in France led to the decisive decisions by France and
Algeria in the early 1970s to halt immigration between the two countries. In 1973, the
Algerian government suspended all emigration to France in response to a series of racial
attacks on Algerians in France (Stora, 2001). In part due to the oil shock of 1973, France
halted labor migrations and family reunifications to France in 1974 (Samers, 2003a). In
1974, the French government suspended all labor migration from outside of Europe
(Stora, 2001). A November 1975 decree introduced a system of labor opportunities that

As described earlier, the French term “banlieue” literally translates to “suburb” but the
term banlieue has become pejorative, meaning slums dominated by immigrants (Packer,
2015). I further discuss these areas in Chapter Seven.
30
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required open job positions to be offered (and preferably filled) by French nationals first,
and then the job could be offered up for foreign fulfillment (Viprey, 2010). In 1978, the
French council of state overturned the ban on family reunification but maintained a firm
stance on restricting labor migrations (Viprey, 2010). Additional policies sought to
eliminate illegal entry, to regularize the status of those already arrived, to encourage
unemployed immigrants to return home, and to handle tensions between indigenous and
foreign workers and the demands of immigrants for broader protection and rights (Ogden
and White, 1989). According to Silverman (1992, pp. 46-47), this period of immigration
was
crucial in terms of the different ways in which immigration came to be perceived
in official circles. From having been considered a peripheral and temporary
phenomenon, immigration was recognized to be of structural significance; from
having been discussed largely in terms of manpower needs and economic
necessity, immigration was conceived also as a ‘social problem’ and a problem of
assimilation and ethnic balance; from having been largely marginalized in France,
immigrants became increasingly politicized and involved in conflict and struggle.
By the 1980s, there was a growing realization in France that “culturally diverse
immigrants were in France to stay,” and anxiety about cultural assimilation began to
grow in French society (Thomas, 2011, p. 78). In response to this anxiety, and faced with
rising unemployment, the French government attempted to “force the return of substantial
numbers of unwanted foreigners who had been legally resident in France, above all
Algerians, to their countries of origin” (Thomas, 2011, p. 78). In 1983, the secretary of
the state added stricter limitations on the 1975 labor requirements and re-established a
system of ‘return assistance’ on the basis of bilateral agreements with the countries of
origin (a provision aimed at Algerian and Moroccan immigrants) (Viprey, 2010). In 1986
French immigration policy took an even harder turn toward ultra-conservativism with the
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introduction of the Pasqua Law that restricted the conditions of entry and residence of
foreigners in France and instigated the deportation of illegal aliens in the name of ‘zero
immigration’ (Viprey, 2010). The 1987 Nationality Code required “mastery of the French
language, civil or military service, ‘Frenchifying’ of last names, absence of a criminal
record, and sponsorship by French nationals;” under this law, second-generation
immigrants would have to opt either for this naturalization or for return to their parents’
country of origin (Thomas, 2011, p. 83).
Through the 1970s and 1980s, Algerian immigration became synonymous with
crime, poverty, and racial tension, terms like ‘North African,’ ‘Muslim,’ ‘Maghrebin,’
‘Arab,’ even ‘immigrant,’ were used “interchangeably when describing the ‘problem’ of
Algerian immigration” (Benbassa, 2005; Byrnes, 2013, p. 3). Attention shifted to the
second and third-generation descendants of Algerian immigrants, and discussions of
integration became increasingly heated. The time period of the late 1970s through the
1980s can be described as a transition that hinged on the republican narrative that
promised Algerian families an eventual social integration through a measured adaptation
to French lifestyle—in reality this was “beset by the confluence of popular and stateendorsed racism which, through citizenship applications and housing policy, generated a
number of structural hindrances that precluded integration on the ground” (Wadowiec,
2014, p. 175). According to Hargreaves (1995), a public survey in 1985 showed that 66
percent of those questioned (French citizens) felt that France was in danger of losing its
national identity if nothing was done to limit the foreign population—this figure rose to
75 percent in a similar 1989 poll (p. 151). North Africans, namely Algerians, were
considered by the French public to be the least assimilated of all immigrant groups in
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France (Hargreaves, 1995). Algerian immigrants and their descendants were perceived as
a recalcitrant community, resistant to proper cultural identifications of French belonging
(Silverstein, 2004). So, while immigration through normative channels (defined by the
historical immigration patterns from Algeria to France during colonization) slowed in the
1970s, the 1980s saw a shift in attention from immigration to integration.
As integration became the main subject of obsession for the French majority, the
second generation of Maghrebi immigrants “experienced their own political and cultural
awakening” and developed a culture of their own—an overlapping of their parents’
heritage with French culture as they experienced it (Byrnes, 2008, p. 13). Calling
themselves ‘beurs’ (inverted slang for ‘Arab’), Algerian-origin youth invoked their
French citizenship and rejected the daily discrimination they suffered in French society
(Begag, 2007). Beur became both a counterculture and a political identity rooted in their
parents’ history and their shared geographic space of the banlieues. The beurs used
music, literature, and filmmaking to express their experiences as poor, marginalized
urban youth (Dotson-Renta, 2015). Postcolonial immigrants and their descendants
challenged the idea of a cohesive society where republican values make everyone the
same—the idea being that politics should not be formed around cultural, ethnic, and
racial categories that would separate citizens. According to Azouz Begag (2007), “it was
during this period that [Algerians and their descendants] began to feel like the disowned,
illegitimate children of French society…the grand mythical principles of the equality of
all citizens before the law were trampled underfoot” (p. 12).
It was also during this time that the banlieue, which had replaced the bidonvilles,
became both a place and an idea by taking on a special meaning attached to the beur
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generation and their parents. Owing to the high level of social disadvantage, chronic rates
of unemployment, and poverty, the banlieue is often regarded as a dead-end space
(Hargreaves, 2011). Yet, for the beur generation (and subsequent generations of
immigrant families), the “ethnically diverse nature of the populations concentrated in
these spaces makes them richly multicultural” (Hargreaves, 2011, p. 28). Mustafa Dikeç
(2007) characterized the banlieue as the ‘badlands’ of France. Dikeç remarks that from
the establishment of the banlieues, they have been associated with insecurity and a lack
of social order (2007). The banlieues function as visual representations of failed
assimilation policies, and they appear in public discourse almost exclusively as spaces of
crime, poverty, and foreign bodies. In short, the banlieues have become the antithesis of
what it means to the French majority to be French (Dotson-Renta, 2015). Re-connecting
this to my selection of neighborhoods for this research, because of these (and other)
assumptions about banlieues, it was important for me to understand the difference (if
any) between central-city Paris, and the surrounding areas.
Franco-Algerian Relations: 1990s-2000s
As the decade of the 1990s approached, events in Algeria were set to become
more influential in the immigration context between Algeria and France. In 1988, Algeria
experienced the collapse of the single-party system dominated by the FLN, which had
ruled Algeria since independence from France (Chelali, 2017). In October of 1988,
demonstrations erupted across Algeria, to protest the widespread inflation and consumer
scarcity (Stora, 2001). Islamic activists mobilized thousands of protestors, and the
government responded with several reforms to appease the Algerian populace, including
the separation of the Party (the FLN) and the state (Chelali, 2017). During the years 1989
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and 1990, multiple shakeups of the government and the electoral process led to the
inclusion of the Front Islamique de Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, FIS) party in the 1991
presidential elections (Stora, 2001). The Algerian government, seeing that it was losing
the election to the FIS, cancelled elections and closed the polls. The cancellation of the
Algerian election was supported by the French government, who “found itself caught in
the web of the conflict” (Stora, 2001, p. 213). The FIS was banned and thousands of its
members arrested (Stora, 2001). Islamist guerrillas emerged and began an armed
campaign against the government and its supporters, plunging the country into a civil war
that lasted until 2002.
This period is often referred to as the ‘Black Decade’ as the level of violence and
bloodshed increased, and the war claimed hundreds of thousands of lives—both military
and civilian (Chelali, 2017). During the Black Decade, tens of thousands of Algerians
fled to France to escape the horrors of the civil war (Zerdoumi, 2015). The French state
responded by further tightening immigration rules. From 1990 through 1993, French
legislators debated and implemented amendments that increased the penalties for
irregular migration and established a legal holding time of 20 days for questionable
migrants (Lochak, 1997; Viprey, 2010). During this time, critics accused immigration
officials of proceeding with the assumption that the Algerian immigrants’ requests for
entrance were “manifestly unfounded” (Viprey, 2010, p. 156).
In 1993, the French government implemented a revised set of migration and
naturalization measures (the second ‘Pasqua law’) that involved random searches and
detainment for those without the proper papers (Samers, 2003b). In 1997, the Debré law
“called for further limiting of foreigners’ rights and a heightened surveillance of
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undocumented immigration” (Samers, 2003b, p. 567). This law was directly aimed at the
“ambiguous status of some sans papiers,31 particularly the parents of French-born
children, the foreign spouses of French citizens, children who entered France before the
age of 10 and foreigners who had resided irregularly in France for more than fifteen
years” (Samers, 2003b, p. 567). Subsequently, and reflecting new neoliberal imperatives
that were stricter on immigration, a new set of immigration laws passed in 1998 focused
on retaining highly skilled and highly educated foreign students and professionals
(Lochak, 1997; Viprey, 2010).
During this time, integration, naturalization policies, the meaning of French
citizenship, and the relation between cultural diversity and national unity became the
most important issues in French politics (Celik, 2010). Debates about integration and
citizenship soon revolved around a series of ‘headscarf affairs’ which first emerged in
1989 and had become hotly politicized by 2004. The headscarf issue, which concerned
the right of Muslim girls to wear the headscarf in state-run schools—brought questions
about the proper function of public education, gender equality, individual autonomy,
public order, religious freedom, and the rights of immigrants to the forefront of French
public and political discussions (Celik, 2010). In early 2004, the French government
passed a law that prohibited the wearing of any clothing that clearly indicated religious
affiliation in the public schools (Bowen, 2007). While the law promoted secularism32,

31

Sans papiers refers to illegal immigrants, or immigrants without legal residency papers,
in literal translation, it means “without papers.” In the 1990s there was a Sans Papiers
movement that fought for the regularization of illegal immigrants in France.
32
French secularism, known as laïcité was codified in French law in 1905 after a long
struggle between liberal-Enlightenment movements and conservative forces allied with
the Catholic Church. As originally construed, it sought to bring the power of the Church
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and was worded “in a religion-neutral way,” in practice, the law targeted the headscarf
worn by Muslim girls. According to the French government, young women wearing the
headscarf presented
grave dangers to French society and its tradition of secularism (laïcité) presented
by Islamic radicalism, a trend toward “communalism,” and the oppression of
women in the poor suburbs…French public figures seemed to blame the
headscarves for a surprising range of France’s problems, including anti-Semitism,
Islamic fundamentalism, growing ghettoization in the poor suburbs, and the
breakdown of order in the classroom (Bowen, 2007, p. 1) 33.
Compounding the sense of alienation that many immigrants felt in the wake of
the headscarf debate was a law passed in 2005 by the National Assembly regarding the
historical presentation of French colonization. The law called for the building of new
monuments and museums that would valorize French colonial work and require schools
to include within their curriculum the positive role of colonialism in the lives of colonial
subjects (Bancel, 2013). The law was ultimately repealed by Constitutional Council.
However, this debate illustrates how the state has sought to invoke colonialism and
imperialism in defining Frenchness, regardless of the deeply alienating effect the memory
of colonialism has on hundreds of thousands of French citizens from postcolonial
backgrounds (Woodhouse-Ledermann, 2018).
In 2005, riots broke out in the banlieues of Paris (and later across France). The
riots began after two young boys fled from police and hid in a power substation where
they were electrocuted and died from their injuries (Begag, 2007). Then interior minister,

under the control of the French state. Its meaning has changed considerably in recent
decades in the context of Muslim immigration. I discuss laïcité further in Chapter Six.
33
In 2011, the niqab (Muslim dress where all of the face except the eyes are covered) was
outlawed in public spaces. In 2016, efforts were made to outlaw the burkini (Muslim
swimwear that covers most of the body and head) (Woodhouse-Ledermann, 2018, p.
133).
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Nicholas Sarkozy, made public comments about his intentions to clean out the racaille,
or ‘scum’ of the banlieues (Pulham, 2005). Racaille, a term with implicit racial and
ethnic resonances, is “about as close as one can get to hollering “ethnic cleansing”
without actually saying so” (Pulham, 2005, p. 1). The expression racaille again laid bare
the vestiges of colonialism in France, the word is associated with ratonnades, or “rat
hunts” that occurred not only in colonial Algeria but in Imperial France to seek and kill
assumed Algerian dissidents (Stora, 2001). The riots revealed a crisis of representation
and recognition that called the viability of the French political system into question
(Celik, 2010). While France had promised formal legal recognition of equality to all of its
citizens, in practice, the identities of North African—namely Algerian—French citizens
have historically been unequally recognized, and their demands not equally represented
in French society.
In 2006, Nicholas Sarkozy again made aggressive public comments regarding
immigrants. Then president, Sarkozy declared that French immigration policies should be
focused on ‘Immigration choisie v. Immigration subie,’ meaning that France should
‘choose’ desirable immigrants, rather than ‘suffer’ undesirable immigrants (De Carvalho,
2016). In this way, Sarkozy signaled his desire for legislation that allowed France to
choose its immigrants and to foster educated and ‘of good stock’ immigrants while
discouraging undesirable immigrants. This same sentiment has continued to guide French
immigration policy to the present day. Today, a majority of French politicians see
immigration as a problem. Former Prime Minister of France, Manual Valls called France
“to take urgent action to control [France’s] external borders...otherwise our societies will
be totally destabilized” (Marliere, 2016, p. 2). According to a September 2016 poll, 62
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percent of French citizens oppose welcoming migrants and refugees seeking asylum in
France (Marliere, 2016, p. 2). Further, a majority of French voters feel a “loss of
‘sovereignty,’ which has to be ‘regained’” (Marliere, 2016, p. 2). In France, racism and
xenophobia are on the rise, especially toward those from former colonies in North Africa
(Marliere, 2016). Anxieties about immigration have been significantly heightened by the
series of terrorist attacks in the mid-2010s. As described earlier, since the beginning of
2015, there have been 36 incidents of terrorism on French soil, totaling 252 killed and
943 wounded (Gatehouse, 2018; Breeden, 2019; Onishi and Méheut, 2020; Erlanger,
2020). Among these incidents were the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, in which terrorists
killed 11 and injured 11 others, and a Bastille Day attack in 2016, in which a driver
ploughed into a crowd killing 84 people and injuring hundreds of others, and 2 gruesome
incidences in 2020 involving beheadings (Chatignoux et al, 2018; Onishi and Méheut,
2020). These acts of terrorism have seen a return of the colonial language that
distinguished the ‘civilized’ from the ‘barbaric.’ Within these discourses, immigrants
have been conflated with Muslims, and Muslims conflated with terrorists, and all of these
are viewed as unassimilable in the French polity.
In short, integration in France has never been about providing immigrants with
opportunities to advance in French society. Political discourses and policies tend to
enforce cultural assimilation, so that Algerians who fail to conform with “French dress,
French habits, French marital practices [can] only be “other” to the French community;”
integration’s tenets have created “the logic through which Algerians [are] excluded”
(Franklin, 2017, p. 28). By elaborating the terms of Algerian-origin individuals’ supposed
‘failed’ assimilation into French society, contemporary French Republicanism obscures
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the structural impediments, unrealistic expectations, and subjective judgements that have
been imposed on postcolonial immigrant communities.
These structural impediments are evidenced by the acutely high unemployment
rates among immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and sub-Saharan Africa
(Lhommeau et al., 2010a). French researchers have found that, “all else being equal and
after many structural effects have been taken into account, some of these groups [of
immigrants] have higher unemployment rates than the mainstream population”
(Lhommeau et al., 2010a, p. 53). In 2010, descendants from Algerian immigrants held
one of the lowest employment rates of sixty-nine percent, compared to the mainstream
employment rate of eighty-one percent (Lhommeau et al., 2010a, p. 54). For Algerian
immigrants and their descendants, “the risk of unemployment is more than twice that of
the mainstream population” (Lhommeau et al., 2010a, p. 56). Speaking to
intergenerational social mobility, sixty-six percent of Algerian descendants’ fathers are
manual laborers (and far more frequently unskilled), compared to only thirty-nine percent
of the mainstream population; forty-six percent of descendants of Algerians also work in
manual labor jobs compared to thirty-four percent of the mainstream population (Okba,
2010, p. 62-63). Additionally, the sons of immigrants from Algeria are typically paid less
than their peers in the mainstream population, yet the wage gap is only half of what it was
for their fathers (Lhommeau et al., 2010b, p. 73). Educationally speaking, in 2010,
eighteen percent of Algerian descendants left the French education system without any
qualifications, compared to only eight percent of the mainstream population (Brinbaum et
al., 2010, p. 46). Forty-one percent of Algerian immigrants’ descendants went on to
higher education, compared to the mainstream figure of fifty-three percent—students
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often attribute this lack of higher educational attainment to “unfavorable treatment”
pertaining to their ‘origin’ or ‘skin color’ (Brinbaum et al., 2010, p. 49-50). A final
observation of the schooling experiences and outcomes of immigrants versus the
mainstream is that because of the residential segregation in France, typically, immigrants’
descendants do not go to the same schools as the children of the mainstream population
(Felouzis, 2005).
Conclusions
This dissertation argues that the socio-cultural norms that define French identity
and that form the basis of membership in the French polity took shape through the
colonial encounter. After the 1789 Revolution, the term ‘empire’ “came to denote the
personality of the entire French nation” and the “unification of disparate local groups into
a single whole” (Pagden, 2001, p. 132). However, to enter the national community of
France, it has been necessary to master the attributes, habits, dispositions, and mores of
French society and culture, as defined by the French political elite (Fogerty and Osborne,
2003). When the French empire undertook their mission civilisatrice to civilize the native
people of its colonies, concepts of ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ were created with
reference to an idealized, universal French culture. Historically in France, there have
been clear lines to distinguish those “who did and did not have the right to be seen, and
see themselves, as French” (Welch and McGonagle, 2013, p. 3).
French racism has continued to deepen the divide between people of Algerian
descent and other post-colonial immigrants, on the one hand, and European-origin French
citizens on the other. This racism has been self-sustaining: “once anti-Algerian racism
had been established and consolidated it, like anti-Semitism, was able to take on a ‘life of
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its own’, a kind of autonomy, and to reproduce itself through time regardless of changes
within the economy and regardless of the degree of Algerian incorporation/integration
into French society” (MacMaster, 1997, p. 222). Throughout the Franco-Algerian
relationship, notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ show up again and again, and like their
predecessors, contemporary French governments continue to draw lines between “those
they deem unworthy of, or unable to access, “Frenchness,” and those who are seen as
properly “French” and “Republican” (Tchumkan, 2015, p. 1). The polarization of official
rhetoric in France between ‘us’ and ‘them’ reveals that the notion of Frenchness
continues to be highly selective and is developed to keep Algerian immigrants and their
descendants out of socially accepted concepts of Frenchness. Citizenship and belonging
for those of Algerian origins has been, and continues to be, tenuous and partial.
This historical overview underscores that France is a “country faced with its
inability to confront its colonial enterprise” in Algeria (Tchumkan, 2015, p. 2). France’s
relationship with Algerian immigrants and their descendants is structured around “the
long hatreds” produced by the original French invasion in 1830, sustained over the 132
years of colonization, and increased through their defeat in the Algerian War of
decolonization (Evans, 2012, p. xi). The “bedrock of Muslim anger” that developed
through the material and cultural dispossession of Algeria was never reconciled by
France (Evans, 2012, p. xi).
While this imprint of colonialism exists in France today, it exists in different, less
directly salient ways for younger generations34. The experiences of colonialism and
postcolonialism between France and Algeria have profoundly shaped the lives of

34

I discuss the aspects of a postcolonial identity in Chapter Five.
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Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France; however, these influences are not
monolithic, all-encompassing, or deterministic. In addition to class differences and
continued differentiations based on ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion/religiosity,’ the amount of
time involved in the history of Algerian immigration to France, and the generations of
Algerians (born in both Algeria and France), make for divergent experiences for the
Algerian-origin population in France. The result nearly two centuries later is a society
that continues to deny Algerian-origin individuals an economic and political space in
France, not least through restrictions on the expression of religious identity in public
space. This troubled history raises several questions pertaining to the nature of belonging
for Algerians in France: how are cultural practices of Algerian immigrants and their
descendants marked by the legacy of the colonial period? What specific features of
current cultural practices of Algerian-descent peoples are derived from pre-migratory
traditions, and how have these been modified through settlement in France? How do
gender, class, and education impact those practices? Do Algerian-origin individuals
function essentially as part of or apart from the national culture of France? These are the
key questions which this dissertation will explore in the subsequent chapters of findings.
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CHAPTER 5
ALGERIAN IDENTITY IN FRANCE
“When I look in the mirror, all I see is my parents’ Algerian son.”
-Ferhat, 45-year-old, son of immigrants
“I can’t tell you what it is to be French, but I can tell you what it is to not be Algerian.”
-Nadia, 26-year-old, part time resident in France
“My name is Lakhdar, not François.”
- Lakhdar, 48-year-old immigrant

Introduction
The preceding chapters have provided conceptual and historical frameworks for
understanding identity, belonging, and integration in the immigrant-receiving context of
France. Immigrant identities are configurations of both ‘self’ and ‘other’ that are
expressed and materialized through categories of ethnicity, heritage, race, religion, and
citizenship. While they occupy a politically and socially subordinate position in France,
Algerian immigrants and their descendants position themselves in relation to these
identity categories and assign values and meanings to them; as well, they act upon these
values and meanings within the realms and spaces of everyday life. Algerian-descent
individuals negotiate these identity categories by embracing or rejecting the traits, values,
and meanings associated with each; in doing so, they often engage with ideas of what is
‘appropriate’ or ‘socially acceptable’ in different socio-spatial contexts.
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This chapter places identities within a post-colonial context marked both by
persistence and flux—shaped by, but also departing from, the situation of Français
musulmans prior to Algerian independence. Algerian immigrants’ ties to Algeria remain
important and meaningful, but there is no static ‘Algerian culture,’ just as there is no
static ‘French culture.’ For the purposes of this dissertation, I follow geographer Don
Mitchell’s (1995) approach that rejects ‘culture’ as a static, coherent, and visible set of
traits to be inventoried so as to demarcate one culture or another. Instead, I engage with
culture as a collection or production of norms, values, attitudes, social practices, and
ways of understanding oneself in relation to Others. As such, cultural identities are
always in the process of becoming through power-laden relationships.
The discussion in this chapter challenges traditional sociological approaches to
integration and assimilation, which posit that immigrant groups’ identification with
‘ethnic’ origins diminish over time and generations and that immigrants take on the
identity of the host society, blending into the mainstream, or the national ‘host-society.’
This teleological understanding of integration, with its binary conception of immigrant
and host-society identities, informs many political discussions of integration. In France, it
is central to discussions about the supposed ‘failure’ of North African immigrants (and
their descendants) to become truly ‘French.’ This perception effectively places Algerian
immigrants and their descendants as ‘internal outsiders’ who, while perhaps holding
French citizenship, are permanently foreign (Costelloe, 2015; Driggers, 2018). State
officials and media figures interpret ‘failed’ integration as an unwillingness of people of
Algerian origin to shed identities (particularly Muslim identities) or to reject those
cultural values and practices that are viewed as antithetical to Frenchness (Sánchez,
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2019). Journalists and politicians, as Silverstein and Tetreault (2006) note, continuously
perpetrate a symbolic violence against young French citizens of North African descent by
repeatedly and mistakenly describing them as ‘foreigners’ and pathologizing and
demonizing them for their supposed unwillingness to ‘integrate’ into French society. In
blaming French children of immigrants for their perceived failure to integrate, these
political actors deflect responsibility for social inequalities (Silverstein and Tetreault,
2006). In these oppositions, this happens in both general terms as to how Algerian
immigrants and their descendants are represented in French media and political discourse,
but also in the everyday experiences of life in France—in public spaces such as the
metro, in cafés, and on streets and sidewalks. The articulation of Algerian identity is
produced as something ‘against Frenchness’ as something ‘other.’
I challenge this approach to integration discourse by illustrating how those of
Algerian origin interviewed for this research identify and place themselves within a
complex assemblage of identity categories that constitute French society. In the following
sections, I show how Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France draw on
multiple, intersecting, and sometimes contradictory identities simultaneously, and how
identities emerge from interactions with others in particular settings and contexts. Acts of
negotiation and arrangement of identities vary within the study population; the constructs
of French and Algerian identities work together for some individuals and collapse for
others. The ways that different components of identity work together for individuals are
indicative of the intersectional quality of Algerian identity in France. The meanings
attached to certain identities reflect stereotypes and prejudices, impressions and
experiences; thus, contradictions are woven throughout the identities presented here.
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This chapter begins with a discussion of official discourse relating to French
identity, and then turns to my research subjects’ identity narratives. My analysis gives
special attention to the importance of historical memory among my respondents and the
antagonism toward France that it generates. This identity plays into French claims about
non-assimilation. But I then explore how interview respondents construct different
identities that can also complicate or undermine the French/Algerian binary. This
discussion evaluates how individuals reconcile and combine the identities and
components of their own lives and personalities that they conceive of as ‘French,’
‘Algerian,’ or as something different. To best understand the relational formulation of
identities, I have grouped interview participants with similar ways of expressing identity,
and I describe the kinds of encounters, situations, and experiences that have led them to
think about and perform identities in particular ways. Following chapters examine in
more detail the spatial element of identities among the Algerian community in Paris,
France.
Defining French Identity
Assimilation discourses and policies assume a coherent, bounded French national
identity and carry an expectation that immigrants should conform to it. Political actors
(bureaucrats, legislators, and other agents of the state, including schoolteachers and social
workers) articulate French national identity on a daily basis, and they enshrine particular
understandings of this identity in the French nationality code, immigration, and
citizenship laws (Oscherwitz, 2001; Hargreaves, 1995). While political actors treat
national identity as self-evident and unchanging, these same actors frequently revise
nationality and citizenship codes and debate the meaning of integration. Indeed, there has
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been much debate about the nature of so-called Frenchness—about whether it is under
threat, how to maintain it, and the role of government in promoting it. These discourses
influence the ways people of Algerian descent understand Frenchness and their position
in a French polity.
The term français de souche35 has been used by key French political actors to
define Frenchness, specifically in reference to postcolonial immigration. In the 1960s, de
Gaulle used the term to demarcate those “who are real French and those who do not fully
belong” (Woodhouse-Lederman, 2018, p. 80). Though Algeria was technically a part of
France at the time, de Gaulle was pointing out that not everyone was legitimately French.
Français de souche suggests an ethnic quality that is rooted in a longstanding
genealogical connection to French territory where multiple generations were born under
French law (excluding colonial subjects) (Décimo, 2013). Thus, the concept of français
de souche is less connected to formal citizenship (though it informs citizenship law) than
to culture, religion, ethnicity, and race: the français de souche are white and either
Catholic or not religious (Fredette, 2010).
The dominant group of French people has thus arrived at some relatively stable
understandings of what it means to be French, allowing them to take their Frenchness for
granted. According to historian Robert Darton (1984), “Frenchness exists” in such a way
that a “specific and national manner, a body of learnings concerning the social world and
precautions to be taken or rules to be followed to make one’s way” in the French world
(Darton, 1984, quoted in Chartier, 1985, p. 684). Immigrants, in contrast, must constantly

The term français de souche translates to ‘native-born French’ or ‘ethnic French.’ The
term is used to delineate those with a dominant group (French) ancestry and those
without (immigrant).
35
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learn and experience what it means to be (or not to be) French. Lacking this
‘commonsense’ quality of French identity, immigrants are always only partially included
within the bounds of Frenchness, causing them to be hyper-aware of what those
boundaries are. Though somewhat stable, this commonsense Frenchness must be
constantly articulated and rearticulated. An especially influential voice in recent
articulations of Frenchness has been historian and public intellectual Patrick Weil (2014),
who has proposed four pillars to define what it means to be French: (1) the principle of
equality (codified in law), (2) the French language36 (a unifying cultural instrument since
1539), (3) the positive memory of the French revolution, and (4) French secularism,
laïcité (inclusive of freedom of thought, separation between church and state, and the
freedom to practice religion). The focus on laïcité37 speaks directly to the characterization
of Muslims (i.e., North Africans) as not only different from the français de souche, but as
unlikely to assimilate so long as they adhere to their religion. Adherence to Islam
becomes a rejection of one of France’s most revered values. Indeed, critics argue that
advocates of laïcité “merely employ [secularism] as a by-word for discussing Muslims”
(Peace, 2017, p. 1). The discourse of laïcité, of course, obscures the rootedness of French
secularist discourse in Western-Christian theological concepts (Ocak, 2015).
Assimilation discourses and policies assume not only a coherent, bounded French
national identity, but also a coherent, bounded immigrant identity, in this case, Algerian
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Within this identification of the French language as a pillar of Frenchness, there is an
implicit class implication. Only those from a certain socioeconomic class (i.e., middleand upper-classes) have access to learn ‘proper’ French, a topic I return to later in this
chapter.
37
I discuss laïcité and its implications for Algerians in France in further detail in Chapter
Six.
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(or, more broadly, Maghrebian or North African). Understandings of Algerianness and
Algerian identity in France are often associated with notions of violence, delinquency,
fundamentalism, illegal immigration, and unemployment (Clare and Abdelhady, 2016;
Zammoum, 2011). Additionally, owing to Algerians’ history of revolution and victory
over France, Algerians are perceived by the French as opponents or antagonists, rather
than potential members. It is important to note, however, that Algerian immigrants and
their descendants produce and reproduce this antagonistic binary, as well, though with
different values and attitudes attached to each element. To understand the delineation
between French and Algerian, we must first understand how people of Algerian descent
themselves participate in the construction of the French/Algerian binary. The following
section examines the identity anchors that research participants ascribe to Algerian
identity.
Defining Algerian Identity
My research participants draw on multiple identities and place themselves in
multiple social groups simultaneously. Their narratives reveal complexity and fluidity,
though, paradoxically, this complexity and fluidity draws upon and reinforces binaries.
Algerian immigrants and their descendants continuously reproduce ideas about
Algerianness, albeit in ways that attribute much more positive meanings to this category
than one finds in French national discourse. Of the 73 people I interviewed for this study,
53 referred to themselves primarily as ‘Algerian,’ seemingly confirming perceptions
among dominant groups that Algerians are not ‘assimilating’ into French society. My
respondents’ articulations of Algerian identity most often revolve around notions of
family and obligation, kindness and hospitality, and of morality and religion. They argue
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that strong attachment and dedication to family is what sets Algerians apart from the
French, and they define the French as more individualistic, self-centered, and isolated.
Their Algerian identification was sometimes combined with religious identity (e.g.,
Muslim), and a more specific ethnic identity (e.g., Berber or Arab). Here in this chapter, I
am focusing just on ‘Algerianness’ as this is the primary way that individuals identified
themselves. In the following chapter, I explore religion and religiosity in more depth.
One way that people of Algerian descent practice dedication to family is by
participating in the transnational behavior of regular visits to Algeria to visit family. As
Salih (2002) explains, “the summer return is a very important event” for North Africans
living in Europe (p. 221). Salih’s work (which focuses on Moroccan migrants in Italy),
found that the “whole way of life in Italy is functional and complementary to the summer
return…The lifestyles migrants display when they are in Morocco for a short period are
the result of a hard and difficult life for the rest of the year” (2002, p. 221). These
findings are applicable to my study respondents. When a familial holiday in Algeria is
not possible (as in the summer of 2020, due to travel restrictions related to COVID-19),
“the pain is acute [because] it is sacred for us to leave” (Méheut, 2020, p. 1). In 2020, an
estimated “82% of French people of Algerian origin had spent at least one holiday in
Algeria during childhood, while 34% return every year,” and family holidays are seen as
a cultural bridge for the second-generation that “allows people to rediscover an identity
through their parents, through their belonging to a people, through their belonging to a
culture” (Méheut, 2020, p. 1).
For example, Imed, a 26-year-old immigrant living in the Meudon banlieue, in the
92nd district outside of Paris, goes home to Algeria twice a year to visit his family. He
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works a “French job” and does not have as much time off as he would like to spend in
Algeria. Imed claims that the difference between French people and Algerian people is
that “they do not mean the same thing when they say ‘family’” because the French do not
have as much respect for the older generations. Imed’s two grandmothers lived with his
family in their apartment in Algeria, something he thinks would never happen in France.
Imed came to France to work as a software engineer and was miserable in this job,
describing his days spent “staring at the walls” and feeling unable to connect with his
French coworkers. Imed sought out other Algerians and North Africans, eventually
convincing his brother to move to Paris to live with him—the re-constitution of his
family unit in France. Imed does not feel “part of the world in France” but feels obligated
to stay. He has had problems with French people both in his work, and especially while
finding an apartment; he feels an inability to connect with French people on a personal
level. In these ways, Imed has and continues to struggle to find his place in France,
asking himself, “What am I doing here?” He speaks fluent French yet prefers to speak
Arabic with his brother and other Arab Algerians because he feels accepted by and
comfortable with this group and with the Arabic language (in fact, Imed spends his free
time exclusively with other Algerians). Imed’s explanation of his feelings of exclusion
indicate a heightened sense of inhospitality, on the part of the French toward immigrant
Others. This attention to his exclusion leads to a second common theme in Algerian
identity, that of hospitality.
Interview participants identify hospitality as a key feature of Algerianness.
Hospitality is often identified as a hallmark of Arab and Muslim cultural traditions, and
the scholarly literature on North Africa recognizes hospitality rituals as a way of
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maintaining the family’s status (Ben Jelloun, 1999). Engaging with this cultural
performance of hospitality, Algerian immigrants and their descendants weave common
hospitality activities into their everyday lives in France. Algerian hospitality involves
providing accommodation, food, and drink to visitors and extends to helping others, both
friends and strangers. Hospitality, in my study respondents’ narratives, is also associated
with kindness and forgiveness—a willingness to grant outsiders some measure of
welcome and inclusion within the ‘community,’ even if only temporarily. The opposite of
hospitality is total, permanent exclusion—an unwillingness to accept outsiders even as
guests. Hospitality incorporates a number of social experiences ranging from acts of
service, the providing of food and shelter, and protection from exclusion; my participants
contrast these ‘Algerian’ traits with the racism and rejection they experience in France.
Expressions and performances of hospitality are central to the formulation of community
and individual identity—and in the specific case of Algerians in France, hospitality is
practiced intentionally, that is, it is practiced because it is not French. The conscious and
intentional acts of hospitality practiced by Algerians in the context of France is an
identity practice with heightened importance, both in its seeming ordinariness and its
clear difference from what is perceived of as French. I explain this further in the
following narratives.
For instance, Said, a 53-year-old immigrant, living in the 13th arrondissement,
works to keep Algerian cultural traditions alive in his life and work through his practices
of hospitality. As a café owner, Said takes hospitality seriously; he is well known in his
neighborhood for helping newly arrived immigrants to find work and housing. Said
regularly gives free meals to weary travelers (on many occasions, this practice included
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me) and immigrants; his hospitality is something that nearly everyone in his
neighborhood has experienced. During the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015-2016, a ‘pop-up’
refugee camp existed a few blocks east of Said’s café. The camp held hundreds of
refugees living in tents in an open area under a bridge along the Seine river. Said
regularly took leftover couscous to the migrants living there. While French society
relegated these refugees to homelessness, Said sought to relieve their burdens, if only
with a warm meal. Said’s practices of hospitality also include acts of forgiveness. For
instance, one of his regular customers at the café is a Frenchman who is a veteran of the
Algerian war (he was a French paratrooper) who participated in the Battle of Algiers
against Algerian revolutionaries. The two men laugh about this now. Said explains, “It is
in the past. If it was my father standing here, yes, there would be a problem. But for me
[makes a sweeping motion over his shoulder with his hand] it is in the past,” despite the
importance of this war to Algerian identity, as I explain below.
My host-mother, Kahina, practices hospitality in many of the same ways that Said
does. Kahina’s apartment is often the first stop for many newly arrived immigrants; in her
home, she can offer a cup of coffee and an Algerian meal or dessert, and she provides a
place to speak Arabic or Berber freely with her. Her home is a meeting place of sorts,
commonly filled with relatives that live nearby, neighbors from North Africa, and other
Algerian friends from the city. Kahina even goes so far as to offer the use of her address
to newly arrived Algerians. Her postal code shows a residence in the 20th arrondissement,
within the city limits of Paris. This is important because job applications are often
rejected by postal code alone. Bonnet et al. (2016) note, for instance, that “job applicants
have lower interview rates when their curriculum vita provides an address indicating a
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poor suburb” outside the city limits of Paris (p.5). During the time that I lived with her,
there were three Algerian immigrants that came over regularly to collect their mail and
visit with Kahina. The assistance that Kahina provides follows the notion of social
capital—the range of thinking around norms and networks, the values and resources that
are the result (and product of) socially negotiated ties and relationships (Edwards, 2004).
In her own way, Kahina practices hospitality to honor her Algerian heritage, and in other
ways, to distinguish herself from the French; this is illustrated in her efforts to help others
of Algerian origin bypass French prejudicial practices involving residential location, in
this small act, she maintains a sense of opposition to Frenchness. The practices of
hospitality shown by Said and Kahina are thus central to the performance of Algerian
identity, they are intentional, rather than random, isolated actions.
In addition to the concepts of hospitality and familial dedication, the notion of
revolution is central to the Algerian identity. Just as French public intellectuals connect
French identity to the French Revolution, many of my respondents connect Algerian
identity to the Algerian Revolution. Algeria’s struggle against French colonial rule serves
as an important reservoir of memories and discourses that my respondents draw upon in
articulating their identities and subjectivity. Algerians have a tradition of cultural and
political resistance that dates back to the colonial encounter. From the moment of the
French conquest of Algeria in 1830, “the indigenous society, in spite of enormous land
expropriations and violent repression, sought to defend its core identity through a
complex range of cultural resistances” (MacMaster, 1997, pp. 218-219). During the
colonial period, many Algerians refused assimilation, resisting their domination by and
absorption into ‘French civilization.’ Though excluded from the realm of formal politics,
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Algerian colonial subjects were dynamic political actors who continually contested
colonial policies and the authority of the colonial state. The legacy of this resistance plays
out in Algerian immigrants’ engagements with the dominant narrative of liberal
republicanism in modern France. Just as the French hold on to an illusion of neutral,
republican citizenship38 while dealing with the fallout of their racist imperialism,
Algerian immigrants and their descendants maintain and assert a revolutionary identity
even while, in many cases, holding French citizenship.
The paradox of living in a former imperial power’s land is not lost on people of
Algerian origin. My research subjects speak of honoring their forbearers’ refusal to
surrender to the French by resisting cultural assimilation in contemporary French
metropolitan society. Interviewees frequently recounted cultural memories of the 1962
Algerian victory in the war against the French. According to Hakim, a 28-year-old
immigrant, living in the 15th arrondissement, “there is a huge proudness” among
Algerians that comes from winning the Algerian war of decolonization. From Hakim’s
perspective, people of Algerian descent do not experience a sense of Frenchness but
rather they substitute that feeling with a sense of pride from beating the French, being a
part of a great revolution, the victors of a great struggle. He says, “In Algeria when they
would talk about the French, they were our invaders, we had a war with them and a lot of
people were killed by the French…It’s a lot about culture and mistrust.”
This pride often translates into practices of recounting memories of family
members who participated in the liberation of Algeria. For example, Hassan, a 33-year-
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old son of immigrants, living in the 18th arrondissement, is working on a documentary
about his father’s life as a revolutionary in Algeria and France. Hassan becomes animated
when he speaks of his father’s accomplishments, and he has devoted his spare time and
money to this project over the years. The stories of fathers smuggling weapons for the
freedom fighters or of grandfathers being tortured but unwilling to betray Algeria are
plentiful in the narratives of my research participants, and they use these nostalgic
explorations of family history to situate themselves in French society. Embracing the
colonial/revolutionary past with pride gives Algerians in France a degree of personal
dignity and social prestige in an otherwise exclusionary social context.
Postcolonial discourses and historical memories circulate through their everyday
lives and spaces and contribute to their conceptions of belonging and identity. Another
example, Youcef, a 35-year-old immigrant, living in the 94th district outside of Paris,
describes his pride in his revolutionary roots, as both sides of his family were heavily
involved with the FLN during the Algerian revolution. He explains that there were two
kinds of revolutionaries: the first kind was actively participating in the resistance—
keeping gun caches and plotting actions, typically from the mountains; the second type,
often labeled as ‘administrative,’ found desk jobs within the French system and acted
against the French from within. Youcef’s grandfathers represent both types of
revolutionaries. His maternal grandfather oversaw weapons stashes in the eastern part of
Algeria while his paternal grandfather worked with the French colons in the western part
of Algeria. His paternal grandfather was so heavily enmeshed with the French that he
feared for his life and his family’s safety after the war; he was considered to be a Harki (a
French sympathizer) by many locals. Youcef’s mother remembers her father being taken
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nightly and tortured, only to be returned to her childhood home in Constantine, Algeria.
One story that Youcef remembers clearly is of the night when his grandfather was taken
by French soldiers to a graveyard, handed a shovel, and instructed to dig his own grave.
This story gave Youcef nightmares as a child. Both families relocated to Algiers after the
war ended in 1962.
For Youcef’s family, the revolutionary spirit did not fade after Algerians achieved
independence. His father was politically active before the Algerian civil war in the 1990s
and was part of a group that started the Social Democratic Party of Algeria. When the
violence of the civil war escalated, Youcef’s father became frightened for his family’s
safety (because of his political activism) and sent Youcef’s sister to France to live with
relatives; he sent Youcef to a private French school in Algiers. Youcef follows in his
ancestor’s footsteps and is politically active in France, regularly participating in protests
against the mistreatment of immigrants and social injustices in France. He frequently
organizes groups through Facebook to bring together like-minded people (mostly
Algerian) to talk about their common struggles in French society. He claims that he has
revolutionary blood in his veins, and he honors his family tradition of fighting against
political oppression, corruption, and social unrest—continuing the work in France,
though in a much smaller capacity than his ancestors.
Numerous participants wove their revolutionary roots into their interviews in
similar ways to Youcef and Hassan and work to honor and remember their Algerian
heroes and heroines in modern France. Djamila, a 34-year-old immigrant, living in the
Bobigny banlieue in the 93rd district outside of Paris, was named for Djamila Bouhired, a
famous female Algerian revolutionary. Omar, a 28-year-old immigrant, living in the 20th
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arrondissement, speaks with pride about his mother, who was born and raised in the
Casbah of Algiers, where Omar’s grandfather worked with the so-called ‘terrorist cells’
of Algerian revolutionaries during the Battle of Algiers. Abdel, a 25-year-old son of
immigrants, living in the 16th arrondissement, describes his father’s participation in the
revolution. His father joined the FLN after moving to France and collected money from
the Algerian workers as a ‘revolutionary tax’ for the war. Three of Abdel’s uncles died in
the Algerian War.
These stories appeared constantly in my interviews, even though there was not a
specific question that directed my respondents to identify a part of their familial history
related to the revolution. This ‘revolutionary energy’ that Algerians so clearly identified
with has been described as something like inventiveness, creativity, or self-management
(Lyotard, 1988). The participants that speak of their revolutionary identity clearly link it
to a sense of autonomy and resistance, pride, and struggle. From a French perspective, the
notion of a revolutionary identity instead signifies a social problem with direct links to
“Islamist separatism” that is placed squarely on Algerians: “the bloody Algerian war and
the colonial past [is] still imprinted” in the “collective psyche” of France, according to
French President Emmanuel Macron (quoted in McAuley, 2020b, p. 1). This accusatory
approach of holding Algerians responsible for Islamism in France has recently been taken
to a grossly excessive level—in a January 2021 report, the so-called ‘Algeria Report,’ the
recent brutal attacks carried out in France by Islamist terrorists (one a Russian passportholder in a Paris suburb, and three attacks by a Tunisian immigrant in the southern city of
Nice) ties these acts of terror to Algeria, the Algerian war, and the ‘collective psyche’ of
the Algerian revolution, even though these “heinous crimes [are] wholly unrelated to
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Algeria” (Ramdani, 2021, p. 1). Macron addressed the specific matter of identity among
the postcolonial population living in France, saying, “we see children of the Republic,
sometimes from elsewhere, children or grandchildren of citizens from immigrant
backgrounds and from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa revisiting their identity
through a post-colonial discourse,” calling this identity practice “a form of self-hatred”
(quoted in McAuley, 2020b, p. 1). Here, we can see how identity and memory within the
Algerian community becomes, from a French perspective, an indicator of community
pathology—the Algerian War is not in the past, it continues on in both French and
Algerian identity practices.
Some of my research respondents asserted the superiority of Algerian-origin
peoples over the français de souche. For instance, Lakhdar, a 48-year-old café owner,
living in the 10th arrondissement, holds strong opinions about the differing work ethics he
perceived between French and Algerian (particularly Berber Algerian) workers. Lakhdar
hesitates to elaborate but admits that he does not typically hire French people to work in
his café because “they are lazy” and unreliable. In Lakhdar’s experience, his Berber
employees work harder, stay longer, do not call in sick, and are reliable and easygoing.
This positioning of himself (and his fellow Algerians/ Berbers) within French society is
part of the relational process of identity formation. Lakhdar identifies strongly as
Algerian and feels disdain for the French. Lakhdar moved to France as an adult, after his
parents and other siblings had immigrated to France. When asked about his identity, he
says, “My name is Lakhdar, not François” and explains that he is always working to
defend and take pride in his Algerian heritage. When Lakhdar was in his 20s, his father
offered to help him file paperwork to change his name to something more French (a
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practice that Lakhdar says was common), but Lakhdar had no interest in becoming
“François or Pierre” he says. Yet Lakhdar also shows a willingness to forgive, explaining
that even though there was a war between his countries of France and Algeria, “the
enemy is our friend.” In fact, Lakhdar sees Algerians as holding a privileged place in
French society because of their victory in the war: “We have a special history with
France, Algeria has made France what it is [today]” he says. Lakhdar offers examples of
how he perceives Algerian immigrants to be more accepted in French society than
Tunisians or Moroccans: “In Paris, more of the hotels and bars are Berber, the Moroccans
are only butchers. Algerian people, we can do anything, but Moroccan and Tunisian
people cannot.” In these ways, Lakhdar understands his position as an Algerian in French
society as subordinate, but he contextualizes his social position within an immigrant
hierarchy where Algerians are placed above other immigrants. From Lakhdar’s example,
the tension between being at once privileged and disadvantaged is very real; his practices
of exclusion of other immigrants (and in some cases, the French) in a way that replicates
the practices of exclusion by French society show the nuanced ways that Algerians
occupy social positions of power and disadvantage simultaneously.
These examples demonstrate how Algerian immigrants and their descendants
continuously reproduce stark binaries between Algerian and French identities, indicating
a pronounced sense of alienation from French society. The constructs of Algerianness
(e.g., hospitality, dedication to family, revolution) become meaningful to individuals in
their everyday lives. Identity formation is taking place relationally, with Algerian-origin
individuals formulating a sense of who they are through interactions with fellow
Algerian-origin people and with non-immigrant French people. This involves a degree of

163

self-stereotyping, as well as a stereotyping (both positive and negative) of other groups.
These practices follow anthropologist Michael Herzfeld’s (2005) understanding of
“cultural intimacy,” which he describes as “the recognition of those aspects of a cultural
identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless
provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality” (p. 3). Herzfeld further
understands stereotypes, woven into the social fabric of a society, as generalizations that
are “by definition reductive, and, as such, always mark the absence of some presumably
desirable property in its object.” For Herzfeld (2005), stereotypes are “a discursive
weapon of power” that inform how individuals articulate who they are in a wider social
milieu (p. 202). A key point is that the Algerian identity expressed by my respondents,
while drawing on historical memories of Algeria and performed through visits to Algeria
or the replication of ‘typical’ Algerian behaviors, is not a simple ‘carry-over’ from the
‘old country.’ It involves an active production of community and belonging and the
attribution of meanings to one’s own behavior and experience. This becomes especially
evident in cases where respondents have ‘failed’ in their efforts to be French and have
made a conscious choice to identify more closely with their Algerianness.
To elaborate, some of my respondents shared with me their efforts to be French
and to conform with the expectations of membership in French society, only to be
rejected and rebuffed. For some, then, the adherence to an Algerian identity and an
explicit rejection of French identity comes from tangible reminders that they are not
French, rather than an incapacity to assimilate, or a choice not to assimilate. Some of
these respondents viewed education or social status as their tickets into the majority
French identity, but they found themselves reconnecting with their Algerian identity in
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the face of discrimination and exclusion. For example, Sakina, a 31-year-old daughter of
immigrants, living in the 20th arrondissement, has developed a strong association with her
parents’ homeland over the course of her child and adulthood. Growing up, Sakina
excelled in school, often despite discriminatory treatment from her teachers for being
Algerian. Sakina explains that she was expected to work harder in school to prove herself
next to her French peers, and she finished high school second in her class. She earned her
bachelor’s degree in Lille before moving to Paris to find work. Though she is from a
working-class background (her father was a manual laborer, her mother stayed at home),
Sakina has achieved a tenuous status within the middle-class with her job at an
advertising firm in Paris.
Sakina describes that while she presents herself as (and feels) French (e.g.,
‘French’ clothing, French language without accent, etc.) she is still frequently singled out
as ‘Algerian’ by her name and skin color. Sakina describes the inhospitable environment
in France for people of Algerian descent and her personal experiences of racism, stating
that she has “experienced racism all my life.” She describes times during her childhood,
growing up in Lille where she felt more racism than in metropolitan places (e.g., Paris).
People would regularly yell at her, "You’re not in your country!" When she was growing
up, if her father was late coming home at the end of the day, she assumed it was because
the police stopped him, as this was just a normal part of her life.
Sakina told me of an experience when a French coworker was surprised that she
spoke so many languages (she speaks six languages); Sakina took offense to this
perception, feeling that people assume she is uneducated because she is of Algerian
descent. In another example from work, she says that she is not included in what she
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perceives as the ‘French’ social groups—she describes her cohort (women around the
same age, also single, etc.) who regularly go out for drinks after work—an event that
Sakina is never invited to: “Maybe it’s because I don’t drink [alcohol] that they don’t ask
me [to join them]” she says. Though the consumption of alcohol was not included in the
four pillars of Frenchness that I described earlier, many interview participants identified
drinking alcohol39 as a marker of difference between Frenchness and Algerianness.
Sakina’s exclusion from socializing with her coworkers, and the social networking
benefits within that everyday activity speak to the settings in which these experiences of
exclusion occur.
Sakina, in some ways, is an ‘ideal’ second-generation immigrant who tries to
‘earn her Frenchness’ through hard work in school and her career. Yet though she
possesses the degree and the career, she has still experienced rejection in these areas,
causing her to turn toward her Algerian roots and get involved with the local Berber
Cultural Association in Paris, where she spends most of her free time. Sakina had always
felt alienated from French society, yet it was not until adulthood that she developed, and
began to act upon, a stronger attachment to her Algerian roots. Having once identified as
French, she now distinctly claims an Algerian and Berber identity.
The feelings that Sakina describe of being excluded from French society are
echoed by Ferhat, a 45-year-old son of immigrants, living in the 19th arrondissement.
Initially in our interview, he proudly declared “I am French!” Yet, he followed this by
discussing his struggle with identity. Like Sakina, Ferhat spent his younger years in
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pursuit of Frenchness, yet, over time and after experiences of exclusion, he admits,
“When I look in the mirror, all I see is my parents’ Algerian son.” Consequently, his
feelings of Frenchness are countered by his feelings of rejection from French society.
Ferhat speaks of childhood experiences at school when he found himself only around
other children of immigrants. He grew up in the banlieue and does not have memories of
‘French’ classmates. When he went to university in Paris, he, like Sakina, was not
included within the social activities of his French classmates. Ferhat talks indirectly about
desperately wanting to acquire more ‘Frenchness’ because he is French. For example,
from the time he arrived as his university, he was drawn to French philosophers’ work,
“especially if they do not believe in God,” because it provided a perspective that he did
not get from his Muslim upbringing. Ferhat’s attempt at gaining Frenchness through
embracing French philosophy and gaining expertise in French subject matter did not
achieve the desired result of acceptance within French society. As much as Ferhat tries to
fit in as ‘French,’ he always falls short of his goal and describes painful experiences of
exclusion from French society.
Though he grew up around other immigrant families, Ferhat’s childhood
experiences were different from others in his generational position in that he has only
been to Algeria twice—once at age 16 and again at age 24. His family does not make the
typical yearly trip to see his extended family and he does not feel a connection to Algeria
in the same way that other participants describe. Most notably, he does not have Algerian
citizenship, only French.40 Further, Ferhat does not speak Arabic, though he understands
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a little bit of the language. His parents spoke Algerian Arabic sometimes when he was a
child but wanted him and his five siblings to speak only French. Here, Ferhat represents a
sort of ‘double-exclusion’ where he is not accepted within ‘French’ society, and yet has
not fully developed a connection to ‘Algerian’ identity, thus, he experiences feelings of
isolation between his French and Algerian identities. This sense of isolation within the
French/Algerian binary is repeated by other participants in their quest for Frenchness.
Another example of the failure to fully access Frenchness through education is
Idir, a 32-year-old immigrant living in the 92nd district outside of Paris who came to
France to continue his studies, and who completed a master’s degree and a PhD. Like
Sakina and Ferhat, Idir perceived higher education as a path to mobility in French
society. However, he places himself squarely within an Algerian identity. After he
graduated, Idir worked in in the finance industry in Paris for a few years but found that
this career left him feeling like he was earning ‘bad money,’ and so he quit his job to
pursue his passion for learning and teaching. Idir explains a sense of right and wrong
through an Algerian adage: “You always know when you are making bad money,” that is,
money made in ways that go against the moral values of a person, specifically a religious
Algerian-origin person. For Idir, being Algerian involves his Muslim faith, hospitality
and kindness, and a modest way of life. He lives these principles and feels that “God will
see me if I have a good heart.” Idir admits that when he studied philosophy in school (and
returned to this study after leaving the finance industry), he only read(s) philosophers
whose beliefs on religion corresponded with his own. He makes it very clear that if a
philosopher (or any academic) does not believe in God, he will not read their work.
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Like many others, Idir describes aspects of Algerianness and Frenchness with
reference to hospitality and kindness. He explains, “being nice is something normal for
Algerians, but for the French, it is seen as a sign of weakness.” He returns to examples of
when he was working with mostly French coworkers in the finance industry, remarking,
“They just want to make money, [and] they don’t care about anything else…it wasn’t for
me.” After he left his job and returned to teaching, he also left many of his acquaintances
with French individuals, now mostly surrounding himself with other people of Algerian
origins—going so far as to seek a teaching position in an immigrant suburb. So, while he
had pursued a French way of life, and surrounded himself with French people, he found
that he could not sustain it, and he now connects himself fully to Algerianness, to people
of Algerian origin, and to the larger immigrant community in Paris and the surrounding
area.
A somewhat different case from Idir, who actively rejected the French middleclass preoccupation with money and prestige, is Youcef, who argued that Frenchness is
not accessible even to those who enjoy a high social status. Youcef, a 36-year-old
immigrant living in the 94th district outside of Paris, describes his upbringing in Algeria:
“I am what they call ‘Golden Algerian’ which means, like, the Daddy’s kids, people who
had money and privilege.” Because of his family’s social status in Algerian society,
Youcef grew up speaking only French. He had what he describes as “a French
upbringing” that involved speaking French without an accent and knowing mainstream
French music and television (i.e., produced and consumed primarily by those of nonimmigrant backgrounds). Youcef assumed that his French upbringing would make it
easier for him to find things in common with French people and feel more at ease in
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French society because he felt that he held a sense of comfort with French social norms
and expectations. Yet, after he immigrated to France, he fell into the status of an
‘immigrant’ and an ‘Algerian.’ He found that even though, in his mind, he could think,
act, and speak as a Frenchman, he could not change the color of his skin, or the instant
perception that accompanied his apparent Algerianness. In addition to this new
experience of racial exclusion, Youcef struggled to maintain legal residency, furthering
his isolation in his new country. Youcef spent nine years working to get his papers in
order to live and work in France legally. During that time, he was unable to travel home
to Algeria to see his family and friends. When Youcef could not travel home to see his
family, he sought out other people of Algerian descent in Paris online and met up with
them in person, finding comfort in his fellow countrymen. Youcef now lives in a
neighborhood that is “totally Algerian” and he likes living among Algerians. In these
ways, like others described here in this section, Youcef perceived his upbringing to offer
access to Frenchness, yet, when he arrived in France as an adult, he found that neither
social status nor education could solidify access to Frenchness—that his Algerianness
would ultimately define him.
Youcef, like Sakina, Ferhat, and Idir found that he ‘reverted’ to his Algerian
identity and to the Algerian community in the face of rejection from Frenchness. Whether
they were rejected by French dominant groups or found that they rejected French
dominant norms themselves, each of them worked to find a place of inclusion and
acceptance in more Algerian-friendly realms—a phenomenon that has recently been
observed by French scholars: “[T]here is an important minority who have this problem of
identity, who don’t feel French—either because they’ve been rejected or because they
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don’t have the desire” for inclusion within French society (El Karoui, 2018, quoted in
McAuley, 2020a, p. 1).
Given the way North African immigrants have been continuously racialized by
French society, it is not surprising that my study respondents define themselves against
Frenchness and that they describe their Algerian identities in both culturalist and
oppositional terms. They also maintain strong transnational connections with Algeria—a
fact that plays into French nationalist discourses about the non-assimilation of
immigrants. The participants’ narratives presented here show the work that Algerian
immigrants and their descendants conduct to destabilize the boundaries between
Frenchness and Algerianness, only to retreat into the ‘unassimilable’ identity of the
Algerian-binary following continued exclusion from Frenchness.
Yet, despite the salience of the French/Algerian binary, it would be overly
simplistic to take it as a given. Clearly, the binary is very meaningful for my respondents,
and it has a ‘real,’ material set of implications in terms of behaviors and social networks.
But a closer look at participants’ responses reveals a significant degree of ambivalence
toward both categories, whereby neither the French nor Algerian identity categories
satisfy the sense of belonging and community among some participants. In the following
section, I show other ways that interviewees trouble the French/Algerian binary. Some of
my respondents attempt to shift identity boundaries or to dis-identify with the categories
that others assigned them; for some, this involves embracing a pan-ethnic identity. With
this said, even these participants reverted to the Algerian-binary identity in certain
circumstances—especially when the felt obliged to state their ‘loyalty.’
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Pan-ethnicities
As shown in earlier examples, my respondents offer hospitality to a broader group
of immigrants. While maintaining a strong identification as Algerian, their sense of
relative sameness with other immigrants hints at the possibility of broader identity
practices. One such practice involves the notion of pan-ethnicity. In this case, research
participants not only reject (or are rejected from) a French identity, but they also reject an
Algerian identity and substitute a pan-ethnic identity. Scholars of pan-ethnicity observe
that pan-ethnicities can be a strategic response to conditions of inequality; they involve a
unique tension inherent in maintaining subgroup distinctions while generating a broader
sense of solidarity (Padilla, 1985; Okamoto and Mora, 2014). Here, I describe three
cases— Nouara, Yanis, and Ali—who ascribe to themselves a pan-ethnic identity and
who, in varying ways, reject the French/Algerian binary as the foundation of identity
construction, offering instead a pan-ethnic identity such as ‘African’ or ‘world citizen.’
Yet, each of the participants also claim an Algerian or Berber identity in certain contexts.
In other words, narrower identities, and the binaries on which they are based, do not
entirely disappear among these respondents. The individuals in this group describe
experiences of extreme rejection, often surrounding their legal status (or lack of) residing
in France, and their pan-ethnicities involve the production of alternative social networks
that serve as important resources for coping with precariousness.
One example of pan-ethnic identity construction is Nouara, a 33-year-old
immigrant residing in the 20th arrondissement of Paris who experiences a particularly
thorny engagement with her identities. Nouara has French ancestry, and her maternal
grandfather received the highest French order of merit for military actions, the Legion of
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Honor. Her mother grew up in France but returned to Algeria to marry Nouara’s father.
Owing to the circumstances surrounding her birth, her parents’ lack of education and
knowledge of citizenship status and processes, Nouara did not, and has not yet attained
French citizenship. Indeed, she has lived in France illegally all her life, though her
parents and sister all have French citizenship41. Nouara’s family moved back to France
during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, and her sister was born in France (with direct
access to French citizenship upon her birth). On the one hand, Nouara might be expected
to identify as Algerian, though she only lived there for the first few years of her life; on
the other hand, she could perhaps identify as French since she has spent her formative
and adult years living in, speaking the language of, and going to school in France, despite
her lack of legal status. In fact, she identifies as neither, choosing instead to call herself
‘African’ or a ‘world citizen.’ Still, while she describes feeling a lack of connection or
feelings of loyalty to either her French or Algerian identities, she admits that she has
relied heavily on her network of Algerian-origin people, her ‘Algerian network.’ This is
especially the case with respect to finding and keeping work and applying for legal
entrance into universities. Nouara says that among Algerians, “everyone is equal, and no
one would refuse another Algerian in need.” Nouara explains her understanding of
Algerian hospitality as something indispensable in her life, “I can’t do it without them”
when describing her reliance on her Algerian network to help her through her life.
Another example is 25-year-old Yanis who arrived in France and lived with
friends in the St. Denis banlieue, in the 93rd district outside of Paris before finding a place

41

I discuss participants like Nouara in further detail in Chapter Six, within the discussion
regarding citizenship status.
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he could afford in the 18th arrondissement. Because he is in France on a work visa, Yanis
must keep his job and get a continuation of his contract to maintain his legal residency in
France. Yanis worked for years to come to France and received many rejections in the
form of school and visa applications—rejections he blames directly on his status as
‘Algerian.’ But at the time of his interview, he had just applied for a one-year visa, and he
aims to stay in France and eventually to apply for citizenship. Like Nouara, he claims an
African identity. Yanis explains that he does not want to discuss his feelings of
‘Frenchness’ or ‘Algerianness.’ Rather, he wants to “depoliticize origins.” He declares, “I
am AFRICAN! I want to make noise about it!”
Yanis’s desire to ‘depoliticize’ his origins is, like Nouara, a reaction to the many
levels of rejection and exclusion he has experienced based on his Algerian origins. When
Yanis speaks of his background, he does (grudgingly) identify as Berber though he tries
to complicate even his Berber identity. Yanis emphasizes the hybridity of all identities,
explaining that Algerians themselves are a mix of cultural groups: before the French,
there were Greeks, Turks, Italians, Arabs, and Spaniards in Algeria. By highlighting this
hybridity, he further distances himself from a singularly Algerian or French identity. But
Yanis’s position sometimes becomes contradictory, showing how identity works across
multiple settings: he claims and rejects identity categories at different moments, changing
the attributes that he assigns to each category and classifying certain identities as merely
‘cultural,’ as when he states, “Well, culturally, I am Berber.” In explaining his sense of
identity and belonging, he refers to an old Algerian adage: “If you do not know where
you are going, look behind you.” For Yanis, this adage refers to how much his parents
and grandparents went through to get him where he is today. His father was born in
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Kabyle during the French-Algerian war and was raised in a ‘Kabyle house’ made famous
by the French ethnographer Pierre Bourdieu. Like Nouara, he socializes mainly with
others of Algerian origin, and he relies extensively on Algerian social networks. There
are limits, then, to his broader African identity, and we might think of ‘Africanness’ more
as an aspirational construct—or as an identity he can deploy in certain contexts to avoid
the political meanings attached to Algerian or French identities.
For many similar reasons, Ali, a 29-year-old immigrant living in the 13th
arrondissement, embraces his African roots in ways akin to Nouara and Yanis. When
asked, he says, “I’m African!” and laughs when he explains that he does not like to claim
his Algerianness in France because he feels there is too much discrimination from the
French. In fact, Ali admits to telling people that he is from Portugal rather than Algeria
when trying to find work. Ali finished the 11th grade in Algeria before he immigrated
illegally to France. He wanted to find work in France to send money home to his large
family (he is the third of eight children) back in Algiers. Ali works multiple jobs in
precarious employment—the work he is able to find is often insecure, low-paid, without
benefits, and often labor-intensive (e.g., working in the early morning markets, unloading
produce for farmers to sell). Ali feels that France is a world of inhospitality toward
immigrants, and to Algerians in particular—a problem he blames entirely on the French
colonization of Algeria. In Ali’s mind, the French remain angry that they lost the
Algerian War, but they still ‘owe’ Algerians for the century plus of colonization.
Ali finds it difficult to locate help or hospitality from the French, but like Nouara
and Yanis, he draws upon a large network of Algerians in Paris. Because Ali did not
finish high school and is living illegally in France, he relies heavily on this network to
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help him accomplish things that legal residents do with ease, such as finding work or
housing. While Ali’s legal status in France is precarious, he is often contacted by friends
and relatives to help other newly arriving immigrants from Algeria. When I interviewed
him, he had recently been to the airport to greet a family of four as they arrived in Paris.
He took them to the government office where they could fill out the necessary paperwork
to begin their life in France (though Ali did not have access to this privilege). Ali
continued to help this family find a place to live and connected the father with others of
Algerian descent that would assist him in finding work. Ali is never paid for his
assistance; he does it out of an obligation to his fellow Algerians. Ali helps Algerians
regardless of the circumstances precipitating their arrival in France and has helped many
unauthorized immigrants find housing and work, just as was done for him by others of
Algerian descent when he arrived in France years prior.
Still, Ali’s African identity is meaningful to him, and its purpose is twofold: first,
he, like Yanis, does not want to offer up his identity, or his ‘origins,’ for possible
rejection on the part of French society. Ali has been rejected by French society in every
way possible, and he claims African (or even other European) identities as a practice to
diffuse, or using Yanis’s term, to depoliticize his origins; second, Ali uses an African
identity to shift attention from his identity as ‘Algerian,’ which, as I have discussed
previously, is often conflated with ‘illegal immigrant.’ He feels that an African identity is
less likely to lead to a questioning of his legal status, though, as shown by his attempt to
claim Portuguese (i.e., European) roots, an African identity is still problematic. Here, Ali
is claiming, or performing an identity with the intention of avoiding suspicion and
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ultimately, avoiding rejection. Ali’s use of African identity, in short, is a strategy to cope
with his vulnerable existence living illegally in France.
These three participants highlight the ways that my respondents make use of panethnic identities to avoid the particular stigma attached to Algerianness and to protect
themselves from the marginalization and rejection that they encounter (Okamoto and
Mora, 2014). The following sections move the conversation past the binary or singular
identity understanding and shift toward a hybrid notion of multiple identities that function
together. In the next section, I further interrogate the premise of binary-identity creation
to incorporate the missing links in the discourse of identity formation by challenging the
generalizations and one-sided conceptualizations of Algerian immigrants and their
descendants in France to include more fluid, complex, and hybrid expressions of identity.
Hybrid Identities: Challenging and Reworking the French/Algerian Binary
I have tried to demonstrate thus far that my respondents’ identities revolve around
a strong French/Algerian binary, and that respondents continuously negotiate this
binary—at times destabilizing it, but also reinforcing it. Binaries remain intact, yet
boundaries become blurry and complicated as respondents position themselves
differently at different periods in their lives, and/or as they aspire to pan-ethnic identities
that offer some relief from the French/Algerian binary. At times, respondents describe
identity categories in terms of cultural purity, at other times, they seem to suggest that
categories may be somewhat flexible—or, at least, individuals have some ability (albeit
limited) to choose an identity. Here, I continue to explore the ambiguities that surround
these identity categories, highlighting the ways some of my respondents continuously
move in and out of identity categories/performances and attempt to position themselves
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in the liminal spaces between categories. Practices of shifting between categories vary by
generation, though all involve a limited appreciation of and conformity to Frenchness
(despite some feelings of exclusion), along with some effort to re-work ‘Frenchness’ to
accommodate racial/ethnic difference; there are also a limited number of cases in which
individuals more fully embrace ‘Frenchness’ at the expense of an Algerian identity.
These hybrid identities emerge from respondents’ experiences and suggest the ways
people knit together various elements associated with different identity categories in
everyday life; hybrid identities continue to rely on binary conceptions of Frenchness and
Algerianness, while also undermining essentialized categories.
As I noted earlier, many of the first-generation Algerian immigrants I
interviewed, and some of their children, work to ‘re-create’ an essentialized Algerian
culture in France. But others make no such attempt and, indeed, regard transnational
practices as adverse to their inclusion within French society. At the same time, while
some members of the second-generation tend to feel connected to Algeria, their
relationship with Algeria differs from that of their parents, and they approach
membership in a transnational Algerian community with hesitancy or separateness. By
the same token, while most second-generation participants identified at least partly with
Frenchness, their sense of membership in a French national polity varies. They all
maintain a distinction between France and Algeria, but the values, attitudes, and ways of
being that they attach to Frenchness differ, and they understand themselves in varying
ways to be partly French. Again, these dynamics do not necessarily dismantle binaries,
but they suggest a degree of agency in the different ways in which immigrants construct
and negotiate categories.
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One example of these complex negotiations is Wily, a 36-year-old immigrant,
living in the 20th arrondissement, who returns home to Algeria to see his family twice a
year. Though Wily is from a very poor family, he has worked hard to escape poverty in
Algeria and to join the middle class in France. He migrated to France in 2008 and went to
college, he now holds an administrative position in a hospital. Wily recounts his
experiences of exclusion in France, explaining that he decided to unofficially change his
name from Karim to Wily after he was rejected from job applications: “[S]ometimes you
hear people, they are racists. They hear Karim, and they think Arabic.” He continues,
“When people ask me where I am from, I do not say Algeria. Algerian is bad because of
the history; if I say I’m Algerian, that changes a lot of things;” and, “They hate us more
now. Before, Algerians work[ed] only in service [manual labor] but now [we] have
degrees and higher jobs and the French say, ‘They take our jobs.’” Yet while Wily
embraces his Berber-Algerian heritage, he says, “I am French, of course” when asked to
articulate his own feelings of identity. Wily links his identification as ‘French’ to his
desire not to practice religion, his pursuit of knowledge through formal education, and his
status as a single, divorced person. Wily says, “If I have to choose between Algerian and
French, I would choose French for sure [because] I feel better here.” In Wily’s example,
in identifying with Frenchness, he creates new opportunities for himself and validates
parts of his life experience that are not socially acceptable in Algerian society (e.g., being
divorced, being non-religious, etc.), which he deems to be “closeminded.”
Wily’s association of Algeria with closemindedness is echoed by other
respondents. For instance, Nadia, a 26-year-old part-time resident in France living in the
14th arrondissement, feels that she belongs less with Algerians and more with the French
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because they are “really open-minded,” and she is “way too open-minded for Algerian
people.” Unlike Wily, Nadia is from an upper-class family in Algeria and has the ability
to live in France for part of the year; she is trying to immigrate to France full-time but so
far, has not been able to secure the required visa for a legal, permanent stay. Nadia
references specific examples of open-mindedness in France when it comes to feminism:
“When they start talking about women’s rights, I feel like I’m the only one [in Algeria]
who thinks like that. Then I come [to France] and talk to French people and I feel, yeah,
I’m like you.” She also feels akin to the French when it comes to issues of sexuality and
religion. Nadia understands Frenchness almost wholly in opposition to Algerianness. She
explains, “I can’t tell you what it is to be French, but I can tell you what it is to not be
Algerian.” Even though she grew up in Algeria and only lives half-time in France, she
does not identify as Algerian. Nadia’s case is especially interesting because her
connections to France are tenuous at best, yet she still identifies with France more
strongly than she does with Algeria.
Nadia’s critical differentiation of Algerian and French identities, perceived
through the lenses of freedoms and open-mindedness are echoed by other participants,
like Omar, a 28-year-old immigrant living in the 20th arrondissement, who came to
France to get his master’s degree and who completed his PhD in 2014. Omar holds
feelings of ambivalence—of both attraction and repulsion, of love and hate for Algeria
and for France (Smelser, 1998). When Omar discusses his understanding of Algerianness,
he draws upon the same binary used by many respondents. He feels that Algerians “want
to have a relationship with [their] parents,” and he plans to take care of his parents when
they are older. For Omar, those who do not take care of their family (i.e., the French) are
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selfish, and he feels that Algerians possess a stronger sense of obligation to family. He
believes, in some ways, that Algerian culture has been imprinted on him, and that he
cannot escape it: “I think your culture is from where you grow up. From zero to 20 years,
it’s the time when you really got your culture.” In this regard, Omar feels separate from
French culture: “I share some things with French people, of course, but some things I
don’t share with them because I didn’t grow up here—I don’t have the same references as
the French.” Yet Omar enjoys the freedoms that come with living in France, and he
cannot imagine moving back to Algeria. Though he feels that he does not share
everything with the French, he thinks of France as an open country, open to people like
him. He states, “It’s why I like the French, [they] are open to other cultures. It’s not like
Algeria, they’re closed [minded]. You will become Algerian [only] if you have the
Algerian culture.” Omar sees French and Algerian societies as offering different costs
and benefits. He states, “to be in a conservative society [like Algeria], you have the cost
of freedoms but in France, you lose the value of family. Here [in France], people see their
mom one time per month…For me it’s not like that, I want to have a relation with my
parents,” who still live in Algeria. But Omar likes living in France, and he plans to stay.
He explains, “there are a lot of advantages [in France] …and many of my Algerian
friends are my schoolmates—they came to finish school but then found jobs, like me, and
stayed.” Interestingly, Omar’s friend-circle consists mainly of Algerians who meet up to
play soccer or celebrate Algerian/Muslim holidays. An avid fan of the Algerian soccer
team, Omar even went to Brazil to see Algeria play in the 2014 World Cup42. In these

Football allegiance has been a casual marker of identity, for example, “If there is a
football game between Algeria and France, I will totally support Algeria” (Alsaafin,
2019). There was also an incident involving a game between the French and Algerian
42
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ways, Omar experiences strong feelings of both his Algerianness and his Frenchness; and
he presents these feelings in a way that shows less sense of rejection by French society,
and more a sense of rejecting French specific attitudes and norms, especially relating to
family. At the same time, he embraces parts of his Algerianness in terms of his close
association with other individuals of Algerian origin—especially those whose lives have
followed a similar course as Omar’s and who embrace similar aspects of Frenchness.
Omar, then, places his Algerian identity within the bounds of Frenchness, without the
fear of rejection experienced by other respondents.
Omar is just one of several participants who feel accepted in France through
education and career success. Another is Brahim, a 36-year-old immigrant living in the
4th arrondissement. He moved to France when he was 22 years old and explains, “At 22,
you have your identity, not like when you immigrate when you are young, or you are
born in France.” He described himself as Algerian, but after thinking about his answer, he
went on to say, “I do feel French though. This is where I live, this is where I work, this is
where I vote, this is the language that I speak” (Brahim also speaks Algerian Arabic,
Standard Arabic, English, and Russian). When asked about Frenchness, Brahim explains
that an appreciation for fine art and museums is something that makes a person ‘French’
or that is indicative of Frenchness. Brahim also loves French philosophy and identifies it
as something innately ‘French,’ but he has a preference for French-Algerian works that
offer some context for his specific sense of French identity. Because of his professional
work abroad and his many languages, Brahim is often interviewed for news segments

soccer teams in France in 2008, when Algerian immigrants and their descendants
infamously booed the French national anthem, inciting political commentators to
proclaim their lack of assimilation.
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about political issues in France regarding immigrants. He admits that while he can
comment on his perception of life as an immigrant, he has no experience living in the
banlieues or of being raised as an immigrant in France: he has not struggled to find work
or housing, and he holds a sense of confidence or even choice in his identity when he
discusses being Algerian and/or French.
Brahim achieved middle-class status in France through his education and career
opportunities. However, as we saw in the narrative of Youcef, the elements of class,
education, and career do not always guarantee access to Frenchness. It is instructive here
to return to the case of Youcef, the 35-year-old ‘Golden Algerian’ who was raised with a
‘French upbringing’ within the upper-class of Algeria. As I described earlier, Youcef’s
grandfathers were revolutionaries on opposite ends of Algeria, and though he came from
an upper-class family in Algeria, he still struggled for nearly a decade to obtain legal
residency in France, suffering feelings of exclusion from a French identity. Youcef
admits that he sometimes also feels separate from other Algerian-origin people in France.
When he is around people of Algerian descent speaking Algerian Arabic, Youcef cannot
participate in the conversation, and he feels that “there is some kind of gap where it’s like
we’re a bit different, like I’m almost like a French-Algerian guy and they’re all real
Algerian people. So yeah, it’s kind of hard.” Youcef’s ambivalence and insecurity in
some circumstances illustrates the many confounding variables that affect identity
construction. Youcef has confidence in both his French and Algerian identities in certain
situations but lacks confidence in other situations. In some situations, his perfect French
offers access to Frenchness, but his struggle to obtain legal residency created a barrier to
inclusion within French society. His family’s history and his association with Algerian
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clubs offers access to Algerianness, but his lack of Algerian Arabic skills makes it
difficult for him to engage fully with an Algerian ‘community.’ In these ways, Youcef’s
narrative illustrates the significance but also the complexity of the French/Algerian
binary and the ways that negotiations of these categories can reinforce and destabilize
them at the same time.
Another example of a hybrid identity from a first-generation participant is Hakim,
who was born in Algeria and his family moved to France when he was a child. Hakim
sees a sharp difference between ‘Algerian’ and ‘French’ identities—two very different
‘cultures,’ distinctive in terms of values and traditions, despite historical connections—
and he recognizes the subordination of one to the other. He states, “Algeria is really
different from here…just the mentality in another country is totally different. I would
love to bring a good friend of mine [from France] to Algiers to show him and he would
see with his eyes what is really different and why…another country, another culture…”
Hakim identifies as French saying, “I was raised here [in France] so of course, I speak
French, my friends are French, my culture is French, my way of thinking is French…I’m
more French than Algerian…I have a French point of view.” Hakim describes a “French
way of thinking” to involve a sense of secularism, he explains that he does not believe in
a God (despite his Muslim upbringing and cultural traditions); he also references a
dedication to higher education, philosophy, and socialization with other French people.
From Hakim’s perspective, a notion of being raised in an environment of Frenchness,
regardless of being physically located in France or not, is enough to confer French
identity (although this was not the case for Youcef, as previously noted).
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Yet he also separates himself from the français de souche in recognizing the
supremacy of subordination of Algerian identity within the French context. He suggests
that the French do not envision France as a country whose modern history, culture, and
identity are founded on the recruitment and absorption of foreigners, but as a nation
formed and preserved by ethnic majority French (Elayyadi, 2004). Hakim, a teacher, calls
this “a kind of postcolonial tension” that exists among his students in the suburbs,
because “they know what they are not: French.” Here, Hakim reflects on the negative
relationality of identity: knowing what one is ‘not’ to know what one ‘is.’ Still, he
regards these categories as navigable—his is a liminal membership, suggesting
something in-between both a French and an Algerian identity. Having defined himself as
culturally French, he then detaches himself from Frenchness, describing the French as not
open-minded, evidenced by the segregation of racialized minorities in France: “[W]here I
work in the 93rd [district], you just have Black and Arab people. It’s like a ghetto and it is
really poor and has a lot of social issues. So, when I see that, I cannot say that France is
very openminded.”
Following Hakim’s depiction of social issues in France, as they have now and
historically affected Algerians in France, Louati also engages with social issues to
understand French and Algerian identity. Louati, a 72-year-old immigrant, lives in
Gentilly, a southern suburb of Paris in the 94th district. He migrated to France in 1965 at
the age of 20, just three years after the end of the Algerian War. He attended college,
earned a master’s degree in economics, and taught in secondary schools for many years.
He then turned his attention to cinema and became a documentary filmmaker, focusing
on topics that he saw as important to the Algerian community in France (e.g., the social
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situation of the banlieues). For Louati, French identity is always secondary to Algerian
identity; though he has lived and worked in France for over fifty years, he identifies as an
“Algerian filmmaker” and not a “French filmmaker.” He says, “You are what others say
you are. If you are born in Algeria, you are Algerian. You are where you are born.” But
Louati’s everyday life is quite different from other study participants who also prioritize
their Algerian identity. Louati fills his day with artists, academics, and other
acquaintances (both French and Algerian); he drinks red wine in the afternoon while
smoking his cigarettes (it was during this time that I interviewed him at his home) and
invites a wide variety of people into his home regularly. He values hospitality, but the
hospitality he practices does not seem to be shaped by Algerian cultural mores. Louati
thus destabilizes the French/Algerian binary, even as he relies upon it to explain his
feelings of identity.
These narratives of first-generation participants demonstrate the complexity that
emerges among first-generation Algerian immigrants as they internalize and make claim
to some level of Frenchness. These individuals, at a personal level, feel lower (or no)
levels of rejection from mainstream French society, but they recognize that French
society excludes Algerians. Their relationship with both Frenchness and Algerianness is
fluid, situational, and partial. Interviews with second-generation participants show similar
ambivalence toward both Algerian and French identities and the desire (and ability) to
borrow from different identities or to move back and forth between two ‘cultural worlds.’
For instance, Mhenna, a 27-year-old son of immigrants who lives in the 20th
arrondissement, feels that there are two different kinds of French people: there are
“French-French” (his version of français de souche) and “half-French.” He defines the
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‘French-French’ as having two parents of French origin: “They are selfish, won’t speak to
other people, won’t help other people, and teach their children not to talk to other people.
If you can just ask for information in the street, even if they know what the answer is,
they say, “I don’t have time”” Mhenna says. Language was another factor Mhenna
describes when separating his categories of French people; the ‘French-French’ speak
only French43, and demand others to speak French with them, whereas ‘half-French’
people have an immigrant parent and a French parent and speak multiple languages
(including French). Mhenna, who considers himself ‘half-French’ (though both of his
parents were born in Algeria), explaining that ‘half-French’ people are identifiable by
their hospitality (or helpfulness), their willingness to speak to others, and their dedication
to family. From this perspective, Mhenna is creating a hybrid identity that embodies
aspects of both a French and Algerian identity that he named ‘half-French.’
Mhenna feels comfortable in French realms because “I am French,” he says.
When describing his everyday life, he explains situations where he draws from both his
French and his Algerian (or in his case, ‘half-French’) identity: “At work, I am with
French people; I do not think about ‘who’ I am,” he says, “but for things like, you know,
holidays, they mean something to me”—referencing Muslim holidays, which he
celebrates with his parents, family, and other Algerians (though he does not actively
practice Islam). Mhenna speaks about a desire to study Algerian history, because it is
interesting to him, something that he sees as different from his own life experience in

Speaking French ‘properly’ does not just imply a command of the French language—it
also implies a certain ‘kind’ of French, so-called ‘Parisian French’ (e.g., the French
spoken by French intellectuals, businessmen, and politicians) (de Gruyter, 1989).
Multiple participants referred to speaking a certain ‘kind’ of French that even many
Frenchmen (in the rural areas) do not have access to.
43
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France, and that he feels an obligation to know more about. In these ways, Mhenna
practices his French and Algerian identities in different circumstances, switching
different identities on and off in certain circumstances.
Partial detachment from French and/or Algerian categories, and differing
engagements with each, is also shown in Hassan’s narrative. Hassan, a 33-year-old son of
immigrants who lives in the 18th arrondissement, believes that to ‘be French,’ a person
must be born and raised in France, speak the French language44 perfectly, and “feel at
ease on French earth”—this notion of ‘feeling at ease’ is in reference to a sense of
belonging to France (i.e., a sense of comfort with French social norms and values).
Though he has a Berber name and a revolutionary father (as mentioned previously,
Hassan is making a documentary about his father’s life as a revolutionary during the
Algerian War), Hassan identifies as French, saying, “The fact is, I am not Algerian.” For
Hassan, an Algerian person is someone born and raised in Algeria who speaks Berber or
Arabic perfectly. Hassan speaks Berber and Arabic, but not perfectly. For him, “I am
French, but a part of my culture is Algerian, and a part of my culture is French, but I
cannot say that I am Algerian.” Yet while Hassan claims that he has always felt at ease in
France, he has felt pressure to “prove his Frenchness” to the français de souche and

According to the 1992 study, “Geographical Mobility and Social Inclusion,” conducted
by the French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) and the National Institute of
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), around half of the first-generation Algerian
immigrants claim Arabic as their maternal language and another twenty-four percent
claim using a mix of Arabic, Berber and French (Tribalat, 1996, p. 190). Tellingly, only
ten percent of the second-generation of Algerians in France claim Arabic as their mother
tongue and an additional twenty-eight percent claim speaking a mixture of French and
Arabic (Tribalat, 1996, p. 203).
44
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claims that with this type of person, you can physically feel their discomfort (i.e.,
prejudice or racism) when they are in the presence of an immigrant. Hassan considers
racism as the antithesis of French political values and considers racist people (e.g.,
français de souche) as “less French than me because they are in total opposition with a lot
of historic French values” (e.g., equality). In this way, Hassan, the son of immigrant
parents, considers Frenchness to be the ability to embrace and live the French values of
equality, liberty, and fraternity—and he admonishes those that do not embrace French
values. Hassan, a teacher, feels that there is a significant problem of racism in French
society: “Racism is caused by other factors and people don’t speak enough about it…it’s
a big problem of social ethnicity, especially in schools. I have two classes [in an
immigrant banlieue] with no whites. But in schools on the other side of the Seine, all
white people.” Hassan thus shows ambivalence between identifying with other French
people, though the problem for him is the willingness (or lack) of the French to adhere to
their own ideals.
Notably, in his condemnation of racist français de souche, Hassan exhibits a
passion for French values of equality, liberty, and fraternity. His identity is thus
determinedly French, and he feels a sense of superiority in his Frenchness. This feeling of
superiority was also shown by Abdel, who like Hassan, perceives what it means to be
French through language, place of birth, and residence. Abdel, a 25-year-old son of
immigrants who lives in the 14th arrondissement of Paris, identifies ‘Frenchness’ in terms
of language, philosophy, and ‘high culture.’ Abdel feels French in some ways,
particularly his mastery of the French language. He explains, “Since my life is dedicated
to the French language, and since this is what makes my life meaningful, I define myself
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as French.” However, he also understands Frenchness, “as an aesthetic demand, never
reachable…in that sense, I consider that only a few people, I would say only cultured
people, are ‘really’ French.” He continues, “[France has] a civilization I admire; I feel
that France is better than Algeria, greater by its civilization. I used to associate Algeria
with violence and superstition.” His vision of France, he explains, is represented by
“1960s France, where culture and republicanism were very important,” but he admits that
he believes this conception of France “is mythical and does not exist anymore.” In a way
akin to Hassan’s understanding of his position within his French identity, Abdel feels
confident enough to offer commentary on an idealized notion of Frenchness, and to
associate himself with idealized French values.
A final example of the hybrid identities expressed by some second-generation
respondents comes from Amara, a 23-year-old daughter of immigrants who lives in the
Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue, who makes claims of Frenchness and Algerianness. She
explains, “I don’t consider myself as only an Algerian girl. I don’t know how to say it,
like, mixed, you know? So, I can talk with the Algerian people in totally Algerian and [I
am] comfortable with talking with these people, and at the same time, [I am] totally
comfortable with French people.” Amara, like others described in this section, identifies
French culture with ‘high culture.’ She points specifically to architecture, indicating that
she sees ‘Frenchness’ in the buildings that she sees in central Paris, but not in the
banlieue where she lives: “It’s also about the history, you know? You just have to walk
on the streets and see the architecture.” She notes that this same French culture is
imprinted within Algeria itself—she sees it in the architecture when she visits Algeria
every year. Amara describes a sense of open-mindedness (like Wily and Nadia) in French
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culture, though unlike many other respondents, she sees open-mindedness in “their
acceptance of immigrants…I think that French society is open-minded, especially in Paris
and other big cities where you have a lot of immigrants.” Though Amara expresses a
sense of ‘fitting in’ within French society, she admits that she does not recognize herself
in French politics, and she does not participate in civic duties like voting. Throughout her
interview, Amara refers to herself as Algerian and French in different situations, places,
and experiences—for example, when she speaks about immigrants (e.g., social relations
in French society or the banlieues), she identifies as Algerian; when she speaks about her
everyday life (e.g., going to the cinema, or out with friends), she identifies as French.
Though their depictions of Frenchness and Algerianness differ, the respondents
described in this section have one thing in common: feelings of at least partial acceptance
in the realm of a French identity, a sense of comfort in ‘French spaces,’ and enough
confidence (possibly because of their higher levels of education, though not all highly
educated respondents feel as they do) to assign nuanced meaning to Frenchness. All of
the participants that show a hybrid identity play back-and-forth with their descriptions of
themselves as ‘Algerian’ in some cases, ‘French’ in other cases, and they vacillate in their
use of the pronouns we/us/they/them in ways that imply relative social proximity or
distance—for instance, “we won the war” (referring to the Algerian War), or “they are
racist” (referring to the French), or “family is important to us” (referring to Algerians),
and so on.
The expressions of identity described in this section reinforce, complicate, and
sometimes undermine the binary construction of Algerian and French identities. It is
important to not only acknowledge how individuals construct identity through

191

dichotomies (e.g., French OR Algerian, or French VERUS Algerian), but how these
dichotomies break down at times, and how they are continuously re-defined in relation to
each other. The distinctions between Frenchness and Algerianness are based on both real
and imagined differences that Algerian immigrants and their descendants experience and
observe in their daily lives in France. In some cases, these dichotomies give way to more
hybrid identities, whereby respondents locate themselves in the interstices of identity
categories or contest the exclusivity of categories. Rather than relying on an either/or
construction of belonging, these individuals work with a both/and construction that
speaks to overlaps, intersections, negotiations, and engagements with social categories.
These findings follow Bhabha’s (1994) claim that hybrid identity emerges when there is
negotiation, interface, and exchange of cultural identities across boundaries. These
examples of first- and second-generation hybrid identities further complicate the identity
construction and expression among my research participants. These cultural productions
cast a critical light on standard narratives of integration, which treat immigrant and hostsociety ‘cultures’ as static and self-evident, and prompt us to consider how people are
constantly bringing social categories into being.
Conclusions
This chapter highlights the complexity of cultural identity and social categories by
unpacking the most prominent identity categories described in the interviews—French
and Algerian. My interviews with people of Algerian origin reveal a wide variety of
values and meanings attached to each of these categories, as well as many contradictions
and ambiguities in their understandings of self and other. Being an immigrant in a
nationally defined polity requires the comprehension of categories and hierarchies and
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the navigation of membership within these categories. The ability and willingness to
claim membership in categories is not uniform but varies significantly even among
people with similar educational and class backgrounds. Participants evaluated their
difference and sameness vis-à-vis various categories, often drawing on their own,
personal experiences, and then indicated their desire to resist, accommodate, and rework
these categories.
Despite adopting a somewhat combative stance toward France and French
identity—treating Frenchness as the opposite of Algerianness—many of the research
respondents do incorporate French identity into their own identities and reconcile what
might otherwise seem like mutually exclusive constructs. My study participants may see
themselves as Algerian, but they also understand that being Algerian does not mean that
they are completely isolated from Frenchness. In this way, being ‘Algerian’ or ‘French’ is
a matter of degree, content, and situation rather than a static or zero-sum state of being.
As might be expected, my second-generation respondents consistently displayed an
increased capacity to explore different identities and to challenge or reject certain
elements of identities. Engaging with multiple identities destabilizes the assumed
boundaries between ‘Frenchness’ and ‘Algerianness’ and, paradoxically, also works to
reinforce them. The recognition by participants that they are the product of different
‘cultures’ in a sense makes these ‘cultures’ real, as people act upon norms and adopt
‘typical’ dispositions that they associate with those cultures. Hybridity and negotiation, in
this sense, do not totally undermine or dissolve those categories, but can instead involve
the internalization and reproduction of the meanings attached to each.
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This chapter has tried to show the range of ways that my study respondents form,
reform, and contextualize identities. I have given particular attention to generations and
generational shifts. First-generation Algerians tended to hold a more confident feeling of
Algerianness from their upbringing in Algeria, though this was not always the case.
Second-generation Algerians tended to rely on family and learned history, rather than
personal experience, to find their Algerian identity, and were also more likely to embrace
certain aspects of Frenchness such as language and political ideals such as equality.
These examples indicate a process generational change that is central to mainstream
integration theory. But I have also tried to show that there is nothing determinant about
generational change—there is no standard pathway or trajectory from difference to
sameness, but constant negotiations of categories and the meanings attached to them. In
other words, ‘paths of integration’ are neither clear-cut along generational lines nor
unambiguous in their endpoints. First and generation respondents alike embraced and
rejected French-coded and Algerian-coded norms and values. What is clear from the
narratives in this chapter is that that French national identity, despite the pretentions of
French national discourse, is not universal, but particularistic. While my respondents vary
in their attitudes and stances toward Frenchness, the very fact of their need to consider
how or whether they can be French tells the lie of French cultural neutrality.
Those seeking to join French society—to integrate themselves into ‘mainstream’
French life—believe they have access to some elements of ‘Frenchness,’ including
French language, French philosophers, French art, and other elements of high culture. But
not all agree that these elements are readily available, or that they are enough to truly
belong. Those who feel more actively excluded or alienated from French society can turn
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to other methods of existing within French society, often by making a determined effort
to be around other (in some cases only) Algerian-origin people. Again, rather than
following a linear progression, identities are bound up with present-day social
interactions and historical relationships, changing in indeterminant ways. Youcef can
describe himself as “a French-Algerian guy,” though he is not a French citizen; Ferhat
can be a French citizen while realizing that he is “my parents’ Algerian son” and not
French; Louati, Sakina, Idir, Omar, and Brahim can work very hard to earn degrees they
thought would open the doors of ‘Frenchness,’ but only some of them will feel that they
have succeeded in gaining access to ‘Frenchness.’ These complex, non-linear identity
constructions indicate the different experiences that second-generation Algerians have
and the different ways they interpret and respond to these experiences. Their responses,
above all, speak to a combination of ambivalence and possibility, of respect and
disappointment, alienation and belonging vis-à-vis French and Algerian identities. In the
following chapter, I give particular attention to religion and citizenship as key fields (and
spaces) in which the dynamics of identity unfold.
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CHAPTER 6
ALGERIAN RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP IN FRANCE
“My religion ends where yours begins.”
- Kahina, 45-year-old Algerian immigrant
“I practice [Islam], but…not totally. I don’t go to the mosque, I don’t pray every day, I
drink, but I do Ramadan.”
- Omar, 28-year-old Algerian immigrant
“They promised us citizenship!”
-Ali, 29-year-old Algerian immigrant
Introduction
The previous chapter illustrated that study participants negotiate a range of
identities in defining their position in French society. While at some level they adhere to
and reinforce broad identity categories like ‘French’ and ‘Algerian,’ their own identities
are complicated, reflecting attachments to particular values, roles, and responsibilities
associated with particular categories. This chapter continues the examination of
immigrant identities as conceptualizations of ‘self’ and ‘other,’ focusing on the social
fields of religion and citizenship as key physical and metaphorical sites of identity
formation and contestation.
The work that immigrants undertake in delineating, rejecting, and accommodating
Frenchness and Algerianness illuminates the insecurities that they face and the fact that
their position as (partial) outsiders requires them to articulate who and what they are
(long-established, white French citizens, in contrast, are better able to take their French
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identity as a given). In France, immigration has become closely associated with crime,
poverty, racial tension, and even terrorism (Benbassa, 2005; Deltombe, 2007).
Commentators and politicians have voiced concerns about the loss of French national
identity and sovereignty due to immigration (Noiriel, 1996; Simon, 2012). While not all
immigrants are perceived as a threat to the majority culture, those that are differentiated
through racialized labels do become the focus of narratives about the threat to
Frenchness. Muslim immigrants, particularly from North Africa (and especially
Algerians), have been portrayed as the most threatening to the core of Frenchness (BlancChaléard, 2001; Hargreaves, 1995).
Owing to the extraordinarily large labor migration from Algeria to France, Islam
and immigration have become almost synonymous in the minds of many French citizens.
As Roy (2006) notes, this “correlation between Muslims and immigrants in [France]
means that Muslims are overrepresented in the most excluded parts of society: in tough
neighborhoods, among the ranks of the unemployed, and in prisons” (Roy, 2006, p. x).
Further, Islam has been pitted against secularism45, which many French have come to
view as an essential component of French national identity and citizenship. In a society
hesitant to openly acknowledge ethnicity or race as social categories, “religion
distinguishes inclusion versus exclusion,” with French and Muslim identities placed on
opposing ends of an ethnonational identity continuum (Beaman, 2016, p. 42; Kastoryano,
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Most recently, in October of 2020, when French leaders rallied support for the
“outmoded national ideology of secularism” in the wake of an Islamic terrorist attack in a
northern suburb of Paris (Mishra, 2020, p. 1). For some, this retreat toward secularism in
the face of social unrest highlights the fact that the social system of France “is
disastrously unsuited to an increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-racial society” (Mishra,
2020, p. 1).
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2002; Scott, 2007). On this continuum, Frenchness signifies rational, Enlightened
civilization, while Islam signifies fanaticism and fundamentalism (Roy, 2006).
The claim that Islam is incompatible with laïcité and democracy requires two
assumptions: first, that all Muslims will think and act as Muslims unless they explicitly
and visibly distance themselves from the religion of Islam; second, that laïcité is a
‘culture’ or a system of values that must be shared and adhered to in a very strict fashion
(Roy, 2006). The irony here is that laïcité, in its intention to keep religion out of the
public sphere, often produces the opposite effect: it makes religious the focus of public
debate and politics. Laïcité requires individuals to explain their ‘religion’ and their
practices, to distinguish between belief and culture, and to think about whether certain
kinds of behavior and actions are religiously Muslim, culturally Muslim, or culturally
French. This chapter addresses these tensions around identity, religion, citizenship, and
belonging in France, giving particular attention to the ways people from Algerian
backgrounds interpret laïcité and how they conceive the relationship between their
religious faith and their membership in French society.
Muslims, of course, do not constitute a coherent community, and people from
Muslim backgrounds are not uniformly inclined to describe themselves in religious terms.
This chapter shows how people of Algerian origin think about Islam as an identity and
how they negotiate membership in a polity that prioritizes a secularist ideal. First, I
discuss the ways French politicians and commentators conceive of religion and religiosity
as indicators of (non)integration. I then compare and contrast these dominant discourses
with respondents’ articulations of the relationship between religion and integration.
Following the discussion of religion, I look more closely at citizenship as a legal
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status/relationship and as a set of values and political norms that regulate people’s
participation in public and political life. Dominant configurations of citizenship in France
valorize Republican values of universalism and equality while ignoring racism and
Islamophobia. My respondents, I will show, purposefully and actively respond to the
closures inherent in French laïcité and citizenship in various ways: by adhering to
Western secularist understandings of religion; challenging the exclusions of laïcité; by
asserting the compatibility of their religious identities with French republican values and
principles; and/or by practicing citizenship in ways that challenge the boundaries of
republican citizenship. Ultimately, the relationships between legal status, rights, and
belonging are complex; ‘membership’ is therefore not a single, formal status (i.e., formal
citizenship) but an array of feelings, positionalities, statuses, and practices.
Secularism and Religion in French Society
Historically, France has been one of the principal Catholic countries of Europe,
but it has also been among the most hostile to the authority of the Church (Reisacher,
2001). Following the French Revolution in 1789, religion was viewed as antirevolutionary and was brought under state control. Secularism emerged as the product of
the power struggle between the French state and the Catholic Church (Bowen, 2007).
This anticlericalism challenged the Church’s right to claim responsibility for the moral
well-being of the French population, and it reflected both liberal and radical expectations
regarding the right of individuals to choose their own moral compass and spiritual beliefs
(Réville, 1905).
Laïcité is France’s “idiosyncratic form of secularism…a complex concept that is
dense with historical genealogy, practical contradictions, and—crucially—political
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geographies” (Lizotte, 2020, p. 1). In 1905, France passed a law on the separation of the
Church and State that guaranteed individual freedom of conscience, that established the
non-interference of the State in religious matters, and that privatized religion. The overall
aim was to ensure “freedom from oppressive religious authority” (El Sammaa, 2007;
McAuley, 2020a, p. 1). The law recognized the rights of individuals to have beliefs of
any kind and the ability to practice those beliefs as long as the individual did not disturb
the public order.
While the 1905 law guaranteed the free exercise of religion, including free
exercise within public institutions (e.g., schools, colleges, hospitals, asylums, and
prisons), laïcité is more restrictive in many ways than other forms of western secularism
(Hurd, 2008). Theoretically, French secularism would make French society more
welcoming to a religiously diverse population, but it associates religious identity with
‘communalism’ or ‘separatism,’ which it views as harmful to the universal French body
politic (Hurd, 2008; El Karoui, 2018). The integration of immigrants is expected to align
with the privatization of religious belief (Jennings, 2000). French national and cultural
identity, in other words, implies acceptance of a more privatized form of religious belief
and practice, as well as a less intense level of religiosity46 (Tribalat, 1995).
The construction of Islam as inherently intense and fanatical, and as uniquely
inseparable from ‘politics,’ is not new; historically, Imperial France viewed Islam as a
rival cultural formation incompatible with French identity. Colonial authorities developed
laws to exclude Muslims from nationality and citizenship and to withhold rights given to

Notably, adherence to Christianity or Judaism “have not been understood to threaten
the foundations of the French nation because they are not associated with immigration (or
racial difference)” (Auslander, 2000, p. 291).
46
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non-Muslim Europeans in colonial Algeria. Debates over whether and how to assimilate
Algerian Muslims in colonial Algeria “acted as a proxy for a much deeper existential
debate about the ultimate compatibility of French and Islamic civilizations” and the
possibility of an Islam Français (Mann, 2017, p. 11). As explained by Naomi Davidson
(2012) with reference to Morocco, Islam Français was a construct developed during
World War I “that blended French secular republicanism with distinct embodied practices
and aesthetics drawn from the French imaginary of orthodox [Maghrebian] Islam…[I]t
was elaborated by French politicians, colonial officials, social scientists, architects, [and]
urban planners” (p.1). Islam Français, in other words, was a hegemonic device to place
Muslims within colonial, and later, French society:
[T]he inscription of Islam on the very bodies of colonial (and later, postcolonial)
immigrants emerged from the French belief that Islam was a rigid and totalizing
system filled with corporeal rituals that needed to be performed in certain kinds of
aesthetic spaces… “Muslim” was as essential and eternal a marker of difference
as gender or skin color in France (Davidson, 2012, p. 2).
In more recent iterations, since the 1980s, successive French governments have tried to
create an ‘Islam of France’ that both ‘integrates’ the country’s Muslims and works to
combat Islamist extremism, “transforming Islam in France to an Islam of France” (Piser,
2018, p. 1, emphasis in original). In 2003, then-Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy created
the French Council of the Muslim Faith, a national elected body that cooperates with the
French state on matters concerning Islam (according to a 2016 survey, “barely a third of
French Muslims even know what it is” (Piser, 2018, p. 1)). The goal of structuring Islam
in France has been to create an Islam that both conforms to national values (secularism)
and is “immune” to radicalization of its followers (Piser, 2018, p. 1). This twofold
approach (secularism and anti-radicalization) has been expanded as recently as October
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2020, when President Macron presented plans to regulate the practice of Islam in France
and to prevent Islamic ‘separatism’ by allowing the state to monitor funding to mosques,
to certify French imams, and to prevent the creation of Islamic schools—an approach that
has been widely criticized for its conflation of Islam and Islamism (overtly politicized or
militant versions of Islam) (McAuley, 2020b). Ultimately, the French state would like
Muslims to be indistinguishable from the practitioners of other religions, with no
identifiable clothing (e.g., headscarves) or dietary restrictions (i.e., halal). These
intentions have most recently been voiced by the French Interior Minister Gérald
Darmanin, who expressed shock at dedicated aisles in supermarkets for halal and kosher
food, and implied that separate sale of these products can contribute to the isolation of
minority communities (communalism) and can even lead to radicalization (Bryant,
2020a; Guillot, 2020).
Laïcité has thus developed into a means of controlling Muslims’ public
expressions of religiosity—a phenomenon recognized and experienced by my research
participants. Moufdi, a 28-year-old son of immigrants living in the 20th arrondissement,
thus explains, “When you are French but also Muslim, they put these identities against
each other. Like, they can’t exist together. Islam isn’t a ‘normal’ religion of France like
Catholicism or even Judaism.” As Wattles (2018) notes, French secularism “allows the
government to have differentiated policies toward North African descendants despite
French citizenship’s implicit denial of race, religion, skin color, or other markers of
difference” (Wattles, 2018, p. 14). Although the Muslim population in France is far from
homogeneous, the dominant French narrative tends to treat Islam and Muslims in a
“reductionist and essentialist fashion, failing to note the important variations and
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cleavages” within the Muslim community47 (Freedman, 2004, p. 8). For an individual to
become ‘fully integrated’ requires being ‘fully secularized,’ or non-observant. From this
perspective, one cannot be both religious and adhere to French values because French
values exclude religiosity (and especially Muslim religiosity). In the following section, I
elaborate on the ways laïcité informs the identities and experiences of my research
participants.
Engaging with Laïcité among Algerian-Origin Communities in Paris
Where French discourse tends to conflate ‘immigrant’ with ‘Muslim’ and to
depict Muslims as a homogeneous group, my interviews reveal a heterogeneity of
practices and identities. Many of my respondents, in the first instance, actually do adhere
to Western secularist understandings of religion, describing their faith as ‘private’ and as
not requiring any public accommodations or recognition. Others, in contrast, challenge
the exclusions of laïcité, asserting the compatibility of their religious identities with
French republican values and principles. Religious identity is also fluid at the individual
level, as some of my respondents describe having shifted their religious beliefs and
practices during their lives. In all these cases, though, Algerian immigrants and their
children must engage, whether they wish to or not, with reification of religion, and they
must position themselves as Muslims, regardless of personal religiosity, vis-à-vis a
French laïque identity. Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France must
constantly engage with a “world in which Islam is a chronic object of discussion and
debate, a world that is thick with self-conscious and explicit discussions about Islam”

In this dissertation, references to a ‘Muslim community’ refer to Muslims living in
France. It does not refer to an official community, the global Muslim community, or a
specific, named Muslim community.
47
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(Brubaker 2013, p. 4). French preoccupations, in other words, oblige Algerian-origin
people to explain how their religion makes them French or not French. It thus becomes
part of the conceptual framework for understanding integration politics in France.
Research on immigrant religiosity tends to accept the categories produced by
laïcité and other modes of secularism—that is, the notion that people are either religious
or non-religious. Some scholarship has focused on generational changes among
immigrant religiosity, noting, per theorizations of progressive secularization, a ‘natural’
decline in religiosity or acceptance of more privatized conceptions of religiosity among
second-generation French Muslims (Cesari, 2002; Ramadan, 2002). Here, again, there is
a taken-for-granted, binary understanding of people as religious or secular. This view
ignores the complicated ways that individuals engage with religion as a field of identity,
belief, and practice; the way they conceive of religion as public/political or
private/personal; and the way they connect religious identities to race, ethnicity, and
gender. Writing in the U.S. context, for instance, Nadine Naber (2005; 2012) finds that
the second-generation Muslim Arab Americans she interviewed view themselves as
‘Muslim first, Arab second’ and view ‘Arab culture’ as a barrier to a more authentic
practice of Islam. These young people immerse themselves and strive for a purer
relationship with Islam that influences decisions about personal morals and marriage.
While operating at a highly personal level, this understanding of Islam requires
engagement with more ‘public’ issues of injustice, racial discrimination, oppression, and
exclusion within U.S. society—issues that are relevant well beyond any Muslim
‘community’ (Naber, 2012). I contribute to these discussions by showing that defining
oneself as religious or non-religious is an act of negotiation—a process of positioning
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oneself in relation to social hierarchies and stereotypes produced in French society. My
interest here is not so much whether my respondents are more or less religious, but how
they explain, construct, and narrate their religiosity in the French laïque context (Roy,
1994; Bowen, 2004).
First-Generation Religious Practices
Given the common assumption about generational change, I begin by exploring
the varying ways my first-generation respondents interpret and ‘manage’ their religiosity
and Muslim identities. A majority of respondents, 52 of 73 participants, identify as
Muslims; of those, 41 of 52 Muslims are first-generation immigrants. Perhaps counterintuitively (given assumptions about more intense religiosity among recent immigrants),
first-generation respondents tend to reflect a clear regard for the precepts of laïcité in
France. They respond to expectations about the privatization of religion by practicing
their religion very quietly. This seems to be a conscious decision, born of their awareness
of the politics of laïcité in France. The following narratives show that my study
participants are deliberate in choosing which aspects of Islam they observe or do not
observe. This indicates that in a laïque context, there is no unconscious, unproblematic
way that people practice Islam; rather, ‘religion’ becomes a collection of practices and
meanings that people must consciously formulate on their own, or in smaller
collectivities. These practices include a range of activities such as daily prayers,
observing Ramadan, abstaining from alcohol (and in some cases cigarettes and other
drugs), following a halal diet, attending mosque, observing Muslim holidays, and/or
wearing a hijab. So, for instance, though all of my Muslim-identifying respondents
observed Ramadan, they differed on their level of dedication and commitment to other
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practices, explaining their varying levels of commitment partly in terms of dominant
norms and expectations. Youcef offers an explanation of this, saying that the French
will be trying to find French things in you. Like they will be trying to find
connections in you. So, if you start talking about things they know, [if you] you
share a bit of their culture, they will accept you more. The main thing will be if
you drink, if you drink alcohol and if you smoke [cigarettes], they will say, ‘Oh
he's integrated, he is in French ways!’ It’s stupid things but it is like this.
Others took a somewhat different tack, pushing back against efforts by French politicians
to circumscribe and exclude certain ‘Muslim’ practices as non-French. For example,
Zizou, a 36-year-old immigrant living in the 92nd district outside of Paris, says, “I do not
need to drink or eat pork to be French and totally integrated.”
Said, a 53-year-old café-owner living in the 13th arrondissement, exemplifies the
kinds of accommodations—including the privatization of religious practice—that my
respondents make to ‘fit in’ while also being faithful to their personal beliefs and values.
When it is time to pray, Said disappears upstairs to the private realm of the family
apartment without explanation and returns after his prayers are finished. Said attends the
mosque regularly, leaving his café in the care of his employees so that he can participate
in prayers. During Ramadan, he quietly fasts. Through the years of my fieldwork, though
Ramadan occurred in the hottest months of the summer, he abstained from consuming
food and beverage from sun up to sun down. In privatizing his religious practice, Said
produces a quasi-‘secular’ space in his café. That is, his café does not bear any markers of
Islam, though it is an important social space for Algerian immigrants. Said serves alcohol
to his customers, including Muslim customers, even though he does not drink alcohol
himself. And he served food and drink in his café all day during Ramadan. As I explained
in Chapter Three, I would often use his café as a venue for interviews. When one of my
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interviewees showed up and ordered a glass of red wine, like he always did, this did not
elicit any commentary from Said. There was no effort or intention to impose his
‘personal’ religious beliefs in this space; he instead confined these to ‘private’ space, and
in doing so, he made his café ‘public’ according to French standards—which is to say,
unmarked by religious norms or identities (though Algerian cultural symbols and
memories are very pronounced in this space).
Said’s consciousness and active production of public and private distinctions is
also evident in the practices of my host-mother, Kahina, a 53-year-old immigrant living
in the 20th arrondissement. Kahina does her best to pray five times a day, yet even when I
lived with her, I never saw her pray because she went into her bedroom, closed the door,
and prayed in private. When she is at work, at a nearby childcare facility, she does not
pray at all. Kahina is a strong advocate of peaceful coexistence between different
religious communities, and this, in her view, requires clear boundaries between people’s
faith and their public life. Thus, she says, “My religion ends where yours begins,” making
circles with her arms as she describes this. While we were in Algeria, Kahina got into a
heated argument with her sister-in-law, who thought that I should convert to Islam.
Kahina stood up and shouted at her, “This is the problem! It is people like you, forcing
your religion onto others that is the problem!” In this example, Kahina, like Said,
illustrates the tendency among my first-generation respondents to adhere to a more
‘private’ and ‘quiet’ approach to practicing religion, taking up as little space (public,
private, mental) as possible. The key point here is that respondents actively produce
distinctions between public and private in the way they spatialize their practices and
beliefs.
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For some of my respondents living in the banlieues, Muslim religious practice
allows for the formation of social connections with Muslims from Sub-Saharan Africa,
Turkey, and other parts of the world. Lina, a 60-year-old immigrant, living in the
Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue, raised her children with a strong affiliation with Islam.
Lina, who is divorced, and her Muslim neighbors often celebrate iftar together during
Ramadan, and twice she invited me for iftar meals. She has one son, the only male in the
house, who was kept apart from me, the single female guest, during the meals. She tries
to pray five times a day (a practice she cannot always keep up while at work in a nursing
home), abstains from alcohol and pork products, but does not attend a mosque. Lina
explains, “there are no good mosques for women here; there is one for men, it is just a
room, with shoes outside. No place for women to pray.” For Lina traditional religious
practices (e.g., the separation of men and women) are more easily woven into social
engagements in the home, and so her home (a private realm) becomes the key site for her
Muslim identity. Her devotion to Islam structures her life, but she makes
accommodations for the times when she is in French, or secular, public spaces such as
her work. Like those in the previous examples, Lina does not pray when in ‘public’ or
‘laïque’ space. She does not wear a headscarf at home or in public. In these ways, Lina
recognizes and accommodates the norms of laicism; in so doing, she produces the
‘private’ space of her home, where social customs (such as prayer, or the separation of
men and women) are practiced, and the ‘public’ space outside of her home, where she
abstains from these practices; thereby making these categories real and substantive
through her practices.
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Said, Kahina, and Lina uphold a distinction between public and private realms
even as they maintain a high level of observance and orthopraxy. For some of my
younger first-generation interviewees, the distinction between public and private becomes
less clear, or perhaps less salient, because their adherence to Islam is more selective and
less intense. Paradoxically, it is in relaxing strict divisions that these respondents feel
better able to engage with mainstream French society. For instance, Omar, a 28-year-old
immigrant living in the 20th arrondissement, says that he is a practicing Muslim, “but not
totally.” He explains, “I don’t go to the mosque, I don’t pray every day; I drink, but I do
Ramadan.” Omar fasts during Ramadan (though he ‘cheats’ sometimes), he prays (but
not five times a day), he consumes alcohol, but not pork products. He feels that because
he does not follow Islam the way that he was raised—what he calls the “right Muslim
Islam”— he is “adapting to my new land” in France. Omar compares the freedom of
religious expression in France to the imposed expression in Algeria, and he prefers living
in France where he can be Muslim, but in his own way. In contrast to Said, Kahina, and
Lina, Omar does not actively work to produce ‘public’ or ‘private’ realms in which to
practice his religion; instead, he takes a fairly relaxed approach to religious practice that
does not require quietly hiding his faith. Without the mandate or expectation to pray daily
or to follow a strict, prescriptive diet, such concerns simply disappear from his normal
everyday life.
Other first-generation respondents describe a similar sense of flexibility in
practicing Islam that allows them to be ‘openly’ Muslim while accommodating French
social practices and expectations. To illustrate, Aehour, a 28-year-old immigrant, living
in the 94th district, explains that his religious practices changed when he arrived
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(illegally) in France in 2013. He says, “[A]t first, I tried to pray five times a day, but
couldn’t because of my job. No special time for prayers here.” As Aehour adjusted to the
restrictions that laïcité places on public spaces (such as the café where he was working at
the time), he also altered other behaviors as he adjusted to the freedoms of French
society. “I remember the first time I drank [alcohol]” he says, “I hated it, but now, I drink
sometimes, it is nothing.” He also admits to smoking hashish and getting high with his
friends: “My friend, I was staying with him when I first got here. He was doing it and
told me to try it.” While Aehour describes a devotion to his religion, he also manages to
reconcile clashing behaviors and his belief—not only in relation to alcohol and drugs, but
also in relation to dating. Aehour is dating a French girl and refuses to tell his mother
(back in Algeria) about her, saying, “I cannot tell her. If she found out, you know, what
we did, she [would] never forgive me.” Aehour, then, identifies as Muslim and at least
claims to take religion seriously, but he is rather flexible with his adherence to the
principles and practices, finding little difficulty in conforming with French social
expectations and norms, though he still prefers to socialize primarily with other Algerian
immigrants. Thus, the spaces of ‘public’ and ‘private’, and the identities associated with
each, become intermingled and less rigid.
The narratives of Said, Kahina, Lina, Omar, and Aehour are indicative of the
ways that first-generation immigrants accommodate their religious practices to a French
context. Though they all consider themselves to be devout, practicing Muslims, they do
not all espouse the same collection of practices. In this sense, they each exercised some
freedom of choice to ‘pick and choose’ which aspects of Islam they observe and those
they do not. But this picking and choosing can only take place in a society that reifies
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religion and conceives of (or even mandates) a separation between public and private
realms. In Algeria, as my interviewees describe it, Islam is woven into everyday life and
there is no need to make decisions about how and where one expresses one’s religious
belief. In France, religion becomes a matter of choices, and people tailor religious
practice and identity in ways that reveal an internalization of France’s secularist norms.
Said, Kahina, and Lina’s interest in relegating religious expression to the ‘private’ sphere
of their homes and not ‘imposing’ it on others, and Omar and Aehour’s flexible approach
to choosing which rules they follow are indicative of the different ways that these firstgeneration immigrants engage with Islam in laïque terms and, perhaps, avoid some of the
stigma they might otherwise experience. These findings mirror existing studies showing
that when migrants move to secular societies, they tend to adhere to secular norms and
practices, rather than disrupt or undermine them (Stump, 1984; Smith, Sikkink, and
Baily, 1998; Inglehart and Norris, 2009). But while migrants may alter their religious
practices along secularist lines, this does not equate to becoming ‘less religious.’ Rather it
implies adhering to an ideology that imagines religion to belong in a separate sphere; a
‘sphere’ that must be actively created and demarcated.
Second-Generation Religious Practices of Algerians
As noted previously, some literature identifies a generational gap in religiosity
and suggests a lessening of religious devotion over generations, much like the decline of
ethnic attachment associated with ‘assimilation’ (Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Gijsberts,
2010; Parikh, 2020). Yet other studies indicate that there is an increase in religiosity
among second-generation Muslims. In France, this phenomenon is attributed to feelings
of social exclusion, and in some extreme cases, fundamentalism (El Karoui, 2016). Still
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others, like Simon and Tiberj (2013) find no evidence of a “generational rupture that
signals a more intense relation to religion among the youth born in France, but rather
[evidence of] a more general affirmation of religion among immigrant populations since
the 1980s, which is a part of a more global movement of the evolution of the function of
religion in the Muslim countries” (p. 27).
These conflicting viewpoints require us to consider how religious practices might
allow second-generation Algerians to connect to their parents’ generation but may also
serve to create distinctions from parents and to navigate a place in France. Returning to
Naber’s (2005) work, she finds that second-generation adults in Arab-Muslim
communities in the U.S. leverage Islam as a way to unsettle parental authority while
maintaining a sense of respect and honor. Naber identifies a formation of a new Muslim
identity among the second-generation, one that is considered a ‘purer’ version of Islam
that purges their parents’ cultural practices and that is attuned to (and disruptive of)
hierarchies of gender and race in both their parents’ societies of origin and in the U.S.
This is not a simple case of becoming less religious as one becomes more ‘assimilated’ or
more religious in reaction to exclusion. Rather, religious identity, belief, and practice
become bound up with generational efforts to navigate relationships with families and the
social hierarchies they encounter on a day-to-day basis. This approach suggests that
broad generalizations are problematic, and that we need to look more closely to see the
different ways that the children of immigrants conceive of religiosity in the context of
laïcité. We can ask how laïcité shapes these individuals’ identities and practices; how it
forces a consciousness of a religious identity even among those who are not very
religious personally; and how it factors into their broader sense of difference or sameness.
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Ideas of religiosity among my respondents involve an element of family and
transnational relationships and tensions, and constant comparisons between their parents’
experiences and their own (which are situated more fully in the French context). Nielsen
and Otterbeck (2016) discusses the use of Islam by first-generation parents to control the
behavior (particularly marriage and partner choice) of their European-raised children.
Islam in this way (and as suggested by Naber) can come to signify ‘back home’ and can
appear to my French-born respondents as a set of foreign practices (much as it does for
the French mainstream). Nadia, a 26-year-old part-time resident in France, living in the
14th arrondissement, explains this as particularly applicable to Algerian mothers raising
daughters in France:
Because her daughter is French, it is nothing for her to go out with her friends, to
have experience with boys…but her mother, even if she is evolved, even if she
became French in her mind, when it comes to her daughter, it is not the same. She
will be an Algerian [Muslim] mom and say, “Show me yourself! What are you?”
because Algerian mothers wish to keep their daughters at home, and this is easy in
Algeria. However, in France, it is not just a matter of culture; it is a matter of not
living in a Muslim society.
Returning to an incident I explained in Chapter Three, my host-mother, Kahina, asked me
to read her daughter’s journal because Aida had been hanging out with people that her
mother did not approve of, and had a much older boyfriend who was not Muslim. Aida
complains about her “Muslim family” and says that she “hated spending holidays with
them,” even going so far as to call her Algerian relatives “stupid” when describing their
faithful way of life. Here, the ‘Algerian mother’ that Nadia describes is evident in
Kahina’s desire to control her French-born daughter in a way that is similar to the way
that she was raised in Algeria.

213

Though these anecdotes show a generational rift between conservative, religious
parents and more ‘assimilated,’ French-born youth, such a rift is not always clearly
evident. When looking at the second-generation, different patterns emerge as they
negotiate identities and must situate religious belief and experience into public and
private realms of life. The intensity of religious belief and feeling among secondgeneration participants in this research varies considerably, falling into three broad
groups: practicing Muslims, ‘cultural Muslims,’ and non-believers. Of the 29 research
participants from the second generation, 11 ascribe to themselves a Muslim identity; nine
identify as ‘culturally Muslim’ and nine have rejected Islam and do not believe in or
practice religion.
The eleven who identify as Muslim show very different engagements with Islam
that range from strict to rather flexible. For instance, Amara, a 23-year-old daughter of
immigrants, living in the Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue, considers herself to be a
devout Muslim. While she prefers not to wear a hijab, she does when she visits mosques
(which is not a regular practice for her). Though she identifies strongly with her Algerian
heritage, she considers herself ‘Westernized’ in her plans for romantic relationships
(though she admits that her parents want her to marry another Algerian Muslim). In
Amara’s workplace, even though there are many other Muslims that work with her (at a
social housing office), they are not allowed to pray at work. She explains that she accepts
this rule but would like to at least be allowed to pray if she wants to, saying, “There are
lots of us, we want to pray, you know, like, if we do it together, why is it bad? It can be
private.”
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Amara’s perceptions of and desire for increased freedom to practice her faith in
public are not the norm among my research participants from the second-generation who
consider themselves Muslim. Where Amara seeks increased recognition, Sakina
downplays her religion, not unlike some of my first-generation respondents; Sakina, a 35year-old daughter of immigrants, living in the 20th arrondissement, considers herself a
devout Muslim, but explains, “I do not say all the time that I am Muslim. You know, it is
only for private knowledge, between me and God.” As previously described, Sakina is
active with the local Berber Cultural Center, but she does not desire accommodations
from French society for her religion. For example, she explains that she prays at home
before work, never at work, but she will pray with other Muslims if she is around them
throughout the day. Sakina embraces the secular expectations of French society and
copes with them by choosing to spend most of her free time with other Algerian-origin
Muslims. In this example, Sakina’s practices and perceptions of religiosity within a
secular context resonate with participants from the first-generation, showing that there is
not always, or necessarily, a sharp division between first- and second-generation religious
practices and perceptions.
While Amara and Sakina both incorporate aspects of Islam into their daily lives,
this is not the case for many of the second-generation participants. The second group of
nine second-generation participants identified as ‘culturally Muslim’—that is, they
identify partly with being Muslim, but they describe their Muslim identity as ‘cultural’
rather than ‘religious’—a distinction that is in line with secularist thinking (Bowen,
2004). References to individuals as ‘cultural Muslims’ is a controversial description;
many scholars worry that referring to individuals who do not follow the religion of Islam
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as ‘Muslim’ is imprecise and continues assumptions such as ‘all Arabs are Muslim’
(Brouard and Tiberj, 2005). Further, the idea of Muslims who are not religious might cast
Islam as more than a religion and less of a choice: it becomes an “inherited marker,
which limits an individual’s freedom of conscience” (Fredette, 2010, p. 59). Yet many
individuals claim an affiliation with other Muslims, even if they do not consider
themselves to be religious, resembling the idea of ‘cultural Muslims’ as put forth by
Klausen (2005) or of ‘sociological Muslims’ as described by Venel (2004). This notion
highlights that religion is a multifaceted social construction that involves more than either
theological beliefs or ritualized practices. This group of respondents talk about
participating in a few rituals, such as observing Ramadan, that are common to Muslims
but that do not, in their view, require deep spiritual commitment.
For instance, Annia, a 22-year-old daughter of immigrants, living in the 10th
arrondissement, claims to be an atheist, explaining that while she was raised as a Muslim
and feels a connection to her parents’ religion, she is not a believer. While she does not
identify as a Muslim, she does not outright reject the identity either. She describes, “I
grew up with Ramadan and prayers, but I do not believe in it. I do not believe in a God. I
drink [alcohol]. I smoke. I live with my boyfriend. But it is my culture, you know?” In a
similar way to Annia, Zohra, a 23-year-old daughter of immigrants, living in the 20th
arrondissement, explains that she was raised Muslim. “Yes, I am Muslim. Well, no, I was
Muslim” she says. As she got older, her friends were all French and were not Muslims. “I
wanted to be like them” she says. When Zohra went to university in Paris, she says, “I
stopped doing the prayers. I don’t believe it anymore.” For Annia and Zohra, there was
an aspect of their ‘culture’ that was Muslim that could be separated from theological
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belief. While they do not ascribe to the precepts of the religion, they cannot entirely
divorce themselves from the label of ‘Muslim.’
A narrative of a childhood steeped in religion, as in the cases of Annia and Zohra,
was common among second-generation Algerians who identified as ‘culturally Muslim.’
Where some rejected religion as they grew up, others experienced more of a back-andforth engagement with Islam. For instance, Abdel, a 25-year-old son of immigrants,
living in the 16th arrondissement, explains his journey of faith: “I used to be Muslim until
the age of 17, and I am still very interested in religion, though I do not believe in a
revealed religion.” Yet, when I interviewed Abdel again, one year later, he had returned
to his Muslim beliefs and was working as an Arabic teacher at a mosque near his home.
Abdel’s experience involved a series of pathways—of an exit and return to Islam. He was
raised in a very poor family and he admits that he associates this poverty with his parents’
dedication to Islam. In his attempt to exit this poverty, he rejected Islam. Abdel’s mother
and sister are still very religious (his father passed away when Abdel was a teenager) and
he has begun to share religious holidays with them again, after years of avoiding them.
Like Abdel, Aida’s views on religion changed over time as well, and where she once
renounced all religion and specifically Islam, she has more recently begun to embrace the
faith of her family.
The delicate balance of religiosity between childhood practices and adult
engagement was also evident for Mhenna, a 27-year-old son of immigrants, living in the
20th arrondissement. Mhenna does not identify as a religious Muslim, but he offers the
clarification that “I was raised Muslim.” He explains that he does not fast during
Ramadan unless he is at his parents’ house, and only then because “my Mother is
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watching, I have to fast.” Mhenna does not pray, drinks alcohol, and admits that he does
not really believe in God; however, he does not eat pork products. This amalgamation of
religious practices and attributes is also evident in the children of Said and Lina (both
discussed in the previous section). Said’s children exhibit quite different ways of
expressing and practicing their faith. Of his three children, only the youngest, Aldjia,
shares Said’s devotion to Islam—she prays five times a day (though not at school, which
the French state designates as a ‘public’ space), and fasts during Ramadan, though she
does not go to the mosque, and does not wear a hijab. She explains, “I don’t wear [the
hijab] because I am French.” Aldjia started taking Berber lessons at the Berber Cultural
Association (where study participant Sakina teaches) and developed a deep fascination
with her parents’ history and culture. Aldjia continued taking Berber lessons and started
participating in other activities at the center, like Berber dance and cooking classes. Like
other participants described in this dissertation, Aldjia’s connection with her Algerian
roots has grown over time and influences her religious practices. In contrast, her siblings,
Said’s older two children, Sylia and Abdallah, do not pray or go to the mosque, or fast
during Ramadan, or abstain from alcohol, though neither will eat pork products48. Lina
describes the religiosity of her children, saying that her oldest daughter and middle son
are devout, but she fears that her youngest daughter is “falling away from God.”
The third group of nine second-generation respondents includes those who have
rejected Islam and do not believe or adhere to any cultural practices connected with the
religion. This group of interviewees maintains virtually no connection with Islam. For
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The halal diet is an important marker of religiosity among Muslims in France, the TeO
study (2008) found that eighty-six percent of second-generation Muslims (practicing or
not) followed a halal diet.
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instance, Dalila, a 50-year-old daughter of immigrants, living in the 6th arrondissement
(an upper-class neighborhood in the center of Paris), explains that “religion should be
practiced at home, with discretion. But I am not religious, I hate Muslims” (though we
were sitting in the home of her sister, a practicing Muslim, at the time of her interview).
Dalila blames the influence of the Arabs on the downfall of her (Berber) people, and she
reiterates the non-religious aspects of Berber history49. She feels that Islam is a restrictive
religion that does not conform with her ideals of being a “liberated woman.”
Like Dalila, Yamina rejects Islam. She is a 39-year-old daughter of an Algerian
immigrant, living in the 10th arrondissement, and she speaks of her experience in
rejecting Islam: her father is Algerian, and her mother is French; her father left when she
was young, and her mother did not continue to teach Yamina about her father’s Islamic
religion. As she grew up, Yamina focused on school instead and found that she was
drawn to fashion and design, not to religion or to her Algerian roots. Most of the
respondents who are not religious either made a conscious choice to leave the religion or
were raised in non-religious households and have never considered religion as part of
their identity.
From these narrative examples of the three different sets of second-generation
Algerians, we can see how respondents are conscious of ‘religion’ as a specific set of
practices, values, and beliefs that they must choose or reject. This need to take a stand on
Islam—to accept it as a culture while rejecting it as a theology or accepting some
practices while rejecting others—is indicative of the influence of French Republicanism
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Historically, the Berber peoples of the Kabyle region of Algeria were known to be nonreligious, or in some instances Christian (owing to the many invasions over centuries).
Though the area now has a majority Muslim population.
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and laïcité and the assumption that religion and culture are discernable realms of life.
One not only has the capacity to choose, but must choose, how one relates to ‘religion’
and ‘culture’ and how religion and culture relate to each other. Such choices do not
follow any clear generational trajectory, though we can identify some general patterns
that may be characteristic of certain generational segments.
French political discourse routinely conflates immigrant with Muslim and
suggests that people of Algerian descent are, above all, Muslim. At the same time, it
regards Islam as naturally hostile to laïcité, which implies that there is a separate realm of
‘religion.’ Laïcité, then, renders Islam problematic and compels immigrants and their
descendants to situate religious belief and culture within particular realms, often in ways
that uphold dominant conceptions of public and private. My study respondents describe
their practices as religious and cultural; they articulate which aspects of their lives are
‘cultural’ and which aspects are ‘religious,’ just as they articulate which aspects of their
lives are Algerian or French. They must determine which elements of both are
appropriate for ‘public’ life in France and which are to be confined to private light behind
doors. Some assert French identity partly by counterposing French identity to Islam; but
others seem to select elements of Muslim practice (or ‘culture’) that fit in with their
particular way of being French and/or Algerian. Ultimately, by showing the multiple
ways that Algerians express or reject religiosity, I show that they are constantly locating
their religious identities in different realms (public/private, cultural/religious), which
becomes a necessity in a laïque society.
The promise of ‘integration’ in France effectively depends on accepting the hostsociety’s norms as one’s own, including laïcité (Hargreaves, 1995). In turn, the
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“transformation and manipulation of laïcité into an illiberal legal tool to restrict religious
freedom has allowed elite public discourse to constantly question Muslim loyalty to
France and debate whether or not Muslims can be good French citizens” (François, 2020,
p. 1). Thus, religion and citizenship are intricately intertwined. The following section
looks more broadly at the production of citizenship in France—the articulation of civic
values and rights, and the ways in which Algerians interviewed for this research engage
with these concepts.
Citizenship in French Society
Integration as a political process works partly through the domain of citizenship.
Citizenship has multiple dimensions relating to legal status, rights and responsibilities,
political participation, and a sense of belonging within a national polity (Bloemraad et al.,
2008; Sandel, 1998; Reiter, 2012). As Thomas (2002) notes, citizenship permits an
individual to lay claim to an identity and to access a set of rights guaranteed by the state.
In France, republicanism serves as the key cultural idiom of citizenship (Brubaker 1992).
Historically, republicanism’s universalistic, civic understanding of nationhood has
encouraged a relatively permissive approach to naturalization and citizenship based on
jus soli, which connects membership to birthplace50 rather than ancestry. French
republican citizenship, in this sense, represents “the reassertion of an Enlightenment
project that values the creation of an autonomous subject who learns how to transcend
particular identifications by way of a universal rational subjectivity” (Hoffman, 2004, p.
1).
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A factor that has complicated the citizenship trajectories for some participants of this
research, discussed in later sections.
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Yet, public concern over the integration of North Africans has also “continued to
foster efforts to narrow access to French citizenship” and the rights associated with it
(Laxer, 2016). According to Hollifield (1994), ‘Franco-Algerians’ and their children were
the central targets of the debates surrounding the French Nationality Code, which
culminated in the ultra-restrictive 1993 Pasqua laws. The Pasqua laws revoked the
automatic attribution of citizenship to children born in France to foreign-born51 parents
(Weil, 2002). Though this and other restrictive aspects of the Pasqua laws have been
modified, new restrictions have since been introduced. In 2002, for instance, the French
government created new limitations on foreigners’ access to French visas and nationality,
particularly for foreign spouses (Bertossi, 2010).
Perhaps not surprisingly, naturalization rates among North Africans remain
remarkably low in France. According to the 2008 TeO survey, the proportion of those
with French nationality among Algerian migrants is 45 percent and 47 percent among
Moroccans and Tunisians (Simon, 2010, p. 116) (Simon (2012) puts the naturalization
rate for all immigrants in France at 40 percent). These low rates of naturalization are
partially due to the substantial practical and administrative barriers that applicants face in
formally joining the French polity. For approval, an application must pass several
thresholds and meet requirements set by governmental agencies. One of the main
obstacles is the criterion of ‘acceptability,’ which requires applicants to justify their
“assimilation into the French community, primarily by sufficient knowledge of the
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As we will see in the upcoming sections, for Algerians, whether or not a person was
born in a ‘foreign’ country was dependent upon the timing and place of their birth as
Algeria’s status as ‘foreign’ changed over the course of the late 20th century.
Additionally, until the late 20th century, former French colonies were not considered
foreign.
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French language” (Bertossi, 2010, p. 18). Currently, the cultural requirements for
immigrants to prove that they are worthy of formal membership within France involve a
language test and a culture test (with questions about French culture and history)
(République Française, n.d.). That said, a relatively generous approach to the Frenchborn children of immigrants means that a majority of descendants of immigrants born in
France are French citizens (Simon, 2012).
These tensions within citizenship policy hint at the unequal distribution of rights
and privileges across citizenry (Brubaker, 1989). Citizenship, Reiter (2012) states,
“privileges those able to claim more citizenship [rights] than others, and through this
process, secure tangible advantages for themselves” (p. 4). In this sense, some individuals
have full legal citizenship but lack full substantive citizenship because of other factors
(residency status, racial, ethnic, religiosity, etc.). The promise of ‘belonging’ that
supposedly comes with French republican citizenship is not realized for those who
manifestly bear another (ethnic, racial, religious) identity (Ungar and Conley, 1996). This
situation can lead people of migrant origin to protest against exclusions and to claim
rights and full (substantive and legal) membership, or to disengage from French society.
Adding complexity to this situation is the fragmentation of citizenship and rights
along multiple legal statuses. Scholars and politicians often assume full legal membership
in the analysis of immigrant integration. However, this is not the case with many
contemporary immigrants or their children. Legal status, and therefore rights, can vary
quite dramatically, creating various forms of inclusion and exclusion, and even those
without formal membership can claim, and exercise, limited or partial forms of
membership. Other individuals, in contrast, can have multiple memberships. Dual
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nationals account for 5 percent of the population of metropolitan France between the ages
of 18-50; 90 percent of these dual nationals are immigrants or descendants of immigrants
(Simon, 2012, p. 6). Simon’s (2012) research determined that 66 percent of the
descendants of Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians keep their parents’ original
nationality, and that “this has particular significance for children of Algerians” (p. 1).
Citing two key surveys, Simon (2010) notes that the proportion of Algerian immigrants
claiming dual nationality rose from 7 percent to 67 percent between 1992 and 2008. This
change largely reflected changes to Algerian citizenship law in 200552— to allow
“nationality by descent” to a child whose mother or father is an Algerian national (the
code is also retroactive). Following this change, many Algerians in France pursued dual
citizenship (Perrin, 2014, p. 5). The prevalence of dual citizenship, whereby individuals
are members of two polities and imagined communities, complicates ideas about
belonging and loyalty and contributes to debates about integration in France.
The empirical evidence offered in this section explores the many intersections
between citizenship, identity, rights, and the varying ways that Algerian immigrants and
their children draw upon particular dimensions of citizenship in articulating membership

The code of Algerian citizenship from 1963 (post-independence), defined ‘Algerian of
origin’ as being a person who has at least two ascendants in paternal lineage born in
Algeria with Muslim status. The provision was based on the discrimination established
by French colonists (the Native Code, see description in Chapter Four), and effectively
excluded non-Muslims from the new nation (Perrin, 2014). Those that did not satisfy this
requirement could apply for Algerian citizenship “on the basis of their participation in the
liberation struggle” (Perrin, 2014, p. 5). Additionally, in 2005, Algeria removed a
requirement that new citizens reject other citizenships (a requirement that was introduced
in 1970) (Perrin, 2014).
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in the French polity. I examine how legal citizenship(s), or the lack thereof, relates to an
individual’s sense of belonging(s) or exclusion(s) from different polities. My findings
suggest that the relationship between legal members and belonging is not straightforward
or predictable. Some of my respondents conform with stereotypes of naturalized citizens
in viewing legal membership in France in purely instrumental terms—as a passport rather
than as a symbol of deeper attachment to a national polity. For these individuals,
belonging is situated more firmly in Algeria. But this scenario certainly does not apply to
all, and my respondents’ attitudes about citizenship vary considerably. Equally important
are the assertions that my undocumented respondents make about their deservingness visà-vis French citizenship. For these individuals, a desire for French citizenship is not just
about a passport or legal access to employment, but about the legacies of French
colonialism and the long, difficult relationship between Algeria and France.
The narratives that follow focus on the tension between citizenship and
belonging: how formal inclusion can fail to ensure a sense of belonging; how legal
exclusion requires an ability to live within profound precariousness; and how multiple
membership requires the compartmentalization of seemingly conflicting emotions and
ties to different places. This discussion reiterates the importance of citizenship as a legal
construct that imparts “a certain objective status in a society” (Simonsen, 2017, p. 1). At
the same time, this discussion highlights the different ways that individuals think about
and experience legal status—how one’s legal status impinges on their sense of
membership and their attachments to people and places.
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Algerian Citizenship Practices in France
Many of my respondents with French citizenship view this citizenship as a bundle
of rights and even more as a privileged legal status that affords social and geographical
mobility. For some critics (especially on the political right), this denotes instrumentalism
on the part of immigrants, rather than ‘genuine’ loyalty toward their adopted country. But
I want to suggest that the value placed on legal status is not merely instrumental or
superficial. My respondents put a great deal of weight on security and mobility, and their
access to these privileges imparts its own form of loyalty and commitment.
I begin with participants who were born in France (second-generation) and were
French citizens at birth. For instance, Amara, a 23-year-old living in the Champigny-surMarne banlieue, has an older brother who was born in Algeria, and two sisters who, like
Amara herself, were born in France. Amara’s grandfather came from Algeria to work in
Paris in the 1950s in construction before returning to Algeria a decade later. Amara’s
father came from Algeria to work in Paris in the 1960s, working mostly in bars and
nightclubs. Her father returned home to Algeria every summer, and in the early 1980s, he
married Amara’s mother in Algeria. After having Amara’s brother, the family of three
moved to France permanently and achieved French citizenship. Amara and her sisters
were born in Ivry-sur-Seine, a suburb south of Paris. In Amara’s family story, we see
multiple pathways toward citizenship, but Amara herself did not consciously choose her
citizenship; rather, she benefited from her parent’s completion of the process before she
was born. Amara, her parents, and her siblings all have dual citizenship in France and
Algeria (a topic I return to below). In Amara’s experience, citizenship is a taken-forgranted reality. As described in Chapter Five, Amara feels as though she is both an
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‘Algerian girl’ and a ‘French girl’—in her words, “I don’t consider myself as only an
Algerian girl. I don’t know how to say it, like, mixed, you know? So, I can talk with
Algerian people in totally Algerian and [I’m] comfortable with talking with these people,
and at the same time, [I am] comfortable with French people. I cannot choose between
Algerian or French, I am both.” For Amara, her identity is reflective of her dual
citizenship status; her feelings of belonging and connection to each nationality indicate
the hybridity of her life experiences.
Sakina’s path to French citizenship was similar to Amara’s. Sakina, a 35-year-old
living in the 20th arrondissement, tells the story of how her parents were born in Algeria
before decolonization, and how they took advantage of de Gaulle’s decision to make
French citizenship available to Algerians (including Muslims) in a last-ditch effort to gain
their loyalty during the Algerian War (as discussed in Chapter Four). Her parents moved
to France in the 1970s when her father found work as a laborer in the northern town of
Lille, France, where Sakina was born. Sakina had French citizenship at birth, but this was
not the case for her entire family, as I explain shortly. Sakina does not take her
citizenship for granted, nor does she lack gratitude for the citizenship she possesses.
Sakina’s citizenship, as she talks about it, feels like a relief, as though she ‘barely made
it’ through the difficult journey toward citizenship, even though it was, in reality, easy for
her. She says, “I am lucky, I have both [citizenships].” To associate an element of ‘luck’
or ‘chance’ to the acquisition of citizenship status is an interesting way to illustrate the
geographic, temporal, and other ‘life chances’ factors that ultimately influence who has
access to different citizenship(s). Unlike Amara, Sakina finds it difficult to embrace
hybridity, and while she was “born French,” she describes herself as feeling alienated
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from French ‘culture.’ She says, “They [the French] don’t see me as French, only as
Algerian.” While she does not worry about her legal status, she worries about her social
status within French-dominated realms of life (as described in Chapter Five).
Like Amara and Sakina, Farid, a 42-year-old immigrant living in the 20th
arrondissement, had French citizenship at birth, though he was born in Algeria. Farid’s
family naturalized during times when it was, he says, “easy for Algerians to get French
citizenship.” His Algerian-born parents spent time in France and completed the process to
gain French citizenship before any of their children were born, easing the path for their
children. Farid and his siblings all have dual citizenship in France and Algeria (he and
one other sibling were born in Algeria and the rest of his siblings were born in France).
Where Amara seems to take her citizenship status for granted and connects it to a sense
of cultural hybridity, and Sakina feels a sense of relief but also a sense of alienation vis-àvis her French citizenship, Farid expresses a sense of citizenship as part of an entitlement
for Algerians in France (I return to this sense of entitlement for those that do not possess
citizenship in France). In Farid’s eyes, he is just as worthy of French citizenship as any
other ‘French’ person, even though he was born in Algeria. He does not feel the need to
express ‘gratitude’ (as Sakina does) for what is rightfully his; his access to French
citizenship is not a ‘gift’ from a generous, benevolent host (France); rather, it is
something owed to him, and it does not require justification or gratitude. Farid’s French
citizenship (in combination with his dual citizenship in Algeria) is natural and normal.
Farid feels that his is just as French as anyone else (cf. Beaman, 2016). From just these
three cases of Amara, Sakina, and Farid, we can see the differing meanings that can be
attached to French citizenship among study participants, ranging from a general lack of
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consciousness about citizenship to feelings of gratitude, to a sense of entitlement. These
complexities multiply when we consider those who have had to travel an arduous path to
French citizenship.
Several of my study participants sought naturalization in France while pursuing
higher education in the country. In this sense, it is important to note that France, like
many other wealthy societies, has left the door open (relatively speaking) to highly
skilled workers, regardless of their origins. This path—which ties citizenship to
attainment of an advanced degree—is difficult; but in the end, it appears to produce a
sense of citizenship that centers on cultural freedom and mobility. For instance, Omar, a
28-year-old immigrant living in the 20th arrondissement, moved to France when he was
22 years old to continue his education in electrical engineering. After graduating, he
moved to Paris to start a new job. Omar works with the same company he started with in
Paris—a solar energy planning firm—and is grateful for the ease with which he found a
job immediately after finishing his PhD in France. He admits that his friends have
encountered more difficulty. Omar attributes his success in the job market to his
attainment of higher education, the connections that he made during his time in grad
school, and his naturalization, which gave him the legal right and the cultural capital to
secure a good job. But his acquisition of citizenship, while ‘easy’ at one level, was also
an anxiety-inducing process. He explains that he was “always conscious” of his legal
status in France and was “obsessed” with completing the requirements for citizenship.
Omar became a French citizen at the age of 27, five years after his arrival in France, and
he quickly embraced a French identity, which he connects to ideas of freedom. He says
that he prefers the freedom of life in France, as opposed to the restrictiveness (in his
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view) of Algerian society. For Omar, the path to French citizenship was important
because it offers completion—it has secured multiple dimensions of freedom
(geographical, economic, cultural) for him.
Omar’s sentiments are echoed by Idir, a 32-year-old immigrant, living in the 92nd
district outside of Paris. Like Omar, Idir came to France to continue his studies, which in
Idir’s case involved a master’s degree and PhD. Idir explains that during his studies, he
came to appreciate the personal freedoms allowed him in France. He says, “I can’t
imagine going back” to Algeria, as “it’s too tribal” and superstitious. He prefers living in
a cosmopolitan society like France. He explains that he began the process toward
achieving French citizenship, staying in school to keep legal residency until he reached
the requisite five-year residency requirement. Like Omar, Idir sees his French citizenship
as freedom—freedom from Algerian social norms and freedom to go wherever he wants.
Since receiving French citizenship in 2014, he has since traveled extensively abroad.
The work that Omar and Idir did toward completing a PhD degree in order to
‘earn’ their ‘Frenchness’ is indicative of the lengths to which my respondents were
willing to go to have the privilege of French citizenship—to belong within the French
national polity. Omar and Idir worked diligently to overcome barriers to French
citizenship, and the combination of citizenship and education confers a sense of
satisfaction and self-esteem—a sense that they have earned the freedom and mobility that
comes with being French. However, not all of my study participants were so successful in
their pursuit of French citizenship, as I discuss in the following section.
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The Elusiveness of Legal Status
I have so far described paths toward or experiences of citizenship; first, those with
French citizenship at birth (born in both France and Algeria), followed by examples of
participants that sought naturalization after arriving in France to pursue higher education.
I now turn the discussion to those that have not been successful in their pursuit of French
citizenship—those who have little hope of achieving legal status to live and work legally
in France. I first describe two instances where temporal shifts in policy have led to
families with members of different legal status. I then offer examples of participants who
immigrated to France illegally and continue to live without legal status in France. In this
section, I delve into the complicated relationships between legal membership and
belonging. As shown in previous examples (e.g., Sakina), individuals can have full
citizenship and not feel belonging; conversely, individuals can lack citizenship and feel
that they ‘ought’ to belong, though the state refuses them. These findings complicate
assumptions and expectations about citizenship, belonging, and generational change.
As described in previous chapters, regular and frequent travel between France and
Algeria are commonplace within the Algerian community. Families have navigated the
ebbs and flows citizenship and immigration regulations that have governed this travel for
decades. Within the political back-and-forth of citizenship regulations in France, timing
has a major impact on the ability for Algerians to access citizenship. In the early years of
Algerian independence, birth in Algeria did not pose a major barrier to legal members in
the French polity, but in recent decades, it has become much more of a problem,
especially for those who do not have the wherewithal to pursue advanced degrees.
Temporal shifts in policy can lead to families with members of different legal status. For
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example, while Sakina was born with citizenship status, her sister, Soumia, lives illegally
in the 20th arrondissement. Their family was living in Lille, France when their mother
was pregnant with Soumia. They went on their yearly summer holiday to Algeria in 1989,
and Soumia was born while the family was in Algeria. Soumia’s parents assumed that
Soumia was French because they held French citizenship and because their other child
was French. Yet in the 1990s there was additional paperwork that had to of been filled
out for Soumia (who was born on independent Algerian soil) to have French citizenship.
This was all very doable if Soumia’s parents had had a detailed understanding of the
bureaucratic workings of the French citizenship system. As it happened, Soumia fell
through the cracks of citizenship and did not claim French citizenship during the time that
it was necessary (and simple) to do so. Sakina and Soumia have another sister and two
younger brothers—all of whom were born in France and have dual citizenship. Sakina
blames her parents for not knowing how to help her sister achieve citizenship in France;
Soumia claims that she does not blame or resent her family for her illegal status—she
blames France. Soumia feels that France owes her citizenship, that she is entitled to it in
spite of the lapse in administrative paperwork required to achieve it.
Because Soumia holds only an Algerian passport, life in France has been very
difficult for her. She has had trouble finding and keeping employment because of her
illegal status. Citizenship status in France is highly valued for the protection it offers
against deportation; the right to permanent residence is a privilege of citizens,
“distinguishing them from settled non-citizens…which ultimately are deportable”
(Birkvad, 2019, p. 801). Soumia feels deserving of French citizenship and, indeed, she
describes herself as French: “I am French. I was born in Algeria, but I am French,” she
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says. Soumia goes on to explain, “My family is French, I live in France, I grew up here.
Just because I was born in Algeria doesn’t mean I’m not French. It is very frustrating.”
While she feels that she belongs in France, she also believes that the historical tension
between France and Algeria have led to her being purposefully excluded by the French
state. She states, “Maybe if I was born in another country, not in Algeria, it wouldn’t be
so difficult, like, in Morocco or something.” Though she was born in Algeria and holds
(only) Algerian citizenship, she has not returned to Algeria in her adult life because it
would be difficult for her to return to France. For the same reasons, when Sakina and
Soumia’s family goes on family vacations outside of France, Soumia never travels with
them. Sakina feels a sense of guilt over her citizenship status because her sister, Soumia,
has led “a smaller life” in comparison but also because she feels the relief of being able to
live, work and travel freely with her French passport. Soumia was, at the time of her
interview, resigned to live in France illegally all her life, however much she feels she is
French.
Where Soumia stopped trying to obtain French citizenship after a lifetime of
exclusion, Nouara refuses to give up on her pursuit of French citizenship. Nouara is a 33year-old daughter of immigrants, residing (illegally) in the 20th arrondissement of Paris.
Nouara’s mother, Nabila, was born in France to Algerian immigrants and holds French
citizenship. Nabila’s parents were French-Algerian, from Tizi Ouzou. Her grandfather
fought for France in World War II and was a prisoner of war in Germany. He received a
Legion of Honor award from the French government after the war. Nouara’s
grandparents moved to France, where her mother was born. Nouara’s mother moved to
Tizi Ouzou as an adult and met Nouara’s father. They were married in Algeria and had
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their first child, Nouara, in 1984. When Nouara was eight years old, the Algerian civil
war was raging in Algeria, and her parents decided to move to France to escape the
violence in 1992.
Nabila and her husband were uneducated and poor, and like Soumia’s parents,
they did not have access to the necessary information about obtaining French citizenship
for their daughter Nouara (who, similarly to Soumia, would have easily qualified for
citizenship if her parents had submitted the paperwork in the correct timeframe). While in
France, Nouara’s sister was born—a French citizen like her parents. Within her family,
only Nouara (as in the case of Soumia) does not have French citizenship, and her freedom
is limited in the same ways that Soumia’s life is limited. Both Soumia and Nouara are
living in France illegally—and have been all their lives.
Nouara, like Soumia, has been denied French citizenship every time she has
applied in the last 20 years. However, this has not yet deterred her from trying. She needs
to find employment with a contract that lasts for multiple years to show her necessity in
the French economy and her stability in employment. To achieve employment, Nouara is
hired as a ‘foreign’ worker—that is, she is hired as an Algerian citizen to work for French
companies in France. Because French law requires companies to fill positions with
French citizens if possible, Nouara struggles to gain employment as a ‘foreigner.’
Because of her struggles, Nouara is very opinionated about the necessity and meaning of
citizenship. She has never felt accepted in France and, unlike Soumia, does not feel
French or claim a French identity. Rather, as described in the previous chapter, she
claims a pan-ethnic ‘African’ identity that manifests itself in her friendships with other
immigrants. Yet at the time of her interview, Nouara was in a serious relationship with a
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white Frenchman. I asked about the prospect of citizenship through marriage, and she
scoffed at this idea: “Yes, he asked me to marry him and then I could be legal, but no, I
will do this myself” she said. Nouara’s obvious insistence on self-reliance (with the
exception of the Algerian community, as described in Chapter Five), coupled with her
rebellious attitude may seem contradictory and even self-defeating. There is in her
attitude a measure of pride in her Algerian identity that keeps her from asking for the
‘assistance’ of her French boyfriend. In a sense, she is insisting that she should be able to
earn French citizenship on the basis of her merit and deservingness; in other words, she is
wholly worthy of membership in the French polity, and the French state should recognize
it. There is in her position a mix of resentment toward France and a desire for
membership in France.
Soumia and Nouara are just two examples of the 13 participants in my study who
were living illegally in France at the time I conducted the research. In fact, many others
among my participants had lived in France illegally while they worked on getting
citizenship papers. For Lina, it took ten years to get citizenship; for Said, eleven years;
for Lina, seven years. Owing to the difficulty in obtaining citizenship, it is understandable
that citizenship becomes deeply emotional, eliciting very mixed feelings of entitlement,
rejection, worthiness, precariousness, and, in some cases, belonging. For example, Ali, a
29-year-old immigrant, lives illegally in France. He feels anger at the French for not
providing him a path toward citizenship, “They promised us citizenship!” he says when
explaining his frustration at living the difficult life of illegality. From Ali’s perspective,
France owes him citizenship and access to the jobs and freedoms that France has to offer.
Ali feels a sense of entitlement to citizenship owing to the fact that France colonized
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Algeria; he feels owed on behalf of his ancestors who suffered under French imperialism.
This emotional connection to a sense of ‘owed citizenship’ is interesting coming from
Ali. He is a young man born more than 20 years after Algeria won its independence from
France, yet he still holds on to this resentment toward the French, even while arguing that
he deserves to be French. His conflicting feelings, to be sure, can be connected to the
reality of his need to support his family in Algeria. Ali wants access to the labor market
in France, as his forefathers had in their seasonal migrations between France and Algeria.
Because of his lack of legal status, he is relegated to working low-waged, insecure jobs in
France and does not feel part of French society. Lacking formal belonging or even a
general sense of membership that might come with long-term residency in a single place,
Ali lives as an outsider in France. Like Nouara, Ali holds a mix of resentment toward
France and a desire for French citizenship—they both feel deserving of French
citizenship but let-down by France.
Ali is relegated to small acts of retaliation against French society for its slights
against him. For instance, he refuses to pay for the metro in Paris, which he takes daily.
This act of retaliation (or perhaps resistance) is echoed in Silverstein’s (2004) accounts of
Algerians living in Paris. Similar acts are reported among my study participants. Both
Aehour and Rafik admitted to not paying for public transport, describing it as retribution
for the injustice they have suffered as illegal immigrants in France. Even some of those
who themselves enjoy legal status perform small acts of retribution on behalf of their
fellow Algerians. For instance, Lakhdar refused to name his children with French names,
instead proudly giving them Berber names (recall that Lakhdar’s father asked him if he
wanted to change his name to a more ‘French’ name). Lina’s act of resistance involved a
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commitment on her part to “re-teach” her children when they got home from their French
state-run school (her children are now grown). Lina explains that she wanted her children
“to know ‘the real story’ of French history” and especially the place of Algeria within
that story. As I described in Chapter Four, French schools have been criticized over
recent decades for teaching the ‘positive aspects’ of colonization and ignoring aspects
that portray France in a negative light. Acts of resistance or retribution within the context
of French citizenship show that though many Algerian immigrants and their descendants
desire, seek, and in some cases, earn citizenship in France, there is a constancy of
resistance in the face of marginalization.
Another participant living illegally in France while seeking French citizenship is
Djamel, a 34-year-old immigrant living in the 20th arrondissement. Here, again, we see a
combination of resentment and entitlement—anger that France has denied membership to
him, and a sense that he is deserving of that membership. Djamel enjoys some fame in
Algeria as a musician, and he has been working toward French citizenship for years. He
blames his music for his inability to gain French citizenship, explaining, “My music is
political. [It is] about what France has put my country through. They don’t want it here.”
For Djamel, like Ali, French citizenship is owed to Algerians, almost as a form of
reparations for the colonization of Algeria and for the emotional weight carried by
Algeria due to French imperialism. Their sense of entitlement and deservingness springs
forth from a sense of loyalty to Algeria, and a desire for justice, rather than from a
positive emotional attachment to France. Neither Ali nor Djamel identify as French, but
they do feel that they have a right to equality, especially in terms of labor market
participation. This interpretation of citizenship is divorced from notions of cultural
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membership or ‘assimilation,’ but it is nonetheless charged with emotion and a strong
sense of the historical relationship and shared past between France and Algeria.
Both Djamel and Ali have been criminalized by the French state because of their
legal status. Ali, for instance, has been taken to jail multiple times for not having proper
identification (he purposefully does not carry identification of any kind). According to
Terrasse (2019), in France there is a connection between frequent identity checks with
“an increase in the likelihood of country of origin identification, a decrease in the
likelihood of French identification, and a decrease in the likelihood of believing others
see one as French” (p. 1). Yet it is important to note that while feeling excluded in
France, Djamel and Ali share a great deal of ambivalence toward Algeria. Neither feels at
home in Algeria. For Ali, he says, “I have been so long in France, I cannot go back now,”
referring to the cosmopolitan life he has become accustomed to even without legal
membership. Despite acknowledging his ambivalence toward Algeria, Ali does continue
to see his dreams for the future unfolding in Algeria, where he intends to return to get
married. Ambivalence toward his ties to both France and Algeria is also exhibited by
Djamel. Djamel is well-known in a small circle of artists in Paris (I met and interviewed
him at an event where he was the ‘star musician’), despite his illegal status and a history
of confrontations with French police. He admits that he enjoys this sense of celebrity in
France, and he does not want to “return to the simple life” in Algeria. For both Ali and
Djamel, they have become cosmopolitans—they are part of the way of life that exists in
highly industrialized nations like France and cannot envision a return to a ‘simple’ life in
Algeria.
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These examples of participants that lack legal status in France show the
complicated relationships between legal membership and belonging; they show that there
is no one-to-one relationship whereby full citizenship equates to belonging (in France or
Algeria). The participants here show a mix of emotional responses to their legal status
ranging from frustration at being legally excluded, to rebellion, to entitlement, to a desire
for autonomy. All of these emotions and desires are woven into the citizenship practices
and experiences of my study participants who live illegally in France, and who are
actively illegalized by French immigration policy.
Dual Citizenship—Dual Belonging?
Further complicating the experience of citizenship for Algerian immigrants and
their descendants is dual citizenship. Dual citizens, or binationals, participate in
transnational activities and social networks which can be ‘political’ in nature (Bloemraad,
2000). Public debates53 tend to portray dual citizenship as necessarily being in
competition with French national identity (Simon, 2012) and as undermining
integration—though the French state is relatively relaxed about dual citizenship, and it
does not require Algerian immigrants to renounce their citizenship upon naturalization.
Dual citizenship critics in France worry that “having bi-nationals within the French
government [is] a worrying feature and ultimately [puts] national interest at risk” (Paquet,
2017, p. 1). This old idea of the impossibility of dual loyalty has become more articulated
and cynical over the years and can be understood simply as “[Y]ou are either French, or
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Interestingly, criticism of dual citizenship has (in 2011) even involved loyalty issues of
soccer when “high-level officials from the national soccer team criticized the choice of
dual-national promising young players for electing to play with their second-nationality
national team instead of the French one” (Simon, 2012, p. 2).
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you are not” (Paquet, 2017, p. 1). Yet, according to the French Institut National d’Études
Démographiques (2012), holding dual nationality has little impact on “feeling French”
such that, binationals feel “just as French as those who gave up their original nationality”
(p. 1). Thus, dual citizenship is not necessarily contradictory with ‘being’ French.
In this final section, I challenge the idea of conflict as an inherent characteristic of
dual citizenship. My study participants who are dual citizens parse out different elements
of citizenship and assign meaning and significance to each. In other words, participants
assign different meanings to their citizenships, rather than viewing citizenships as
existing in tension or conflict with each other. Study respondents express ‘feeling
French,’ ‘feeling at home in France,’ ‘feeling Algerian,’ and ‘feeling at home in Algeria’
in ways that are consistent with other forms of compartmentalization that Algerians
practice when navigating identity. At the same time, it is important to recognize that dual
citizenship does not carry a great deal of significance for everyone: some respondents put
far more weight in one over the other; and some hardly pay any attention at all to their
Algerian citizenship.
Under Algerian law, the children of Algerian émigrés are Algerian nationals;
therefore, it is very easy (and culturally expected) to acquire an Algerian passport for the
children of immigrants living in France. The Algerian passport has particular potency as a
symbol of one’s continued membership in Algerian society. According to Hakim, a 28year-old immigrant, living in the 15th arrondissement, “You don’t want to be caught at
the [Algerian] border without your Algerian passport…no one will respect you.” Amara
explains, “If you only have your French passport [at the Algerian border], it’s like we
don’t recognize ourselves as Algerian.” In short, the use of the Algerian passport is a
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performance of membership for French citizens of Algerian origin and a sign of honor
and respect for Algeria (Ben Jelloun, 1999).
Wily, a 36-year-old immigrant living in the 20th arrondissement, elaborates on the
theme of formal citizenship in Algeria as a form of honor. Wily is working on getting his
French-born son an Algerian passport because, “If he has a grandfather who is Algerian,
he is Algerian too.” For Wily, the passport is meaningful as a symbol of familial pride
and dedication to one’s place of origin. Wily’s father, though he has lived in France for
years, refuses to apply for French citizenship on principle: Wily explains that his father
“doesn’t hate France, but he knows they killed his father. He cannot be a French citizen
for this reason.” In this case, the passport is part of a system of identity that links
generations of people to different places. His son needs an Algerian passport to convey
familial dedication and to honor Wily’s father, who has refused French citizenship.
Clearly, in this case, passports are more than travel documents; they are wrapped up in
historical dramas of colonial violence. Thus, citizenship and legal membership can
simply mean a travel document, but it clearly can mean much more.
Another example is Lina, whose children were all born in France and have French
citizenship. Lina worked hard to ensure that they each had Algerian citizenship, too, even
while Lina herself was struggling to get French citizenship. Said’s children all have
French and Algerian citizenship. Amara and Hakim both mentioned that having an
Algerian passport also makes travel to Algeria easier (for the yearly summer visits to
family) because you do not have to apply for (and pay for) a visa to enter the country.
Many interview participants named the necessity of a visa as a reason to not use their
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French passports when travelling ‘home’54. Yet it is important to note that not all
participants feel emotionally invested in Algerian or dual citizenship. For instance,
Kahina’s daughter Aida used her Algerian passport for the first time when I traveled to
Algeria with them. Aida did not even know that she had an Algerian passport (and in fact
had little interest in traveling to Algeria), but Kahina would not take her daughter to
Algeria without one. For Aida, the possession and use of an Algerian passport does not
hold any emotional weight. Similarly, participant Yamina (described previously in this
chapter) has let her Algerian passport expire—she has no interest in pursuing the
nationality of her father (who divorced her mother and abandoned Yamina as a child).
Interestingly, Yamina has not visited Algeria since her father left more than 30 years ago.
In these ways, some participants from the second-generation are not emotionally invested
in the Algerian passport, do not feel pride or honor in maintaining and performing
Algerian citizenship.
Of course, the meaning of the Algerian passport and formal Algerian citizenship
differs for those who only have Algerian citizenship and who have been excluded from
French citizenship. As noted earlier, many respondents with French citizenship associate
membership in the French polity with freedom. This freedom takes many forms (e.g.,
social values and attitudes), but it is exemplified by the passport. Idir, for instance,
describes the sense of freedom he experienced after naturalizing as a French citizen, as he
was able to travel abroad to visit other parts of the world. Meanwhile, those lacking
French citizenship and possessing only Algerian citizenship feel constrained by their
situation. Yanis, claims that his “biggest wish [is to be] a citizen of the world, just having
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I discuss Algerian interpretations of ‘home’ in Chapter Seven.
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a passport that allows me to go and live wherever I want. [Algerians] have such a poor, a
weak passport. Most Algerians will say that. You can't go anywhere." Another example is
Nassim, who also has only an Algerian passport and is in the process of applying for
French citizenship so that he can get the French passport. He wants citizenship so that he
can work abroad: “I really want to leave Paris. If tomorrow I find the job outside of Paris,
I will go, definitely. But since I cannot leave France, I will not get hired for a job
abroad…after I get my citizenship, I will leave France for a while.” Both Yanis and
Nassim exemplify how citizens of rich democracies (e.g., France) are exempted from visa
restrictions, enjoying a perceived ‘generalized trust’ by virtue of their citizenship status,
whereas citizens of ‘suspect countries’ (e.g., Algeria), are highly constrained in their
mobility (Shamir, 2005; Birkvad, 2019). There is an element of instrumentalism to efforts
to gain French citizenship, but I want to emphasize the emotional aspect of seeking a
French passport. This French passport renders one not just fully French, but fully human.
As a full Frenchman, they garner the trust of other wealthy countries and are no longer
global non-citizens with limited access to mobility. Therefore, obtaining a passport from
a country in the ‘Global North’ constitutes an important motivation to naturalize
(Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2006).
A 2016 Algerian law that restricts holding “high office” to “those with ‘exclusive
Algerian nationality’” (Zoja, 2016, p. 1) adds a wrinkle to the dynamics of dual
citizenship in Algerian-origin communities in France and highlights the generally limited
way in which my respondents regard their formal membership in the Algerian polity.
This law targets the widespread practice of dual citizenship in Algeria, where (as in
France) it is very common to hold a French passport in addition to an Algerian passport
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(Perrin, 2014). As recently as 2020, the 2016 law was exercised when the Algerian
appointee as minister delegate to the prime minister, Samir Chaabna, was rejected on the
issue of his refusal to relinquish his French citizenship to take this office (Hekking,
2020). Thus, in Algeria, the possession of a French passport is seen to be in conflict with
loyalty to the Algerian nation.
None of my dual-citizen research participants, however, said they would
relinquish their French citizenship if forced to choose between French and Algerian
citizenship. Though the ties that bind them to their ancestral homeland function partly
through dual citizenship, Algerian citizenship simply is not worth the loss of freedom
(mobility and lifestyle) that would accompany the loss of French citizenship. Thus, the
attachment that my respondents feel to the ‘homeland’ is somewhat limited and narrow—
more familial and cultural than political (though the relationship and emotions involved
in dual citizenship are certainly politically charged). The narratives offered in this section
reveal a range of experiences, attitudes, feelings, and desires that revolve around
citizenship. Within state discourse and even in some academic discourse, citizenship
appears as a clearly identifiable status with clear meanings. One is, or is not, a citizen,
and being a citizen suggests access to rights and full membership in a national polity. I
have tried to show here, though, that citizenship does not have a single set of meanings.
This is the case whether or not one holds multiple citizenship, though dual citizenship
certainly complicates notions of membership and loyalty. Legal status varies
considerably among my respondents, and so too does the meaning of that legal status. For
some, legal status has been easy, and this affords them some luxury in terms of
participation in the labor market and ease of travel. But there is no single relationship
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between full legal status and a sense of belonging. For those without legal status, there is
definitely a profound precariousness, yet also different levels of commitment to achieving
membership. Some of those with French citizenship feel entitled to that formal
membership, or simply take for granted that they are French; others feel gratitude or feel
that they have earned it. Those without French citizenship might also feel that the deserve
it, or they may simply experience a sense of permanent exclusion and otherness, despite
perhaps feeling more ‘at home’ in France than in Algeria.
Conclusions
This chapter has focused on two key, interconnected fields of contestation and
negotiation within integration politics in France: religion and citizenship. I have tried to
show, first, that for people of Algerian descent, religion becomes part of identity whether
or not they are personally religious. My participants work to distinguish between belief
and culture and to designate certain practices as religiously Muslim, culturally Muslim, or
culturally French. Where some respondents adhere to French secularist understandings of
religion and make an effort to keep their faith in the ‘private’ sphere, others work to
challenge the exclusions of laïcité, asserting the compatibility of their religious identities
with French republican values and principles.
This need to position oneself in relation to Islam is in response to French
secularist discourse and practice, which brands Islam as foreign and as hostile to French
republican values and to the neutral public sphere. Laïcité is a form of exclusion, but I
have tried to show that people are able to navigate the boundaries created by laïcité by
adhering to the public/private distinction concerning when and where to observe one’s
religious beliefs; they may also treat Islam as a cultural artifact rather than as a
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community of belief and practice that stands against the French polity. These practices
vary among and between first-generation immigrants and their children. Some firstgeneration respondents, for instance, uphold a distinction between public and private
realms, even as they maintain a high level of observance and orthopraxy; for others, the
distinction between public and private becomes less prominent because their adherence to
Islam is more selective and less intense, though the separation remains. Some of these
respondents feel a deeper engagement with mainstream French society.
Second-generation Algerians also show a variation in their practice or rejection of
Islam as these participants work to establish an identity that is different from their parents
as they navigate their place within (or outside of) French society. Respondents from this
group describe themselves as practicing Muslims, ‘cultural Muslims,’ and as nonbelievers, and in doing so, engage with secularism in different ways. Some incorporate a
strict practice into their everyday lives in France, but typically in a way that adheres to
secularist norms. Those that identify as ‘culturally Muslim’ rely on secularist thinking to
describe their Muslim identity as ‘cultural’ rather than ‘religious;’ they do not believe in
Islam as a set of theological assertions, but they cannot entirely divorce themselves from
the label of ‘Muslim’ because of their ‘cultural’ background. A third group of secondgeneration participants reject Islam entirely and do not believe or adhere to any cultural
practices connected with the religion.
Together, these first and second-generation respondents together reveal a
spectrum of responses to laïcité and the varying ways people can parse ‘religion’ and
‘culture,’ identifying with, or rejecting, particular elements of each. It is impossible to
escape the logic of laïcité in France, but my study respondents do show some agency in
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locating themselves within its constructs. This analysis overall problematizes religiosity
as an ‘indicator’ of ‘integration’ in France. It shows instead how beliefs and practices
associated with religion become folded into an indeterminate, ideological-political
process of claiming sameness within a national polity. Whereas laïcité purports to
privatize religion, in fact, it politicizes religion by making it the object of public
discussion, deliberation, and negotiation—something that immigrants, in particular, must
think about, deal with, explain, and justify.
Citizenship is the second key field of negotiation. In France, some individuals
have full legal citizenship but lack full substantive citizenship and/or feel alienated from
Frenchness. The language of citizenship is one of universalism and egalitarianism, but
citizenship is neither universal nor equally understand or experienced. In the first
instance, “visible and audible traits such as ‘race,’ ethnicity, religion, and accent may
supersede formal citizenship in daily negotiations over national membership” (Birkvad,
2019, p. 802). National membership, in this sense, is not only governed solely by the
state, but also by ordinary individuals, who deploy tacit understandings of belonging in
everyday life (Brubaker, 2010). As Cesari (1994) and Balibar (2004) have noted, the
paradox of equality envisioned by the French citizenship structure is that it has produced
a generation of young people fed on a diet of ‘equality’ and ‘social opportunities’ who
cannot find a space for their equality claims due to their status as “illegitimate children of
the colonial affair” (Memmi, 2004, p. 97).
In this chapter, I have shown the division of citizenship and rights along multiple
legal statuses. In describing the range of legal membership(s) held, or withheld, from my
research participants, we can see the many intersections between citizenship, identity, and
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rights, and the varying ways that Algerian immigrants and their children draw upon
dimensions of citizenship in articulating membership in the French polity. The narratives
in this chapter indicate that formal inclusion does not guarantee a sense of belonging,
though it can; some of my respondents feel a deep sense of connection to France and
French ‘culture,’ while others connect their legal status to more hybrid or partial
identities. Legal exclusion always amplifies precariousness and feelings of exclusion,
though it also produces feelings of entitlement—of being owed membership in the French
polity.
Resentment is a common emotion tied to citizenship for my research participants,
often coupled with a desire for membership and connected to experiences of rejection
from the French polity. Like many other experiences for Algerian-origin individuals in
France, these feelings of resentment or entitlement are tied to colonialism and the
Algerian War. Clearly, these resentments are not uniform; some express gratitude or just
relief at having made it through the process of naturalization. But some do continue to
engage in acts of retaliation or resistance in their daily lives in France—acts ranging from
not paying for public transportation, to naming their children with Berber names, to ‘reteaching’ their children the ‘true’ history between France and Algeria. These acts of
resistance or retribution within the context of French citizenship show that though many
Algerian immigrants and their descendants desire, seek, and in some cases, earn
citizenship in France, there is a constancy of resistance in the face of marginalization.
Finally, dual citizenship is a common practice among my research participants.
Though worrying for the French state, the evidence presented in this chapter shows that
dual citizenship is not necessarily contradictory with ‘being’ French. Again, participants
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describe a range of emotions tied to dual citizenship. The Algerian passport is a badge of
honor, pride, and cultural heritage, while the French passport becomes a means of access
to the ‘Global North.’ But the Algerian passport can also be viewed as constraining or as
a burden, while French citizenship can signify a real sense of belonging, beyond mere
possession of a passport.
This chapter overall has tried to complicate both scholarly understandings of
integration as a generational trajectory toward sameness, and political discourses that
conceive of Algerian-origin people as existing outside of, or in opposition to, French
republican citizenship. The narratives presented here show that while they are in a
socially, economically, and/or legally subordinate position, my research participants are
constantly engaging with the discourses and structures of French republican, laique
citizenship and positioning themselves in these fields of meaning—their identities are
formed in relation to ideas of citizenship and secularism. Importantly, these engagements
do not follow any standard trajectory, and they have no definitive endpoint. In the
following chapter, I consider in more detail how negotiations of identity, belonging, and
citizenship described in Chapters 5 and 6 unfold in the spaces of everyday life in Paris.
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CHAPTER 7
SPACES AND PLACES OF ALGERIANS IN FRANCE
“I like living in the banlieue…there are no French people here, only Blacks and Arabs.”
-Hacina, 28-year-old immigrant
“If you look like them, they think you belong here and will be nice to you [flips shirt
collar up].”
-Ali, 28-year-old illegal immigrant
“I lived in the 15th, but the rich people are racist; too many white people live there. So, I
moved to the 19th.”
- Ferhat, 45-year-old son of immigrants
Introduction
The preceding chapters have elaborated how people from Algerian-immigrant
backgrounds negotiate a range of identities—French, Algerian, Muslim, immigrant, and
citizen—in defining membership and belonging. These negotiations bring in experiences
and understandings of inclusion and exclusion, racism, hospitality, familial obligation,
and personal freedom. Study respondents connect identities to particular values, roles,
and responsibilities, and then place these in specific realms of interaction and social
activity. In interpreting their experiences and identities, respondents describe a
fundamental rift between Frenchness and Algerianness, but they also complicate this
binary in describing their relationships to different ‘communities.’ Respondents construct
their identity through dichotomies, but these dichotomies also break down at times, and
respondents often view themselves in more hybrid terms or as existing in the interstices
of broad categories. Belonging is thus muddled, hybridized, and complicated by the
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realities of people’s lives and their experiences of inclusion and exclusion within
economic, legal, and cultural structures.
It is within these moments of messy hybridity that we can start to talk about
‘integration’ as a back-and-forth exchange through which social actors produce and act
upon ideas of sameness and difference. Rather than adaptation, this process is about
conflict, negotiation, accommodation, conformity, resistance, and subversion. It involves
the (unequal) coproduction of social membership and identity. Previous chapters have
suggested that interviewees place identities in different realms of life and situate
themselves selectively in these realms through social behaviors. Respondents sometimes
articulate these realms as metaphorical spaces (such as public and private spheres). This
chapter brings into focus the materiality of these spaces.
This chapter explores the geographies of Algerian-origin people in France and the
spatial strategies they use to assert, submerge, or rework various identities in the course
of everyday life. Empirical evidence highlights the ways in which Algerian-origin
individuals structure their interactions with French society, and the geographic contexts
that influence and inform those interactions. While French republican ideology posits a
universal, neutral ‘public’ sphere, in practice, this ideology works to denigrate and
marginalize communities of Algerian descent who do not share equal class, racial, or
cultural status with the mainstream French population. It is their identities that are pushed
out of the public sphere to ensure its supposed neutrality. This chapter focuses on the
ways that individuals of Algerian origin negotiate these bounded spaces of inclusion and
exclusion in the French public sphere, which is manifested not only in state spaces like
schools, but also in parks, cafés, neighborhoods, and workplaces. My study respondents
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use, avoid, and often modify their behavior in these spaces in order to position
themselves as insiders, or to cope with, or to call attention to, their exclusion. This
chapter focuses on highly localized contexts within Paris. Integration is often framed
within the national context, yet social interaction takes place where people live closely
together and encounter each other on a regular, daily basis.
Valentine (2001) notes that the majority group(s) often take the ease with which
they occupy public space for granted. The majority group has the prerogative to define
space according to its shared majority identity. The majority (in this case, white, nonimmigrant, middle-class French) then reinforces its identity through repetitive practices,
thereby creating spatial norms and defining ‘appropriate’ uses of space. Members of the
majority are unconscious of their domination of space because they rarely (if ever) need
to examine or question their own identity. The spatial experiences of many, though not
all, immigrants involve feelings of unease relating to living and working in an
environment where a French/white/secular identity is normative and pervasive. Some
find a sense of comfort within the supposedly ‘unsafe’ environment of the banlieue—the
geographical Other to ‘mainstream’ public space. As I will explain, however, the
banlieue itself creates tensions for some of my respondents. Not all, in other words, see
the banlieue in rosy terms as an escape from an oppressive French environment.
While my analysis focuses on negotiations of French space and its opposite, the
banlieue, it also hints at the ways immigrant cultural practices can transformation
dominant space, challenging the majority’s ownership and dominance and creating a
sense of anxiety or crisis for majority groups. Immigrants—especially those who do not
adhere to dominant norms, behaviors, and appearance—thus can subvert the majority’s
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control over space, perhaps temporarily. In other cases, the majority resists any shift in
‘ownership’ for as long as possible, as seen in efforts in the U.S. throughout the 20th
century to block any ‘incursion’ of Blacks and Jews (among others) into ‘white’
neighborhoods, as described by Sugrue (2005). In France, these dynamics of space and
place are often influenced by the contemporary politicization of laïcité, as detailed in the
previous chapter.
This chapter examines Algerian-origin individuals’ engagement with spaces and
places in France through a critical geographical lens that centers on the production of
space, the inscription of power relationships in space, and the contestedness of space. The
production of space is a matter of domination, exclusion, enforcement, and erasure, but it
can also be a matter of creativity, negotiation, and performance. This chapter emphasizes
that the city is not a single, unified space, but a collection of different kinds of spaces in
which certain people may be wholly or partially included or excluded. Space is the means
by which people create ‘community,’ be it a community of citizens, or a subaltern,
‘minority’ community; in either case, space is regulated and inscribed with written or
unwritten rules. The analysis in this chapter focuses on the ways that people of Algerian
origins operate within, accommodate, and push back on the spatialized parameters for
belonging in France. While the discussion highlights the systematic exclusion of
Algerian-origin people and the requirements placed on them as they enter the spaces of
the dominant, unmarked political community, it also highlights that Algerian-origin
people are not entirely powerless, and that they have some capacity to move between
spaces, to challenge dominant meanings of space, and to carve out their own spaces.
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This chapter is organized as follows: I begin with a conceptual discussion about
how space and place figure into discussions of immigrants and integration/assimilation. I
follow this with a description of the urban environment of Paris and the norms, identities,
and social rules embedded in the city’s spaces. I then offer narratives from the research
participants relating to their different engagements within these spaces. Here, I illustrate
how my respondents (re)frame the banlieue as ‘home’ by contesting dominant
conceptions of the banlieue as a deviant space. But I also reveal the ambivalence some of
my respondents feel toward the banlieue and their acceptance of some elements of
dominant French narratives about Algerian space. Finally, I discuss the spatialities of
Algerian immigrants and their children as they move in and out of racialized and
dominant spaces, and as they make and claim space in the everyday experiences of their
lives in France. The chapter overall offers a critical perspective on the intersections of the
social and spatial in the everyday lives of Algerian immigrants and the on-going
production of societal membership and belonging.
Space and Place: Immigrants, Integration, and Assimilation
Understanding the politics of integration requires, first, an examination of the
“spatiosymbolic order” that works to legitimate the majority group and their interests
while marginalizing and excluding others (Farrar, 2008, p. 11). This examination, in turn,
begins with an understanding of immigrant’s residential patterns and the interplay
between residential ‘clustering’ and the dominant group’s anxieties about nonassimilation. Scholars and politicians alike have long been preoccupied with the degree to
which immigrants form ‘colonies,’ or residential clusters, within host-society cities
(Huttman, 1991; Peach, 1975; Phillips, 1998). The spatial assimilation perspective holds
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that immigrant groups tend to concentrate in “poorer neighborhoods, live in the worst
dwellings, and are either over-represented in the worst segments of the labor market or
are unemployed” (Bolt, Özüekren, and Phillips, 2010, pp. 169-170), but that under
normal circumstances, they will gradually disperse from their initial social and residential
‘ghettoes’ (Bolt and van Kempen, 2002; Clark and Drever, 2000). The spatial
assimilation perspective has been challenged in recent years from different directions. For
instance, some scholars have noted a more complex set of residential patterns that suggest
a looser relationship between degree of ‘assimilation’ and residential location. More
interesting, though, are accounts that have considered the interplay between observable
residential patterns and the competing meanings attached to those residential patterns—
that is, the different ways that immigrants and dominant groups interpret, and respond to,
the possibility or desirability of residential mobility. Such research often employs
qualitative methods to explore “the experiences and aspirations of minority ethnic groups
in relation to their housing and neighborhood and the significance of clustering for their
sense of well-being and identity” (Bolt et al., 2010, p. 170; Ehrkamp, 2005; Phillips et al.,
2007). These studies have highlighted the social and cultural capital associated with
minority concentrations in specific neighborhoods. From this perspective, persistent
ethnic or minority segregation can be read both as a sign of community strength, and as a
mark of social exclusion (Bolt et al., 2010). In general, this literature challenges political
discourses that read residential clustering solely in terms of ‘self-separation,’ nonassimilation, and group isolationism.
The work of Deborah Phillips (2006) and her associates (Philips et al., 2007) on
northern British towns is indicative of this approach. This work debunks the notion that
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Muslim communities are ‘self-segregating’ and willfully choosing to live ‘parallel lives’
that run alongside, but rarely intersect with other residents (Phillips 2006; Phillips et al.,
2007). Ethnic enclaves, they argue, are not solely the product of a one-way decision made
by the minority; rather, they are the result of multiply layered influences including racial
discrimination, the mistreatment of minority groups by the dominant group, housing
affordability, and the spatial structure of employment (Phillips, 2006). This work finds
that poverty, lack of mobility, racism, and a fear of feeling ‘out of place’ all contribute to
clustering along ethnic/minority lines. Phillips (2007) also finds that while Muslim ethnic
communities persist and grow, this is “largely because of natural increase and new
household formation among a youthful population” and that “there are also signs of
dispersal into higher status neighborhoods, particularly by professionals” (Phillips, 2007,
p. 1142). At the same time, she finds that “both the public and private housing markets,
and in other spheres of resource allocation, together with popular racist sentiments,
expressed through racist harassment, continued to reinforce existing patterns of minority
ethnic segregation” (Phillips, 2006, p. 27). In this respect, “contests over space manifest
themselves in displays of resistance by some white households when minority ethnic
households try to move into ‘their’ neighborhoods”—indicative of the power that
dominant groups have to exclude minority groups (Phillips, 2007, p. 1149). While it is
seldom commented upon in debates about immigration, the highest levels of segregation
along ethnic lines within multicultural cities typically occur in white residential spaces
(Stillwell and Phillips, 2006). This is certainly the case in Paris, where the upper class is
the “most segregated, followed by the lower class and immigrants, and the socio-spatial
gap between these two most isolated groups is deepening”—reflecting choices made by
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the upper class to self-segregate, and to reject socialized housing in their neighborhoods,
not choices made by the minority (Grzegorczyk, 2013, p. 22; Prétecaille, 2006). I
describe this point in further detail below.
By re-framing discussions of residential clustering in terms of racialization,
power, and agency, critical geographical literature draws attention to the discursive
production of race and immigrant difference within the broader landscape, and the
embeddedness of racial ideology in space (Anderson, 1987; 1988; 1991). Anderson’s
seminal work on Vancouver’s Chinatown, for instance, describes how Chinatown for
European Canadians signified “all those features that seemed to set the Chinese
irrevocably apart...It embodied the white Europeans’ sense of difference between
immigrants from China and themselves, between the East and the West” (1987, p. 594).
Following Anderson and others, the analysis presented here considers spatial patterns not
simply in terms of assimilation-versus-non-assimilation, but in terms of the shifting
boundaries of identity and race in the host society, and the inclusion (or exclusion) of
immigrant Others within the imagined and material spaces of the mainstream (Jacobson,
1998). This work explores how every-day decisions on the part of both the dominant
group (e.g., to cluster or disperse public housing, to ban or permit ‘communal’ identifiers
in certain spaces) and minority groups (e.g., to live within or outside of a banlieue, to
cease speaking in one’s mother tongue in certain locations) can work to legitimate or
undermine the majority/dominant group claims, and to position minority groups within or
outside the ‘mainstream’ (Farrar, 2008). In these myriad ways, individuals’ lives “are
given shape and meaning through the spaces” they inhabit and the spaces where they
“work, sleep, study, congregate, meditate, worship, govern, or protest” (Farrar, 2008, p.
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2). Ultimately, according to Farrar (2008), the built environment “lends permanence to
our aspirations about how we should live together…thus the language of space is also the
language of politics, as both try to get at the ways we should organize our collective
existence” (p. 2). Toward understanding the built environment of Paris, the following
section offers a contextual analysis of the city, as it pertains to the spatial locations of
dominant and minority groups.
The Spatial Context of the City of Paris
The Paris known and loved by tourists and residents today conceals under its
romantic, ordered façade an urban environment of division and hierarchy (Rideout,
2016). Paris is elegant, grand, and inviting with its uniform, embellished buildings and
wide sidewalks lined with well-manicured trees and shrubbery (Rideout, 2016). Yet,
behind this dazzling façade is a story of tension, struggle, demolition, and violence.
Modern Paris is largely the result of a series of interventions in the urban environment in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Land enclosures and the migration of rural
inhabitants from the northern areas of France during the industrial revolution contributed
to the growth of large areas of impoverishment in the center of the city (Silverstein,
2004). The region of Paris grew from 1.35 million inhabitants in 1800 to over six million
by 1880 (Silverstein, 2004, p. 86). The infrastructure of Paris suffered under the strain of
such a large increase in population, resulting in congested roads, poor sanitation, the
spread of disease, and a limited supply of potable water (Silverstein, 2004). In response
to the social upheaval that accompanied this difficult living environment (including
regular violent confrontations against the government) and disease, reformers at the École
Polytechnique developed plans to reconstruct Paris by demolishing the congested inner-
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city impoverished areas, opening up wide avenues, and constructing a rail and canal
system (Filler, 1991).
Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann, appointed by Louis Napoleon as director of
public works for the Paris region between 1853 and 1870, put the plans from the École
Polytechnique in motion. Over the course of his tenure, he directed the demolition of
“12,000 structures, cutting 85 miles of new direct roadways through the city to replace
333 miles of meandering old ones, erecting imposing landmarks like the Opera and the
Halles Centrals, revamping the antiquated and unhealthy water and sewage systems,
increasing the number of street lights and sidewalks” (Filler, 1991, p. 32). Haussmann
was also responsible for the development of nearly 5000 acres of public parks
(Silverstein, 2004, p. 87).
Though widely celebrated at the time, Haussmann’s work was not without
criticism; his republican opponents “saw his avenues as imperialist tools to neuter
fermenting civil unrest in working-class areas, allowing troops to be rapidly deployed to
quell revolt” (Willsher, 2016, p.1; Taunton, 2009). Haussmann was also accused of
engineering social hierarchies by destroying the mixed neighborhoods where rich,
middle-class, and working-class people lived on the same streets. Post-Haussmann, the
“emergent notion of the economically segregated community prevailed” (Filler, 1991, p.
32), with the poor expelled from the inner-city to the outskirts of town, outside the city
wall. The remains of the city wall eventually were dismantled and replaced by the
périphérique—the ring road that functions to “delineate a sharp boundary between the
Haussmannian city and the sprawling wasteland beyond” (Taunton, 2009, p. 99). The
process of industrialization in the nineteenth century saw nearly all of Paris’s heavy
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industry located outside the wall (later the périphérique); along with the factories, came
the laborers required to work in the factories.
It is within this landscape of segregation and control that hundreds of thousands
of Algerian immigrants settled after World War II. In the first decade after World War II,
Paris faced a serious housing crisis, “which disproportionately affected North African”
immigrants (Prakash, 2010, p. 223). Many North Africans sought cheap housing in
boarding houses, hotels, and hostels in the less expensive districts of the city, in the 13th,
14th, 18th, and 19th arrondissements; others found similar accommodations suburban
shantytowns (Prakash, 2010). These shantytowns—the bidonvilles I first discussed in
Chapter Four—were ethnically segregated and populated with a majority of Algerian
immigrants. The bidonvilles were seen by governing authorities and the press as a threat
to ‘French character,’ according to Wadowiec (2014, p. 135):
[A]s the population was bottlenecked in dilapidated tenements and makeshift
bidonvilles, popular and political discourse deflected longstanding structural
problems (not enough homes) as further proof of problems inherent to the
migrants themselves—such as an innate preference for squalor indicating that
Algerians had little capacity or desire to become French.
In this way, the bidonville emerged ideologically during the era of decolonization “as the
spatial and symbolic antithesis to the type of adaptation that marked [Algerians] as stable
contributors to French society” (Wadowiec, 2014, p. 167). Further, the visibility of these
shantytown communities triggered authorities to view “most migration issues through the
bidonville prism” (Byrnes, 2008, p. 11).
In these conditions, there was an urgent need for providing Habitation de Loyer
Modéré (HLM)—i.e., affordable rental housing—for immigrant workers (Dalrymple,
2002). By the 1970s, most bidonvilles were demolished and replaced by social housing,
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mainly in the form of high-rise, brutalist apartment buildings on the outskirts of Paris
(Togman, 2002). These government-subsidized housing estates, called banlieues, or
‘suburbs’, were developed in the style of Le Corbusier, a Swiss architect who sought to
institute radical social reform through utopian, high-modernist urban design (Kohlstedt,
2018, p. 1). Corbusier’s plans for a ‘contemporary’ and ‘radiant’ city built outside the
périphérique “rapidly developed into a ghetto” (Shreir, 2014, p. 1), a place of
“overcrowded public housing, people of color, new immigrants, and crime…categorical
inequality, exclusion from the labor market, and social boundaries resulting in residential
segregation” (Hutchison, 2010, p. 52). Scholars, journalists, and politicians have
construed this banlieues mainly as spaces of resentment and oppositional behavior. For
instance, Dalrymple (2002, p. 1) states,
A kind of anti-society has grown up in [the banlieue]—a population that derives
meaning of its life from the hatred it bears for the other, “official,” society in
France. This alienation, this gulf of mistrust…is written on the faces of the young
men, most of them permanently unemployed, who hang out in the pocked and
potholed open spaces between their [apartments].
For some commentators, the description of banlieues as quartiers en difficulté (deprived
areas), or zones sensibles (trouble spots) is intended to call attention to the problem of
inequality and to advocate for solutions to inequality and unemployment. The imagining
of these neighborhoods as wastelands filled with crime and violence, however, has also
allowed the state “to rally support for targeted crackdowns” (Angélil and Siress, 2012, p.
63). Police brutality is common in the banlieue, and this only works to fuel banlieue
violence against the state. Riots occur periodically, including 1981 (the ‘rodeo riots’),
1991 (Sartrouville and Mantes-la-Jolie), and 2005 (the ‘French riots’) (Laachir, 2007).
The banlieues since the early 2000s have also been declared ‘no go’ spaces by governing
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authorities (especially the banlieue of La Courneuve, north of Paris), and French media
representations consistently focus on selective images of crime and violence that confirm
the “idea of the banlieues as the space of the threatening ‘other’” (Laachir, 2007, p. 102).
These sensationalized, culturalist explanations of segregation mask the historic,
economic, and political mechanisms that have created segregation in the first place, and
that have functioned to maintain inner Paris as a space of racialized privilege (McAvay
and Safi, 2018). The mixed, immigrant-origin population appears simply to be “internally
exiled—foreigners in their own country living a wholly different social and physical
construct” (Angélil and Siress, 2012, pp. 61-62). Having expelled the Black, Arab, and
immigrant poor from the white, French city center, France has “found itself replaying a
former colonial refrain, only this time within its own national borders,” thus furthering
the idea of the banlieue as a ghettoized community (Angélil and Siress, 2012, p. 60).
This analysis of the banlieue echoes Anderson’s (1987) analysis of Chinatown as
a convergence of “place, power, racial discourse, and institutional practice” (p. 581).
More than just a physical space, the ‘immigrant’ banlieue is a social construct that gives
definition to France’s white European society. French Republicanism is based upon a
perceived total equality of all citizens; these universalist pretentions are embedded in the
capital city’s ‘public’ spaces—its “civic squares, government buildings, monuments,
thoroughfares, and cultural centers,” all of which convey a coherent identity and provide
“citizens with common landmarks and places of collective memory” (Farrar, 2008, p. 14).
But this idealized citizenship relies upon the peripheralized Other that, for many French
citizens, exists only through media images. Of course, the spatialized self-and-other
construction of inner Paris and its suburbs is complicated by the existence of a large
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population of Algerians living within the city limits. That is, while there is clear evidence
of residential segregation, not all people of Algerian or North African origin reside in
peripheral enclaves. Of my research participants only 15 of 73 are currently living in
banlieues (though many grew up in banlieues and moved to Paris as adults). The
remaining 58 respondents live within the city of Paris. All but 8 of these participants live
in districts known to have a significant immigrant or Algerian population (mainly the
13th, 18th, or 20th arrondissements); but ‘significant’ in these districts means a minority—
for example, the 18th arrondissement had an immigrant population of 27.5 percent in
2017 (INSEE, 2020a). The question raised here is what residence in these more mixed
neighborhoods means. Does it suggest a group of immigrants who are on their way to
‘assimilation’ and who are comfortable interacting with the Français de souche or other
Europeans (Najib, 2019)? Does it signify the fading of differences between people of
Algerian origin and dominant French society? Among my study participants, those of
Berber origin are more likely to live in central Paris than those who consider themselves
Arab. It might not be coincidental that Berbers tend to have lighter skin, hair, and eye
color, and they enjoyed a degree of racial privilege under French colonial rule
(Camiscioli, 2009). They may thus find it relatively easy to live in central Paris.
Certainly, some of my Berber-identifying respondents commented on their ability to ‘fit
in’ with their pale skin, light eye color, and blond hair. For example, Sylia said, “I look
like them, so it is easier for me [to fit in].” But as I explain below, such a pathway to
sameness is not preordained. Moreover, the openness of dominant space to particular
groups of outsiders should not be understood as creating spaces that are somehow neutral
or devoid of identities.
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While I give attention to residential space, the issue of residential segregation or
integration is of less interest to me here than the ways all kinds of places become integral
to my respondents’ understandings and negotiations of identity, belonging, and
membership. Space and representations of spaces (like the banlieues) are important to
these negotiations, but not in any single way. I want to suggest that relationships between
place, identity, and belonging are complicated and fraught with tension, as people from
immigrant backgrounds must struggle to define who they are and where they belong in a
national society that insists upon the neutrality and universalism of its values. Rather than
take the meaning of certain kinds of places for granted, I ask my respondents what those
places mean to them, and how their performances of identity might shift as they move
through space—going, perhaps, from immigrant-dominated to French-dominated spaces,
or from school to home, and so on.
Narrating space
Immigrants have played a fundamental role in shaping urban space and urban life
in Paris for generations, and those spaces are filled with meanings and tensions for
immigrants and non-immigrants alike. The banlieues, and the negative discourses that
surround them, have a particularly salient role in Algerian-origin individuals’ perceptions
of their place in French society, even for those that do not live in the banlieues. For
many, the banlieues are ‘home,’ even as these neighborhoods are constantly denigrated
by politicians and the media. Within the context of ethnic segregation, social marginality,
and transnational mobility, “domesticity—understood as the potential to enact a domestic
dimension in meaningful places—is an important asset to resist present hardships,
cultivate memory and lay out projects for the future” (Boccagni and Brighenti, 2015, p.
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1). At the same time, and regardless of their relationships with the banlieues, Algerian
immigrants and their descendants must also position themselves within public spaces that
are characteristically ordered, framed, and managed by dominant groups (Boccagni and
Brighenti, 2015). It is important to understand how migrants navigate social membership
in the fragmented and discontinuous spaces of a racially and class segregated city.
The interviews conducted for this study show that while structural forces—state
policies, immigration policies, capitalism—shape the city and people’s place within it,
individuals exercise some agency in navigating different kinds of spaces and in asserting
their identities and understandings of community through their performances in these
spaces. Previous chapters have described how interviewees place identities in different
spheres and histories of life, thereby situating themselves selectively within these realms
through their social behaviors. Research participants express their identities situationally,
conforming to, or resisting, the codes and unwritten rules that govern certain realms of
life and the spaces associated with them. The struggle for Algerian-origin individuals to
‘fit in’ among French society manifests itself spatially, though such struggles may not be
visible to members of the dominant group. In the sections that follow, I explore how my
respondents frame and re-frame the banlieue as home by contesting dominant
conceptions of the banlieue. I then offer counternarratives to the ‘banlieue is home’
narrative by showing the ambivalence some feel toward the banlieue, or their outright
rejection of these spaces. Finally, I discuss the spatialities of Algerian immigrants and
their descendants as they move in and out of immigrant and non-immigrant spaces in the
course of everyday life.
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(Re)Framing the banlieue as home
Individuals of Algerian origin interviewed for this research tend to construct their
own neighborhood in terms of ‘home’ and ‘belonging,’ as places where they feel safe and
familiar, thereby connecting the physical aspects of place(s) to the social dimensions of
everyday places (van der Burgt, 2015). As geographers Blunt and Dowling (2006)
describe, ‘home’ is not simply a site in which individuals live, it is also a “spatial
imaginary: a set of intersecting and variable ideas and feelings, which are related to
context, which construct place, extend across space and scales, and connect places” (p.2).
Algerian-origin peoples work to create a translocal/ transnational conception of place
where the sights, smells, and sounds of Algeria are ‘normal’ and not ‘foreign.’ For many
participants, the banlieue offers a space in which to (re)create an Algerian ‘home’—a
space of authenticity, inclusivity, and ‘community.’ Though these spaces were created
through exclusion and discrimination, they have also become spaces of safety, security,
and comfort. Phillips (2006) speaks of the positive attributes of such spaces formed from
discrimination and economic need: these are vibrant lived spaces that produce a sense of
belonging and safety and that facilitate social capital. Like Phillips’ respondents, my
respondents “valued the local networks of support, institutions, care, and information
exchange relationships” in these spaces (2006, p. 28). These neighborhoods
convey/preserve an ‘Algerian’ identity, but this can extend beyond people of Algerian
descent to a broader immigrant population. This is despite elements of isolation (both
social and physical) and despite the severe disrepair of the housing in these
neighborhoods.
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For instance, Lina, a 60-year-old immigrant, living in the Champigny-sur-Marne
banlieue, wanted to raise her children around other immigrants and Muslims, stating “I
wanted my children to grow up without racist [treatment].” Though the living conditions
in her building are lower than she desires (the elevator is regularly out of service, the
hallways smell of urine, repairs take longer than they should, etc.), Lina talks about how
hard she has worked to make her family’s home comfortable. For Lina, her home in the
banlieue is a place of comfort and ease. Her apartment is decorated in the style of her
home in the Kabyle region of Algeria: bright maroon tapestries adorn the walls, carpets
from Algeria are on the floors, and a tea set from Algeria is on display on the buffet in the
dining/living room. It is not only the space of her apartment that Lina adorns with
Algerian items. She also wears an Algerian dress as a housecoat; it is black with gold
embroidery and is her favorite article of clothing. When I joined Lina and her family for
meals, a family friend, Binta (from Senegal) was invited over to celebrate the breaking of
the fast during Ramadan. For Lina, the space of her home is inclusive beyond being an
‘Algerian’ space—she is open to a broader sense of a community of (Muslim)
immigrants. This meeting of friends, family, and an academic geographer (an outsider)
seemed normal for this group—a sense of shared community, engagement with their
heritage and traditions, and a desire to share it with outsiders. In this way, the banlieue
functions as “a “village” of multicultural entente and familial ties” (Austin, 2009, p. 88).
Understanding the banlieue in this way demonstrates that this space is meant to be an
authentic space, though its meaning and form have a specific meaning in the French
context: it is not an entirely closed-off ‘cultural space’ that reproduces Algerian life
exactly, but, rather, a space that offers refuge from French spaces.

267

In the same ways that Lina prefers to live in a community of immigrants in the
banlieue, Hacina, a 24-year-old immigrant, living in the 93rd district outside of Paris
explains, “I like living in the banlieue…there are no French people here, only Blacks and
Arabs.” She describes a sense of ease that she feels, of ‘being at home’ when in the space
of the banlieue: “Being here is better…there’s no pressure”—referring to the social
pressures, stemming from secularist and assimilationist discourse and policy, of ‘French
space’ within the city of Paris. From this perspective, ‘French’ is very much a marked,
visible category that Hacina can avoid by living most of her life within the boundaries of
banlieue—where she lives, works, and conducts her social life. Hacina describes a
distaste of what she called “original French” meaning Français de souche, describing
them as unkind and unwelcoming. When Hacina met me for our interview, she arrived
late because she had gotten lost. We were meeting at a café just inside the périphérique,
and she was unfamiliar with the area, even though it was within minutes of her home. She
called me and asked for directions and I sent her a text message with the address of the
café so that she could use her phone to map her way there. She again got lost driving out
of Paris and into the banlieue. She explained that she “never goes to Paris.” Once we
were on the familiar streets of her neighborhood (only a few blocks from the café where
we met), she no longer needed guidance with navigation. This small, but telling action
indicated an almost physically identifiable boundary between where Hacina feels ‘in
place’ and ‘out of place,’ where she is ‘lost’ and where she ‘belongs.’
Hacina’s friend Djamila, with whom she works at the local hospital, agrees with
Hacina’s positive feelings of ‘being at home’ in the banlieue. “There are many people
like us here,” she says, referring to their common Algerian heritage. Djamila lives in the
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same banlieue (Bobigny) as Hacina in the 93rd district (north-east of Paris), but down the
street, in a different high-rise building. The two women share meals with friends and
families in their apartments, but usually congregate at Djamila’s because she has children
at home. Like Lina, Djamila and Hacina have a large group of immigrant (and
immigrant-descendant) friends that share meals, Muslim holidays, and celebrations
together. During my interviews with Djamila and Hacina, we shared a meal of couscous
at Djamila’s house (according to Hacina, “you cannot learn about Algeria without
couscous!”). After we finished the couscous, while drinking mint tea (in the customary
fashion of Algeria), another friend arrived at Djamila’s, Brice, an immigrant from
Senegal, who joined in the conversation. Again, the space of Djamila’s home was
inclusive beyond the boundaries of ‘Algerian’ and included a broader sense of
community that included other immigrants from the neighborhood.
In a way similar to Lina’s interior decor, Djamila’s home is filled with
decorations and products that remind her of Algeria. The contrast was striking between
the state of disrepair of the building she lives in, with its drab walls, and Djamila’s home,
decorated with vibrant art from Kabylia in Algeria (where Djamila is from). Djamila
explained that though she does not go home to Algeria as often as she would like, when
she does, she brings back olive oil, dates, and spices to cook with in France. She pointed
out her favorite trinkets from Algeria, on display in her living room—a polished metal
teapot, a metal plate with a design hammered in the center, a woven tapestry on the
wall—all brought from Kabyle. At home, Djamila wears an Algerian dress (like Lina’s)
as a housecoat. She only wears this at home and never outside her apartment (she is a
nurse, and she and Hacina both wear typical medical attire at work). Though Djamila and
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Lina lived miles apart, and did not know each other, their lives, apartments, and social
gatherings were mirror images of each other—the drab and deteriorating buildings of the
banlieue contrasted with a cheery and vibrant décor from Algeria inside their apartments,
even down to the similar clothing that they each wore at home. Both women cooked
Algerian food and prepared North African tea for my visit; both visits were accompanied
with the inclusion of others from the neighborhood (all immigrants or descendants of
immigrants).
During my interview with Djamila, her son was studying for an upcoming exam
in school, and Djamila was distracted by this, regularly interrupting herself to remind him
to focus. Djamila keeps a strict hold over her children and encourages (rather forcefully)
their success in school. For Djamila, her children can “achieve more in life” than she did;
she wants a life for them that was not of a working-class nature, perhaps a life outside the
space banlieue. Djamila’s ambivalence toward the banlieue is evident here, in that she
both chooses to live in her neighborhood and creates a space of ‘home’ while
simultaneously desiring her son to have the ability to live somewhere else. Though she
did not fully articulate her specific desires for her children (whether she wanted them to
live somewhere else and to lead a different kind of life), her efforts both to foster a sense
of ‘home’ and belonging in the banlieue and to focus on her children’s ability to exercise
a choice in where and how they live seemed to disrupt the “non-assimilation” narratives
so commonly applied to Algerian immigrants.
Djamila was not unique in her desire to exercise freedom and choice in where and
how her family lives. Many of my interviewees, in fact, had made decisions in their own
lives to separate themselves fully or partly from the banlieue and to renegotiate their
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relationships with both the Algerian/immigrant community and with ‘mainstream’ French
society. In the following section, I offer a counterpart to the above descriptions of a
reproduction of Algerian home and community, by presenting the narratives of those who
have tried to distance themselves from immigrant space.
Leaving Immigrant Space
Where some research participants fit the traditional assimilation narrative about
‘immigrant colonies’ or ‘immigrant clusters,’ not all appeared to be striving for
community authenticity, or an ‘Algerian sense of home.’ For example, Sarah., Lina’s
eldest daughter, expressed both positive and negative feelings and associations with her
childhood home in the Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue. When we met for our interview,
Sarah picked me up in the 20th arrondissement and drove me to Champigny-sur-Marne,
where Lina raised her, about a 30-minute drive. She talked about how far away it was
from Paris, and how difficult it is to get there or to get to Paris from there on public
transportation. When we parked her car (after looking for a ‘safe’ place to park), she said
hello to her friends that we passed and stopped to introduce me. Sakina and I
communicated in a mix of French and English, and when she introduced me as an
American to her friends, they were all very happy to meet an American but did not speak
English to me. When I asked about language use in her neighborhood, Sarah told me that
no one in her banlieue learns or speaks English. “Why would they?” she asked,
conveying a sense of restricted opportunities for the residents.
When we arrived at her family’s apartment, I was shown to the sitting area and
offered a glass of Fanta (Sarah and her family were still practicing fasting until sundown,
but they wanted to offer their Christian guest a beverage). As we waited for the sun to go

271

down, I went to the window and looked at the view. The sun was going down behind the
other high-rise buildings and rays of light were streaming through. I thought it was a
beautiful scene and said, “Sarah! Come look at this!” Sarah sighed and stayed in her seat,
and said, “I know that view.” I felt the world close in on me and tried for a moment to
imagine looking out this very window for days and years on end. I thought about how
hard Sarah had worked to escape her childhood living environment, and I felt exhaustion
in her response to my naïve enjoyment of the sunset in the banlieue. Sarah’s ambivalence
toward her neighborhood was palpable.
Sarah was open about her complicated feelings about her neighborhood. She
described it, on the one hand, as familiar and secure: she knows the people around her
and she does not feel out of place or at risk of being the victim of the racism that she feels
in the central part of Paris. Yet her old neighborhood also feels increasingly unfamiliar
and unsafe. She has been exposed to and, in some cases, included in ‘French’ social
spheres such as her university, so she no longer identifies solely with her neighborhood.
As we drove into the banlieue, she explained, in clear detail, the level of danger we were
in—that her car might be broken into or stolen, and that we had to be conscious of where
we were (as two women) after dark. Sarah exemplifies the ambivalence experienced by
racialized groups in their everyday lives as they navigate and try to reconcile contrasting
identities and emotional responses (Boccagni and Kivisto, 2019). For Sarah the banlieue
insofar is her ‘home’ in some respects but a deeply unhomely environment in other
respects (Boccagni and Kivisto, 2019). It is from this paradox of feelings that Sarah
navigates where she ultimately belongs, and where her place in the world is located.
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While Sarah was eager to leave the banlieue where she grew up, she continues to
be drawn to immigrant spaces, though she experiences them somewhat as a detached
observer. She is a doctoral student whose work focuses on Algerian immigrant women in
the Clichy banlieue just north of the city of Paris, where she took me one day for a visit.
We took the metro up to Clichy. It was a long metro ride in a very crowded metro car;
Sarah explained that the trains do not go to these (low-income, immigrant) areas very
often, so the trains are almost always overcrowded. We walked around the commercial
center, where we saw clothing stores that specialized in Algerian wedding attire and
restaurants that offered special menus for Ramadan, and we walked among a highly
diverse crowd of people. Sarah remarked that usually she wears a headscarf when she
visits Clichy to conduct interviews with Algerian women for her research (she was not
wearing one during our meeting). When she conducts interviews, she uses her Algerian
Arabic, and she describes feeling comfortable in this area. Her time spent working with
these immigrant women had a profound effect on her own feelings of belonging and
inclusion in France. Sakina explained that it was during these interviews that she found
expression for her lifelong feelings of exclusion as a child of immigrants, as a woman,
and as a person of Algerian descent born and raised in France. She feels at home in these
immigrant neighborhoods, she says, because she grew up in one. She also feels the
respect and admiration of the women, who know that she is highly educated. But she
identifies with her research population of Algerian women only partly. As an academic
researcher and ‘banlieue escapee’ she maintains a kind of ‘objective’ distance from the
women she interacts with in Clichy. As we walked, Sarah talked about her research,
referring to the women she works with as ‘they’/’them’ and placed herself apart from
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them, even her interviewees are women much like her mother, Lina, a first-generation
female Algerian immigrant.
As noted earlier, Sarah has become more comfortable in French spaces because of
her time at university and the level of access that her educational mobility has offered
her. Yet, in some cases/spaces, she sees French space as exclusionary, including,
somewhat counterintuitively, the area around the Paris Mosque in the center of Paris. The
mosque is located in the 5th arrondissement—a very wealthy downtown area of Paris55. I
visited the mosque with Sarah, who explained that she had been to the mosque before,
but she did not visit often. She brought a headscarf with her, in her bag, that she took out
and put on before we entered the mosque (I had also brought a scarf and put it on before
entering). Inside the building, Sarah walked around the mosque with me and explained
the different rooms and fixtures. Upon exiting the mosque, Sarah immediately removed
her headscarf and pointed out the police vans stationed outside the mosque 24 hours/day.
As she pointed to this clear sign of a police presence, her demeanor did not change, it
seemed that she just wanted me to notice this everyday company of the police in the lives
of Muslims. Here, we see her ambivalence again, this time toward French space. Sarah
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The mosque was built to honor the North African soldiers who fought for France in the
first World War. At the time of the construction (the early 1920s), the location was
chosen for its “prime and historic location,” meant to illustrate “France’s deep and
historic respect for Islam” yet also to hold control over the use of the mosque—there was
a very small population of Muslims living nearby at the time (Bayoumi, 1998, pp. 303304). The mosque was conceived of as a symbolic gesture of France’s good will toward
its Muslims, “That didn’t mean, however, that it was to be used by them” as Bayoumi
(1998) describes, referring to the low number of immigrants/Muslims living in the
expensive 5th arrondissement (p. 305). In 2012, the migrant population of the 5th
arrondissement was 17 percent, with, 8.2 percent of the population living in social
housing; the 5th arrondissement is among the lowest migrant population and social
housing (OECD, 2018, p. 35).
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can navigate both immigrant and French spaces with a degree of ease, but there remains a
tension in how she views her belonging in these spaces—she belongs partly in both; both
require some level of adjustment.
As we walked away from the mosque, we began a conversation about the banning
of headscarves in certain public spaces (e.g., schools) and the policing of Muslim spaces
by state authorities. Sarah has mixed feelings about the controversy surrounding the hijab
in France. She says, “it is really about belonging or being excluded” when talking about
wearing a headscarf. She feels that the headscarf is both a symbol of rebellion against the
French (see Chapter Five for further discussion of rebelliousness against Frenchness), but
at the same time, Sarah feels that the legal restrictions on headscarves work in ways to
isolate Muslim women from French society. The mosque is in a very upscale
neighborhood, and when I asked Sarah about this, she said, “No Muslim could afford to
live here,” and she speculated that the French who do live in the neighborhood “probably
hate the mosque.” As we walked to the metro station, she explained that she did not like
to walk in ‘French’ places like this because she felt that everyone was staring at her
“because I am not white.” From Sarah’s perspective, French spaces are white and
immigrant spaces are for people of color.
Other study respondents offered less conflicted evaluations of different spaces,
describing the banlieue as a place to be avoided all together and situating themselves
more squarely in French spaces. Abdel, a 25-year-old son of immigrants, grew up in
Reuil-Malmaison, a banlieue west of Paris, but he now lives in the 14th arrondissement,
in south-central Paris. In 2012, the migrant population of the 14th arrondissement was 20
percent, with, 24.8 percent of the population living in social housing, the fourth highest
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level of social housing in Paris (the first being the 19th arrondissement, with 38 percent)
(OECD, 2018, p. 35). Abdel considers himself to be Algerian, but he distinguishes
himself from the Algerian community. Much more than Sarah in the previous example,
he works to distance himself from his Algerian roots and Algerian social circles. He
explains, “I have some acquaintances from Algeria, though all my friends are from
France. I do not have close links with members of my extended family. I found my job,
my housing, and borrowed money on my own.”
Abdel makes a concerted effort to surround himself with French friends and social
circles. Describing his socializing habits, he states,
I mainly socialize with non-North Africans, through the contexts of studies and of
associations I joined. For instance, the residence I live in is very friendly and
tends to organize many events. I have developed my friendships mainly because
of my studies. Most of my friends are from Sciences Po56 because they shared
with me a common interest in politics or art.
In Abdel’s efforts to distance himself from immigrant spaces, places, and people, he also
works to claim space in the dominant French space. He chose the location for one of our
meetings near the Sorbonne University, in the 5th arrondissement of Paris, near the city
center. Abdel’s years of school, socializing, and living in Paris, outside of the banlieue,
have given him the experience and presence to feel comfortable in these places.
However, Abdel has struggled to find work as a high school teacher and is working as a
substitute teacher at a school in a northern district, in an immigrant banlieue. He has to
travel from the southern part of the city of Paris, where he lives, to outside the northern
boundary to get to work, a commute that takes about 45 minutes on the metro.
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The Paris Institute of Political Sciences, often referred to as ‘Sciences Po.’
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Abdel’s feelings about the banlieue where he grew up are negative. He
remembers Reuil-Malmaison as “dirty…there was an airport nearby and it was so loud. I
hated it.” His mother and sister still live in a home near where Abdel grew up. He rarely
visits, and he disassociates himself from his parents’ immigrant status. When he explains
his perspective of ‘immigrant spaces,’ he calls the residents ‘them’—referring to
immigrants and their descendants, thereby distancing himself from the residents, in effect
othering them. He describes these spaces as a product of racism, suggesting that “French
society is torn apart by racism and the will to integrate immigrants.” He says, “Most of
them [descendants of immigrants] are born, raised, live and die in the same poor suburbs
of French cities.” But for Abdel, the solution to this problem is not so much addressing
French racism but moving immigrants and their descendants out of their segregated
spaces. He suggests the need for “a massive land settlement, that is to say the destruction
of ghettos and the settlings of immigrants and newcomers everywhere around France
(and not only around the main metropolises), in order to foster social diversity.” This
perspective of immigrant space echoes mainstream discourses about the ‘problem’ of the
banlieue as one of self-segregation, cultural isolation, and concentrated poverty –a
problem to be solved by dispersing residents away from these problematic sites.
From the narratives of Sarah and Abdel, we start to see the ways that some
banlieue residents accept criticism of the ‘cultural isolation’ that exists in the
neighborhoods where they grew up. Both recognize exclusion on the part of
‘mainstream,’ non-immigrant French society; but both in different ways, also reject the
immigrant space of the banlieue and attempt to function within ‘mainstream’ French
spaces (though not with equal levels of comfort or enthusiasm). The following section
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explores the experiences of other respondents whose attitudes toward different spaces are
even more ambivalent (and ambiguous) than these, and whose relationship with different
places and identity categories are fraught with emotional tension. This section will give
particular attention the ways that my study respondents perform different identities as
they move through both immigrant and dominant spaces.
Balancing French and Algerian Identities through Space
The ways that Algerian-origin peoples in France think about themselves can
translate into their conduct and performance in particular places and situations. Many of
my respondents work to gain acceptance and to exist within the French ‘mainstream’ by
strategically engaging with social space. That is, they employ strategies to “reduce social
distance, minimize difference, and build relationships and coalitions that allow them to
negotiate” space and social membership (Pugh, 2017, p. 2). Yet they face a variety of
challenges when entering dominant French space, such as being the only person of
Algerian descent in the room and interacting with people from the majority group who
may carry implicit biases, stereotypes, and patronizing attitudes toward racialized groups
(Sinclair, 2018). In this section, I describe how individuals move in and out of immigrant
and dominant spaces, and the different performances of identity involved, including
personal comportment and language use. All of these aspects form a balancing act
performed by Algerian-origin people as they move through space in France.
One example is Idir, a 32-year-old immigrant who lives in the 92nd district outside
of Paris in the Meudon banlieue. He requested that we conduct our interview in the very
heart of Paris (we met at the Shakespeare Library, a very well-known tourist location
near the Notre Dame Cathedral), an area that he knew well because he visited there often
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on his days off. Though this part of Paris is more than 40 minutes away from where he
lives (by metro and bus), Idir described feeling comfortable in parts of Paris that other
participants explicitly avoided. Idir attributed this level of comfort within French spaces
to his time at the Cité International University in Paris (the university is in the 14th
arrondissement, about a 20-minute metro-ride away from the Shakespeare library).
During his time at the university, he lived and went to school in French space, made
French friends, and even dated a French girl.
Though he functions in these spaces, he admitted that he struggles with the
secular aspect of public space, and, more broadly, with the notion of a secular society.
“The problem is religion in France,” he remarked. Idir likened the immigration ‘problem’
between France and Algeria to that of the U.S. and Mexico, he says:
The river, the Rio Grande, separates the two, just like the Mediterranean Sea
separates France and Algeria…but Mexican immigrants living in the United
States share a common religious foundation of Christianity with Americans, so
they can get along. In France, the majority of Algerians are Muslim. This is the
problem.
Though he has French friends, Idir feels that he has not been able to make good personal
connections with French people because, he says, “I can’t see myself in them.” For Idir,
faith is the fundamental reason for feeling distance between himself and others. As I
described in Chapter Five, he prefers not to read philosophical works from authors who
do not believe in God; and he feels the same about those with whom he socializes.
Though he feels relatively comfortable in French spaces like the downtown tourist area
and the neighborhood surrounding his university, he avoids what he considers ultraFrench spaces (e.g., including non-tourist/non-university French spaces) as much as he
avoids banlieue areas outside of his home neighborhood. For example, he, like other
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participants, avoids the ‘rich’ arrondissements such as the 15th and 16th arrondissements
in Paris; likewise, he avoids the ‘bad’ banlieues, choosing, rather, to spend his free time
in other parts of the city where identities are perhaps less rigid or prescribed. He shows
relative comfort moving across space and performing a French identity, but he also
recognizes the limits to his Frenchness, and thus maintains some affinity to Algerianness.
Idir is not the only participant seeking a community, and a place, that he can ‘see
himself’ in. Youcef is a 35-year-old immigrant living in the 94th district outside of Paris
who blames social problems in French society on both ‘the French’ and ‘immigrants.’
First, he places blame on the French state for patterns of segregation, stating that
immigrants were “funneled into these high-rise buildings” in the banlieues because
France wanted to “keep the immigrants contained” in a small area. Though Youcef lives
outside the city limits of Paris (in a neighborhood he describes as “totally Algerian”), he
regularly travels across the city to meet up with other people of Algerian descent. While
he is philosophically against segregation, he seeks to socialize and live with people of
Algerian backgrounds, though he is clear about seeking out a community that includes a
particular kind of Algerian-origin people.
To elaborate on this ambivalent viewpoint, Youcef had a difficult time in France
when he was working toward legal residency. Before his student visa expired, Youcef
had been enjoying his time in France—he had mostly French and some Algerian-descent
friends, and he lived and worked within French spaces. Once he lost his legal status in
France, Youcef fell into a depression. He lost his job (he needed legal papers to continue
his employment and the company was unwilling to sponsor a work visa) and many of his
French friends along with it. As I first described in Chapter Five, it was during this time
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that Youcef turned to Facebook to create a community. He explains, “I really felt like, I
like this thing of Algeria, I like meeting Algerian people…I felt like something was
missing and I wanted to reconnect with Algeria, so I found this Facebook group called
‘The Community of Algerian Friends.’” He joined the group and began organizing
meetings for job fairs and educational opportunities. Youcef says that he felt very
welcomed by this group: “I was super proud to find, like, all these Algerians with good
education, good manners and coming from like my background…they speak nice, they’re
serious in what they do, and people who, like, look like you, you know?” Yet while
Youcef was proud of being part of a group of educated, well-mannered individuals of
Algerian descent, his sense of community was disrupted when members of the group
began speaking Arabic at a group picnic. Even though Youcef was raised in Algeria, his
family focused on teaching him French, not Arabic. Youcef felt exclusion from his ‘own
group’ when the language changed to Arabic. Here, Youcef shows the balancing act that
he practices between French and Algerian spaces—he devised a specific sense of cultural
identity that is Algerian in a specific way that has access to privilege and mobility
because of (French) education and (French) language abilities. It is an idealized,
somewhat hybrid sense of community that is disrupted when its members speak Arabic.
Youcef, like Idir, requested to meet me in the downtown area of Paris, but at an Algerian
restaurant. So, while he holds confidence in French spaces, he too seeks to maintain a
certain degree and a certain kind of Algerianness. Idir and Youcef are indicative of the
balancing act of Algerian-origin peoples in France—those who feel mostly comfortable
moving across space and performing French identity, but also seek to maintain a certain
degree and a certain kind of Algerianness. In the following section, I offer additional
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narratives that reveal how participants conditionally embrace and perform elements of
Frenchness and Algerianness and move between categories and spaces as they attempt to
produce community and belonging.
Seeking ‘Algeria’ within Paris
Some of my study respondents feel relatively comfortable moving between the
banlieue and mainstream spaces of central Paris and feel able to perform elements of
Frenchness within the latter, even as they maintain a circle of friends that is defined (at
least partly) by their Algerianness. Others live within the city of Paris, but purposefully
seek out elements of Algerianness in these spaces. For example, Annia, the 22-year-old
daughter of immigrants, lives in the 18th arrondissement, which she calls “Little Algeria”
because she can be around the tastes and smells from her parents’ homeland when she so
chooses, as Algerian spices and food staples are readily available in stores in this district.
The 18th arrondissement is a mix of tourism, nightlife, and immigrant neighborhoods; it is
centered around a hilltop neighborhood called Montmartre—a former artists’ village
where Picasso and Dali spent time. Atop the hill is the Sacré-Cœur basilica, surrounded
by gardens, shops, and eateries. Nearby, the iconic Moulin Rouge cabaret draws tourists
and nightlife enthusiasts alike. Woven between these landmarks are clusters of immigrant
neighborhoods, home to African markets, Arab cafés, and halal butchers. In 2012, the
migrant population of the 18th arrondissement was 23.4 percent, with 20.6 percent of the
population living in social housing (OECD, 2018, p. 35). This seems to be enough
immigrant presence to make the 18th seem ‘colorful,’ ‘lively,’ and ‘fun’, but not so much
to make it ‘scary,’ ‘crime-ridden,’ or ‘ghetto-like’ as the banlieues are perceived. Indeed,
the dominant French social group frequents the 18th and views it as a destination spot. It
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is a popular location to hold birthday celebrations and other friendly gatherings among
the young and ‘hip’ crowd of white, middle class Parisians. Annia likes this atmosphere
of an ‘edgy’ immigrant/artist/gritty neighborhood. Annia’s engagement with “Little
Algeria” speaks to the different ways that individuals can ‘be Algerian’ and experience
identity and place. She is ‘Algerian’ yet also experiences the neighborhood’s immigrant
character much as a ‘tourist’ would. It is a space of lively adventure, and she is part of it
as an ‘immigrant’ but capable of consuming it as an outsider might. It is important to
note, in this respect, that Annia distances herself from her parents’ version of Algerian
culture: they live in the banlieue but Annia has left that life behind her and now lives
within the city limits of Paris in the 18th arrondissement.
The act of seeking a certain kind of Algerian space, as Annia does, is a common
spatial practice among my research participants. For instance, Farid, a 52-year-old
immigrant, has lived in the 20th arrondissement for nearly 30 years, but he says, “There
are some places in Paris that I have never been, like the 8th or 16th [arrondissements]. I
don’t like it there, there aren’t any immigrants57…my favorite place is the 20th
[arrondissement]. There is diversity here and I feel good.” Mehdi, a 41-year-old
immigrant, lives in the 94th district outside of Paris, but commutes into the city—20
minutes on the metro—to work in Said’s café in the 13th arrondissement. Like Farid,
however, spending a great deal of time in within Paris has not made him any more
comfortable being there. He makes a concerted effort to avoid ‘French’ spaces, where he
feels he is treated with racist sentiments: “I never go to the center [of Paris]” he says,
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“people that look like me don’t go there.” For Mehdi, Said’s café is a sanctuary of
Algerianness where he feels safe to exist amidst a broader environment of hostility.
A tendency to avoid places where participants feel they will be subjected to racist
treatment is common, as shown by multiple participants. According to Rafik, for
instance, Algerians in France “are raised with hate…they know that French people hate
them…anti-Algerian racism is all over France.” This sense of racism affected some
participants’ engagement with different spaces in Paris. For example, Ferhat, a 45-yearold son of immigrants, explains that he used to live in the 15th arrondissement, but he
moved away because he felt that “the rich people are racist” and that there were “too
many white people” in the neighborhood. He moved to the 19th arrondissement where he
is more comfortable because “there are more immigrants.” Here, Ferhat offers a twist to
the traditional assimilation narrative—the assumption that there is a one-way movement
from ghetto to middle class residential areas, as immigrants move along the trajectory of
integration.
Participant Lakhdar seeks and produces a particular kind of immigrant space
within a non-immigrant-dominated neighborhood in central Paris. Lakhdar is a 48-yearold immigrant who lives and works in in the 10th arrondissement, where in 2012,
immigrants were 22.9 percent of the population, though only 12.7 percent of the
population lived in social housing (OECD, 2018, p. 35). The 10th arrondissement is an
upper-class neighborhood, with the exception of an area of about 3 square city blocks that
houses Algerian restaurants, halal butchers, tea houses, and cafés. Lakhdar, a café owner,
socializes almost exclusively with Algerians, and creates a social space in his café that
caters to people of Algerian origin. As well, he employs almost exclusively Algerians
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(specifically Berbers) in his café. But while he clearly identifies with, and places himself
among Algerians, he understands Algerianness in certain ways—as encompassing certain
kinds of people with certain values and attitudes. As seen with other respondents,
Lakhdar is critical of the banlieues, though he has never lived in one. He describes the
banlieues as isolated and impoverished areas and as a problem—as the problem—in
France. Lakhdar feels that these problems could be alleviated with an increase in social
housing availability throughout the city of Paris. For Lakhdar, the problem of the
banlieue is not that it is an Algerian space, but that it has ceased to embody real Algerian
values. In his understanding, the problems of illegal behavior, including the use and sale
of drugs, could be avoided if the families (i.e. mothers) “worked harder to teach their
children the values and culture of Algeria.” He, in contrast, is creating just such an
authentically Algerian space. He does not seek to assimilate fully into France but to
practice, and to create a space for, proper Algerian values. Lakhdar never visits the
banlieue (though some of his employees live there), and he comments on the banlieue
from the perspective of an outsider, avoiding any association with delinquency and
poverty. But he buffers himself equally from French-dominated spaces. Though he says
of Paris, “this is my home, I can go anywhere,” his everyday life offers little cause to
travel to more ‘French’ spaces like the 15th and 16th arrondissements in Paris (areas that
other respondents avoid).
While my working-class participants were more likely to live in the banlieue
neighborhoods, some were living in central Paris, where they had found temporary
housing with other Algerians. For example, Ali, a 29-year-old immigrant, was staying
with a friend in the 13th arrondissement when I interviewed him. He was living illegally
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in France, so state-subsidized official housing is impossible for him. Ali told me of the
many times that he has been stopped by the police—in the metro stations and on the
streets. For these reasons, Ali is very careful about where he is at what part of the day.
His work as a manual laborer for a morning market takes him to some wealthy parts of
Paris, but he explained that he does not go to these areas outside of the time that his
market is scheduled there58. Ali also remarked that he socializes with only Algerian
people because, “I can’t trust French people” not to turn him in for living in France
illegally. Yet even Ali, despite his precarious position as an undocumented immigrant in
dominant spaces, felt that he could at least make himself appear as if he belonged. He
explained, “If you look like them, they think you belong here and will be nice to you.” He
then flipped up his shirt collar up to illustrate his point (Ali wears knock-off designer
clothing that he buys at the street markets).
These examples of the production of Algerian spaces within Paris and the
practices of coding and interpreting spaces and places exemplify the different kinds of
performances, attitudes, and perceptions of (spatial) identity that can be found among
study participants. These performances speak to a sense of belonging with an Algerian
community but also ambivalence toward and a sense of distance from certain kinds of
Algerians and Algerian spaces. This is a selective performance of Algerianness that takes
place in certain kinds of spaces. As important as the spaces that Algerians frequent in
Paris are those that they avoid, and many participants discussed these spaces of
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avoidance. In the following section, I address performances of identity as study
participants move between Algerian and French spaces.
Spatial Dissonance: Spatiality and Identity Performance
Most of my research participants feel, to varying degrees, part of an Algerian
‘community,’ but their identities and spatialities also produces dissonances insofar as
they can experience archetypal immigrant spaces as outsiders. Their sense of otherness
with respect to Algerian/immigrant space, or certain kinds of spaces, shows how broad
identity labels and a sense of community do not map neatly on the urban landscape. The
importance of spatial context to the performance of identity comes into full view when
we listen to study participants’ descriptions of their movements across different spaces in
Paris. An example is Sakina, the 31-year-old daughter of immigrants who lives in the 20th
arrondissement, where immigrants are around one-fifth of the population and where
around of the third of the population lives in social housing (OECD, 2018, p. 35). The
20th arrondissement, though within the périphérique, is the last area of the city of Paris
before the banlieues. It is known as a ‘bohemian’ area with a new wave of contemporary
art galleries, and it is home to the famous Père Lachaise Cemetery, where celebrities like
Oscar Wilde and Jim Morrison are buried. Sakina works in a French-dominated
workplace, but after work, she surrounds herself with other Algerians as often as
possible.
Sakina seeks social interaction with Algerians, because, she says, “I like to hang
out with other Algerians…we can REALLY be Algerian!” She works and volunteers at
the Berber Cultural Center (located in the 10th arrondissement, near Lakhdar’s café),
spending most of her evenings and weekends there at events or tutoring students of the
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Berber language and culture. Sakina explains that part of the reason she prefers to be
around other Algerians is because she has experienced racism from “white, French
people” all her life. As I described in Chapter Five, she grew up in Lille (a city in
Northern France), where she felt even more racism than in Paris. People would yell at
her, "You’re not in your country!" If her father was late coming home at the end of the
day, she assumed it was because the police stopped him. After the 2015 Bastille Day
attack in Nice, France, Sakina was walking in the street when news came on a television
in a storefront that the police killed an Algerian immigrant during the attack. A
Frenchwoman yelled at Sakina as she walked by, “There is one less of you!” For these
reasons, Sakina tends to frequent Algerian or ‘immigrant’ areas where she feels that she
is less likely to experience racist treatment.
As Sakina describes the spatiality of her life, she offers a depiction of her life
growing up in Lille, which sounds much like the situation described above with Lina and
Djamila: “Inside my house was Algeria, outside was France.” Sakina describes how her
parents decorated her childhood home with artifacts from Algeria, specifically, things
from Kabyle. Her mother cooked Kabylie food, dressed in Kabylie clothing, and spoke
Berber to her father and the children. Sakina talked about the ways that she had to
transform herself as she stepped from her home into the world of France. It was like a
doorway between two worlds—home and France, where the physical surroundings, food,
language, and social rules were different.
This experience of moving between worlds, whether referring to movement to and
from the banlieue, or movement between the spaces of home and public space, ‘inside
Algeria, outside France,’ was repeated by other participants. Very similar to Sakina,
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Amara speaks about the different worlds between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ her familial
home. Amara is a 23-year-old daughter of immigrants, who lives with her parents in the
Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue. Amara’s family’s home is also decorated with articles
from Algeria, and the language practices between family members differs from one
relationship to the next. Her mother speaks Berber at home, and her mother and father
speak Berber to each other, but her father speaks French to the children. “We don’t know
why,” she says. Outside the house, they only speak French.
Though Amara expresses a confidence in her French identity, she lives, works,
and goes to school outside the city of Paris, in immigrant-dominated spaces. She explains
this dual life within the different spaces she inhabits: “At home, it is important to keep
our traditions, you know, to go back to Algerian [customs] to eat our food or things like
that or speak the language.” But she says that while her parents keep an atmosphere of
Algeria within their home, they “are more open-minded” than other immigrant families
she knows, and explains, “Outside of our home we do what we want, you know?” Here,
Amara is referring to her parents allowing her the freedom to choose her friends,
participate in ‘French’ activities, and date casually. Amara speaks about people in her
neighborhood that make a concerted effort not to speak to French people, completely
excluding them from their lives. “If those people don’t change their mind, they can’t be
integrated in the country. It’s already difficult for us to be integrated. So, if you do things
like that, you’re not integrating.” Still, though she does have some French friends, most
of her friends are from African immigrant families that live in her neighborhood. In her
view, though, this particular circle of friends shares her viewpoint; in other words, these
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are not the kind of Algerians/immigrants whom she perceives as ‘not integrated’—that is,
who alienate themselves from society and politicize their difference.
Amara is in school, working to earn a specialization in social housing. As part of
her studies, she interns at a social housing company, going through applications to
determine whether or not applicants are eligible for public assistance. Amara says that
she enjoyed her coursework in commercial real estate, but that she developed a special
preference for the work in social housing because of her life experience in Champignysur-Marne. She says, “I have to choose integrity over money.” Amara describes France’s
a crisis in social housing, explaining that “there are 7000 housing applications for 2000
housing options” in her office.
Like Sakina, Amara maintains some critical distance from Algerianness, even
though she lives, works, and identifies with/within Algerian spaces. Like Sakina, she
works to ‘serve’ her community, seeing that community as being in need of ‘help,’ even
if she personally has more mobility than others within that community. For Amara, social
housing is a classic progressive intervention—it is about changing people’s social
surroundings in order to improve who they are; to lift individuals out of lower social
standards into the standards of the rest of society. In these ways, Sakina and Amara move
in these different spheres and spaces where they are part of the community but also
position themselves as external to it in such a way that their services can ‘help’ those in
need.
Another of my respondents, Hassan, has followed a trajectory like Amara and
Sakina’s in his simultaneous commitment to, and externalization of, the
Algerian/immigrant community. Hassan moves through immigrant spaces with a semi-
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outsider role; he teaches young students in the St. Denis neighborhood north of Paris. St.
Denis has the highest population of immigrants of any neighborhood in the greater Paris
area, with nearly half the population of immigrant origin; in 2008, 18.1 percent of the
population of St. Denis identified as Maghrebian (Tribalat, 2010; Maxwell, 2008, p. 197).
It is known for high rates of crime, poverty, and civil unrest. For these reasons, the area is
appealing to Hassan as a prime location to ‘give back’ to the immigrant community. He
likes his position as a teacher because he “can teach children like me, kids of
immigrants.” Hassan explained that “there is a big problem [of racism] in France and
people don’t speak about it…It’s a big problem of social ethnicity, especially in schools. I
have two classes, no whites. But in schools on the other side of the Seine, all white
people.” He explained the lives of his students, the spaces that they occupy, and ongoing
conflicts with the police, in terms of “old tensions” that reach back to colonialism. But
while Hassan identified with his students’ interactions with the police, he felt that he had,
on a personal level, left these experiences behind him when he moved to Paris.
He grew up in a community where many immigrants came to work in the mines
(as his father did), and his childhood friends were from a variety of immigrant families—
not just Algerians, but also Polish, Spanish, and Turkish immigrants. He does not keep in
touch with these childhood friends because, he explained, “I moved geographically, and I
also moved socially.” Hassan is the only person from his hometown friend-group who
went to university to get an education and who moved away. Now that he is an adult, his
friends are not of Algerian origin: “My friends here in Paris are from classical French
families, they are not immigrants.” Hassan does live in an immigrant neighborhood, in
the 18th arrondissement in Paris. But as described above, this area does not carry the same
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stigma as the banlieue, and the immigrant presence here is discursively slotted into a
framework of multicultural hipness. In these ways, Hassan steps outside his ‘normal’ to
teach the children of immigrants in the space of the banlieue. He is committed to his
students in the banlieue, and he feels comfortable there, but this is not his space, and he
approaches it partly as an outsider—as someone who wishes to ‘help’ a group of people
who are more disadvantaged than he is.
The examples of Sakina, Amara, and Hassan show the differing ways that some
participants expressed social-spatial dissonance in their everyday lives, moving in and out
of spaces and feeling varying degrees of belonging in them. In these cases, archetypal
immigrant spaces can be spaces of otherness, even as they are familiar. A multitude of
meanings, motivations, and intentions enter into these individuals’ engagements with
certain places and the social groups and norms associated with those places.
Conclusions
The narratives presented in this chapter show how participants experience and
perform their identities through space. These examples reveal an interplay between
conforming to, and even desiring, French environments and spaces and staying within
‘immigrant spaces’ or ‘Algerian spaces.’ Each of the narratives presented in this chapter
represent a different set of performances, attitudes, and perceptions. Together, they all
speak to the complexity of integration. Much more than adaptation, integration is a
political process that involves accommodation, resistance, subversion, avoidance, and the
production of alternative modes of community and membership. In the course of
everyday life, my respondents perform Frenchness and Algerianness in different ways
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and to different degrees; they avoid certain elements of each category and try to produce
and perform idealized versions of each.
The different spatialities expressed by my study participants indicate the diverse
ways that individuals conceive of membership in different communities and the
relationship between communities and places. This account does not entirely negate the
insights of spatial assimilation literature—that is, that many first-generation immigrants
find themselves, both by choice and by necessity (and discrimination) in poor quality,
crowded, segregated housing. But it tries to go beyond this by exploring how people
understand different landscapes and how, within many constraints, they make choices
about where home and community are located. This is story not of a clear pathway to
assimilation, but of ongoing ambivalence; of simultaneous insiderness and outsiderness.
Patterns of mobility and immobility speak to different opportunities and advantages, but
also to different strategies for asserting membership in different communities. In some
cases, participants were intent on blending into the spaces and social realms of French
mainstream society; others avoided French space and French people; some located
authentic Algerian space in the banlieues; still others found a more desirable
Algerianness in more affluent and more multicultural neighborhoods.
I have given special attention in this chapter to the banlieue as the archetypal
representation space of the Algerian community. These immigrant-dominated spaces are
referred to by mainstream commentators as no-go areas that are full of crime and
deviance. Many of my respondents, though, view and experience these places quite
differently—as places of community, warmth, and hospitality. Still, many of the
respondents at least partly accept mainstream narratives of the banlieue and feel a greater
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degree of ambivalence toward these places. Some seek to avoid them all together; others
experience them as somewhat foreign places that while not deviant, are also not
desirable. Such individuals seek out places of belonging elsewhere, but only seldom find
them in the ‘pure’ spaces of French national culture.
This chapter recognizes that moving away from immigrant space can signify a
moving away from one’s immigrant roots—from ‘tradition’ and family and the strictures
of ‘culture.’ But it also opens the possibility of movement back and forth between places
and communities and of the formulation of different ways of relating to community and
place. It highlights the mixed feelings that people have about different places (and not
just residential areas) and their desire to break out of existing categories and ways of
seeing sameness and difference. A key point in all of this is that the outcome of such
negotiations is not societal homogeneity but the reproduction and reworking of different
identity categories. Integration does not erase differences so much as it multiplies them
and changes their boundaries. Space is not external to these dynamics, but central to
them. For people of immigrant backgrounds—who are defined as foreigners and who
stand more or less apart from the dominant national polity—space is the medium in
which they experience and perform the politics of belonging.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation has developed a case study of Algerian-origin communities in
Paris to shed light on processes that underlie what we commonly think of as immigrant
integration. Using critical race theory, postcolonial scholarship, and critical geographical
theories of identity, place, and space, this dissertation has tried to reconceptualize
integration as a political rather than ecological process. I have explored the experiences
of Algerian immigrants and their children, examining how they enact identity and
belonging in French society, and how they navigate systems of racialized exclusion. The
narratives of my study respondents reveal the varying ways that formerly colonized
people structure their interactions and engagements with people and institutions who
once subjugated them and who largely continue to view them as outsiders and foreigners.
These narratives show how, in such circumstances, former colonial subjects might
exercise some agency in formulating their identities and their sense of community within
the former metropole.
The topic of immigration in France has been discussed in great detail in both
French and English academic literature, and there is no shortage of scholarship on the
exclusion of immigrants in postcolonial contexts. Yet despite a wealth of scholarship,
there is a remarkable persistence of public and even academic discourse that takes the
concept of integration for granted, and that, in the French context, treats postcolonial
migrants as problems in need of a solution—a solution that usually involves a complete
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shift in consciousness on the part of immigrants. For instance, in January of 2021, French
President Emmanuel Macron received a report from his ‘Memories and Truth
Commission’ on the Franco-Algerian relationship. The so-called ‘Algeria Report’
addressed the “reconciliation of memories” between Algeria and France (Carmella and
Patrick, 2021; Ramdani, 2021, p. 1). Though Macron intended the report to be a step
toward “heal[ing] the wounds between France and its former colony, including the after
effects of atrocities committed during Algeria’s war of independence from 1954 to
1962,” the report “once again hews to France’s long-standing position of not apologizing
for its harsh colonial rule of Algeria from 1830, or the brutal tactics it used during the
eight-year war of independence” (Carmella and Patrick, 2021, p. 1). Some are calling it a
“toothless” report, one that “feigns an interest in justice while whitewashing colonial
crimes” (Ramdani, 2021, p. 1). Rather than recommending an apology to Algeria,
supporting reparations, or raising the possibility of prosecutions, the report settled on
“tokenism and a desire to downplay unspeakable crimes that are in living memory”
among French, Algerian, and Algerian immigrant populations (Ramdani, 2021, p. 1).
Macron connects Islamist ‘separatism’ with the “traumas of France’s colonial
past,” specifically the Algerian War, which he feels “feed[s] unspoken resentments” that
allegedly radicalize youths and lead to acts of terrorism (Ramdani, 2021, p. 1). It is
exactly this populist trope that this dissertation has interrogated—the trope that today’s
Islamist terror in France is directly connected to “angry Algerians who remain as
incorrigibly violent as they were when they resisted French rule.” This trope has many
repercussions for the Algerian community in France that relate to their identity, their
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spatial practices, and their sense of belonging, inclusion, and exclusion (Ramdani, 2021,
p. 1).
While this study is not large enough to be generalizable to the entire Algerian
community in France, much less to all immigrants in all postcolonial contexts, its value is
in its interrogation of the categories (like ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’) that have underpinned
traditional theorizations of immigrants’ lives and experiences, and that also inform public
discourse about immigration integration. This dissertation continues to push against
ecological conceptions of integration. It speaks instead to an understanding of
‘integration’ as a complex set of spatialized engagements, negotiations, and
accommodations between immigrants and non-immigrants (‘natives’ and ‘aliens’/
‘foreigners’ and ‘outsiders’). Importantly, there is no real endpoint to these interactions—
there is no future in which a national society achieves total sameness, harmony, and
unity. National society rests on a constant interplay between difference and sameness:
one group may eventually achieve sameness in the eyes of the dominant majority (and in
its own eyes), but there will always be another that must be singled out, disciplined,
excluded, or policed. Thus, the politics of ‘integration’ is a continual process marked by
varying degrees of conflict, tension, harmony, inclusion, exclusion. This process plays
out through space, and especially through the designation of spaces as public, private,
desirable, or deviant.
Theoretical Interventions
In the past decade, much of Europe has witnessed a resurgence of discourse and
policy relating to immigrant integration. Integration has also remained a major
preoccupation in migration scholarship, especially in Europe. In both scholarly and
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political circles, integration signifies an assumption that an immigrant group can and
should become indistinguishable from the native-born population. In this sense, its use
has been almost identical to that of ‘assimilation’ in the US context, embodying the same
normative expectation that newcomers and foreigners can and will adapt and
acculturate—that they will shed their markers of difference, ‘tradition,’ and ‘ethnicity.’
Conventional understandings of assimilation suggest that each subsequent generation
will, or should, progressively experience a deeper sense of belonging to the place where
their forebears have settled; simultaneously they will lose their feelings of belonging
toward their place of origin. This conventional viewpoint has been complicated by
notions of ‘segmented’ and ‘downward’ integration, as well as by the concept of
transnationalism. But even these refinements to integration continue to rely on a
monolithic understanding of the ‘immigrant group,’ usually with reference to national
origins. They have also tended to take the ‘host society’ as a given, rather than as a
historical construct.
To be sure, this study does not dismiss the importance of national categories. But
it has sought to understand categories like nationhood to be actively produced and
reproduced through discourses, institutions, and policies. ‘France’ is not a homogenous
unit, but French national identity, and the narratives that underpin it, are very powerful,
and French national norms and identities are imprinted on the spaces of everyday life in
France. A dominant conception of Frenchness pervades citizenship and immigration law
and enters into the social and spatial practices of inclusion and exclusion between native
French and Algerian-origin groups. French state discourses and policies constantly
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remind immigrants that they are a challenge or even threat to the secularist, republican,
French-European polity.
Nor does this dissertation dismiss the possibility of becoming the same—of
‘assimilating’ into a nationally-defined mainstream. Many European migrants in the
United States and France in the 20th century came to see themselves, and to be seen by
long-established citizens, as American or French. But this dissertation has tried to show
that this process of sameness is neither inevitable nor natural; nor does it lead to the
disappearance of ‘difference’ from society. It is a political negotiation that results in new
social cleavages and redrawn boundaries of difference and sameness. In France anxieties
over immigration and integration have reproduced narratives of a unified, universal
Frenchness. These narratives suggest that foreigners are welcome to join the French
polity by embracing certain ‘universal’ qualities and values. But the polity is not
universally inclusive, and foreigners seldom have either the social or cultural capital to
reconfigure and broaden the boundaries of membership.
In this work, then, I have reimagined integration not as an ‘either-or’ state, or as
an idealized end-state, or as a process of adaptation, but as a political process that
involves conflict and negotiation. This politics works partly through citizenship and
naturalization law. Subordinate groups encounter ongoing tensions between the
universalisms that define ideal liberal democratic citizenship and the particularisms that
ultimately delineate societal belonging. By focusing on citizenship, I have tried to move
beyond the question of why some immigrants ‘integrate’ faster or more slowly than
others, and to interrogate, in the first instance, what people mean when they talk about
integration. How do they define the boundaries of culture, community, and polity, and
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what are the beliefs and practices that sustain these entities? What are the rules of
membership, and who creates and enforces these rules? What are the relations between
marginalization and lack of recognition in France and integration? How are Algerian
immigrants and their descendants represented by the French state and how in turn do they
respond to these representations?
This dissertation has specifically sought to bring postcolonial scholarship into the
study of integration and to show how the politics of integration are ultimately rooted in
colonial relations. Untangling colonial histories is key to understanding the immigration
politics in France today, and in many other postcolonial contexts. France and Algeria are
forever imbricated, and the colonial past continues to haunt the presence. Violent events
in the French colonial past have led to feelings of distrust toward Islam in French society
(Bancel et al., 2005). At the same time, memories of the Algerian War and of the highly
discriminatory treatment of Algerians both before and after independence inform my
respondents’ understandings of their position in France and of the possibility (or lack
thereof) of equality (Barou, 2014).
In its exploration of the postcolonial context of integration politics, this
dissertation brought Islam into focus, not as an ‘immigrant tradition,’ but as a field of
contestation and identity formation. Since colonial times, the French state has viewed
Algerians and Muslims as irredeemably foreign ‘others.’ Islam has only become more
prominent in recent years as a signifier of foreignness—as something that must be ejected
from the ‘public’ spaces of the nation. My respondents are subordinated by this dynamic,
but they are also participants in it. While they do not wield the same power to set and
hold boundaries of membership, they do engage with the categories produced by this
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dynamic; they experience and enact their membership and exclusion in the course of
everyday life, in the spaces that they visit and avoid, and in the reinforcement of ideas of
public and private space.
Finally, this study has drawn on geographical perspectives on the ‘everyday’ and
on immigrants’ relationships to residential space and the broader urban landscape. Here,
the ‘everyday’ is understood to connect experiences and practices, including the ways
people conduct themselves in their daily routines, how they think about the social world
around them, how they interact with dominant members of the national ‘host’ society,
and how they comport themselves in certain spaces. In understanding the more nuanced
realities of Algerian use of space, this work expands upon and goes beyond more
traditional concerns with residential clustering. I have brought into focus how my
respondents ‘see’ different spaces and associate them with different groups—how they
constantly assess whether and how they belong in these spaces. Subordinate groups have
some agency in producing and navigating space: they can change their behaviors in
certain spaces or avoid spaces all together. They can also attach new meanings to spaces
and can challenge dominant meanings and identities. The production and navigation of
urban, national, and transnational space, I have tried to show, is central to the ways my
respondents assert their identity and their membership in different communities; it is part
of the relational process of creating self and other.
Empirical insights
In terms of its more specific empirical contributions, this dissertation has explored
the ways my respondents respond to and at times destabilize binary formulations of
identity. My respondents constructed and expressed their identities in relation to binary
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notions of ‘Frenchness’ and ‘Algerianness.’ These identity categories had a great deal of
meaning for my respondents. Yet there is no static ‘Algerian culture,’ just as there is no
static ‘French culture.’ Rather, these identities are constantly being reformulated in
relation to each other in an ever-shifting (geo)political context. Indeed, my respondents
draw on, and place themselves in relation to, multiple, intersecting, and sometimes
contradictory identities as they navigate different settings and interact with different
groups. The meanings they attached to certain identities reflected stereotypes and
prejudices, impressions and experiences, desires, and aversions. These meanings vary
somewhat between my respondents: not all approach their Algerianness or Frenchness in
the same way. Not all feel fully included or excluded from particular categories. If the
conventional theorization of integration assumes a coherent ‘host society,’ this study has
shown the host-society to be imagined and performed, and thus constantly in the process
of becoming. The same, of course, can be said of ‘immigrant ethnicity.’
This dissertation has highlighted religion and citizenship as two important social
fields in which people of Algerian origin experience community and exclusion and
participate in the politics of integration. People of Algerian origin live in a secularist
political context that draws upon a colonialist imaginary of Islam as antithetical to French
republicanism. In French political discourse, to be part of the French polity is to be an
autonomous, rational individual who is capable of freeing oneself from social, religious,
and cultural determinisms. Because of the salience of this discourse, people of Algerian
origin, regardless of their actual religiosity, must engage with their Muslim identity and
with the neat boundaries that laïcité attempts to draw around ‘public’ and ‘private’ space.
My respondents purposefully and actively respond to the closures inherent in French
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laïcité and citizenship by adhering to Western secularist understandings of religion or, in
other cases, by challenging the exclusions of laïcité and asserting the compatibility of
their religious identities with French republican values and principles. They also work to
distinguish between belief and culture—to distinguish behaviors and actions that are
religiously Muslim from those that are culturally Muslim (or culturally French). These
practices partly map onto generation, with many of my first-generation respondents
upholding a strict distinction between public and private realms, and second-generation
respondents being less concerned with orthopraxy and thus less preoccupied with
maintaining strict distinctions between public and private practices. This generational
difference, though, was not entirely clear-cut among my study participants, and there was
considerable variation among generational groups. Indeed, my second-generation
respondents fell into three broad groups: practicing Muslims who incorporated a strict
orthopraxy into their everyday lives in France; those who defined themselves as
‘culturally Muslim’ and who relied on secularist thinking to describe their Muslim
identity as ‘cultural’ rather than ‘religious’; and those who rejected Islam entirely and did
not adhere to any practices connected with religion.
Laïcité was the basis of a broader discussion of citizenship as a key field of
integration politics. In the modern nation-state, citizenship is sometimes conflated with
identity, in that citizenship not only confers legal status but also actualizes membership in
a national, and therefore cultural, community (Isin and Wood, 1999). Citizenship
encompasses the legal status of citizens, the relationship between citizenship and the
state, relationships and obligations among citizenship, and notions of belonging and
loyalty (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2001). This broad understanding of citizenship is
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needed to understand how people of Algerian origin understand, perform, and assert
belonging in the ‘community’ and polity. My analysis showed that formal inclusion in an
immigrant-receiving context does not guarantee a sense of belonging, likewise, formal
exclusion does not always equate to a lack of belonging. My participants described a
range of feelings toward France, including gratitude, entitlement, and resentment.
Resentment, somewhat paradoxically, was often coupled with a desire for membership
within the French polity. That is, some of my respondents felt resentment about French
colonization of Algeria and the violent war of decolonization; these individuals asserted
that France ‘owes’ them citizenship as payment for the suffering of their ancestors.
My research showed that my respondents also disrupt the modern nation-state
ideal of unitary ties to a singular national polity (Scribner, 2007). Instead, they conceive
of themselves as members of both France and Algeria, selecting different elements of
membership to each (Basch et al., 1994). Thus, for many of my respondents, lives are
lived between two places. Many participants attempt to re-create Algerian culture in
France, and they maintain social and political connections to Algeria. But, again,
transnationalism is not a uniform condition. Some respondents, while recognizing their
connection to Algeria, try to distance themselves from ‘homeland’ and to situate
themselves more fully in French society—or particular elements of French society.
This research also showed how study participants configure their identities
through urban space. The findings in this study suggest that Algerian-origin individual’s
performances of identity and their citizenship practices involve varying engagements
with everyday spaces of the city. While my research shows a reproduction of ‘Algerian
culture’ in the banlieues, this practice is complicated by individuals’ different mobility
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through space. As such, divisions between ‘Algerian’ or ‘immigrant’ space and French
space are very real but are not absolute or all-encompassing: people can and do move
between them. My participants’ relationships to different spaces varied considerably—
where some described the banlieue as an authentic cultural space, others sought out more
‘diverse’ spaces away from what they viewed as the degraded and culturally stultifying
immigrant neighborhoods on the periphery of Paris. Still others engaged partially with
the banlieue, living their daily lives across and through different kinds of spaces, and
adjusting their behavior accordingly; for some, the banlieue presented itself as an
‘authentic’ space but ultimately as foreign and unfamiliar.
Further, dominant conceptions of French national identity and values are encoded
in ‘public spaces’—both spaces governed directly by the French state including schools
(the main site of conflict over headscarves), as well as public parks and pools,
government buildings, and the like. French identity is also encoded, less formally, in the
commercial spaces of inner Paris—in the streets, cafés, and workplaces. These spaces are
presumably open to all, yet they are not wholly open to everyone or to every identity.
Algerians are conscious of and react to the ways that they are perceived and framed vis-àvis the dominant French society. My study respondents use, avoid, or modify their
behavior in these spaces, whether to assert membership in French society, to rework what
counts as Frenchness, or to refuse conformity to either broad identity categories like
Algerian or French. The engagement with these spaces, and how they are interpreted and
used, varies from one individual to another, though there are some loose patterns that
emerge around generation and educational levels.
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In sum, the lives and experiences of immigrants and their descendants can be
understood whereby people engage with different social categories and social spaces in
the course of everyday life. My study participants’ social-spatial behaviors represent a
multitude of meanings, motivations, intentions, and values that play into their
understandings of how they can and should incorporate themselves into some
communities while distancing themselves from others. Integration is not a clearly
definable process but a politics of negotiating identities, members, and spaces. This
politics is shaped by present-day experiences and informed by the colonial past; it relies
upon stark binaries of identity and difference, but also disrupts these. While recognizing
the many constraints that immigrants and their children face in national contexts that
view them as aliens, it has also emphasized that immigrants and their children are active
participants in the politics of integration.
Moving forward
In France, the study of so-called ‘identity politics’ has become the subject of
controversy. A 2021 book published by esteemed French scholars Stéphane Beaud and
Gérard Noiriel criticizes scholarly examination of ethnic and racial questions, gender and
sexuality subjectivities, postcolonial inquiry, intersectionality, and a newly understood
approach of ‘Islamo-leftism59’ as adversary to the French state. Explicitly targeted in this
critique of critical race and postcolonial examination are American academics, blamed
for being obsessed with race and the postcolonial condition. Beaud and Noiriel feel
obliged to defend “not thought in general, but specifically [French] national thought” as it
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Islamo-leftism is the term applied to academic research on race, gender and social class,
and religion. It implies a “broader culture war that is sweeping both the political and
academic establishment in France” (Fassin, 2021a, p. 1).
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pertains to these conditions (Fassin, 2021b, p. 1). Clearly, the burgeoning interest “among
younger scholars” in the ideas and theories that analyze religious prejudice, racial
discrimination, and social injustice “have disturbed a comfortable belief in the
supposedly universalist values of the French republic” (Fassin, 2021a, p. 1).
Like Fassin (2021), I take issue with Beaud and Noiriel’s characterization of
scholarship on immigrants in France and their faith in French universalism. I have shown
in this dissertation that the experiences and perspectives of Algerian immigrants cannot
be divorced from broader historical and geographical contexts; their ‘integration’ does
not start with a definitive break with one’s homeland; rather, it flows through deep
historical relationships between origin and destination. These postcolonial, transnational
relationships animate relationships of inclusion and exclusion that we see today.
With this said, I want to reiterate that the ‘colonial’ is not a static feature of
people’s lives or identities, and it is important to recognize how the meaning of
postcolonial changes over time and, as I have indicated in this dissertation, how it varies
between individuals. Postcolonialism as a theoretical approach questions binaries such as
self/other, metropole/colony, center/periphery, colonized/colonizer, etc. (McClintock,
1992). But it has also, at times, reinforced these same binaries. It also assumes a temporal
progression from ‘pre-colonial’ to ‘colonial’ and ‘post-colonial’ in such a way that
assigns levels of development and experience singularly to each period of time
(McClintock, 1992). My participants’ narratives suggest, in contrast, that the postcolonial
coexists with a multiplicity of experiences that have been shaped in different spatial and
temporal contexts. Additionally, a singular category of ‘postcolonial’ cannot be used in a
universal sense where all individuals within a postcolonial population share identical
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identity attributes. In much the same way that national categories are overgeneralized,
experiences of postcoloniality are regularly overgeneralized. Yet not all experiences of
colonialism and postcolonialism are the same, and the distinct historical drama between
France and Algeria, and the modern-day problems this relationship entails, cannot be
used as a template to understand all postcolonial relationships, outcomes, and
interpretations. Though the Franco-Algerian connection is manifestly shown to influence
identity among my participants, it would be misleading to claim that individuals are only
postcolonial—that their existence can only be understood in relation to their subjugation
by a colonial power (cf. Spivak, 1999).
The challenge, then, is to bring an appreciation for colonial relationships into the
study of integration politics while not viewing the present day as an inevitable outcome
of, or replica of, past events. Colonialism is a source of memories, tensions, and
resentments; it is a process that has brought people together in relations of subordination
and domination; it continues to shape relationships and identities. Yet the meaning of
colonialism has also shifted over time, as its legacies have been woven into contemporary
events and political-economic processes.
My research also advances the concept of intersectionality and points to ways that
we can refine it. My findings affirm that we need to consider gender, racial, and class
status in understanding the experiences of immigrants (and all people). However, these
are not neat categories, and my findings do not show clearly identifiable clusters of
respondents based on ascribed categories. Nor do my findings indicate that a specific
combination of subordinate social locations produces specific outcomes for Algerian
immigrants and their descendants. While Algerian-origin individuals do hold multiple
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subordinate identities, how these categories operate together varies (in some cases,
dramatically) from one participant to another. My data did not reveal certain
combinations of identities that indicated certain outcomes; clearly, then, intersectionality
does not function as an additive model of identity ‘variables.’ This is not to say that we
cannot find patterns in data, but that patterns are not always absolute or definitive. This is
because the identity categories themselves are not so much set categories as sets of
relationships that shape, and are shaped by, interactions between real people in real
places. Intersectionality must be understood to encompass a degree of indeterminacy in
terms of people’s life experiences.
Finally, this dissertation points toward the need to incorporate space more fully
into the study of immigration and integration. A great deal of geographical work has
addressed residential clustering, which is indeed can be important indicator of social and
economic exclusion. But there is much more to immigrant geographies than residential
patterns (and residential patterns themselves can have multiple meanings). Building on
the work of geographers such as Kay Anderson, Deborah Phillips, Lise Nelson, and
Nancy Hiemstra, this dissertation proposes thinking in more complicated ways about how
people from immigrant backgrounds relate to complex, fragmented urban space. This
approach raises questions for future research about how people interpret the social coding
of spaces, how they move in and out these spaces, and how they adjust their behavior as
they do so. It draws our attention to the ways people can feel excluded from places but
also how they can potentially navigate these spaces by adjusting behaviors. And it also
makes us consider how people from immigrant backgrounds can experience archetypal
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immigrant spaces as foreign places, or as culturally oppressive places that they would
rather escape.
At a time when immigrants in many contexts are being blamed for many societal
problems, it is crucial that we recognize the power of social categories while also treating
immigrants and their descendants as individuals who hold multiple, and sometimes
conflictual, identities, desires, memories, and experiences. We need to recognize that
people are situated in multiple, translocal contexts, and that they often feel a mix of
belonging to and exclusion from all of these contexts. Immigrants do share many
experiences, but they are not a monolithic bloc; they, and the societies of which they are
part, are in a constant process of becoming, though not toward any particular endpoint.
This framework I have presented in this dissertation is intended not to find general
experiences and trajectories, but to capture a diversity of experiences, to complicate the
idea of clear pathways of sameness, and to show how people are constantly living and
producing difference and sameness vis-à-vis multiple categories.
While this dissertation has highlighted the uniqueness of the French-Algerian
situation, the conceptual framework it offers is applicable to other contexts that conceive
of themselves as facing a ‘problem’ of assimilation of immigrant populations. It is
especially relevant to contexts where Islam has become a “crucial litmus test to determine
whether [immigrants can] integrate and function effectively in the liberal-democratic”
West (Chin, 2010, p. 558). Such has been the case throughout Europe, including in
Germany, where the recent arrival of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees has reignited debates about the (in)compatibility between Muslims and (non-Muslim) German
society. Suspicions of Islam’s incompatibility with Western life have also punctuated
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immigration debates in settler-colonial societies like the U.S., Canada, and Australia. The
presence of the postcolonial subject in the West effectively questions the authority and
authenticity of founding Western narratives of modernity, democracy and secularism. In
what ways, we must ask, do religion, secularism, race, modernity, nationhood, and
citizenship become connected to each other in different contexts? How are these
connections informed by historical and contemporary dynamics and discourses? Where
do we see continuities and changes across temporal and geographical contexts? And how
are these politics grounded in actual space—in cities, neighborhoods, parks, monuments,
schools, and workplaces? How do people experience them as material realities in their
day-to-day lives? Such questions, I believe, may at last move us beyond the assumptions
of conventional integration models, which maintain a tight grip both on immigration
scholarship and on public discourse. They will provide some entry point into difficult
conversations about social inequalities and about the meaning of belonging in our
societies.

311

REFERENCES
Abrahamson, M. (1996). Urban Enclaves: Identity and Place in America. New York: St.
Martin's Press.
Ackerly, B. & True, J. (2008). Reflexivity in Practice: Power and Ethics in Feminist
Research on International Relations. International Studies Review, 10(4), 693707.
Adler, P.A. & Adler, P. (1993). Ethical issues in self-censorship: Ethnographic research
on sensitive topics. In: Renzetti, C.M. & Lee, R.M. (eds) Researching Sensitive
Topics, London, UK: SAGE, pp. 249–266.
Ageron, C.R. (1991). Modern Algeria. A History from 1830 to the Present. Trenton:
Africa World Press.
Aissaoui, R. (2009). Immigration and National Identity: North African Political
Movements in Colonial and Postcolonial France. London: Tauris Academic
Studies.
Alba, R. (1995). Assimilation's quiet tide. Public Interest, (119), 3-18.
Alba, R. & Victor, N. (1997). Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of
Immigration. The International Migration Review, 31(4), 826-874.
Alba, R. & Victor, N. (2003). Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and
Contemporary Immigration. Boston: First Harvard University Press.

312

Alba, R. & Logan, J.R. (1993). Minority Proximity to Whites in the Suburbs: An
Individual Analysis of Segregation. American Journal of Sociology, 98(6), 13881427.
Aldrich, R. (1996). Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion. London:
Macmillan.
Aleinikoff, T.A. & Klusmeyer, D. (eds) (2001). Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives
and Practices. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Allen, J.P. & Turner, E. (1996). Spatial Patterns of Immigrant Assimilation. Professional
Geographer, 48(2), 140-155.
Allen, S. (2010). Seducing the Orient: Origins of France's Civilizing Mission.
Dissertation. University of Virginia.
Alsaafin, L. (2019). French Algerians on identity, discrimination, protests at ‘home.’
Aljazeera, Europe. Retrieved July 6, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features /french-algerians-identity-discrimination-protests-home190522095749156.html
American Psychological Association. (2015). Measuring Socioeconomic Status and
Subjective Social Status. Retrieved July 6, 2020, from https://www.apa.org/pi/
ses/resources/class/measuring-status
Amiri, L. (2004). La bataille de France: La guerre d'Algérie en métropole. Paris:
Editions Robert Laffont.
Anderson, K. (2000). “The Beast Within”: Race, Humanity, and Animality. Environment
and Planning D: Society and Space, (18), 301–320.

313

Anderson, K. (1987). The Idea of Chinatown: The Power of Place and Institutional
Practice in the Making of a Racial Category. Annals of the Association of
American Geographers, 77(4), 580-598.
Anderson, K. (1988). Cultural hegemony and the race-definition process in Chinatown,
Vancouver: 1880-1980. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, (6),
127-149.
Anderson, K. (1991). Vancouver's Chinatown: racial discourse in Canada, 1875-1980.
Montreal; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Angélil, M. & Siress, C. (2012). The Paris Banlieue: Peripheries of Inequality. Journal of
International Affairs, 65(2), 57-67.
Antonsich, M. (2010). Searching for Belonging – An Analytical Framework. Geography
Compass, 4(6), 644-659.
Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. & Tiffin, H. (2000). Post-colonial studies: The Key Concepts.
(2nd ed) London and New York: Routledge.
Auslander, L. (2000). Bavarian Crucifixes and French Headscarves: Religious Signs and
the Postmodern European State. Cultural Dynamics, (12), 283–309.
Austin, J. (2009). Destroying the banlieue: Reconfigurations of Suburban Space in
French Film. Yale French Studies, (115), 80-92.
Balibar, É. (2004) We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bancel, N., Blanchard, P., & Lamaire, S. (2005). La fracture coloniale. La société
française au prisme de l’héritage colonial. Paris: La Découverte.

314

Bancel, N. (2013). France, 2005: A postcolonial turning point. French Cultural Studies
(24), 208-218.
Barclay, F., Chopin, C., & Evans, M. (2018). Introduction: settler colonialism and French
Algeria. Settler Colonial Studies, 8(2), 115-130.
Barei, G. (2003). Britain and Algeria, 1945-1965. Dissertation. University of London.
Barou, J. (2014). Integration of Immigrants in France: a historical perspective. Identities,
21(6), 642-657.
Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1994). Nations Unbound:
Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized NationStates (1 edition). S.l.: Routledge.
Bayoumi, M.M. (1998). Migrating Islam: Religion, Modernity, and Colonialism.
Dissertation. Columbia University.
BBC. (2015). As it happened: Charlie Hebdo attack. BBC. Retrieved March 20, 2015,
from http://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-europe-30710777
Beaman, J. (2016). As French as Anyone Else: Islam and the North African Second
Generation in France. International Migration Review, 50(1),41–69.
Beaman, J. (2017). Citizen Outsider: Racism, Marginalization, and Immigration in
France. Metropolitics. Retrieved January 21, 2021, from
https://metropolitics.org/IMG/pdf/met-beaman.pdf
Beauchemin, C., Hamelle, C., & Simon, P. (2010). Trajectories and Origins: Survey on
Population Diversity in France. Trajectoires et Origines, Institut national d'études
démographiques, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.

315

Beaud, S. and Noiriel, G. (2021). Race et sciences sociales: Une socio-histoire de la
raison identitaire. Paris: AGONE.
Begag, A. (2007). Ethnicity and Equality: France in the Balance. University of Nebraska
Press.
Behr, E. (1961). The Algerian Problem. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
Bell, D. A. (1992). Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism.
BasicBooks.
Ben Jelloun, T. (1999). French Hospitality: Racism and North African Immigrants.
Columbia University Press.
Benaissa, H. (2021). Islam Became A ‘Problem’ in France When Muslims Became
French. Le Monde. Retrieved March 4, 2021 from https://worldcrunch.com/
culture-society/islam-became-a-39problem39-in-france-when-muslims-becamefrench
Benbassa, E. (2005). La republique face à ses minorités. Paris: Milles et une nuits.
Bertossi, C. (2010). Country Report: France (No. Country Report, RSCAS/EUDO-CITCR 2010/14).
Betts, R. (1991). France and Decolonisation 1900-1960. London: Macmillan.
Bhabha, H. (1983). Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism. In
Barker, D., Hulme, P., Iversen, M. & Loxley, D (eds). The Politics of Theory. Colchester:
University of Essex, pp. 144-165.
Bhabha, H. (1984). Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.
October 28, 125-133.
Bhabha, H.K. (1990). Nation and Narration. London; New York: Routledge.

316

Birkvad, S.R. (2019). Immigrant meanings of citizenship: mobility, stability, and
recognition. Citizenship Studies, 23(8), 798-814.
Blackman, L., Cromby, J., Hook, D., Papadopoulos, D. & Walkerdine, V. (2008).
Creating subjectivities. Subjectivity, 22(1), 1-27.
Blanc-Chaléard, M.C. (2001). Histoire de l'immigration. Paris: Edition La Découverte.
Blanchard, P., Bancel, N., & Lemaire, S. (eds.) 2005. La fracture coloniale: La société
française au prisme de l’héritage colonial. Paris: Éditions La Découverte.
Bloemraad, I. (2000). Citizenship and Immigration: A Current Review. Journal of
International Migration and Integration, 1(1), 9-37.
Bloemraad, I., Korteweg, A., & Gokce, Y. (2008). Citizenship and Immigration:
Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State. Annual
Review of Sociology, (34), 153-179.
Blunt, A. & Dowling, R. (2006) Home. London: Routledge.
Boccagni, P. & Brighenti, A.M. (2015). Immigrants and home in the making: thresholds
of domesticity, commonality and publicness. J Hous and the Built Environ. 32(1),
1-11.
Boccagni, P. & Kivisto, P. (2019). Ambivalence and the social processes of immigrant
inclusion. International Journal of Comparative Sociology. 60(1-2), 3-13.
Bolt, G. & van Kempen, R. (2002) ‘Moving up or moving down? Housing careers of
Turks and Moroccans in Utrecht, the Netherlands’, Housing Studies, 17(3), 401422.
Bolt, G., Ozuekren, A., & Phillips, D. (2010). Linking Integration and Residential
Segregation. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 36(2), 169-186.

317

Bonnet, F., Lalé, E., Safi, M., & Wasmer, E. (2016). Better residential than ethnic
discrimination! Reconciling audit and interview findings in the Parisian housing
market. Urban Studies, 53(13), 2815-2833.
Bouchareb, R. (2006). Days of Glory. film.
Bourdieu, P., & Sayad, A. (1964). Le déracinement: la crise de l'agriculture algérienne.
Paris: Minuit.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Bowen, J. (2004). Does French Islam have Borders? Dilemmas of Domestication in a
Global Religious Field. American Anthropologist, 106(1), 43-55.
Bowen, J. (2007). Why the French Don't Like Headscarves. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
Bowen, J. (2017). French Republicanism and Pluralism: Can they co-exist? Global
Centre for Pluralism, Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies. pp. 1-26.
Retrieved February 20, 2020 from https://www.pluralism.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/France_EN-2.pdf
Breeden, A. (2019). Lyon Bomb Suspect Told Police He Pledged Allegiance to ISIS.
New York Times. Retrieved September 16, 2019 from https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/05/30/ world/europe/lyon-france-bombing.html
Brettell, C.B. & Nibbs, F.G. (2010). Immigrant Suburban Settlement and the "Threat" to
Middle Class Status and Identity: The Case of Farmers Branch, Texas.
International Migration, 49(1), 1-30.

318

Breuil-Genier, P., Borrel, C., & Lhommeau, B. (2011). Les immigrés, les descendants
d'immigrés et leurs enfants. INSEE.
Brickell, K. & Datta, A. (2011). Translocal geographies: Spaces, places, connections.
Farnham, Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Brinbaum, Y., Moguérou, L., & Primon, J.L. (2010). Educational Trajectories and
Experiences of Young Descendants of Immigrants in France. In Beauchemin, C.,
Hamelle, C., & Simon, P. Trajectories and Origins: Survey on Population
Diversity in France. Trajectoires et Origines, Institut national d'études
démographiques, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, pp.
37-45.
Brouard, S. & Tiberj, V. (2005). Français comme les autres? Une enquête auprès des
citoyens d'origine maghrébine, africaine et turque. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Brown, S. & Bean, F. (2006). Assimilation Models, Old and New: Explaining a LongTerm Process. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved September 23, 2019, from
https://www.migration policy.org/article/assimilation-models-old-and-newexplaining-long-term-process
Brubaker, R. (1989) Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North
America. Lanham: University Press of America
Brubaker, R. (1992). Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. London;
Cambridge:Harvard University Press.
Brubaker, R. (2010). Migration, Membership, and the Modern Nation-State: Internal and
External Dimensions of the Politics of Belonging. Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, 41(1), 61-78.

319

Brubaker, R. (2013). Categories of Analysis and Categories of Practice: A Note on the
Study of Muslims in European Countries of Immigration. Ethnic and Racial
Studies, (36), 1–8.
Bryant, E. (2020a). As France mourns slain teacher Samuel Paty, some question secular
values. DW. Retrieved November 24, 2020, from https://www.dw.com/en/samuelpaty-france-

radical-islam-secularism/a-55383482

Burgess, E. (1926). The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities. The Family, 7(2),
3-9.
Byrnes, M. (2008). French Like Us? Municipal Policies and North African Migrants in
the Parisian Banlieues 1945-1975. Dissertation. Georgetown University.
Byrnes, M. (2013). Liberating the land or absorbing a community: Managing North
African Migration and the bidonvilles in Paris's banlieues. French Politics,
Culture and Society, 31(3), 1-21.
Camiscioli, E. (2009). Reproducing the French Race: Immigration, Intimacy, and
Embodiment in the Early Twentieth Century. Durham; London: Duke University
Press.
Canzano, P. & Cohn, L. (2009). The Stamford Historical Society, Pride and Patriotism:
Stamford's Role in World War II, The Battles, Operation Torch and the Invasion
of North Africa. Retrieved December 16, 2019, from
http://www.stamfordhistory.org/ww2_torch.htm
CARAN F1a 5014. (1962). Synthèse des Rapports Trimestriels Etablis par les Conseillers
Techniques pour les Affaires Musulmanes, 1e trimestre.

320

Carmella, J. & Patrick, A. (eds). (2021). Algerians Reject French Reconciliation Report,
Demand Apology from Macron. The Tennessee Tribune. Retrieved February 7,
2021, from https://www.tntribune.com/algerians-reject-french-reconciliationreport-demand-apology-from-macron/
Castles, S., de Haas, H., & Miller, M. (2014). The age of migration: International
population movements in the modern world. (5th ed.) New York: Guilford Press.
Castree, N. (2004). Differential geographies: place, indigenous rights and ‘local’
resources. Political Geography, (23), 133–167.
Celik, O. (2010). The French Headscarf Affair: Universality, Secularism, and Autonomy.
Dissertation. University of Colorado.
Cesari, J. (1994) Être musulman en France: Associations, militants et mosques. Paris:
Éditions Karthala et RÉMAM.
Cesari, J. (2002). Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority. In Haddad, Y.Y.
(ed) Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, pp. 36-51.
Chacko, E. (2013). La Fiesta DC: The Ethnic Festival as an Act of Belonging in the City.
Journal of Intercultural Studies, 34(4), 443-453.
Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through
qualitative analysis. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.
Chartier, R. (1985). Text, Symbols, and Frenchness. The Journal of Modern History,
57(4), 682-695.

321

Chase, S. (2005). Narrative Inquiry. In Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. (eds), The SAGE
Handbook of Qualitative Research (3rd ed). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications,
pp. 651-679.
Chatignoux, E., Gabet, A., Moutengou, E., Pirard, P., Bonaldi, C., & Olié, V. (2018). The
2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks in France: was there a short-term impact on
hospitalizations for cardiovascular disease? Clinical Epidemiology, (10), 413-419.
Chelali, T. (2017). Algeria yet to heal from Black Decade scars. World. Retrieved
December 23, 2019, from https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/algeria-yet-to-healfrom-black-decade-scars-1.2093062
Chin, R. (2010). Turkish Women, West German Feminists, and the Gendered Discourse
on Muslim Cultural Difference. Public Culture, 22(3, Fall 2010), 557-581.
Choi, S.E. (2016). Decolonization and The French of Algeria-Bringing the Settler Colony
Home. Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series. New York:
Palgrave MacMillan.
Citron, S. (1994). Imaginaire de la Nation française, xénophobie, et racism. In Ullmo,
Sylvio (ed) L'immigration américaine: Exemple ou contre-exemple pour la
France. Paris: Harmattan, pp. 55-63.
Clare, M. & Abdelhady, D. (2016). No longer a waltz between red wine and mint tea:
The portrayal of the children of immigrants in French newspapers (2003-2013).
International Journal of Intercultural Relations, (50), 13-28.
Clark, W. & Drever, A. (2000) ‘Residential mobility in a constrained housing market:
implications for ethnic population in Germany,’ Environment and Planning A,
32(5): 833-846.

322

Cohen, M. & Lacroix, A. (2016). Introduction: Entre Algérie et France : Écrire une
histoire sociale des Algériens au vingtième siècle. French Politics, Culture &
Society, 34 (2), 1-10.
Cohen, P. & Bains, H. (eds). (1988). Multi-Racist Britain. Basingstoke; London:
Macmillan.
Cole, J. (2012). Constantine before the riots of August 1934: civil status, anti-Semitism,
and the politics of assimilation in interwar French Algeria. The Journal of North
African Studies, 17(5), 839-861.
Comaroff, J. & Comaroff, J. (1991). Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity,
Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa, Volume I. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Conklin, A. (1997). A mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and
West Africa, 1895-1930. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Cooper, F. (2002). Africa since 1940: the past of the present. Cambridge University
Press.
Costelloe, L. (2015). 'Charlie Hebdo' and the legacy of the eternal outsider.
Independent.ie. Retrieved February 22, 2020 from https://www.independent.ie/
opinion/ comment/charlie-hebdo-and-the-legacy-of- the-eternal-outsider31001460.html
Cozen, K., Gerber, D., Morawska E, Pozzetta, G., & Vecoli, R. (1992). The Invention of
Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A. Journal of American Ethnic History,
12(1), 3-41.

323

Crenshaw, K. (1995). Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color. In Critical Race Theory (pp. 357–384). New
York: The New Press.
Crenshaw, K., Gotanda, N., Peller, G., & Thomas, K. (eds). (1996). Critical Race
Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement. New York: New Press.
Cresswell, T. (2004). “Introduction: Defining Place.” In Place: a Short Introduction.
Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 1-14
Dalrymple, T. (2002). Barbarians at the Gate of Paris. City Journal, 12(4), 63–73.
Darton, R. (1984). The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural
History. New York: Basic Books.
Daughton, J. (2002). The Civilizing Mission: Missionaries, Colonialists, and French
Identity, 1885- 1914. Dissertation. Berekeley: University of California.
Davidson, N. (2012). Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth Century France.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
de Azevedo, R. (1994). Migration and Development Co-operation. Luxembourg: Council
of Europe Press.
de Carvalho, J.M. (2016). Immigration Policy Under President Nicolas Sarkozy.
Parliamentary Affairs, 69(1), 53-72.
de Certeau, M. (1984). The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley; Los Angeles: University
of California Press.
Décimo, M. (2013). Français de souche: Etre Gaulois ou citoyen Français? Contemporary
French and Francophone Studies, 17(2), 164-172.

324

Delgado, R. & Stefancic, J. (2012). Critical Race Theory: An Introduction. New York:
NYU Press.
Deltombe, T. (2007). Imaginary Islam: The media construction of Islamophobia in
France, 1975-2005. Paris: La Découverte.
den Besten, O. (2010). Local belonging and ‘geographies of emotions’: Immigrant
children’s experience of their neighborhoods in Paris and Berlin. Childhood,
17(2), 181-195.
Dikec, M. (2007). Space, Governmentality, and the Geographies of French Urban Policy.
European Urban and Regional Studies, (14), 277-289.
Domosh, M. (2015). Why is our Geography Curriculum so White? AAG Newsletter.
Retrieved on March 16, 2021, from http://news.aag.org/2015/06/why-is-ourgeography-curriculum-so-white/
Dotson-Renta, L. (2015). Hip-hop and the banlieue narrative. French Cultural Studies,
26(3), 354-367.
Driggers, S. (2018). Les Banlieues de France: how a failure of integration has led to the
spread of extremism. Georgia Political Review. Retrieved February 13, 2020
from http://georgiapolitical

review.com/les-banlieues-de-france-how-a-failure-

of-integration-has-led-to-the-spread- of-extremism/
Edwards, R. (2004). Social Capital. Organizational Management Journal, 1(1), 81-88.
Ehrkamp, P. (2002). Turkish immigrants' politics of belonging: identity, assimilation
discourse, and the transformation of urban space in Duisburg-Marxloh,
Germany. Dissertation. University of Minnesota.

325

Ehrkamp, P. (2005). Placing identities: Transnational practices and local attachments of
Turkish immigrants in Germany. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(2),
345-364.
Ehrkamp, P. & Leitner, H. (2006). Rethinking immigration and citizenship: new spaces
of migrant transnationalism and belonging. Environment and Planning A:
Economy and Space, 38(9), 1591-1597.
Ehrkamp, P. & Nagel, C. (2012). Immigration, places of worship and the politics of
Citizenship in the US South. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,
(27), 624-638.
El Karoui, H. (2016). A French Islam is Possible. Institut Montaigne. Retrieved June 30,
2020, from https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/publications/french-islampossible
El Karoui, H. (2018). L’islam une religion française. Paris: Editions Gallimard.
El Sammaa, K. (2007). Freedom of Religion and the Principle of Laïcité: The Case of
France. Dissertation. University of Toronto.
Elayyadi, A. (2004). Post-colonial Immigration in France: History, Memory, and Space.
Dissertation. Miami University.
Elwood. S.A. & Martin, D.G. (2000). 'Placing' interviews: Location and scales of power.
Professional Geographer, (52), 649-657.
Entelis, J. (1986). The Revolution Institutionalized. Boulder: Westview Press.
Entzinger, H. & Biezeveld, R. (2003). Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration. European
Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations, pp.1-53.

326

Erlanger, S. (2020). Muslim Countries Denounce French Response to Killing of Teacher,
Urge Boycott. The New York Times. Retrieved November 12, 2020, from
https://www.nytimes. com/2020/10/27/world/europe/French-Muslims-Turkeycrackdown.html?action =click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article
Essed, P. (1991). Understanding Everyday Racism: An Interdisciplinary Theory.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Esson, J. & Last, A. (2019). Learning and Teaching about Race and Racism in
Geography. figshare. Retrieved March 17, 2020 from
htpps://hdl.handle.net/2134/34286.
Evans, M. (2012). Algeria: France's Undeclared War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fanon, F., Sartre, J.P., & Bhabha, H. K. (2005). The Wretched of the Earth. (R. Philcox,
Trans.) (Reprint edition). New York: Grove Press.
Farrar, M. (2008). Building the Body Politic: Power and Urban Space in Washington,
D.C. University of Illinois Press: Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
Fassin, D. (2021a). Are ‘woke’ academics a threat to the French republic? Ask Macron’s
ministers. The Guardian. Retrieved April 7, 2021 from
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/mar/12/academics-frenchrepublic-macron-islamo-leftism
Fassin, D. (2021b). Un vent de réaction souffle sur la vie intellectuelle. AOC. Retrieved
April 7, 2021 from https://aoc.media/analyse/2021/02/22/un-vent-de-reactionsouffle-sur-la-vie-intellectuelle/?loggedin=true
Felouzis G., Liot F., & Perroton J. (2005). L’apartheid scolaire. Paris, Seuil.

327

Filler, M. (1991). Architecture View; Baron Haussmann, Urban Designer Par Excellence.
New York Times. p. 32 Retrieved October 10, 2020, from
https://www.nytimes.com/ 1991/03/24/arts/architecture-view-baron-haussmannurban-designer-par-excellence.html
Fogarty, R. & Osborne, M. (2003). Constructions and Functions of Race in French
Military Medicine, 1830-1920. In Peabody, S. & Stovall, T. (eds) The Color of
Liberty: Histories of Race in France. Durham; London: Duke University Press.
Fois, M. (2016). Identity, Politics and Nation: Algerian Nationalism and the 'Berberist
Crisis' of 1949. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 43(2), 206-218.
Forsdick, C. (2005). Travel in Twentieth Century French and Francophone Cultures: The
Persistence of Diversity. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
François, M. (2020). "The enemy within": Is there a place for Muslims in France's secular
republic? ABC Religion & Ethics. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from
https://www.abc. net.au/ religion/place-for-muslims-in-france-secularrepublic/12848512.
Franklin, E. (2017). A Slow End to Empire: Social Aid Associations, Family Migration,
and Decolonization in France and Algeria, 1954-1981. Dissertation. Boston
College.
Fredette, J. (2010). On the Muslim question: The contentious politics of citizenship in
France. Dissertation. University of Washington.
Freedman, J. (2004). Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? The French Dilemma.
International Migration, 42(3), 5-27.

328

Gall, B. (1966). La Famille Algérienne. Colloque sur la migration algérienne. Paris.
Ganguly, K. (2001). States of exception: Everyday life and postcolonial identity.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Gans, H. J. (1992). Second‐generation decline: scenarios for the economic and ethnic
futures of the post‐1965 American immigrants. Ethnic and racial studies, 15(2),
173-192.
Gatehouse, J. (2018). The staggering scale of France's battle against terror, by the
numbers. CBC News. Retrieved September 16, 2019, from
https://www.cbc.ca/news/ thenational/national-today-newsletter-terrorismimplant-registry-rice-1.4939071
Genova, J.E. (2004). Colonial Ambivalence, Cultural Authenticity, and the Limitations of
Mimicry in French-Ruled West Africa, 1914-1956 vol. 45. New York: Peter Lang.
Gilbert, H. & Tompkins, J. (1996). Post-Colonial Drama: Theory, Practice, Politics.
London; New York: Rutledge.
Gill, P., Stewart, K., Treasure, E., & Chadwick, B. (2008). Methods of data collection in
qualitative research: interviews and focus groups. British Dental Journal, 204(6),
291-295.
Gilroy, P. (2004). After Empire: Melancholia or Communal Culture? Abingdon; New
York: Routledge.
Glesne, C. (2011). Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction. (4th edn).
Boston: Pearson.
Godley, N. (2006). “Almost-Finished Frenchmen”: The Jews of Algeria and the Question
of French National Identity, 1830-1902. Dissertation. University of Iowa.

329

Golden, A. (2015). A Brief History of Postcolonial Literature, Part I. Books Tell you
Why. Retrieved June 22, 2020, from https://blog.bookstellyouwhy.com/a-briefhistory-of-postcolonial-literature-part-i
Google, n.d. [Map of Algeria] Retrieved July 6, 2020, from https://www.google.com/
maps/place/Algeria/@34.7051605,-3.9239018,5z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0xd7e
8a6a28037bd1:0x7140bee3abd7f8a2!8m2!3d28.033886!4d1.659626.
Google. n.d. [Google Map of Paris, France]. Retrieved February 8, 2020, from
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Paris,+France/@48.8588376,2.3595895,13z/
data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x47e66e1f06e2b70f:0x40b82c3688c9460!8m2!3d48.856614!
4d2.3522219.
Gordon, M. (1964). Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion, and
national origins. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gosnell, J. (2002). The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria, 1930-1954. Rochester:
University of Rochester Press.
Greiner, C. & Sakdapolrak, P. (2013). Translocality: Concepts, Applications and
Emerging Research Perspectives. Geography Compass, 7(5), 373-384.
Grewal, I. & Kaplan, C. (eds). (1994). Scattered Hegemonies. London; Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Grzegorczyk, A. (2013). Social and ethnic segregation in the Paris metropolitan area at
the beginning of the 21st century. Miscellanea Geographica-Regional Studies on
Development, 17(2), 20-29.
Guarnizo, L. (1997). The Emergence of a Transnational Social Formation and the Mirage
of Return Migration Among Dominican Transmigrants. Identities, 4(2), 281-322.

330

Guerdijou, B. (1998). Living in Paradise. [Motion picture on VHS]. USA: Arab Film
Distribution.
Guesmi, H. (2020). Postcolonialism does not exist in France. Africa is a country.
Retrieved January 19, 2021, from https://africasacountry.com/2020/01/
postcolonialism-does-not-

exist-in-france

Guillot, L. (2020). French minister's complaint on religious food aisles sparks criticism.
Politico. Retrieved November 27, 2020, from https://www.politico.eu/
article/gerald-darmanin-france-complaint-religious-food-aisles-sparks-criticism/
Hage, G. (1997). At Home in the Entrails of the West: Multiculturalism, "Ethnic Food"
and

Migrant Home Building. In H. Grace, Hage, G., Johnson, L., Langsworth,

J., & Symonds, M. (eds). Home/World Space, Community and Marginality
in Sydney's West, 99-153. Sydney: Pluto Press.
Hajjat, A. (2012). The borders of "national identity": The injunction to assimilation in
metropolitan and colonial France. Paris: Éditions La Découverte.
Hall, S. (1996). Introduction: Who Needs ‘Identity’? in Questions of Cultural Identity,
edited by Hall, S. & du Gay, P. London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage
Publications, p. 1-17.
Halla, B. (2014). A Night to Remember, or Forget. Harvard Political Review. Retrieved
May 23, 2019, from http://harvardpolitics.com/books-arts/paris-massacre/
Hamaz, S., & Vasta, E. (2009). To Belong or Not to Belong’: Is That the Question?
Negotiating Belonging in Multi-Ethnic London. University of Oxford: Centre on
Migration, Policy and Society.

331

Hancock, D. R., & Algozzine, B. (2011). Doing Case Study Research: A Practical Guide
for Beginning Researchers (2nd edition). New York: Teachers College Press.
Hargreaves, A. (1995). Immigration, 'race and ethnicity in contemporary France.
London: Routledge.
Hargreaves, A. (2011). From "Ghettoes" to Globalization: Situating Maghrebi-French
Filmmakers, in (eds.) Durmelat, Sylvie and Vinay Swamy. Screening Integration:
Recasting Maghrebi Immigration in Contemporary France. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, pp. 25-40.
Hargreaves, A. & McKinney, M. (eds). (1997). Post-Colonial Cultures in France.
London; New York: Routledge.
Hargreaves, A. & Heffernan, M. (1993). French and Algerian Identities from Colonial
Times to the Present: A Century of Interaction. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen
Press.
Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l'Egalité. (2006). La
discrimination dans l’accès au logement locatif privé. ASDO études.
Hegde, R. (1998). A View from Elsewhere: Locating Difference and the Politics of
Representation from a Transnational Feminist Perspective. Communication
Theory, (8),

276.

Hekking, M. (2020). Algerian President Sacks Minister Who Refused to Give Up French
Nationality. Morocco World News. Retrieved July 11, 2020, from https://www.
moroccoworldnews.com/2020/06/307175/algerian-president-sacks-ministerwho-refused-to-give-up-french-nationality/

332

Herzfeld, M. (2005). Cultural intimacy: social poetics in the nation-state. New York:
Routledge.
Hill, T. (2006). Imperial Nomads: Settling Paupers, Proletariats, and Pastoralists in
Colonial France and Algeria, 1830-1863. Dissertation. University of Chicago.
Hoffman, C. (2004). Discourses of Citizenship in Contemporary France:
Multiculturalism and Neo-Republicanism since 1981. Dissertation. Indiana
University.
Hollifield, J. F. (1994). Immigration and Republicanism in France: The Hidden
Consensus. In W.A. Cornelius, P. L. Martin, & J. F. Hollifield (Eds.), Controlling
Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Hopkins, P. & Noble, G. (2009). Masculinities in Place: Situated Identities, Relations and
Intersectionality. Social & Cultural Geography, 10(8), 811-819.
Horne, A. (1977). A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962. London: Macmillan.
House, J. (2006). The colonial and post-colonial dimensions of Algerian migration to
France. History in Focus: Migration, Issue 11. Retrieved May 14, 2019, from
https:// www.history.sc.uk/ihr/Focus/Migration/articles/house.html
Housel, J. (2007). Placing Race: The Role of Regulation and Social Practice in the
Production of Racialized Space in Buffalo, New York. Dissertation. State
University of New York.

333

Huddleston, T., Niessen, J., & Dag Tjaden, J. (2013). Using EU Indicators of Immigrant
Integration. European Commission. Retrieved January 21, 2021, from
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dirk_Jacobs/publication/327987542_Exami
ning_results_for_the_core_EU__indicators_of_immigrant_integration_focus_on_
education/links/5e98e4dfa6fdcca78920055d/Examining-results-for-the-coreEU-indicators-of-immigrant- integration-focus-on-education.pdf
Hurd, E. S. (2008). The Politics of Secularism in International Relations. Princeton
Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Hutchinson, J. (2000). Ethnicity and modem nations. Ethnic and Racial Studies, (23),
651-669.
Hutchison, R. (2010). Encyclopedia of Urban Studies. Thousand Oaks: SAGE
Publications.
Huttman, E. (1991). Urban housing segregation of minorities in Western Europe and the
United States. Duke, NC: Duke University Press.
IAU. (2011). Immigrants and their families in Île-de-France. Institute d'Amenagement et
d'urbanisme. Retrieved March 17, 2021, from https://web.archive.org/
web/20111028101845/http://www.iau-idf.fr/detail-dune-etude/etude/lesimmigres-et- leur-famille-en-ile-de-france.html
Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2009). Muslim integration into Western cultures: between
origins and destinations. Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working
Paper Series, draft 28/2/2009.

334

INSEE. (2020a). Comparateur de territoire. Commune de Paris 18e Arrondissement
(75118). Retrieved July 28, 2020, from
https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1405599?geo=COM-75118
INSEE. (2020b). Institus National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE).
Retrieved April 1, 2020, from https://www.insee.fr/en/accueil
Institut National d’Études Démographiques. (2012). Dual nationality and national
identity. Retrieved February 2, 2021, from https://www.ined.fr/en/
everything_about_ population/demographic-facts-sheets/focus-on/doublenationalite-national-identity/
Institut national d'études démographiques (INED). 2020b. Demographic Facts: covid-19.
Retrieved March 5, 2021, from https://www.ined.fr/en/everything_about_
population/demographic-facts-sheets/focus-on/excess-mortality-due-to-covid-19seine- saint-denis-invisibility-of-minorities-in-the-figures/
Isin, E. & Wood, P. (1999). Citizenship and Identity. London: Sage Publications.
Jacobson, M. (1998). Whiteness of a different color: European Immigrants and the
alchemy of race. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
James, R. (2018). Postcolonialism: A Brief Overview. Retrieved September 24, 2019,
from https://www.academia.edu/2662908/Postcolonialism_A_Brief_Overview
Jay, M. (2003). Critical Race Theory, Multicultural Education, and the Hidden
Curriculum of Hegemony. Multicultural Perspectives, 5(4), 3–9.
Jennings, J. (2000). Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary
France. British Journal of Political Science, 30(4), 575-598.

335

Johnson, K. (2004). The “huddled masses” myth: Immigration and civil rights.
Philadelphia: `Temple University Press.
Joshi, K. Y. (2006). The racialization of Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism in the United
States. Equity & Excellence in Education, 39(3), 211-226.
Kaplan, D. (2015). Immigration and the making of place in Paris. Journal of Cultural
Geography, 32(1), 23-39.
Kastoryano, R. (2002). Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and
Germany. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Klausen, J. (2005). The Islamic challenge: politics and religion in Western Europe.
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Kobayashi, A. (1994). Coloring the field: gender, "race", and the politics of fieldwork.
The Professional Geographer, (46), 73-79.
Kobayashi, A. (2014). The Dialectic of Race and the Discipline of Geography. Annals of
the Association of American Geographers, 104(6), 1101–1115.
Kohlstedt, K. (2018). Ville Radieuse: Le Corbusier's Functionalist Plan for a Utopian
"Radiant City" 99% Invisible. Retrieved October 11, 2020, from
https://99percentinvisible.org/ article/ville-radieuse-le-corbusiers-functionalistplan-utopian-radiant-city/
Krause, C. (2021). Map. Migrant population rates in the greater Paris region.
Laachir, K. (2007). France's 'Ethnic' Minorities and the Question of Exclusion.
Mediterranean Politics, 12(1), 99-105.

336

Lalonde, L. (2018). Disrupting Whiteness in Contemporary France: A Radical,
Multifaceted and Intersectional Approach to (De)Constructing French Identity.
Dissertation. University of Washington.
Larcher, S. (2015). Troubles in “race”: About some Contradictions and Blind Spots of the
Contemporary French Antiracism. L'Homme et la société, 4(4), 213-229.
Laxer, E. (2016). A Nation's Dilemma: Party Politics and the Production of Nationhood,
Belonging and Citizenship in France's Face Veil Debate. Dissertation. University
of Toronto.
Le Glay, G. (1921). L' école française et la question berbére. Bulletin de l"enseignement
Publique au Maroc. 33bis: 1-15.
Lee, T.M.L. (2006). Book Review or After Empire and Between Camps. Ethnic and
Racial Studies, 29(1), 186-207.
Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space. (D. Nicholson-Smith, Trans.) Oxford, OX,
UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. (Original work published 1974).
Leitner, H. (2012). Spaces of encounters: Immigration, race, class, and the politics of
belonging in small-town America. Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, 102(4), 828-846.
Levitt, P., Glick-Schiller, N. (2004). Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational
Social Field Perspective on Society. International Migration Review, 38(3), 10021039.
Lewis, J. (2009). Redefining qualitative methods: Believability in the fifth moment.
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 8(2), 1-14.

337

Lhommeau, B., Meurs, D., & Primon, J.L. (2010a). Labour Market Situation of Persons
Aged 18-50 by Sex and Origin. In Beauchemin, C., Hamelle, C., & Simon, P.
(2010). Trajectories and Origins: Survey on Population Diversity in France.
Trajectoires et Origines, Institut national d'études démographiques, Institut
national de la statistique et des études économiques, pp. 53-61.
Lhommeau, B., Meurs, D., & Primon, J.L. (2010b). Working Hours and Wages. In
Beauchemin, C., Hamelle, C., & Simon, P. (2010). Trajectories and Origins:
Survey on Population Diversity in France. Trajectoires et Origines, Institut
national d'études démographiques, Institut national de la statistique et des études
économiques, pp. 69-75.
Lizotte, C. (2020). Laïcité as assimilation, laïcité as negotiation: Political geographies of
secularism in the French public school. Political Geography, (77), 1-10.
Lochak, D. (1997). The Bounds of Freedom: Good Foreigners, bad illegals. Le Monde.
Paris.
Logan, J. R., Alba, R., & Zhang, W. (2002). Immigrant enclaves and ethnic communities
in New York and Los Angeles. American Sociological Review, (67),299–322.
Longhurst, R. (2010). Semi-structured Interviews and Focus Groups. In Clifford,
Nicholas, Shaun French and Gill Valentine, eds. 2010. Key Methods in
Geography, 2nd edition. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Singapore: SAGE,
pp. 103-115.
Lorcin, P. (1995). Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial
Algeria. IB Tauris, New York.

338

Lyons, A. (2013). The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the
French Welfare State During Decolonization. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Lyotard, J.F. (1988). 'A l'insu', Le Genre humain: politiques de l'oubli, pp. 37-43.
MacMaster, N. (1995). Labour Migration in French North Africa. In Cohen, Robin (ed).
The Cambridge Survey of World Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 190- 195.
MacMaster, N. (1997). Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900-62.
New York: St. Martin's Press.
Maddy-Weitzman, B. (2018). Algeria revisited: history, culture and identity, edited by
Rabah Aissaoui and Claire Eldridge. (review) Mediterranean Historical Review,
33(1), 125-128.
Maier, S. & Monahan, B. (2010). How close is too close? Balancing closeness and
detachment in qualitative research. Deviant Behavior, (31), 1-32.
Maliepaard, M., Lubbers, M., & Gijsberts, M. (2010). Generational differences in ethnic
and religious attachment and their interrelation: A study among Muslim
minorities in the Netherlands. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33(3), 451-472.
Mann, M. (2017). Not Quite Citizens: Assimilation, World War One and the question
indigene in Colonial Algeria 1870-1920. Dissertation. Brandeis University.
Marliere, P. (2016). French politicians are now marching to Marine Le Pen's immigration
tune. The Guardian. Retrieved December 23, 2019, from
https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2016/nov/20/french-politiciansdancing-marine-le-pen-tune-immigration.

339

Mason, N. (2017). Leading at the Intersections: An Introduction to the Intersectional
Approach Model for Policy & Social Change. Women of Color Policy Network.
Retrieved November 30, 2019, from intergroupresources.com/rc/
Intersectionality%20primer%20%20Women%20of%20Color%20Policy%20Netw
ork.pdf
Massey, D. (1991). A global sense of place. Marxism Today, June. pp. 24-29.
Massey, D.S. (1985). Ethnic Residential Segregation: A Theoretical Synthesis and an
Empirical Review. Sociology and Sociological Research, (69), 315.
Mattingly, C. (1998). Healing dramas and clinical plots: The narrative structure of
experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mavroudi, E. & Nagel, C. (2016). Global Migration: Patterns, Processes, and Politics.
Abingdon; New York: Routledge.
Maxwell, R. (2008). Tensions and Tradeoffs: Ethnic Minority Migrant Integration in
Britain and France. Dissertation. University of California, Berkeley.
May, V. (2011). Self, Belonging and Social Change. Sociology, 45(3), 363-378.
McAuley, J. (2020a). Instead of fighting systemic racism, France wants to 'reform Islam.'
Washington Post. Retrieved October 25, 2020, from https://www.washington
post.com/outlook/macron-france-reform-islam-paty/2020/10/23/f1a0232c-148b11eb-bc10-40b25382f1be_story.html
McAuley, J. (2020b). Macron outlines new law to prevent Islamic 'separatism' in France.
Washington Post. Retrieved October 25, 2020, from https://www.washington
post.com/world/europe/macron-islam-france/2020/10/02/ba8a1dcc-04bc-11ebb92e- 029676f9ebec_story.html

340

McAvay, H. & Safi, M. (2018). Is there really such thing as immigrant spatial
assimilation in France? Desegregation trends and inequality along ethnoracial
lines. Social Science Research, (73), 45–62.
McClintock, A. (1992). The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term “Post-Colonialism.”
Social Text, (31/32), 84-98.
Méheut, C. (2020). For French-Algerian Families, Virus Disrupts Cherished Summer
Ritual. The New York Times. Retrieved September 1, 2020, from
https://www.nytimes.com/ 2020/07/26/world/europe/france-algeria-summervacations.html
Memmi, A. (2004) Portrait du décolonisé arabo-musulman et de quelques autres. Paris:
Gallimard.
Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded
sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Mishra, P. (2020). Macron's Clash of Civilizations is Misguided. Bloomberg. Retrieved
November 24, 2020, from https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/macron-sclash-of-civilizations-with-islam-is-misguided
Mitchell, A. & Stewart, J. (2013). The Efficacy of All-Male Academies: Insights from
Critical Race Theory (CRT). Sex Roles 69. pp. 382-392.
Mitchell, D. (1995). There's no such thing as culture: Towards a Reconceptualization of
the Idea of Culture in Geography. Transactions of the Institute of British
Geographers, 20(1), 102-116.
Möschel, M. (2011). Race in mainland European legal analysis: towards a European
critical race theory. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34(10), 1648-1660.

341

Naber, N. (2005). Muslim First, Arab Second: A Strategic Politics of Race and Gender.
The Muslim World, 95(4), 479-95.
Naber, N. (2012). Arab America: gender, cultural politics, and activism. New York;
London: New York University Press.
Nagel, C. (2002). Geopolitics by another name: Immigration and the politics of
assimilation. Political Geography, (21), 971-987
Nagel, C. (2009). Rethinking Geographies of Assimilation. The Professional
Geographer, 61(3), 400-407.
Najib, K. (2019). Géographie et intersectionnalité des actes antimusulmans en région
parisienne, Hommes et Migrations, 1324, January-March 2019. Religion and
Discrimination 19–26.
Napoli, J. (1997). A 1961 Massacre of Algerians in Paris: When the Media Failed the
Test. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs: p. 36.
Nelson, L., & Hiemstra, N. (2008). Latino immigrants and the renegotiation of place and
belonging in small town America. Social & cultural geography, 9(3), 319-342.
Newman, D. & Passi, A. (1998). Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World:
Boundary Narratives in Political Geography. Progress in Human Geography,
22(2), 186–207.
Nickels, B. (2007). Unsettling French Algeria: Settlement, Terror, and Violence in the
French-Algerian War (1954-1962). Dissertation. University of Chicago.
Nielsen, J., & Otterbeck, J. (2016). Muslims in Western Europe. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.

342

Noiriel, G. (1996). The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National
Identity. translation by Geoffroy de Laforcade. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Ocak, O. (2015). Theorizing France's Ministry of Immigration: Borders, Population and
National Identity in Postcolonial Europe. Dissertation. George Mason University.
OECD. (2018). Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees.
OECD Publishing, Paris.
Ogden, P. & White, P. (1989). Migrants in Modern France. London: Routledge.
Okamoto, D. & Mora, C. (2014). Panethnicity. Annual Review of Sociology, (40),
219–39.
Okba, M. (2010). Occupations of Descendants of Immigrants and their Fathers: Is
Occupational Inheritance Determined by Geographical Origin? In Beauchemin,
C., Hamelle, C., & Simon, P. (2010). Trajectories and Origins: Survey on
Population Diversity in France. Trajectoires et Origines, Institut national d'études
démographiques, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, pp.
61-69.
Omi, M. & Winant, H. (2015). Racial Formation in the United States. New York:
Routledge.
Ong, A. (1996). Cultural citizenship as subject-making: Immigrants negotiate racial and
cultural boundaries in the United States. Current Anthropology, 37(5), 737- 762.
Onishi, N. & Méheut.C. (2020). New Terror Attacks Leave France Embattled at Home
and Abroad. The New York Times. Retrieved November 12, 2020, from
https://www.ny times.com/2020/10/29/world/europe/nice-attack-france.html

343

Oscherwitz, D.L. (2001). Representing the Nation: Cinema, Literature and the Struggle
for National Identity in Contemporary France. Dissertation. University of Texas
at Austin.
Paasi, A. (2001). Europe as a Social Process and Discourse Considerations of Place,
Boundaries and Identity. European Urban and Regional Studies, 8(1), 7–28.
Packer, G. (2015). The Other France. New Yorker. New York. August 31, 2015.
Retrieved May 21, 2019, from
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/31/the-other-france
Padilla, F. (1985). Latino Ethnic Consciousness: The Case of Mexican Americans and
Puerto Ricans in Chicago. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Pagden, A. (2001). People and Empires: A Short History of European Migration,
Exploration, and Conquest from Greece to the Present. New York: Modern
Library.
Paquet, J.N. (2017). Marine Le Pen to End Dual Citizenship. Retrieved February 4, 2021,
from https://medium.com/@jnpaquet/marine-le-pen-to-end-dual-citizenship13cceeefa59a
Parikh, S. (2020). Conceptualizing Narratives of Religious Generational Gap Between
Muslim Immigrants and Their French-born Descendants. Dissertation. Chapel
Hill.
Park, R. E., & Burgess, E. W. (1921). Introduction to the science of sociology. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

344

Peace, T. (2017). Secularism and French politics in History and theorizing the secular.
The Immanent Frame, secularism, religion, and the public sphere. Retrieved June
10, 2020, from https://tif.ssrc.org/2017/09/06/history-and-theorizing-the-secular/
Peach, C. (1975). Urban social segregation. London: Longman
Peach, C. (1997). Pluralist and Assimilationist Models of Ethnic Settlement in London,
1991. Journal of Economic and Social Geography, 88(2), 120-34.
Peach, C. (2009). Slippery Segregation: Discovering or Manufacturing Ghettos? Journal
of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35:9, 1381-1395.
Perrin, D. (2014). Struggles of Citizenship in the Maghreb. The Routledge Handbook of
Global Citizenship Studies, Routledge. pp. 230-239.
Phalet, K. & Swyngedouw, M. (2003). Measuring immigrant integration: the case of
Belgium. Studi Emigrazione/Migration Studies XL, (152), 773-803.
Phillips, D. (1998). Black minority ethnic concentration, segregation and dispersal in
Britain. Urban Studies, 35 (10), 1681–1702.
Phillips, D. (2006) Parallel lives? Challenging discourses of British Muslim selfsegregation. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 24(1), 25–40.
Phillips, D., Davis, C., & Ratcliffe, P. (2007). British Asian narratives of urban space.
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 32(2), 217-234.
Piser, K. (2018). A New Plan to Create an 'Islam of France.' The Atlantic, Global.
Retrieved October 25, 2020, from
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 2018/03/islam-francemacron/556604/

345

Pitts, J. (2005). A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Portes, A., & Zhou, M. (1993). The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and
its variants. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
530(1), 74-96.
Prakash, A. (2010). Empire on the Seine: Surveillance, Citizenship, and North African
Migrants in Paris (1925-1975). Dissertation. Columbia University.
Préteceille, E. (2006). ‘La ségrégation social a-t-elle augmenté ? La métropole parisienne
antre polarisation et mixité’, Sociétés contemporaines, 2006/2, no 62, pp. 69-93.
Préteceille, E. (2009) La ségrégation ethno-raciale a-t-elle augmenté dans la métropole
parisienne?. Revue Francaise de Sociologie, 50(3), 489–519.
Price, P.L. (2010). At the crossroads: critical race theory and critical geographies of race.
Progress in Human Geography, 34(2), 147–174.
Pugh, J. (2017). Negotiating Identity and Belonging through the Invisibility Bargain:
Colombian Forced Migrants in Ecuador. International Migration Review, 1-33.
Pulham, S. (2005). Inflammatory language. The Guardian. Retrieved March 17, 2021,
from https://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2005/nov/08/inflammatoryla
Ramadan, T. (2002). Islam and Muslims in Europe: A Silent Revolution Toward
Rediscovery. In Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, edited by Y.
Y. Haddad, 158–66. Cary, NC: Oxford University Press.
Ramdani, N. (2021). Macron's Algeria Report Isn't Progress, It's a Whitewash. Foreign
Policy. Retrieved February 7, 2021, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/01/
macrons-algeria-report-isnt-progress-its-a-whitewash/

346

Ranek, A. (2017). Paradoxical Spaces: Identity and Everyday Spatial Practice Among
Muslim Youth in Copenhagen, Denmark. Dissertation. The University of Arizona.
Reding, M. (2017). Yesterday's Colonization and Today's Immigration: An Intellectual
Biography of Abdelmalek Sayad, 1957-1998. Thesis. University of Oregon.
Reisacher, E.A. (2001). The process of attachment between the Algerians and French
within the Christian community in France. Dissertation. Fuller Theological
Seminary.
Reiter, B. (2012). Framing Non-Whites and Producing Second-Class Citizens in France
and Portugal. Government and International Affairs Faculty Publications. 7.
Républic Française. n.d. Légifrance: Le service public de la diffusion du droit. Retrieved
November 28, 2020, from https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
Réville, J. (1905). Anticlericalism in France. The American Journal of Theology, 9(4),
605-620.
Rideout, A. (2016). Beyond the Façade: Haussmannization in Paris as a Transformation
of Society. Pursuit - The Journal of Undergraduate Research at the University of
Tennessee: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 20.
Riessman, C. K. (2008). Narrative methods for the human sciences. Sage Publications,
Inc.
Rinn, L. (1889). Les origines berbères. Etude linguistique et ethnologique. Jourdan,
Algiers.
Romero, M. (2008). Crossing the immigration and race border: A critical race theory
approach to immigration studies. Contemporary Justice Review, 11(1), 23–37.

347

Rosello, M. (1997). French Bidonvilles in the 1960s: Urban & individual initiatives.
Culture, Theory and Critique, 40(1), 97-110.
Rosenberg, C. (2006). Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control
Between the Wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Roy, O. (1994). Islam in France: Religion, Ethnic Community or Social Ghetto? In
Muslims in Europe, edited by B. Lewis, and D. Schnapper, 54–66. New York: St.
Martin’s Press.
Roy, O. (2006). Forward to Laurence, J. & Vaïsse, J. Integrating Islam: Political and
Religious Challenges in Contemporary France, Brookings Institution Press. pp.
ix-xv.
Roy, O. (2007). Secularism Confronts Islam. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ruedy, J. (1992). Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Saadallah, B. (1965). The Rise of Algerian Nationalism: 1900-1930. Dissertation.
University of Minnesota.
Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books.
Said, E. W. (1994). Culture and Imperialism (Reprint edition). New York: Vintage.
Salih, R. (2002). Reformulating tradition and modernity: Moroccan migrant women and
the transnational division of ritual space. Global Networks, 2(3), 219- 231.
Samers, M. (1997). The Production of Diaspora: Algerian Emigration From Colonialism
to Neo-colonialism (1840-1970). Antipode, 29(1), 32-64.
Samers, M. (2003a). Diaspora unbound: Muslim identity and the erratic regulation of
Islam in France. International Journal of Population Geography, 9(4), 351-364.

348

Samers, M. (2003b). Invisible capitalism: political economy and the regulation of
undocumented immigration in France. Economy and Society, 32(4), 555-583.
San Juan, E. (1998). The Limits of Postcolonial Criticism: The Discourse of Edward
Said. Against the Current. Retrieved September 24, 2019, from
https://www.marxists. org/history/etol/newspape/atc/1781.html
Sánchez, D. (2019). How France's Assimilation Model Failed to Integrate its Cultural
Diversity. Medium. Retrieved February 22, 2020, from
https://medium.com/@danielrsanchez /https-medium-com-danielrsanchezfrances-cultural-assimilation-model-food-for-thought-af6109f631f1
Sandel, M. (1998) Democracy’s Discontent. New York: Belknap.
Sartre, J. P. (1956). Le Colonialisme est un systeme. Paris, France.
Sartre, J. P. (1963). Preface. In Fanon, F. The Wretched of the Earth (pp. xliii–lxii). New
York: Grove Press.
Sartre, J. P. (2001). Colonialism and neo-colonialism. London; New York: Routledge.
Sayad, A. & Gillette, A. (1972). L'immigration algérienne en France. Paris: Editions
Entente.
Sayad A. (1977). ‘Les trois “âges” de l’émigration algérienne en France.’ Actes de la
recherche en sciences sociales. 15(1), 59–79.
Schiller, N.G., Basch, L. and Blanc-Szanton, C. (1992). Transnationalism: A New
Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration. Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences, (645) 1-24.
Schinkel, W. (2013). The imagination of 'society' in measurements of immigrant
integration. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36(7), 1142-1161.

349

Scott, J.W. (2007). The Politics of the Veil. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Scribner, J. (2007). Dual Citizenship: examining belonging, identity and racialization in
the lives of transmigrants. Dissertation. Carleton University, Ottowa, ON,
Canada.
Selby, J. A. (2011). Islam in France reconfigured: Republican Islam in the 2010 Gerin
report. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 31(3), 383–398.
Session, J. (2016). By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Sessions, J. (2005). Making Colonial France: Culture, National Identity and the
Colonization of Algeria, 1830-1851. Dissertation. University of Pennsylvania.
Shamir, R. (2005). Without Borders? Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime.
Sociological Theory, 23(2), 197–217.
Shepard, T. (2006). The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the
Remaking of France. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.
Shreir, D. (2014). Utopia Deconstructed: Le Corbusier and the Banlieue. ISIS magazine.
Retrieved March 17, 2021, from https://isismagazine.org.uk/2014/04/utopiaunconstructed-le-corbusier-and-the-banlieu/
Silverman, M. (1992). Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, racism and citizenship in
modern France. London; New York: Routledge.
Silverstein, P. (1998). Trans-politics: Islam, Berberity, and the French-nation state.
Dissertation. The University of Chicago, Chicago.
Silverstein, P. (2004). Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation. Bloomington;
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

350

Silverstein, P. & Tetreault, C. (2006). Postcolonial Urban Apartheid: Civil Unrest in the
French Suburbs. Social Science Research Council. Retrieved December 6, 2019,
from https://items.ssrc.org/from-our-archives/postcolonial-urban-apartheid/
Simon, P. & Tiberj, V. (2013) Sécularisation ou regain religieux: La religion des
immigrés et de leurs descendants, INED, Documents de travail, Séries
Trajectoires et Origines, 196, 47.
Simon, P. (2010). Nationality and National Belonging. In Beauchemin, C., Hamelle, C.,
& Simon, P. (2010). Trajectories and Origins: Survey on Population Diversity in
France. Trajectoires et Origines, Institut national d'études démographiques,
Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, pp. 115-121.
Simon, P. (2012). French National Identity and Integration: Who Belongs to the National
Community? Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
Simonsen, K. B. (2017). Does citizenship always further Immigrants' feeling of
belonging to the host nation? A study of policies and public attitudes in 14
Western democracies. Comparative migration studies, 5(1), 3.
Sinclair, K. (2018). Minorities in Majority Spaces. Making a New Reality. Retrieved
October 12, 2020, from https://makinganewreality.org/minorities-in-majorityspaces-8728c8687db8
Sloan, E. (2012). Welfare and Warfare: Social Action for Algerian Migrants in
Metropolitan France during the Algerian War. Dissertation. Stony Brook
University.
Smelser, N. (1998). The rational and the ambivalent in the social sciences. American
Sociological Review, 63(1), 1–16.

351

Smith, A. (1996). Citizenship in the Colony: Naturalization Law and Legal Assimilation
in 19th Century Algeria. Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 19(1), 33-49.
Smith, C., Sikkink, D., & Baily, J. (1998). Devotion in Dixie and beyond: a test of the
‘‘Shibley Thesis’’ on the effects of regional origin and migration on individual
religiosity. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37(3), 494-506.
Smith, M. P., & Guarnizo, L. E. (1998). Transnationalism From Below (Comparative
Urban & Community Research Vol 6 ed.). (M. P. Smith, & L. E. Guarnizo, Eds.)
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Smith, T. (1973). Idealism and People's War: Sartre on Algeria. Political Theory, 1(4),
426-449.
Spivak, G. (1999). A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Towards a History of the
Vanishing Present. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Calcutta: Seagull Press.
Spivak, G. (2005). Are We Postcolonial? Post-Soviet Space. Annual Meeting of the
American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages
(PMLA 121.3) 29 December 2005, Washington, D.C., pp. 828-829.
Staeheli, L. (2003). Cities and Citizenship. Urban Geography, 24(2), 97-102.
Starman, A.B. (2013). The case study as a type of qualitative research. Journal
Contemporary Educational Studies, (1), 28–43.
State University. (2018). Algeria, History and Background. Retrieved December 16,
2019, from https://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/19/Algeria-HISTORYBACKGROUND.html

352

Stillwell, J., & Phillips, D. (2006). Diversity and change: understanding the ethnic
geographies of Leeds. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32(7), 1131–
1152.
Stora, B. (2001). Algeria 1830-2000, A Short History. Trans. Lane Marie Todd. Ithaca;
London: Cornell University Press.
Stump, R.W. (1984). Regional migration and religious commitment in the US. Journal
for the Scientific Study of Religion, 23(3), 292-303.
Sugrue, T. (2005). The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar
Detroit. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Taunton, M. (2009) The Parisian Banlieue. In: Fictions of the City. Language, Discourse,
Society. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Taylor, S. J., Bogdan, R., & DeVault, M. (2015). Introduction to qualitative research
methods: A guidebook and resource. New York: Wiley.
Tchumkam, H. (2015). State Power, Stigmatization, and Youth Resistance Culture in the
French Banlieues: Uncanny Citizenship. London: Lexington Books.
Terrasse, M. (2019). Dimensions of belonging: relationships between police identity
checks and national identity in France. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
1-22.
Thierry, X. (2004). Recent immigration trends in France and elements of comparison
with the United Kingdom. Population 2004/5. 59. pp. 725-764.
Thomas, C. (2000). Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development Theory:
Observations on Methodology. 45 Vill. L. Rev. pp. 1195-1220.

353

Thomas, E.R. (2002). Who Belongs? Competing Conceptions of Political Membership.
European Journal or Social Theory, 5(3), 323-349.
Thomas, E.R. (2006). Keeping Identity at a distance: Explaining France's new legal
restrictions on the Islamic headscarf. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29(2), 237-259.
Thomas, E.R. (2011). Immigration, Islam, and the Politics of Belonging in France: A
Comparative Framework. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.
Thomas, W. & Znaniecki, F. (1927). The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. New
York: Alfred Knopf.
Tocqueville, A. (1872). Correspondence and Conversations of Alexis de Tocqueville with
Nassau William Senior from 1834-1859. (M.C.M. Simpson (ed.) London: Henry
S. King & Co.
Togman, J. (2002). The ramparts of nations: institutions and immigration policies in
France and the United States. Westport: Praeger Publishers.
Tribalat, M. (1995). Faire France: Une grande en enquéte sur les immigrés et leurs
enfants. Paris: Découverte.
Tribalat, M. (1996). De l’immigration à l’assimilation : Enquête sur les populations
d’origine étrangère en France. Paris: La Découverte.
Tribalat, M. (2009). Revue Commentaire, juin 2009, n°126.
Tribalat, M. (2010). Les yeux grand fermés. Denoel: Paris.
Tribalat, M. (2015). Une estimation des populations d’origine étrangère en France en
2011. Espace populations sociétés, 2015/1-2.
Trudeau, D. (2006). Politics of belonging in the construction of landscapes: placemaking, boundary-drawing and exclusion. Cultural Geographies, (13), 421-443.

354

Tyre, S. (2004). De Gaulle and the Algerian War. Retrieved December 18, 2019, from
http://www.crawfordsworld.com/rob/apcg/France/Day%20of%20the%20Jackal/T
yneJackal.html
Ungar, S. & Conley, T. (1996). Identity papers contested nationhood in twentieth-century
France. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Urquhart, C. (2000). Strategies for conversation and systems analysis in requirements
gathering: A qualitative view of analyst-client communication. The Qualitative
Report, 4(1/2).
Valentine, G. (2001). Social geographies: Space and society. New York: Prentice Hall.
Valentine, G. (2005). "Tell me about...using interviews as a research methodology', in R.
Flowerdew & D. Martin (eds) Methods in Human Geography: A Guide for
Students Doing a Research Project (2nd edn). Edinburgh Gate: Addison Wesley
Longman, pp. 110-127.
Valentine, G. (2007). Theorizing and researching intersectionality: A challenge for
feminist geography. The Professional Geographer, 59(1), 10-21.
van der Burgt, D. (2015). Spatial avoidance or spatial confidence? Young people's
agency in the active negotiation of risk and safety in public space. Children's
Geographies, 13(2), 181-195.
van Tubergen, F. (2006). Immigrant Integration: A Cross-national Study. New York:
LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC.
Venel, N. (2004). Musulmans et citoyens. 1re ed. ed. Paris: Presses universitaires de
France.

355

Verne, J. (2012). Living translocality. Space, culture and economy in contemporary
Swahili trade. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
Vertovec, S. (2001). Transnationalism and identity. Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies, 27(4), 573-582.
Viprey, M. (2010). Immigration choisie, immigration subie: du discors a la realite. La
Revue de L'Ires. 1:64. pp. 149-169.
Wadowiec, J. (2014). The Afterlives of Empire: Gender, Race, and Citizenship in
Decolonized France. Dissertation. Binghamton University.
Ware, L. (2015). Color-blind racism in France: Bias Against Ethnic Minority Immigrants.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, (46), 185-244.
Wattles, A.S. (2018). Islamist Radicalization in France Since the Algerian War.
Dissertation. University of Washington.
Weil, P. (2002). Qu’est ce qu’un Français? Paris: Grasset.
Weil, P. (2014). Etre français: Les quatre piliers de la nationalité. Paris: L’Aube.
Welch, E. & Perivolaris, J. (2016). The place of the Republic: Space, territory and
identity around and after Charlie Hebdo. French Cultural Studies, 27(3), 279-292.
Welch, E. & McGonagle, J. (2013). Contesting Views: The Visual Economy of France
and Algeria. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Williamson, L. (2020). France teacher attack" Suspect 'asked pupile to point Samuel Paty
out'. BBC News, Europe. Retrieved November 12, 2020, from
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54581827

356

Willsher, K. (2016). Story of cities #12: Haussmann rips up Paris-and divides France to
this day. The Guardian. Retrieved October 11, 2020, from
https://www.theguardian.com/ cities/2016/mar/31/story-cities-12-paris-baronhaussmann-france-urban-planner-napoleon
Wise, A. (2011). 'Foreign' Signs and Multicultural Belongings on a Diverse Shopping
Street. Built Environment. Perspectives on Urban Segregation, 37(2), 139-54.
Woodhouse-Ledermann, K. (2018). Contesting Identities within Cultural Insecurity: the
Case of Muslim Women in Contemporary France. Dissertation. Rutgers
University.
Wright, R., Ellis, M., & Parks, V. (2005). Re-placing Whiteness in Spatial Assimilation
Research. City and Community, 4(2), 111-35.
Yamey, G. (2017). How to Write a Qualitative Research Paper. Chinese Consortium of
Universities for Global Health. Retrieved September 16, 2019, from
https://dukekunshan.edu.cn/sites/default/files/u587/Lecutres%20Yamey%202017
%20Qualitative%20Research.pdf
Yeoh, B. (2000). Historical geographies of the colonised world. In B. Graham & C. Nash
(Eds.), Modern Historical Geogrpahies (pp. 146–166). London: Longman.
Yin, R. (1992). The Case Study Method as a Tool for Doing Evaluation. Current
Sociology, 40(1), 121-137.
Young, P. (1928). The Reorganization of Jewish Family Life in America: A Natural
History of the Social Forces Governing the Assimilation of the Jewish Immigrant
(in Public Welfare and Social Work). Social Forces, 7(2), 238-244.

357

Yuval-Davis, N., Anthias, F., & Kofman, E. (2005). Secure borders and safe haven and
the gendered politics of belonging: Beyond social cohesion. Ethnic & Racial
Studies, 28(3), 513-535.
Yuval-Davis, N. (2006a). Belonging and the politics of belonging. Patterns of Prejudice,
40(3), 197-214.
Zammoum, K. (2011). Minorité ethnique issue de l’immigration et communication
communautaire: les spécificités du modèle intégrationniste francais. Global
Media Journal—Édition Canadienne, 4(1), 93–108.
Zelinksy, W. & Lee, B. (1998). Heterolocalism: An Alternative Model of the Sociospatial
Behaviour of Immigrant Ethnic Communities. International Journal of
Population Geography, (4), 281-298.
Zerdoumi, A.J. (2015). French-Algerian or Algerian-French, Truly Home Nowhere. New
York Times. 08/15/2015, pg. A14. Retrieved May 19, 2019, from
https://nyti.ms/1WtpxyS
Zhou, M. (1997). Segmented assimilation: Issues, controversies, and recent research on
the new second generation. International Migration Review, 975-1008.
Zoja, F. (2016). The tug-of-war over identity. Oantara. Retrieved February 2, 2021 from
https://en.qantara.de/content/citizenship-law-reform-in-algeria-the-tug-of-warover-identity.

358

APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
-Interviewed (alias):
-Male/Female:
-Age:
-Marriage status:
-Place of birth:
-Ethnic / national heritage:
-Years in France:
-Continuous residence in France?:
-Years in other residences:
-Generation in France
-Generation outside of Algeria/North Africa:
-Number living in the household:
-Languages spoken at home (specify which member of the household):
-Language at work:
-Citizenship(s):
-Reason(s) for migration to France:
-Education:
-Employment:
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-Were you referred to your current job by another Algerian/North African?:
-Neighborhood and postal code of residence in Paris:
-Were you assisted in finding your housing by another Algerian/North African?:

Semi-Structured Interview Questions
1. Could you tell me about the history of your family? How did you/your
parents/grandparents come to live in France? Did other Algerian/North African/Arab
immigrants others help you/your family?
2. Do your friends tend to be other Algerians/North Africans? Other immigrants? Do you
have close links with members of your extended family? Have you asked your friends
and/or family for help finding a job? Finding housing? For help in other ways (such as
borrowing money)? What is the main value of having close family and friends that you
can rely on here in France (or in Algeria/North Africa)?

3. Are there times when you do NOT want to rely on your network with other
Algerians/North Africans/Berbers/Arabs/etc? Under what circumstances do you engage
with French institutions for assistance (such as social services)?

4. Why do you live in the particular area that you live? How would you describe your
neighborhood (i.e. 'immigrant neighborhood', Algerian/Arab neighborhood, middle-class,
etc.)? Does it feel like a 'community', or just a place to live? Do you have everything
they need there? Do you feel that you have good access to other places in or near the
city? How often do you go to other parts of the city, and how do you feel when you are in
these other places? Are your social networks located in this neighborhood or do they
extend beyond it?

5. Do you socialize with non-Algerians/North Africans? How? In what contexts? Do you
have separate groups of friends or a group of friends with whom you interact? How did
you develop the group of friends you have?

6. How do you label yourself (in terms of religious, ethnic, or nationality- for example,
“Algerian” “Berber” “Arab”)? Do you label yourself the same way in all situations?
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7. Are you a French citizen? Why or why not? If you are a citizen, did you find easy or
difficult to become a citizen? If not, would you become?
8. How would you characterize “French society”? What are the dilemmas/opportunities
facing Algerians/Muslims/immigrants (etc.) in France? How do you think the nonAlgerian/North African population in Paris perceives Algerians/North Africans and why?
What is it like dealing with teachers, employers, officials, etc. who are not from an
immigrant background? Are there times when you are made to feel that you are not
French?

9. What are your feelings in the current environment of social unrest with regards to the
terrorism attacks in France over the last 2 years? How do you feel about the media’s
portrayal of the situations? How does this affect the social status of Algerians/North
Africans/Arabs living in France?

10. What is necessary for social relationships in France to become better? What can be
done to make social situations better for all immigrants living in France? (Please offer
your total opinion here, socially, politically, religiously, culturally, etc.)

11. Do you follow politics in France? What are your feelings about the current events in
France, with the government involved? What are your feelings about the next presidential
election in 2017? Which candidate(s) do you support, and which candidates do you not
support?

[If applicable: 12. Walking Interview/Activity: 13. Other information:]
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